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PREFACE. 
Few artists have the hardihood to set up as psy- 
chologists. it is meet, therefore, that I should preface 
these studies with an apology. The conspicuous failure of 
attempts by artists to write psychology requires no recall- 
ing. This fact might well have been a salutary warning 
against entering so specialised a province as that of aes- 
thetics. But the desire to comprehend those secret pro- 
cesses by which I have, to some extent, been able to achieve 
my artistic aims has always been strong and at times im- 
perious. It was not, therefore, any undue confidence in 
my ability to prosecute these investigations or any self - 
assurance that I could bring new light to bear on so vast 
and so difficult a problem that prompted the undertaking, 
but a keen desire to satisfy a clamant personal need. 
There was perhaps another motive present in my mind 
besides mere curiosity as to the nature of my own psycholog- 
ical processes: the desire to compare representative views 
and theories with my own experience as a producing artist, 
and to observe the extent to which they appeared to confirm 
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or disprove my own speculations and introspective results. 
Throughout I have aimed at accuracy rather than novelty, 
facts rather than originality. I have tried not to obtrude 
unduly my own theoretical predilections, but rather to ex- 
amine such doctrines as have come up for discussion in the 
double light of my own creative experience and the accredit- 
ed facts of psychology. To what extent I have been success- 
ful in these pursuits the following studies will presently 
bear witness. 
The work has undergone many modifications since its 
inception. Originally the plan included the study of the 
appreciative as well as the productive aspect of art. 13ut 
circumstances early led to the curtailment of its scope: 
first, the realisation that the task was impossible because 
of its immensity; and second, prolonged periods of illness 
between the years 1930 and 1933 which forced we to reduce 
my activities to essential duties. Perhaps the curtail- 
ment of the field has not been without some compensatory 
virtue; for I have been able to concentrate on one aspect 
and that, one in which I am naturally chiefly interested. 
The appreciation of art has to a limited degree been dealt 
with in an Appendix, where the problem has been approached 
from a pedagogical standpoint. I have also added an Appen- 
dix dealing with representation in art - this, too, from the 
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pedagogic point of view. :Both appendices, I hope, will 
clear up minor difficulties which could not conveniently 
be discussed in the main text without involving some 
divagation. 
My acknowledgments should be numerous, but I select 
the following. First, I would express my indebtedness 
to the many authors whose books and articles I have con- 
sulted. Next, to Professor James Dreyer of the Department 
of Psychology in this University, for his patience and tol- 
erance over a long period during which I have frequented 
his laboratory; to the University Librarian and his assist- 
ants for their kindness and help; to my former teachers 
in University and Training College; and finally, to 
Ir. Stanley Cursiter, Director of the National Gallery of 
Scotland, for permission to photograph a Rubens' drawing 
from the Gallery's collection. 




The Nature and Scope of Interest in .rt. 
CiAl'TER I 
"The good critic is he who tells the adventures 
of his soul among masterpieces." 
Anatole France. 
Speech and language abound in platitudes, many of 
which, emanating from the current usage of past ages, have 
become woven into the very fabric of thought; they are as 
free from suspicion as the coinage of the state. Based 
ostensibly upon self- evident truths, they carry with them 
the sanctions of commonsense and common usage. But, since 
language is ever developing and expanding with the progress 
of science and the advancement of knowledge, it is incum- 
bent upon the student to be wary of the snares hidden in 
the ordinary words and phrases of his own age. 
Throughout a wide field of literature the platitudinous 
assertion that art is a phenomenon of universal interest is 
ever recurring. This assertion no doubt contains a large 
amount of truth; but it is both ambiguous and misleading 
and ought not to be taken at its face value, as a. little 
reflection will reveal. For clearly there are many diff- 
erent aspects of the phenomenon capable of arousing the 
interest of the observer. The interest of the Bushman 
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or Hindu slave is emphatically not the same as the interest 
of the sophisticated layman. Nor is the interest of the 
layman comparable with that of the aesthete, the historian, 
the philosopher or the Kunstforscher. Interest in art may 
arise from an innate endowment of the individual, a peculiar 
inborn responsiveness to artistic phenomena, or it may be 
a sophisticated or acquired interest due to learning or 
conditioned by environment and based on the dullest sensibil- 
ity. These are psychologically quite distinct mental 
attitudes which ought not to be confused. In the one case 
the interest is aroused spontaneously and immediately; in 
the other, it is aroused only indirectly, through devious 
channels which merely skirt the secret spring. Indeed, 
the more sophisticated the interest is, the more consciously 
directed and controlled it is, the greater is the probabil- 
ity of its being a mere intellectual interest in some aspect 
of art, which presents itself to the mind of the agent as 
a problem to be investigated with a view to fuller know- 
ledge and rational interpretation, not a spontaneous surr- 
ender of the mind and heart, which is the prior condition 
of the highest artistic experience. 
In the earliest phases of man's cultural development 
art was so inextricably bound up with life that it is 
highly doubtful whether its existence as a separate pheno- 
menon was recognised by primitive perception. It was an 
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activity which grew side by side with everyday experience. 
Field ethnologists and anthropologists, working among ex- 
tant primitive peoples, have revealed over and over again 
the closeness of the connection between art and the practi- 
cal affairs of the individual and the tribe(1), and, al- 
though speculations about the problem of the origin of art 
have nowhere produced any very significant body of agreed 
opinion, there is evidence enough to justify the belief 
that art existed long before man became fully conscious of 
his special creative gifts. In the course of time, as his 
powers of perception and reasoning developed, he may have 
paused to reflect critically upon the appearance of his own 
productions, gradually disentangling his interest in art 
from the more prosaic activities with which it was so in- 
timately bound up, until he achieved a concept of it which 
(1)E.6. Lévy -Bruhl (quoting Spencer and Gillen, The Native 
Tribes of Central Australia, p.617) points out in his book 
How Natives Think (p.116) that nWhen asked the meaning of 
certain drawings... the natives will constantly answer 
that they are only play work, and mean nothing... but... 
similar drawings, only drawn on some ceremonial object or 
in a particular spot, have a very different meaning... 
The same native will tell you that a special drawing in 
one spot has no meaning, and yet he will tell you exactly 
what, it is supposed to signify when drawn in a different 
spot. The latter, it may be remarked, is always on what 
we may call sacred ground, near to which the women may 
not come." et. seq. Vide also Footnote p.118 op. cit.; 
Camille Schuwer, "La Signification de l'art primitif," 
Journal de Psychologie, Vol. 28, pp. 120 -162; and Ernest 
Grosse, The Beginnings of Art. 
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established its independent status anion; the normal func- 
tions of life. Its later development, however, has been 
characterised by its gradual divorce from the ordinary 
conditions and activities of existence, with the result 
that sophisticated man tends to regard it as a special type 
of hun an activity, practised by a few people cloistered in 
the Ivory Tower, shut off from the world of affairs and 
common experience. Man's interest in art has thus varied 
immensely throughout the course of history. 
"Interest in art" is a vague phrase, as vague as the 
terms "interest" and "art" themselves, and ill- suited to 
scientific discourse. cor the sake of clearness, there- 
fore, it would be well to inquire into its precise meaning. 
In everyday language it implies both knowledge about, as 
well as sensibility to art, two distinct and independent 
concepts, which are usually associated with the idea of 
appreciation. Psychologically, interest is a state of 
readiness to attend to anything. ccording to lviciougall, 
"Interest is latent attention; and attention is interest 
in action. The essential condition of both interest in 
and attention to any object is that the mind shall be or- 
ganised either natively or through experience, that it can 
think of the object and that such thinking shall evoke 
some impulse or desire which maintains a train of activity 
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in relation to the object.(1)" The words "think" and 
"thinking" in this definition introduce a complication 
which must be examined. "To think of an object," states 
the same writer,(2) "is to conceive it; to know, to recog- 
nise, to be aware of, or conscious of, any object is to 
conceive it, even when our knowing is a perceptual knowing:" 
and further, (` "All our perceiving is recognition in the 
wider sense; it is a knowing, a cognising of the object as 
a kind previously known." 'Thinking' of art in this sense 
of the term might mean anything from the mere perceptual 
cognition of a particular example to the highest and most 
complicated processes of philosophic speculation - an inter- 
pretation which is as vague as the ordinary everyday inter- 
pretation of the phrase "interest in art." It ignores the 
most notable feature of artistic perception. I'or, far 
from cognising the work of art as an object of "a kind 
previously known," the contemplative observer is virtually 
in a state of dissociation. Thinking may follow the act 
of pure artistic perception, but it is doubtful whether it 
can be regarded fundamentally as an essential ingredient of 
(1) 





The purely psychological aspects of the problem, how- 
ever, need not be discussed here. It will be sufficient 
to inquire into the nature of interest in art by examining 
it, concretely, so to speak, under the normal conditions 
of active cultural life. 
Four principal classes of people are usually credited 
with an interest in art. First, the artist or producer, 
whose interest is essentially practical; second, the cul- 
tured layman or cdnsumer, whose interest is mainly passive 
or appreciative; third, the critic, whose interest is 
mainly evaluatory; and fourth, the aesthetician, whose 
interest is mainly philosophical and psychological. As 
the interests of the critic and the aesthetician are in- 
timately interconnected, the third and fourth classes may, 
for the purposes of study, be taken together. Interest 
in art may, therefore, be discussed under three heads:- 
(a) &ractica,l Interest 
(b) Appreciative Interes 
(c) Theoretical InterestU -) 
(a) A practical interest in art implies having some 
purpose in view beyond the mere passive indulgence of the 
interest. This purpose may be (1) the production of art, 
(1)tiide Wilenski, R. H., The study of Art, part lII,pp.49- 
200, for a detailed analysis of the problem from the peda- 
gogic point of view. 
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which is the special province of the artist; or (2) the 
understanding and elucidation of the technical, psycholog- 
ical and other processes involved in the production of art, 
which is the province of the historical and technical ex- 
pert, the psychologist and the critic; or (3) the purchase 
or acquisition of a work of art with a view to hanging it 
in a particular locality or reselling it or otherwise 
disposing of it to gain profit or social distinction: this 
is the province of the connoisseur, the collector, the 
dealer; or (4) the writing of a book, an article or a news 
notice about art or a particular work of art, either for 
private gain or for some didactic purpose: this is the 
province of the journalist, the aesthetician, the aesthetic 
and philosophic littérateur. iiow all these interests are 
practical, they have a useful end in view, but clearly the 
first is what should be - and, indeed, usually is - under- 
stood when the term 'practical' is predicated of interest 
in art. ?or, strictly speaking, the other classes do not 
refer to interest in art per se,(1) but interest only in 
some purpose beyond art - writing, owning, commenting, 
evaluating and so on.(2) Practical interest of this 
(1) 
i.e. For its own sake. 
(2) 
It is hardly necessary to point out that the critic must 
first experience a work of art, its artistic quality, before 
he is capable of exercising his function. But his interest 
does not stop there: it becomes the starting point of a new 
interest, that of criticism. 
8 
latter type ivir. 4ilensxi would associate with "consuming 
and producing students" of art (Producing students of 
supposition, Producing students of art history, Producing 
students of Aesthetic, Producing students of Art Comment, 
etc.) as distinct from the producer of art, the artist. 
But, since it is no part of the artist's function to produce 
suppositions, art history, aesthetic theories or comments, 
his interest is practical only in the fullest and strictest 
sense of the term, namely, productive of art. 
The practical aspect of art interest may, therefore, 
be subdivided as follows: 
(i) Production of Art (nrtist) 
(ii) Production of Art Comment (critic, 




It should be noted, however, that the second part (ii) is 
there only by virtue of the prior existence of the first. 
It represents a practical interest in the second degree, 
as distinct from the practical interest of the artist: in 
other words, the interest of the artist, qua artist, is 
essentially and wholly practical, whereas that of the critic, 
historian, expert, etc., is both practical and theoretical. 
(b) Appreciation implies interest in art, but interest 
in art does not necessarily imply appreciation in the 
psychological -aesthetic sense of the term, which is to be 
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sensitive to art and aesthetic quality. The term 
appreciation is an ambiguous and misleading term. In 
everyday thought and language, and in the great mass of 
philosophical and critical literature dealing with art, 
it carries with it the connotation of 'valuing' or 
'estimating,' which both imply rational processes. This 
no doubt emanates from the etymology of the word itself. 
Consequently, art appreciation is normally held to be the 
crowning achievement of a rational process, in which the 
object "appreciated" is critically examined, analysed and 
finally appraised.(l) such a standpoint is the offspring 
of a view of life which exalts intellect above other forms 
of mental awareness, such as intuition, and flagrantly 
ignores plain psychological fact. For art appreciation 
is not an achievement of the intelligence or will, but a 
spontaneous act of pure sense -perception, involving an 
immediate apprehension of value. It is not the culmination 
of a process of the rational intellect, but a total state 
of mind, immediately induced by the perception of the 
sensuous phenomena of form and colour and pattern,(2) which 
constitute the visible work of art. 
The supposed close association of the rational intellect 
(l) Cf. ù. ppendix I, pp. 426-432. 
( 2) 
Cf. 1Read Herbert, The lea.nin- of 1.rt , , ; , p.18 (lst ed.) 
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with interest in and appreciation of art has been an 
obstacle to the proper understanding of the nature of 
appreciative interest. 
(1) Interest in art of the appre- 
ciative kind may arise from either of two radically diff- 
erent sources. On the one hand, it may arise from an 
inborn hypersensitivity of the individual organism to 
artistic phenomena (form and colour, line and pattern, etc.), 
which is a state of spontaneous growth and development, 
such as lies at the root of the best paleolithic and peas- 
ant art, and which predisposes the individual to attend to 
and find satisfaction in ordered visual experience. Or, 
on the other hand, it may arise as a result of the influence 
of environment upon the mind and native sensibility of the 
individual, or the influence of specific training and 
conscious education upon an organism that is, from the 
point of view of its responsiveness to sensuous artistic 
qualities, quite dull and impotent. No individual is 
completely devoid of sensibility. No individual, that is 
to say, is completely incapable of perceiving differences 
of form and colour, line and pattern, and of reactin, to 
these differences feelingly or emotionally. Some people, 
however, are capable of perceiving very subtle differences 
(1) Cf. Appendix I, p. 426 -430. 
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such as are unnoticed by others of equal or higher intell- 
igence and of reacting to these differences with strong 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure. "rill works of art 
represent a transmission from the artist to the spectator, 
a transmission necessarily occurring through the medium of 
the senses - ear or eye.(l)" The acuteness of these 
senses in the individual, then, will determine exactly how 
much he will experience of what the artist transmits by 
their means. If his senses are tuned to a high degree of 
responsiveness, he will become aware of much more than the 
man whose senses are dull and sluggish. 
The acuteness of the senses, however, is not the sole 
determining factor of sensibility. The senses can not of 
themselves inform the mind. The senses of most animals 
are probably much more acute than those of man, but no 
amount of training could maize them aware of what is trans- 
mitted by the simplest work of art. sensibility implies 
much more than mere hypersensitivity of the senses. It 
implies the powers of intelligence and intuition, an aware- 
ness of the world and the power of sharing the deepest and 
most universal moods of man. It implies a philosophy, a 
way of life, a faith in the supremacy of mind over matter, 
a belief in the right of man to share in the shaping of his 
( 1) 
sdauron, Charles, hesthetics and i'sycholog,y, , p.53. 
12 
own destiny. These enlarge his awareness, producing what 
may by analogy be termed the sensibilities of the mind and 
spirit, which are indeed the ultimate instruments of in- 
tellectual culture. Intellect and sensibility constitute 
a partnership which cannot be wholly dissolved; their 
coöperative failure means sterility and the final decay 
of creativeness. 
The gifts of sensibility and intelligence are unevenly 
distributed. Few men possess them in the highest degree, 
fewer still in the highest degree side by side with one 
another. One man will have a high sensibility and a less 
high intelligence; another a high intelligence and a less 
acute sensibility. Hence the comparative rareness of 
genius of the rank of Michelangelo or Leonardo da Vinci. 
Hence also the apparent inexplicability of the power and 
beauty of the art of primitive peoples, whose intellectual 
development, according to orthodox standards, is of the 
lowest order. One of the most remarkable facts about the 
whole history of art is that, while man's intelligence has 
developed immensely from first to last, his sensibility to 
form has remained comparatively stable. 
The importance of drawing a distinction between innate 
sensibility on the one hand and intellectual sensibility on 
the other hardly needs to be advocated. Current usage, 
however, appears to recognise no need for differentiating 
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between the appreciation of the technical or critical ex- 
pert and that of the untrained but sensitive spectator. 
But, as has been claimed, the attitudes of these two obser- 
vers in the presence of the work of art are psychologically 
quite distinct. To regard both attitudes simply as modes 
of "appreciation" is slovenly and misleading. The interest 
of the one is, for the most part, focussed on points of 
style, technique and composition, which demand knowledge 
and logic for their appreciation and assessment. The in- 
terest of the untrained sensitive observer, on the other 
hand, is allowed to operate unchecked in naive indulgence. 
The term "appreciative interest" is indeed perhaps the most 
appropriate term that could be found to denote the operative 
attitude of the expert.(1) It is a critical attitude, an 
attitude which tends "to drive us from indulgence to take 
thought of our going," whereas that of the untrained sensi- 
tive observer is all indulgence and "alert passivity." 
Between the two extremes of sheer aesthetic intellectualism 
and naive aesthetic indulgence the possibilities of combina- 
tion are infinite, but, caeteris paribus, the artistic 
(1)Using the term appreciation in its etymological sense. 
Cf. Appendix I, p.426. A great deal of what is regarded 
as art appreciation belongs to this class of interest; 
it is mainly rational, analytical and critical. Witness 
the extravagant enthusiasm of the expert, the connoisseur, 
on finding some new piece of evidence, some previously 
unknown flaw, some new technical idiosyncracy in a master- 
piece. 
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experience of the man who has preserved his "innocence of 
eye" will be deeper and richer in significance and ultimate 
value. 
(c) Theoretical interest in art is an intellectual 
or rational discipline, the outcome of a philosophic or 
scientific attitude to art. Its aim is the intellectual 
understanding of art, and its operation may range from the 
mere curiosity of the layman to the abstract intellectual 
analysis of the philosopher. 
That a strong theoretical interest implies ipso facto 
a special degree of innate sensibility on the part of the 
theorist may appear a reasonable assumption; for, if he 
were not specially attracted by art, how else could his 
interest have been established, and how sustained? In 
point of fact, however, a theoretical interest in art may 
arise in a variety of different ways, few of which may be 
due to direct artistic experience. 
If theoretical interest in art is to yield valuable 
results for science and philosophy, it ought properly to 
be founded upon innate sensibility and independent first- 
hand experience. For, as Thorburn points out,(1 the work 
of art cannot as such become a datum for science or philo- 
sophy until it has made its appeal directly to the 
(1) T horburn, J. id., .,art and the Unconscious, p.4. 
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investigator. The history of aesthetics, however, raises 
doubts as to whether this has always been the case.(1) 
speculation as to the fundamental impulses underlying the 
formulation of the major historical aesthetic theories 
would be both tiresome and futile, but it is at least indis- 
putable that, from first to last, from Socrates to Croce, 
the important theories of aesthetics have been the work of 
men whose interests and cultural predilections have been 
primarily those of the scholar and philosopher. A few have 
been poets, (e.g. Goethe and Coleridge), some have been 
painters or sculptors, (Leonardo da Vinci, Benvenuto Cellini, 
Sir Joshua Reynolds), but, from the historical point of view, 
their contributions to the theory of art and aesthetics are 
negligible. Perhaps this could not have been otherwise; 
for aesthetics is the product of the reflective and critical 
mind, art the product of the creative mind, and seldom are 
these powers found in equal degree in one personality. 
.vîetaphysical speculation produced the earliest theories; 
they were the outcome of a non -aesthetic attitude of mind, 
which regarded art merely as a phenomenon to be fitted into 
the comprehensive system of ultimate realities. Instead 
(1)Nobody, for instance, could associate sensibility with 
a man like Kant. On the other hand, Hegel was a man with 
a fine sensibility and understanding of art. 
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of being the offspring of a desire to comprehend the nature 
of art from first -hand artistic experience, the first 
theories originated in reflections concerning the nature of 
the universe, from which art could not, in the Greek mind, 
be excluded. "The Greek world of ideas, before or outside 
the philosophic schools, was wholly free from dualism. 
Its parts were homogeneous. (l)" Starting in speculation, 
metaphysical aesthetic has pursued its lofty path undeviat- 
ingly, without having revealed a single universal principle 
of art that could be unambiguously demonstrated, or having 
settled a single artistic question with any degree of 
finality. 
During the middle ages theoretical interest in art 
arose from the close association of art with religion; 
hence the theory of the period is concerned mainly with 
Christian symbolism and is wholly speculative and metaphys- 
ical. Partly as a consequence of what Bosanquet calls the 
"individual" tendency in philosophy, partly owing to the 
influence of the empirical psychologists, and partly to the 
development of criticism, notably by Lessing and 
(l) Bosanquet, B., history of Aesthetics, p.11. 
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Winckelmann,(1) the objective consideration of the work of 
art begins to' take an important place in the theories of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Coincidentally, 
Kant, Schelling and Hegel accord to art a key position in 
their respective philosophical systems. Contemporary 
'theory in the main orientates either from the concrete 
phenomenon or from the concrete experience. The whole 
(1)It is instructive to note the revolt of Winckelmann 
against "erudition" (Belesenheit) in art as opposed to 
direct sensuous observation. "Research and insight into 
art we look for in vain in the great costly works descrip- 
tive of ancient statues, which have as yet been published. 
The description of a statue ought to demonstrate the cause 
of its beauty, and point out the individuality in the style 
of its art; ... but where is it taught in what the beauty 
of a statue consists, and what scribe (Scribente) has 
looked at it with an artist's eye ?" "How has it happened, 
whereas profound treatises have appeared in all other 
sciences, that the rationale of art and of beauty has been 
so little enquired into? Reader! the fault lies in our 
innate indolence as regards thinking for ourselves, and in 
the wisdom of the schools. For on the one hand the ancient 
works of art have been regarded as beauties to the enjoy- 
ment of which we cannot hope to attain, and which therefore 
readily warm the imagination of a few, but do not penetrate 
the soul, and antiquities have only given occasion for 
shóoting the rubbish of book -learning, but have afforded no 
nourishment or hardly any to the reason. On the other hand 
again, since philosophy has chiefly been practised and 
taught by such as, through reading their dry -as -dust prede- 
cessors therein, are forced to leave little room for feeling, 
and cover it up, so to speak, with a hard skin, we have 
been led through a labyrinth of metaphysical subtleties and 
circumlocutions which after all have chiefly served to ex- 
cogitate huge books and sicken the understanding." 
Winckelmann, Geschichte der Bildenden Kunst, intro. ii. 
Quoted by Bosanquet, History of Aesthetics, pp. 240 -241. 
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tendency, then, from antiquity to modern times has been 
marked by a movement away from the abstract metaphysical 
intuition of first principles to the more concrete treat- 
ment of the problem. Yet it is noteworthy that no 
aesthetic theory of importance has, as far as is known, 
originated in the first instance from an interest in art 
primarily determined by sensibility.(l) Without exception 
all the important contributions to aesthetic theory have 
originated in academic philosophy, and many of the modern 
ones from scientific inquiry in the fields of psychology, 
ethnology, ethnography and archaeology. Indeed, it 'was 
through the desire of an eighteenth century philosopher, 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, to round off his system of 
metaphysic; that the science of Aesthetics received its 
name, as designating the theory of "obscure" knowledge in 
contrast to and co -equal with the "clear" knowledge of 
logical thought. 
These observations concerning the motivating impulse 
behind the formulation of aesthetic theories are of more 
than passing interest, because they suggest questions of 
considerable moment to the student. The discussion of 
(1)It might be objected that Winckelmann's theory was the 
outcome of innate sensibility. But, although fundament- 
ally he had a real feeling for sculpture, his interest 
arose through his passion for classical learning. 
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these, however, is no part of the present purpose. But 
it may here be asked whether a mere intellectual interest 
in art does not carry with it mental limitations, which 
may very well result in failure on the part of the inves- 
tigator to observe essential elements in the phenomenon 
he purports to scrutinise. For, since the experience of 
art transcends mere cognitive awareness of its attributes, 
the theorist must, in the long run, test his theory not 
only by checking it against bare abstract fact, but by 
introspective analysis of his own experience. he cannot 
stand outside the universal subjective experience and 
examine it objectively by means of the searching rays of 
science; he must observe it first as a phenomenon at work 
within himself, checking his introspective observations by 
the reliable introspection of others. Neither can he know 
nor understand another's feelings unless in terms of his 
own. And for that reason a theory of aesthetics that is 
not founded upon first -hand experience of art is bound to be 
inadequate, superficial and barren. "To aesthetic exper- 
ience," states Dewey,(1) "the philosopher must go to under- 
stand what experience is. For this reason, while the 
theory of aesthetic put forward by a philosopher is incident- 
ally a test of the capacity of its author to have the 
( 1) Deweÿ , Jorih, Art as Experience, p.274. 
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experience that is the subject -matter of his analysis, it 
is also much more than that. It is a test of the capacity 
of the system he puts forth to grasp the nature of exper- 
ience itself." This much, then, philosophers and psycho- 
logists readily concede.(1) Yet the facts of history 
and biography point to the conclusion that the subject has 
more often than not been approached regardless of this 
fundamental prerequisite of direct experience. how rare, 
(1)For example: (a) "In trying to arrive at an understanding 
of any activity, one must begin with a mass of experience, 
relative to that activity; and this experience cannot be 
acquired by philosophical thinking, or by scientific ex- 
periments, or by observation of the activity in other people, 
but only by a long and specialised pursuit of the activity 
itself. Only after this experience has been acquired is 
it possible to reflect upon it and bring to light the prin- 
ciples underlying it." R. G. Collingwood, Outlines of a 
Philosophy of Art, pp. 8 -9. (Apparently Collingwood 
believes that the experience can be acquired like, say, 
motor driving! It does not occur to him that the wrong 
kind of experience can be acquired.) 
(b) "It is of vital importance to be clear that 
generalisations about art and about aesthetic experience 
can only be justified when they are based upon immediately 
experienced aesthetic intuition. Without aesthetic intui- 
tion of individual beautiful things, generalisations about 
aesthetic experience are 'but words and breath.' Critics 
are right when they resent 'high priori' ways of thinking 
and speaking of art. It may be possible to use the concept 
of beauty as the completion of a system of philosophy, as 
some philosophers have done; it may even be possible for 
the metaphysician to define beauty more or less correctly, 
out of a very general and vague sort of experience. But 
this kind of thing, even in the hands of genius, is not 
worth a great deal, unless it is based on experience of 
many beautiful things, and of many sorts of beautiful things.'' 
L. A. Reid, A Study in Aesthetics, pp.17 -18. Vide also 
footnote p.18, Winckelmann. 
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according to ivr. Desmond MacCarthy,(1) the combination of 
the powers of sensibility and abstract thought is, the 
history of aesthetics shows. "As a rule it has been to- 
wards the end of his life that a philosopher, to round off 
his system, has sat down to write upon Aesthetics; having 
explained the universe, laid the foundations of logic and 
morals, he proceeds at last to explain our 'sense of 
beauty.' The manner in which he does so is usually de- 
termined by his system, and the results are seldom as valu- 
able as they might be, partly for this reason, and partly 
because they have not been drawn from wide or vivid person- 
al experience. Any reader who has enjoyed the arts, 
though immensely inferior to a philosopher in intellect, 
is apt to notice that these theories by no means explain 
all that he has himself felt." Would Fechner, it may be 
asked, have embarked upon his long series of experiments, 
if his sensibility had been equal to his scientific urge? 
For, if such had been the case, he would surely have ob- 
served - what, in fact, has since been established - that 
the material he employed, like most of the material of 
(1) Reviewing The Principles of Literary Criticism, by 
I. A. Richards, Sunday Times, July 21, 1929. 
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experimental aesthetics, had no fundamental relation to 
art. Fechner's work yielded no positive principle which 
could be demonstrated in art. Subsequent experiments(l) 
of a similar type have been equally sterile, although much 
useful information has been forthcoming that will help 
eventually to define the proper function of this department 
of experimental psychology. 
Theoretical interest in art is not, however, confined 
to the aesthetician, whether philosopher or psychologist; 
it is also - or ought to be - the province of the critic 
and the historian. For "all criticism, which does not 
either achieve science, or definitely reach towards it, is 
mere mirage. "(2 Unless the critic can justify his criti- 
cism and the historian his history in terms of fundamental 
principles, there can be no real criticism and no real 
history, only superficial judgments based on vague pre- 
conceptions and personal prejudices. 
The term "critic" is a vague term in great need of 
exact definition. In the world of letters and of art it 
(l) 
Haines and Davies, "The Psychology of Aesthetic heac- 
tions to Rectangular Forms," Psychological Review, Vol.XI. 
1904; Vide also Lillian J. Martin, "An Experimental 
Study of FechnerTs Principles of Aesthetics," Psychological 
Review, Vol. XIII, May 1906. 
(2) Dallas, E. S., The Gay Science, Vol.I, p.71. One of 
the earliest and almost unknown attempts to lay the founda- 
tions of a scientific criticism. 
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includes, besides the critic proper who is fundamentally 
a philosopher and a publicist - individuals whose interest 
in art is not primarily theoretical (like the aesthetician), 
nor yet appreciative (like the sensitive layman), but mainly 
practical: for instance, the technical expert, iconographer 
and the archivist. But it is only by accordinE, to the 
term its very widest and least exact connotation that these 
art functionaries can be designated critics; they are not 
primarily concerned with the establishment of intangible 
values, which is the business of the true critic of art, 
but rather with the search after facts and the systematic 
recording of facts relating to particular works of art. 
The technical expert, iconographer and the archivist are 
each concerned with the data relevant to the material work 
of art, its physical attributes, its history in terms of 
ownership, restorations, chemistry, technique and so on. 
They are not called upon to express judgments of a philoso- 
phic or psychological kind. Their function is essentially 
a practical function; they need not be sensitive to the 
intrinsic qualities of the object they are examining; they 
need only be capable of making exact pronouncements on 
questions capable of more or less exact answer. For this 
reason it is frequently stated that expert critics are 
better able to spot bad works of art than good ones! 
There is, of course, a sense in which the true critic's 
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interest is also practical; he wishes to write about art, 
to interpret, to explain, to call attention to art. In a 
word he is a publicist; and a publicist is a practical man. 
But, granting; that, it is iaportant to note that before 
the critic is capable of fulfilling his function, he must 
first of all have a direct personal experience of that 
which he professes to criticise. The art critic's criti- 
cism must arise from lived experience; and the fundamental 
condition of such lived experience is innate sensibility. 
Between the true critic - the critic whose business it is 
to pronounce ,judgments concerning art quality - and the 
technical critic, iconographer and archivist, there is, 
then, this crucial difference: whereas the latter may 
exercise their function independently of any innate sensi- 
bility to art, to the former sensibility is a fundamental 
prerequisite, without which no valid or useful criticism 
is possible. 
The critic who lacks first -hand experience of the sig- 
nificance of art is, in Mr. Wilenski's view, a mere auto- 
biographer. But sensibility and direct experience are not 
enough. The critic must also possess the gift of clear 
and cogent exposition. He must be capable of transmitting 
to others something of his own enthusiasm, something of the 
indwelling spirit of art, which has seized him. How rare 
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it is, as Mr. MacCarthy pointed out, to find these requis- 
ites in a single personality the history of criticism re- 
veals. "No one," declares Mr. Clive Bell,(1) "can state 
in words just what he feels about a work of art - especi- 
ally about a work of visual art. He may exclaim; indeed 
if he be a critic he should exclaim, for that is how he 
arrests the public. He may go on to seek some rough equi- 
valent in words for his excited feelings. But whatever he 
may say will amount to little more than steam let off. 
He cannot describe his feelings; he can only make it clear 
that he has them." That, too, is what Winckelmann meant 
when he said that "Hardly any scribe can penetrate the 
inmost essence of art." 
But, besides sensibility and the power of literary 
expression, the critic must be prepared to support his 
judgments by reference to fundamental principles. Mr. L. A. 
Reid has insisted upon this with some force. "All criti- 
cism," he states,(2) "implies good 'taste,' implies com- 
petence of aesthetic intuition. But this is not all that 
is required. Nor are technical, historical and biograph- 
ical knowledge and the gift of literary expression adequate 
supplements. Philosophy is also required. The interest 
(l) 
Since Cézanne, p. 158. 
(2) A Studs in 1.esthetics, pp. 23 -24. 
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of the critic is, of course, in individual works of art, 
and, as we have said, no amount of general knowledge is of 
the least use as a substitute for this. But surely it is 
also the business of the completely equipped critic to give 
reasons, if required, for the faith which is in him. I do 
not suggest that he must always be doing so, or that he is 
mainly concerned with theory. But he should be able to do 
so; nis should be a 'thinking study' of art. He can 
point, or he can talk round the issue, or he can sing as 
the poets sing. But as the complete critic he is, if he 
merely does these things, a comparative (not a complete) 
failure, for though he has likes and dislikes, though he 
may know what is good, he has no idea why. He is not 
interested in the question. All good critics must put to 
themselves from time to time such questions as, Why is this 
or that good? Why is this technical device to be preferred 
to that? Why is this or that historical development 
important? Such questions directly involve others, such 
as, What is the meaning of good, or of bad, in art? What 
is the difference between the 'beautiful' and the 'ugly,' 
between the 'great' and the 'trifling,' between the 'tragic' 
and the 'comic,' between the 'classical' and the 'romantic'? 
And these are - however little this be realised by critics 
themselves - most emphatically philosophical questions." 
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During last century, Dr. Santayana points out, (l) the 
'term criticism was employed by many writers to denote the 
philosophy of beauty;(2) to -day the word is retained as the 
title for the "reasoned appreciation of art." In Mir. Wil- 
enski's view "Art criticism... is the systematic assessment 
of all kinds of values in art considered as a human activity, 
and all kinds of values in particular artists, and all kinds 
of values residing in or presented to the objects produced 
by that activity. (3)n Both these definitions include much 
iiore than the everyday connotation of the term, which limits 
art criticism to the assessment of objects, the products of 
the art activity. But, as Mr. Reid rightly points out, 
the critic's pronouncements must be based upon a philoso- 
phical foundation. Every judgment the critic makes is in 
the last resort based upon a more or less clearly conceived 
philosophy of art; or else it is not criticism, but mere 
prejudice or autobiography. Mr. Wilenski's definition 
of art criticism is, then, as comprehensive as any definition 
need be; it is as good a definition as it is possible to 
(1) The Sense of Beauty, p.15. 
(2) Cf. E. S. Dallas, The Gay Science, Chap. II, Vol. I, 
for a most instructive survey of the field of criticism, 
as it appeared to the author in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. 
(3) The Study of Art, gip. 162 -163. 
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find. In fact, it is a statement in exact terms of all 
that is by implication contained in the commonplace 
definition of criticism as the "reasoned appreciation of 
art." But for the ambiguity of the term 'appreciation' 
the commonplace definition might have been accepted as both 
sufficient and accurate - besides having the advantage of 
brevity. If, however, the term be used strictly in its 
etymological sense(1) as implying rational judgment, the 
following definition should be adequate: Art criticism is 
the reasoned appreciation of art regarded as the product 
of human activity and the public assessment of its values. 
Now the values attaching to or inhering in art are 
mainly four O: (i) The value of the work of art to the 
art - consuming community as an expression of the intuitions 
and aspirations of its members and a symbol of its common 
culture. This is its public value. (ii) The value of 
the work of art to the artist as the expression or formal 
equivalent of a private intuition or aspiration. This is 
(1) Vide Appendix I, pp. 426. 
(2) Regarding the matter from the point of view of the 
criticism of art as an activity taking place ,publicly in 
cultural society by means of books or newspapers. Vide 
Chap. VI with referencé to the terms "public" and "private" 
in art. 
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its private value.(1) (iii) The value of the work of art 
in terms of some system of ultimate values. This is its 
metaphysical value. (iv) The value of the work of art as 
a means of yielding psychological satisfaction (release 
of psychical tension, pleasure, etc.) to the artist, the 
spectator and the community as a whole. This is its human 
or psycho- sociological value. There are, of course, other 
values depending upon or arising from special circumstances - 
for instance, the value of the work of art to the artist - 
spectator, who might conceivably desire to make use of it 
in order to improve his own productions, or the value of 
the work of art to the morbid, psychotic or otherwise 
extraordinary spectator. These values, however, can all 
be subsumed under one or other of the four main categories 
enumerated. The value of the work of art to the consuming 
community (i.e. its public value) is, of course, not a 
simple but a compound value,(2) comprising socio- psycholo- 
gical, pedagogical and metaphysical elements. Likewise 
(1) Mr. Wilenski applies the term intrinsic to the value 
attaching to the work of art for the artist, and acquired 
to the value attaching to the work of art for the spectator. 
(2) It must, of course, be assumed that the art - consuming 
community is not a community of theorists or philosophers, 
but simple a community of art contemplators with an 
appetite for passive artistic experience. 
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the value of the work of art to the artist (i.e. its 
private value) is not simple, but consists of psychological, 
sociological and metaphysical ingredients. The metaphys- 
ical value of the work of art will be determined both by 
reference to some system of absolute art values and by re- 
ference to some system of ultimate universal values. 
Psycho - sociological art value will include all values 
arising from psychic causes which art is capable of ful- 
filling (i.e. pleasures of sense perception, sublimation of 
conflicts and primitive impulses, wish- fulfilments, etc.) 
The critic's function, then, is a very difficult and 
complicated one. If he is to give a reasoned account of 
the faith that is in him, if he is to give a "thinking 
study" of art, his task is indeed an onerous one. For, 
whenever he makes a judgment of value in one department of 
his field, he immediately raises fundamental questions in 
another department. For instance, if he makes a pronounce- 
ment about the purely artistic qualities of a picture for 
which a large sum of public money has been paid, and tries 
to show that such a purchase is, in fact, a most laudable 
act, he raises questions of the utmost metaphysical import- 
ance, which can only be answered by appealing to authorities 
in the different aspects of art, or by attempting to answer 
them all himself: in which case he must assume the rôle of 
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the Deity as expert, historian, psychologist, philosopher 
and metaphysician at one and the same time. For this 
reason a kind of system of labour division has been evolved, 
whereby one man concerns himself solely with historical 
values,(1) another with philosophical values, another with 
social values, another with psychological values, and so on 
according to the nature of his interest and mental equip- 
ment. This enables the practical business of art criticism 
to proceed without the endless discussion of metaphysical 
fundamentals, which it would entail were each critic to 
attempt to cover the whole field of knowledge which his 
function involves. 
Of the types of art criticism by far the commonest is 
what Mr. L. A. Reid calls "signpost criticism. "(2) Its 
main purpose is to reveal, to 'direct' the public's atten- 
tion to the best and most worthy examples of contemporary 
art, as well as the best and most worthy examples of the art 
of the past. Ar. Reid, it would appear, does not rank 
this type very high in his scale of values, stating simply 
that it has a very useful function, "largely the function 
of a guide -book or a good newspaper. "(3) But, be that 
(1)11 department of public value. 
(2) "Primarily, a critic is a signpost," says Mr. Clive 
Bell (Op. Cit. p.155). "He points to a work of art and 
says - 'Stop! Look!'" 
(3) Op. cit. p.21. 
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as it may, this is surely to underestimate the importance 
of the regular criticism of men like Mr,. Ernest Newman in 
the world of music, iuïr. Clive Bell, ivir. Herbert Read, 
Mr. Frank Rutter, not to mention the late Roger Fry, 
in the visual arts, which is no mere signpost work, but 
criticism of a very high order. Indeed, the journalistic 
criticism of these men ranks higher, am criticism, than 
a vast amount of the "technical" or "scholarly" variety, 
to which a too academic culture is wont to accord the 
highest value.(l) Perhaps in the long run 'signpost' 
criticism, when it is of the first rank, is the most valu- 
able of all, since, unlike the so- called 'higher' forms of 
criticism, it is addressed not merely to a select public 
of critics or literature- producing and consuming students 
of art, but to the cultured and sensitive 'everyman.' 
(1) Whistler, it will be recalled, expressed his contempt 
for this kind of criticism in his Ten O'Clock lecture. 
"There are those also, sombre of mien, and wise with the 
wisdom of books, who frequent museums and burrow in crypts; 
collecting - comparing - compiling - classifying - contra- 
dicting. 
"Experts these - for whom a date is an accomplishment - a 
hall -mark, success! 
"Careful in scrutiny are they, and conscientious of judg- 
ment, establishing, with due weight, unimportant reputa- 
tions, discovering the picture by the stain on the back - 
testing the torso by the leg that is missing.... disputa- 
tious and dictatorial concerning the birthplace of inferior 
persons - speculating, in much writing, upon the great 
worth of bad work." 
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"Critics," says gr Bell,(1) "do not exist for artists 
any more than paleontologists exist for fossils." ... 
"The critic's business is to help the public ... io put tue 
public in the way of aesthetic pleasure, that is the ehd 
for which critics exist, and to that end all means are 
good." ïrr. Bell clearly has in mind a public of intelli- 
gent and sensitive laymen. It is no part of the critic's 
business to address artists; neither is it any part of the 
critic's business to address other critics. Criticism of 
other critics' theories is not art criticism but philoso- 
phic criticism or criticism of art criticism, which is 
either a scientific or a philosophic discipline. It has 
for its subject -matter life, more particularly that part of 
life which is lived in and through the experience of art. 
The essence of good criticism (to quote Ir. Bell again) is 
this: "that, instead of merely imparting to others the 
opinions of the critic, it puts them in a state to appre- 
ciate the work of art itself... Further, the critic has 
got to convince... He should be able... to disentangle 
and appraise the qualities which go to make up a master - 
piece...(2)" The critic, that is to say, must be able to 
show by reference to comprehensive scale of values, what 
(l) Op. cit. p.154. 
(2) ?. 156. 
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works of art are good and why, and what works of art are 
inferior or bad and why. The ultimate end of art criticism 
may, therefore, be defined as the establishment of a com- 
prehensive and stable system of values, that will render 
possible the public assessment(1) of the art products of 
the world, irrespective of their time and place. It is 
not, then, to the arid discourses of the technical critics 
nor to the panegyrics of the savants that the custodians 
of tradition and culture must look, but to the signpost 
critics of the calibre of the late Roter Fry, Mr. Clive Bell 
and Muir. Frank Rutter. That Mr. heid appears to see no 
more important value in the journalistic criticism of these 
men than that of signposts which tell "the uninitiated what 
to seek and what to avoid" seems to indicate a lack of 
judgment that is surprising in a writer of his ability and 
perspicuity; unless it be concluded that for the purposes 
of his inquiry he has slumped all journalistic criticism 
into one common class and attributed to it a common value, 
which must relegate it to the lowest literary and philo- 
sophic level in the scale. Mr. Reid, however unwittingly, 
is guilty of a grievous error in failing alike to appreciate 
the true value of signpost criticism and the high standing 
(1) i.e. communicable assessment. 
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of the journals to which the best critics regularly con - 
tribute.(1) 
1, great deal of what is frequently referred to as 
"higher" criticism is addressed to a very limited public - 
mostly critics themselves or literature -producing and 
consuming students of art and culture. Mr. B. Berenson 
(author, inter alia, of The Study and Criticism of Italian 
Art) and sir. T. Borenius (author, inter alia, of Florentine 
Frescoes) are true representatives of this type of criti- 
cism, which demands for its understanding a wide and accu- 
rate knowledge of the history and technical processes of 
art. Whether such 'technical' criticism is really criti- 
cism is an arguable point. Criticism implies judgment; 
criticism is judgment. Technical criticism, then, means 
the critical examination of the technical characteristics 
of the work of art - its drawing, composition, colour, 
surface texture, representational accuracy, history and 
so on - and its disposal in terms of some ideal criterion. 
But, it may be asked, is there an ideal standard available 
by which to assess technical values? Is there some ideal 
(i) That two of these writers (Clive Bell and Roger Fry) 
regard such journalistic work as serious criticism is evid- 
ent from the fact that both have republished much of it in 
book form - Transformations and Vision and Design by Roger 
Fry and Since Cézanne by Clive Bell. Mr. Bell himself 
states (op. cit. p.162): "It is becoming fashionable to 
take criticism seriously, or more exactly, serious critics 
are trying to make it so. How far they have succeeded 
may be measured by the fact that we are no longer ashamed 
to reprint our reviews..." 
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technical standard to which all great art may be said to 
conform? If not, then criticism of art in terms of tech- 
nique is impossible.. Possessing no criterion, the critic 
cannot choose his material. "This," as one writer has 
emphasised.,(1) "is unsatisfactory; and it is worse - it 
is self -destructive. For, not being able to reject, 
criticism cannot, in logic, choose the objects of its 
attention. But a method which cannot limit on its own 
principles the field within which it is to work is con- 
demned from the beginning; it bears a fallacy at its core. 
In order to make criticism theoretically possible at all, 
the power to choose and reject, and so the pronouncing of 
judgment, must be an integral part of it." 
Now, it may be submitted that there is no criterion of 
technique by which to judge art, whether it be painting, 
sculpture, architecture or music. Alike to the academic 
painter and the critic of the nineteenth century such an 
assertion would have appeared absurd on the face of it. 
To-day, however, although there are critics who would hotly 
dispute the statement, the more responsible of them would 
either agree or propound a definition of technique which 
reduced it to something other than what the academies be- 
lieved it to be. The Impressionist exhibition shocked 
(1) Puffer, Ethel D., The Psychology of Beauty, p. 6. 
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the critics, who believed that the canons of art had been 
fixed for all time by the Greeks, and that any divergence 
from the classical path was a sign of decadence and in- 
decency.(1) The supremacy of the technical canons, which 
had been pursued with the utmost earnestness as promising 
the one and only way to the citadel of art, was first con- 
tested, then finally renounced. No one of any sensibility 
would say to -day that Cézanne's technique was inferior to 
Correggio's: which is a true indication that the technical 
criterion is as useless as it is irrelevant as a criterion 
of art value. 
The word "technique" is defined by the Oxford Envlish 
Dictionary (2) as "mechanical skill in art." Such a defini- 
tion is quite empty. Apart altogether from the question 
as to whether there is any such activity as "mechanical 
skill" (it looks like a contradiction in terms), it implies 
a distinction between the artist's psychic and physical 
functions which no psychology can or would support. Psy- 
chic need begets the means of its own fulfilment; technique 
manifests itself only in expression; and expression is the 
only technique that is capable of assessment. Good tech- 
nique is simply the best means of achieving the formal 
(1) Cf. Wilenski, R. H., French Painting, Pp. 237 -244. 
(2) Concise Edition. 
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equivalent of an inner experience. And, since every crea- 
tive impulse is a unique situation, each new effort at art- 
istic production will present a new set of technical prob- 
lems to be mastered. No one mode of skill in manipulating 
a medium will satisfy the ever - changing needs of the spirit, 
for technical skill in art is a life -long process of inven- 
tion, which cannot be encompassed within the confines of a 
single formula.(1) There is, therefore, no criterion of 
technique, and, therefore, no principles upon which to 
found a technical criticism. 
But it may be objected that there are surely rights 
and wrongs in the manner of handling the materials of art. 
And is this not what in the long run is meant by technique? 
The answer is that there are undoubtedly rights and wrongs 
in handling the materials of art, but what is right and 
what is wrong is neither determined by the physical nature 
of the material, nor by traditional methods of handling, 
but the artist's purpose with it. And, if the artist 
achieves his purpose only by taking liberties with his 
material, the work of art cannot be assessed on these 
grounds, but only by asking whether he has in fact produced 
a meritorious work. If it be concluded that he has not, 
the failure may in part be attributable to the liberties 
he has taken with his material, but that need not be the 
(1) 
"... in art such a thing as a technique founded on no 
given basis - in short, a technique in the air - would be 
utterly inconceivable." (Igor Stravinsky, Chronicle of 
My Life, p.38.) 
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final reason. On the other hand, if the work of art is 
a work of high merit, then it matters nothing whether he 
has taken liberties with his material or not. The end 
justifies the means. Or, as Ir. John Copley, the dis- 
tinguished lithographer, states:(1) "few, if any things, 
are de facto outside the scope of a medium: the artist 
may make his medium do anything he can make it do" - and 
he cites Carrière's lithography "sinking into ... the full, 
the most brutal depths of stone." 
Technical criticism cannot be dissociated from histo- 
rical or scientific criticism, which regard the history of 
art as a process analogous to that manifested in naturalist- 
ic evolution of species, and the work of art as a product. 
Accordingly, scientific criticism consists in the systema- 
tic evaluation of the work of art in terms of the evolution- 
ary principles of stylistic species, which the historical 
development of art is supposed to enunciate. The adherents 
of the school maintain that this is the only kind of criti- 
cism which is capable of pronouncing an objective and stable 
judgment - a judgment free from the subjectivism of the 
so- called Impressionistic and Appreciative schools, of 
(1) "True and False Technique," print Collectors' Quarterly, 
Vol. XXI, No.l, January 1934. Cf. pp.215 -21? seq. 
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which Walter Pater may be taken as a true representative. 
Judgment of artistic value, however, is neither intended 
nor implied by scientific criticism; "it merely attempts," 
declares Professor Wölfflin,(1) one of the most distinguish- 
ed exponents of the method, "to set up standards by which 
the historical transformations (and national types) can be 
more exactly defined." 
But once again the question may be asked: Is scientif- 
ic criticism a feasible ideal? Is a scientific judgment of 
a work of art possible? Or, in other words, is the classi- 
fication of a work of art according to national type and its 
disposal in relation to the members of its type a judgment? 
The answer is surely an emphatic negative. For the judg- 
ment of anything always means judgment with reference to the 
end for which it exists,() and the end for which a work of 
art exists is, as Victor Hugo asserted, the cause of human- 
ity. Its existence is its own excuse for being. 
"The type belongs to natural history. The one prin- 
ciple at the basis of scientific criticism is, as we have 
seen, the conception of ... history as a process, and of 
(1) Principles of girt ñistor1, Preface VII. 
(2) Puffer, op. cit., p. 8. 
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the work of art as a product. The work of art is,then, a 
moment in a necessary succession, governed by laws of change 
and adaptation like those of natural evolution. But how 
can the conception of values enter here? Excellence can 
be attributed only to that which attains an ideal end; and 
a necessary succession has no end in itself. The 'type,' 
in this sense, is perfectly hollow. To say that the modern 
chrysanthemum is better than that of our forbears because 
it is more chrysanthemum -like is true only if we make the 
latter form the arbitrary standard of the chrysanthemum. 
No species which is constituted by its own history can be 
said to have an end in itself, and can, therefore, have an 
excellence to which it shall attain. In short, good and 
bad can be applied to the moments in a necessary evolution 
only by imputing a fictitious superiority to the last term; 
and so one type cannot logically be preferred to another. 
As for the individual specimens, since the conception of the 
type does not admit the principle of excellence, conformity 
thereto means nothing." 
Scientific criticism is a. misnomer born of a false 
conception of the meaning and scope of criticism. It ought 
not to be necessary to emphasise this, but in an age which 
is nurtured on the belief that science is on the point of 
discovering the Godhead," it is important to keep in mind 
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that in the end science must return to philosophy for its 
mandate. The scientific study of art is both a laudable 
and an essential discipline, which has already won an 
honourable place in the history of the "great search, "(l) 
but it must not be permitted to overstep the bounds of its 
proper province. 
Complementary to the scientific worker in the field 
of art is the art historian. It is the historian's busi- 
ness to attempt, from the vast material supplied by the 
critic and the scientific worker, to recreate by cautious 
inference and intuition the spiritual milieu out of which 
the material has evolved, and to see art both as a character- 
istic achievement of an individual mind and as the undeviat- 
ing ideal of a people. The immensity of this task has been 
clearly and cogently expressed by one of'the most eminent 
and sensitive art historians of to -day - Professor Wilhelm 
Worrinaer. "When we look upon the history of art no longer 
as a mere history of artistic ability, but as a history of 
artistic will, it gains a significance in the general history 
of mankind. Its subject- matter is thereby raised to such 
an exalted sphere of consideration that it becomes an ad- 
junct of the greatest of all chapters in human history, the 
one which treats of the development of the religious and 
(1) Cf. Chapter II. 
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philosophic ideas of man, and reveals to us the actual 
psychology of mankind. For changes in will, whose mere 
precipitates are file variations of style in the history of 
art, cannot be purely arbitrary or fortuitous. On the 
contrary, they must have a consistent relation to those 
spiritual and mental changes occurring in the constitution 
of mankind generally, those changes which are clearly re- 
flected in the historical development of myths, of religions, 
of philosophical systems, of world conceptions. Directly- 
we have discovered this consistent relationship, the history 
of the artistic will takes equal right of place with the 
comparative history of myths, the comparative history of 
religion, the comparative history of philosophy, the com- 
parative history of world conceptions; it takes equal 
right of place with these great stages in the general 
psychology of man. "(l) 
( l) Worringer, , W. , Form in Gothic, p.12. 
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CHAPTER II. 
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"Tis not a lip or eye we beauty call, 
But the joint force and full result of all." 
The history of intellectual culture bears witness to 
the fallibility of great thinkers. Erroneous assumptions 
have led to many a false start in the slow march of science. 
Again and again it has been necessary to return to the 
starting point and to begin anew the long labours of 
research. 
That many of these false assumptions are traceable 
either to excusable ignorance or to the restricting influ- 
ence of powerful authority can now be demonstrated in the 
light of history, but the persistent blindness of philo- 
sophers and psychologists to the fallacy underlying the 
identification of art and beauty is less easy to account 
for and more difficult to excuse. Almost the entire his- 
tory of speculation concerning the meaning and nature of 
art is founded upon this (now) ridiculous fallacy. 
The origin of this confusion may be traced back to the 
prevailing anthropocentric monism of ancient Greek philo- 
sophy, which exalted all human values and essayed to explain 
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the whole of nature in terms of one comprehensive principle. 
It was not inconsistent with this principle to recognise 
Beauty as an objective reality which pervaded the whole 
universe, and was embodied and localised in all natural 
phenomena, especially in man as the supreme and crowning 
achievement of nature's process. Thus it was in the 
idealistic representation of man - man "perfectly formed, 
perfectly proportioned, noble and serene" - that the Hellenic 
genius found the fullest and richest realisation of its 
artistic aspirations. Rome inherited this ideal and 
sought to emulate it; after the 'Decline and Fall' it was 
revived at the Renaissance, whence it passed into the main 
stream of European tradition.(1) 
That such an ideal "of human qualities raised to the 
highest power" is only one of other possible ideals is 
manifestly evident from the history and genetic development 
of world art. It differs alike from the abstract anti - 
vital ideals of Egypt and Byzantium, the abstract mystic 
ideal of the Orient and the transcendental ideal of Gothic. 
Yet the whole scope of historical aesthetics from antiquity 
to modern times has been confined to the philosophical 
study of the one ideal of classical beauty. Philosophers, 
themselves the direct legatees of the Hellenic culture, 
(1) Cf. Herbert head, The Meaning of brt, pp. 4 -5. 
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have regarded the totality of world art as the concrete 
result of a universal desire to attain one supre.ne ideal, 
the Absolute Beauty, fixed for all time by the ancient 
Greeks.(l) Hence "the time- honoured assumption that the 
history of art is equivalent to the history of artistic 
ability, and that the self -evident unvarying aim of this 
ability is the artistic reproduction and rendering of 
natural models.(2)" This assumption hopelessly fettered 
aesthetics to a one -sided and severely limited view of art, 
from which it has only been partially freed in recent times 
by the recognition that art and beauty are neither synony- 
mous terms nor identical phenomena.(3) 
(1) As recently as December 1934 this view was expressed by 
Dr. T. R. Glover in a National Lecture entitled "The 
Challenge of the Greek." "...In Athens... there came to 
be the nidus which gave the world its eternal models in 
art, poetry, letters, history and philosophy; ..." 
Listener, Vol. XII, No. 311, December 1934. 
(2) Worringer, W.,Form in Gothic, p.8. 
(3) Cf. "That art is not of necessity the beautiful is now 
a fairly well recognised fact and it is agreed that art may 
be both beautiful and unbeautiful. This does no more than 
to state that the particular emotion which we identify with 
art, the aesthetic may be the result of a wide field on 
contact of which only a part is shared by the beautiful. 
By enlarging the field of experience we have had to broaden 
our theories. The term 'Art' has come to have a greater 
significance in European culture since that culture has 
recognised not only the type of the Greek ideal (upon which 
it has until recently based its considerations) but also the 
arts of primitive people, and contemporary art both savage 
and civilized as being a source of the aesthetic emotion." 
J. M. Hannah, The Psychology of Beauty in Relation to Art. 
p. 9. 
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It is hardly necessary to draw from the abundant evi- 
dence which might be cited in support of this assertion; 
two instances will suffice. The designs produced by the 
haphazard tilting of a kaleidoscope and the curves produced 
by the automatic operations of a cyclo- harmonograph are 
almost invariably beautiful. No one, however, would 
describe these aesthetic phenomena as art except figurative- 
ly, although they may manifest all those attributes of 
harmony, balance, proportion and unity which aestheticians 
have long ascribed to beauty. On the other hand, there 
are innumerable objects of man's creation which do not 
display these qualities of formal refinement and from which 
the name art can no longer be withheld. (Plate 1.) 
An object whose proportions and arrangement are pleasing to 
the eye may become a thing of beauty; but it acquires an 
artistic character only in so far as its formal attributes 
perform or assist the function of expression. The presence 
of formal aesthetic qualities in a construction cannot of 
themselves bestow upon it the title of art.(1) "Art must 
have strength and vigour," states Professor Talbot Rice;(2) 
"it must be able to transfer sensation and power from the 
(l) Cf. Hirn, Y., The Origins of Art, p. 117. 
(2) "The Scope of Art History," Inaugural Lecture, 
University of Edinburgh, October 1934, pp. 14 -15. 
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creator, the artist to the spectator. It may use beauty, 
just as it may use majesty or mysticism or religion to 
achieve its ends, but beauty need not be there, and beauty 
must not be the sole aim." The terms 'art' and 'beauty' 
are therefore not interchangeable, and if they are to be 
used in scientific discourse, they must be clearly 
distinguished. 
The confusion which the history of aesthetic specula- 
tion displays so markedly is largely attributable to the 
erroneous identification of these two terms, for by forcing 
the word 'beauty' into the service of such disparate artist- 
ic ideals as those of cultured Greece and savage Africa, 
the whole problem concerning the meaning and nature of art 
has been obscured by a tangle of metaphysical subterfuge.(1) 
Philosophers, after constructing the most elaborate theories 
of beauty and art, were forced into the absurd position of 
regarding non -European art as the outcome of an ability 
inadequate to the highest artistic demands and incapable of 
fulfilling the technical conditions necessary for correct 
delineation and accurate plastic representation. "It was 
actually believed," as Worringer points out,(2) "that 
(1) Baumgarten, Lessing, Winckelmann, Kant, Schiller, 
Schelling and Hegel, for instance, all regard art as the 
province of the beautiful, and the beautiful as the sole 
principle of aesthetic. 
(2) 
Worringer, W., Form in Gothic, pp. 8 -9. 
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centuries had been necessary to enable mankind to draw 
correctly, that is to say, to be true to nature; it was 
actually believed that artistic production takes shape from 
time to time only by means of a plus or minus of ability. 
do account had been taken of the fact, although so obvious 
and literally forced upon the student by many factors in 
the history of art, that this ability was of secondary 
importance, and that it was actually determined and governed 
by the higher factor of will, which was the one and only 
authority." 
Of these "many factors" in the history of art mention 
need only be made of the animal representations of Paleoli- 
thic man in order to reduce the view to absurdity. But 
recent research into the psychology of perception reveals the 
fallacy of this view yet more forcibly. It has been exper- 
imentally demonstrated(1) that there is a very considerable 
divergence between what the eye actually sees and the shapes 
and sizes of things determined by the laws of perspective 
in plane projection, and that the degree of divergence 
varies markedly as between different individuals. 1Lere 
accuracy of representation has nothing to do with art, 
and although, ever since ,hristotle propounded his theory 
(1) Thouless, R. H., "Phenomenal Regression to the Real 
Object," British Journal of Psychology, Vols. XXI and XXII. 
51 
of art as imitation, it has been laid down that a work of 
art must be something other than a mere copy, aesthetic 
philosophers have been unable to free their minds from the 
representational fallacy. Accuracy of representation is 
a scientific rather than an artistic activity;(1) even 
where literal accuracy is deliberately aimed at, emotional 
and temperamental factors are liable to interfere with the 
technical processes of delineation. "Ludwig Richter re- 
lates in his reminiscences how once, when he was in Tivoli 
as a young man, he and three friends set oat to paint part 
of the landscape, all four firmly resolved not to deviate 
from nature by a hair's breadth; and, although the subject 
was the same, and each quite creditabljÿ reproduced what his 
eye had seen, the result was four totally different pictures, 
as different from each other as the personalities of the 
four painters. Whence the narrator drew the conclusion 
that there is no such thing as objective vision, and that 
form and colour are always apprehended differently according 
to temperament.(2) " 
A little over a decade ago three Cambridge psycholo- 
gists addressed themselves to the problem underlying the 
(1) Vide Appendix II, "The Criterion of Accuracy in 
Representational Art." 
(2) Quoted by Wölfflin, Principles of Art History. Cf. 
Britsch, G., Theorie der Bildenden Kunst, where the view is 
propounded that art develops with the growth of vision. 
The child, says Britsch, does not 'see' in order to draw, 
but draws in order to see! 
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multiplicity of definitions of beauty. Their study is of 
special interest in the present connection. Many intelli- 
gent people, they point out,(1) abandon aesthetic speculation 
and take no interest in discussions about the nature and 
object of art; they feel that there is no likelihood of 
arriving at any definite conclusions. Authorities differ 
in their judgments as to which things are beautiful, and 
when they do agree there is no means of determining what 
they are agreeing about. The question is: What do they 
mean by Beauty? Philosophers and critics in their volumin- 
ous attempts to answer the question have left their conclu- 
sions uncorrelated with those of their predecessors. ":but 
if there is no reason to suppose that people are talking 
about the same thing, a lack of correlation in their remarks 
need not cause surprise. We assume too readily that simil- 
ar language involves similar thoughts and similar things 
thought of. Yet why should there be only one subject of 
investigation which has been called Aesthetics? Why not 
several fields to be separately investigated, whether they 
are found to be connected or not? ... What reason is there 
to suppose that one aesthetic doctrine can be framed to 
include all the valuable kinds of what is called Literature ?" 
(or Art). And they conclude that no one explanation is 
(1) Ogden, Richards and Wood, The Foundations of Aesthetics, 
pp. 15 -16. 
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adequate. 
Messrs. Ogden, lichards and Wood begin by stating(1) 
that "Whenever we have any experience which might be called 
'aesthetic,' that is, whenever we are enjoying, contemplat- 
ing, admiring or appreciating an object, there are plainly 
different parts of the situation on which emphasis can be 
laid. As we select one or other of these so we shall 
develop one or other of the main aesthetic doctrines. In 
this choice we shall, in fact, be deciding which of the main 
(2) 
T yp es of Definition we are employing." (Table Ij Here 
is a statement which immediately invites challenge, and 
although its discussion at this point may seem an irrelev- 
ance, it will be found to contain implications which bear 
directly upon the value of their work and conclusions, 
while affording an excellent illustration of the confusion 
and ambiguity which may result from the casual use of the 
two terms Art and Beauty. 
It is not easy to make out exactly what meaning the 
statement just quoted is intended to convey: there appears 
to lie behind it the assumption that the very act of enjoy- 
ing, contemplating, admiring, or appreciating an object is 
(1) Ibid. p. 18. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 6 -7. In their book, The Meaning of Meaning, 
Ogden and Richards propound the view that the functions of 
language are twofold: the "symbolic" and the "emotive." 
The symbolic use of words is statement; the emotive (emotion 
arousing) use is to express feelings and attitudes. 
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dependent upon or involves, wittingly or unwittingly, the 
selection and emphasis, on the part of the spectator, of 
certain parts of the aesthetic situation as conforming to 
or in harmony with his theoretical predilections, emotional 
predispositions or aesthetic prejudices. "The appreciation 
of Beauty, whether in Painting, iviusic or Poetry, or in 
everyday experience," the authors maintain, "cannot but be 
developed by a clearer knowledge of what it is and where it 
may be looked for, and an acquaintance with the opinions of 
artists and philosophers on the subject will assist those 
who wish to increase their powers of discrimination and 
thereby lay the foundations of a genuine and at the same 
time personal taste." And since they clearly indicate that 
throughout their book "anything judged to be beautiful 
either a work of art or a natural object," they appear to 
see no necessity either to distinguish between beauty and 
art, or between the appreciative experience of beauty and 
the immediate awareness of art. Further, they are definite- 
ly of the opinion that theoretical knowledge is essential 
to the appreciation of beauty and art, and that the organ- 
isation and clarification of such theoretical knowledge 
must inevitably bring about the development of the capacity 
for aesthetic experience. In other words, they assume 
that the experience of beauty and art is of a higher or 
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more valuable category if it is of the appreciative type 
rather than the 'direct' type.(1) 
Although Ogden, Richards and good set out to disen- 
tangle inter alia differences of opinion and interest in 
relation to aesthetics, they have evidently failed to ob- 
serve that art and beauty are radically different phenomena, 
and that the province of the Science of Aesthetics is not 
the province of the Science of Art. "The fields reached 
by these various sources," (Table I), they say, "can all 
be cultivated and most of them are associated with well - 
known names in the Philosophy of Art," adding a footnote to 
the effect that "As this discussion is throughout concerned 
with the theory of Beauty, we are not called upon to 
(1) Cf. Professor Talbot Rice's Inaugural Lecture, p.10 
et. seq.: "In attempting to justify or explain by reason 
our attraction to one particular type of art, we lose the 
true appreciation which is sensed and gain in its stead a 
justified one, which is so often no more than a bottomless 
pose. Reasoned quibble or philosophical arguments are 
practically never of value in the appreciation or in the 
appraisement of works of art, for art is instinctive, wilful 
or wayward in its coming..." Differences of opinion in 
matters of theory and differences of interest are, it may 
be conceded, "closely interconnected," but differences of 
opinion as to the merit of a work of art are not always or 
even usually dependent upon preconceived theoretical prefer- 
ences: they may also be due to differences of sensibility 
and "innocence of eye." It is therefore impossible to 
sympathise with the rationalistic approach of these authors 
to art and aesthetic experience. Rather the attitude of 
the simple man who approaches the work of.art with an open 
mind than that of the philosopher- critic whose mode of 
vision is conditioned by his philosophy. 
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examine the various senses in which the word art has been 
used." But since one part of their purpose was to present 
"the main positions from which the theory of art- criticism 
may proceed," their failure to distinguish between art and 
beauty is an unfortunate blemish on an otherwise useful and 
instructive study of aesthetic theory. . theory of art 
criticism cannot be satisfactorily founded upon a theory 
of beauty. 11. theory of art criticism whose criterion is 
beauty is condemned from the beginning to labour under "a 
sort of hereditary squint." "The beautiful," declares 
Dallas,(1)"most distinctly, is one of the ideas on which art 
loves to dwell; but it is not an idea which inspires every 
work of art. Moreover, on the other hand ..., is it to be 
supposed that to display beauty is to produce a work of art? 
La belle chose que la philosophie! says M. Jourdain, not 
untruly; but are fine systems of philosophy to be reckoned 
among the fine arts? Horace, long ago, in a verse which 
has become proverbial, expressed the truth about the posi- 
tion of beauty in art. Non satis est pulchra esse poemata, 
he said: dulcia sunto. It is not enough that a work of art 
be beautiful; it must have more powerful charms." 
The identification of art and beauty cannot be dis- 
sociated from the doctrine of aesthetic Hedonism. That the 
aim of art is pleasure is a view which has found support 
(1) 
The Gay science, Vol.I, p.86. 
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in all ages: for the Greeks, it was the pleasure of 
imitation; for the Germans it was the pleasure of the 
beautiful; for the English it was the pleasure of the 
imagination. "All the schools of criticism ;.. with one 
voice declare for pleasure as the end of art.(l)" 
The persistence in history of the hedonistic view of 
art is inextricably bound up with the view of art as the 
expression or manifestation of beauty. Since beauty is a 
pleasure experience, it is but a step to the proposition 
that any production which does not yield pleasure cannot 
be beautiful and ex hypothesi cannot be a work of art. 
"Beauty," says Professor Santayana, the most distin- 
guished living advocate of the pleasure theory, "is value 
positive, intrinsic, objectified. Or, in less technical 
language, Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a 
thing.... An object cannot be beautiful if it can give 
pleasure to nobody: a beauty to which all men were forever 
indifferent is a contradiction in terms.(2)" According 
to Santayana, there was a time in man's early history when 
he habitually attributed to the objects of the external 
world whatever happened within himself, and although this 
animistic and mythological habit of thought has been modi- 
fied, it "still holds its own at the confines of knowledge, 
(l) 
Ibid. Chap. V, pp. 98 -176. 
(2) 
Cf. Santayana, G., The Sense of Beauty, p. 49. 
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where mechanical explanations are not found." Beauty "is 
the survival of the original universal tendency to make 
every effect of a thing upon us a constituent of its con- 
ceived nature. The scientific idea of a thing is a great 
abstraction from the mass of perceptions and reactions 
which that thing produces; the aesthetic idea is less 
abstract,, since it retains the emotional reaction, the 
pleasure of perception, as an integral part of the con- 
ceived thing.(l)" 
Another and more sturdy advocate of the pleasure 
theory is the almost forgotten nineteenth century critic 
E. S. Dallas, to whose remarkable study reference has al- 
ready been made. All human activity has happiness for 
its final end; but with art it is the first as well as 
the last.(2) The pleasure which the artist strives to 
give arises from what Socrates called the quiet of the mind, 
which is not the quiet of inaction or empty repose but of 
harmony. Although harmony, like pleasure, may be indefin- 
able, two types may be distinguished: active or dynamic 
harmony and reposeful or static harmony. Dynamic harmony 
is induced by the contemplation of dramatic effects; it 
(1) Ibii. pp. 47-48. 
(2) Vol. II, p. 39. 
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is a "mixed pleasure" - the pleasure "which rules in drama- 
tic art, and provides its canon," i.e. pleasure "struck from 
pain. "(l) No form of words, Dallas points out,(2) has yet 
been invented to get rid of this contradiction - a logical 
lie and a metaphysical truth - that a heap of pains may 
be a mass of pleasure.(3) Reposeful harmony arises from 
"pure pleasure" experience, which is "the product of the 
beautiful; and in so far as art aims at the beautiful it 
aims at pure pleasure, "(4) a "relation of harmony," of 
concord of forms, concord of sounds, concord of colours. 
"In the forms of art where beauty predominates, we must 
make sure that it is balanced and in perfect la.w. "(5) 
Dallas' understanding of the problem of the relation 
of beauty to art is remarkable considering the aesthetic 
philosophy of his time. A few changes in terminology 
(1) Vol. II, pp.49 -62. 
(2) Ibid. p.93. 
(3) Cf. Dr. Annand, The Hindu View of Art, p.155. "Hasa 
(the essential quality in a work of art) may be evoked by 
an aspect of life treated by a perfect artist: 'delightful 
or disgusting, exalted or lowly, cruel or kind, obscure or 
refined, actual or imaginary, there is no subject that 
cannot evoke rasa in man.'" 
(4) The Gay Science, p.95. 
(5) Ibid. p.103. 
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would make his book read like a contemporary document. 
Particularly interesting in connection with the present 
discussion is the following passage: "Classical art as 
aiming more distinctly than Christian art at pure enjoyment, 
aims more evidently at that harmony, that sympathy, that 
repose which belongs to the idea of the beautiful. ánd 
t 
it is because Winckelmann and the critics of that school 
set up Greek art as the standard, that in all their criti- 
cisms they give an exaggerated importance to the accomplish- 
ment of beauty as the aim of art. lost certainly Greek 
art aims chiefly at the presentment of beautiful impressions; 
and at the creation of that pure pleasure which comes of 
beauty. But it is needful to bear in mind that there are 
other pleasures than those of the beautiful - pleasures, 
too, which, in spite of the much and many pains mingled 
with them, we, at least in this age of the world, court 
more eagerly.(U 
On the one hand, tragedy and comedy, as the two leading 
types of dramatic art; on the other, pure beauty: these 
are the "great objects" of the artist to produce. The 
former runs to pleasure through a discipline of pain; the 
latter yields pleasure without pain. .But for Dallas there 
(1) Ibid. p. 96. 
61 
is a further object (and here he reveals an insight into 
the working of the mind which anticipates the findings of 
Freud by nearly a quarter of a century, and the most ad- 
vanced contemporary aesthetic theory by a good deal longer): 
it is neither the "mixed pleasure" of tragedy and comedy, 
nor yet the "pure pleasure" of beauty, but a peculiar 
"hidden pleasure" - "a dream of enchantment" - which springs 
from the "hidden soul" and manifests itself as that "know - 
not- what" quality of art which he calls "the weird;" and 
the weird is the most constant of the characteristics of 
art. "You can have great art which is not dramatic," 
aeclares Dallas,(1) "and you can have great art which is 
not beautiful; but you cannot have great art which is not 
weird." Between the weird and the beautiful there is no 
antagonism. Neither is there any antagonism between the 
weird and the dramatic. "You may have any amount of drama- 
tic action, and there is nothing to prevent its being 
weird. You may have symmetry the most perfect, beauty the 
most lovely, and not only is there nothing to prevent its 
being weird - it has a natural tendency to become so, to 
appeal to the secret heart, to ally itself with unknown 
delights, and to win from us epithets in which we recognise 
it as a dream of enchantment.(2)" 
(1) Ibid. p. 139. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Neither :Professor SantayanaTs nor Dallas' hedonistic 
view of art is self- destructive; both are tenable doctrines. 
indeed, if the Freudian pleasure principle is sound, then 
Dallas' theory is remarkably near the truth. Dut, be that 
as it may, no hedonistic theory of art can be adequate; it 
cannot be demonstrated that art and beauty produce a special 
type of pleasure; and that, ultimately, is what the theory 
implies. Immediately the hedonist attempts to differen- 
tiate between pleasures which belong appropriately to art 
and those which do not, he is faced with an impossible 
dilemma. For if he admits on the one hand that pleasures 
differ qualitatively, he is appealing to a criterion other 
than pleasure; on the other hand, if he admits that plea- 
sures then gross physical pleasures 
arising from sex or hunger may be superior to the refined 
intellectual pleasure of the scholar - the pig satisfied, 
to use Mill's instance, would be better than Socrates 
dissatisfied.(1) Careful introspection clearly points to 
the Kantian dogma that the merely 'pleasant' and 'agreeable' 
differ radically from the genuine artistic experience. 
In emphasising this fact, Dallas revealed his acute psycho- 
logical insight and artistic understanding. Pleasure, as 
(1) Cf. Ducasse, C. J., The Philosophy of Art, p. 195. 
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Lord Listowel rightly points out,(l) "is qualitatively 
the same in an act of bestial cruelty, in the delights 
of the palate or in frivóious games, as it is in a moment 
of mystical ecstasy, in the audition of a magnificent 
opera, or in an action of supreme heroism and abnegation 
of self, and for this reason it cannot possibly serve to 
demarcate one type of human experience from another; what 
differs fundamentally in each case, making of man a hero 
or a beast, is, not the naked feeling itself, the bare 
unadorned sense of pleasure, but the internal and external 
causes, conditions and concomitants of the feeling in 
question." ghat is required is a theory of the causes 
of the artistic satisfaction accruing to the artist and 
the spectator alike, a theory that will explain that 
"most vital" element of art - "the element of mystery, 
the sense of the unseen, that possession of the far -away, 
that glimmer of infinity, tnat incommunicable secret, that 
know- not -what," the study of which occupied the mind of 
Dallas. The 'pleasure' which accompanies the art exper- 
ience arises from the totality of subjective undertones, 
of the feeling tones of sensation and of "hidden memories." 
But.these are only epiphenomena, 'subjective accompaniments' 
of the art experience; they are not elements of its 
( 1) Listowel, Earl of, A Critical History of lodern 
Aesthetics, p. 154. 
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essential nature.(1)In the highest and richest moments of 
artistic experience, the stings and ecstasies of life are 
mingled; either may predominate, or both may be balanced 
in a sense of being that rests on the very edge of oblivion. 
"Masterpieces," Ozenfant urges,'2) "are practically never 
pleasing. Their effect upon us is too striking for the 
definition of 'pleasing' to have any true application... 
The truth is that a masterpiece inevitably calls forth 
strong emotion: some feel pleasure because of this emotion, 
but others feel pain: we must have nobility ourselves to 
be able to support grandeur. There are no glorious ascents 
without fatigue, and for that reason the greatest works 
are not pleasing." It ought not to be necessary to em- 
phasise this, but prejudice is so deeply rooted that even 
intelligent and sensitive people, whose experience of art 
includes a painful content, pass it over in theory as an 
inexplicable and irrelevant intrusion which has no right 
of place in what is, or what they conceive ought to be, 
a wholly agreeable and pleasurable indulgence. 
It will be obvious that as long as the classical 
concept of beauty is regarded as the one universal beauty, 
justice cannot be done to the immense field of non -European 
(l) Cf. Hartshorne, Charles, The Philosophy and Psychology 
of Sensation, pp. 107 -189. 
(2) Foundations of iiiodern Art, pp. 303 -304. 
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art, which includes some of the finest creative achievements 
of the human race. But the view that art and (classical) 
beauty are inseparable is so firmly established in the 
European tradition, that any attempt to effect a reorienta- 
tion must encounter (and has encountered) the opposition 
of deep -rooted habits of thought. t_ piece of Polynesian 
pottery, a Hindu dancing Siva, a Greek Apollo: these are 
all unchallengeable works of art; but to describe them 
as beautiful in the ordinary manner of speaking would in- 
volve a ridiculous distortion of language. The approach 
to the study of art must therefore be preceded by a choice 
of alternative standpoints: 
(a) The term "beauty" might be abandoned altogether 
in discussions about art (Croce). 
(B) The Classical concept of beauty might be regarded 
as the highest aim of art, the one ideal to which all art 
aspires (Winckelmann) . 
(C) Beauty might be regarded as an essential though 
fluctuating characteristic of art (Read). 
Now obviously, if (A) be adopted, the ordinary con- 
notation of the term must simply be ignored as too vague 
and ambiguous for exact discourse. This is a perfectly 
legitimate standpoint, since both the phenomenon and the 
theory of art can and do exist independently of beauty. 
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Croce's theory, for instance, might well have been ex- 
pressed without the concept of beauty. tend, it may be 
recalled, Max Müller writes: "I remember Humbolt, when he 
was writing his Kosmos, asking me what the Indians thought 
of the Beautiful in Nature. I gave him several descrip- 
tions of Nature, which I believe he published, but I had to 
tell him that the idea of the Beautiful in Nature did not 
exist in the Hindu mind. It is the same with their des- 
criptions of human beauty. They describe what they saw, 
they'praise certain features; they compare them with other 
features in Nature; but the Beautiful as such does not 
exist for them.(1)" Dr. Armand gives support to this 
view in his study of the theory of Hindu art.(2) "There is 
in the Sanskrit language no exact equivalent for the word 
art as it is used in modern European languages... " rend 
the nearest equivalent to the idea of beauty is the word 
rasa, which is the essential quality of art - "that state 
of bliss through the realisation of the inner worlds of 
faculty and experience which is aroused by the spectacle 
(dramatic, acrobatic, plastic or pictorial) of a rhythmic 
expression and controlled emotion." No one would question 
the existence or the merits of Hindu art. No one need 
(1) quoted from The Bhilosophy of the Beautiful, Knight, W., 
Vol. I, p. 17. 
(2) The Hindu View of Art, pp. 36 and 148. 
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therefore question the propriety of dispensing altogether 
with the term beauty in the discussion of art. Its abo- 
lition from the field of art discourse would obviate a 
great deal of misunderstanding. It must be granted, how- 
ever, (keeping in mind the reservations already expressed 
above) that there is apparently a very close relation 
between the experience of beauty induced by the contempla- 
tion of non- artistic phenomena (e.g. kaleidoscopic designs) 
and that induced by the contemplation of, say, an rabian 
rug. But this relation is superficial; it penetrates no 
deeper than the sense of sight alone can penetrate. Be- 
hind the visual aspect of the rug there is an informing 
sensibility whose operation invests the pattern with emo- 
tional and intuitive values for the spectator and the 
craftsman alike.(1) The rug, unlike the kaleidoscopic 
(1) "It may be objected that many things in nature, such as 
flowers, possess these two qualities of order and variety 
in a high degree, and these objects do undoubtedly stimu- 
late and satisfy that clear disinterested contemplation 
which is characteristic of the aesthetic attitude. But in 
our reaction to a work of art there is something more - 
there is the consciousness of purpose, the consciousness of 
a peculiar relation of sympathy with the man who made this 
thing in order to arouse precisely the sensations we ex- 
perience. And when we come to the higher works of art, 
where sensations are so arranged that they arouse in us 
deep emotions, this feeling of a special tie with the man 
who expressed them becomes very strong. 4e feel that he 
has expressed something which was latent in us all the time, 
but which we never realised, that he has revealed us to 
ourselves in revealing himself. And this recognition of 
purpose is, I believe, an essential part of the aesthetic 
judgment proper.'} Fry, Roger, Vision and Design, pp. 29 -30. 
68 
design, is not the outcome of chance arrangement of parts 
or of mechanical skill, despite its mechanical appearance. 
By banishing the term beauty from the field of art, the 
ground would be cleared to some extent for the psychological 
investigation of the respective contributions of sense, 
apperception, intellect and intuition to the total artistic 
experience. At the moment this task seems well -nigh 
insuperable, but the investigations of rrofessor Charles 
Hartshorne into the "affective continuum" of sensation 
promise a new groundwork from which a fruitful approach 
may be made.(1) 
If (B) be adopted, it will be necessary to prove, with 
reference to the totality of world art, the validity of the 
assumption that all art, irrespective of time or place, 
race or circumstance, aspires to the one ideal as conceived 
by classical man and inherited by his cultural legatees and 
successors. This proposition, it need hardly be emphasised, 
is so ridiculous on the face of it as to be unworthy of 
serious discussion. 
The adoption of (C) clearly involves an extension of 
the ordinary meaning of the term to include much that would 
not be regarded as conforming to the normal concept of 
beauty. In the long run, perhaps, the advantages of such 
(1) Op. cit. 
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a procedure may outweigh the disadvantages. If beauty be 
regarded as a fluctuating phenomenon, as Ir. Herbert Read. 
prefers, the main objection to (A) is overcome by including 
within the connotation of the term the aesthetic qualities 
which language is wont to attribute to non- artistic pheno- 
mena, but the other - and by far the most embarrassing - 
difficulty arising from the confusion of the term beauty 
ith art remains. And, since this has been one of the 
main sources of the confusion existing in the history of 
aesthetic speculation, the conclusion that (A) is the most 
satisfactory course appears to require no advocacy. 
The differentiation of the concepts of 'art' and 
'beauty' is of immense importance to the scientific study 
of art. For it is no longer possible for investigators to 
assume that in studying the nature of beauty as revealed in 
art they are ipso facto studying the nature of art and 
artistic phenomena.(l) Aesthetics, originally the science 
of perception in all its modes and phases, should be restric- 
ted, it is now recognised, to the study of the process of 
perception which yields the experience of beauty. Spinoza, 
Leibniz and Wolff, it will be recalled, had all recognised 
(1) Such an assumption, in fact, is made by most if not all 
the workers in the field of Experimental Aesthetics, and, 
as will be shown in Chapter VI, Professor Spearman is 
guilty of the same error in his book, Creative Mind. 
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an 'obscure' xind of knowledge associated with the passions 
and sense perceptions and available to mind through feeling. 
This type of knowledge was in direct contrast to the science 
and method of Logic, which aimed at clear knowledge. 
Baumgarten (1714 -62), wishing to complete the Leibnizian 
theory, therefore introduced the prior science of sensible 
or "obscure" knowledge which he called Aesthetic - the 
philosophic theory of perceptual knowledge which Kant 
developed in a logic of aesthetic judgment. The term 
'aesthetic,' however, quickly lost its original narrow 
connotation - to perceive by a sense, and especially an 
external sense - Kant being the last to use it as its origi- 
nator had intended. Its current use and connotation, 
though firmly established, is neither etymologically accu- 
rate nor historically justified. Properly speaking, 
aesthetics is the science of sense perception, and although 
it has been mainly concerned with the study of the perception 
of the Beautiful regarded as the characteristic manifestation 
and prior principle of art, it has been found necessary to 
restrict it to its legitimate province and to establish a 
new field for the scientific study of art - the field now 
allotted to the Science of Art or Kunstwissenschaft. 
Now, in contradistinction to the ordinary modes of 
perception (which, as Stout points out,(1) are also modes 
(1) Analytic Psychology, Vol. II, p. 173. 
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of conception) aesthetic perception, in its purest function- 
ing, is a mode of experience which is characterised by its 
objectivity, its preoccupation with the bare sensuous quali- 
ties of things rather than with their meaning and interpre- 
tation in terms of teleological or biological functions. 
To perceive a vase of flowers, in the ordinary manner of 
speaking, (i.e. with a greater or lesser degree of compla- 
cency), is to recognise it as belonging to a class of pheno- 
mena of which some previous experience has been acquired. 
The perceiving process may proceed by the recognition of the 
vase as a particular type of vase (e.g. cut glass) and the 
flowers as particular kinds of flowers (roses, carnations 
etc.). Further, the vase may be recognised as a particular 
make, displaying certain peculiar qualities or features 
which demarcate it from other types; and the flowers may 
be recognised as possessing special horticultural trade 
names. The perceiving process may continue thus until the 
object in all its dominant particularities is fully known 
sensuously and conceptually, the multiplicity of sense 
impressions being organised and reconstructed psychologically 
into the (now) recognised object. But to perceive a vase 
of flowers aesthetically (i.e. as a beautiful object) is to 
be more or less vividly aware of the existence of a particu- 
lar grouping of shapes and colours, textures and masses, to 
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be absorbed, perhaps momentarily transported, by the sheer 
power of the apparition. The processes of abstraction 
essential to cognitive perception are arrested and, for 
the time being, held in abeyance. 
Perception of this category is, of course, comparative 
ly fleeting and ephemeral. And this is true even in the 
case of the man who is specially gifted with the power of 
aesthetic vision, because it involves the involuntary in- 
hibition of those habitual modes of looking at things which 
are the direct result of biological or practical exigency. 
It may be a very rare experience in the life of the ordinary 
man, because, in the course of ills biological history, man 
appears gradually to have lost his capacity for simple in- 
dulgence of his sense of sight - his power of merely 
looking at things. "The needs of our actual life are so 
imperative," states Roger Fry, "that the sense of vision 
becomes highly specialised in their service. With an admir- 
able economy we learn to see only so much as is needful for 
our purposes; but this is in fact very little, just enough 
to recognise and identify each object or person; that done, 
they go into an entry in our mental catalogue and are no 
more really seen. In actual life the normal person really 
only reads the labels as it were on the objects around him 
and troubles no further... It is only when an object 
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exists in our lives for no other purpose than to be seen 
that we really look at it, as for instance at a China 
ornament or a precious stone, and towards such even the 
normal person adopts to some extent the artistic attitude 
of pure vision abstracted from necessity.(l)' 
This simple mode of looking at things, which is the 
most characteristic feature of naive aesthetic perception, 
implies no more than the mere apprehension of certain 
shapes and colours. The accompanying affect may be very 
mild and transitory. But a further and higher stage is 
reached when the perception includes the vivid awareness of 
a harmonious and unified system of relations of forms, 
colours, masses, textures and volumes. Perception of this 
order is, for some as yet obscure psychological or psycho - 
physiological reason, always accompanied by a more or less 
(1) Fry, Roger, Vision and Design, pp., 47 -54. To d.ermine 
exactly where aesthetic perception ends and cognitive per- 
ception begins is, of course, impossible. It would like- 
wise be impossible to prove to a sceptical critic that 
aesthetic perception can exist without some degree of con- 
ceptual thought. Professor Spearman would certainly deny 
the reality of such a power of "naive looking." But the. 
fact that Professor Santayana and ti.oger Fry have in their 
respective theoretical expositions made serious and well - 
founded claims for its recognition is adequate justification 
for putting it forward here as a fairly well established 
psychological fact. Further evidence of course could be 
adduced, e.g. Bell, Clive, Art; Bullough, Ed., "'Psychical 
Distance' as a factor in art and an Aesthetic Principle," 
British Journal of Psychology, Vol. V, pp. 87 -118; Britsch, 
G., Theorie der Bildenden Kunst; and Fiedler, K., tJber die 
Beurteilung von wirken der Bildenden Kunst," Schriften, 
Vol. I, pp. 3 -79. 
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marked hedonic affect. Thus beauty has been variously 
defined as "unity in variety" by the Greeks, "that which 
being seen pleases" (id quod visum placet) by St. Thomas 
Aquinas,(1) and, quite recently, by Mr. Herbert Read, as "a 
unity of formal relations among our sense perceptions.(2)" 
Now a beautiful object may be either (i) a natural 
object (a flower, a crystal); or (ii) it may be a chance 
arrangement of heterogeneous elements; or (iii) a fabrica- 
ted object produced by man (a motor car, an aeroplane, an 
efficient instrument, a piece of jewellery, a picture or a 
design.) But in the aesthetic perception of these objects 
there can be no discrimination as between one and another, 
for each yields in different degree the identical experience 
of beauty. This, however, may be coloured by associations 
of sentiment and emotion which have nothing to do with the 
aesthetic perception per se, but are really subjective 
secondary qualities deriving from the subject's past experi- 
ence and psychological make -up. These elements in the 
total response are not mere additions to the primary 
aesthetic perceptual response; they are quite distinct 
(1) Summa Theologica, I. g. 5 a. 4 ad 1. 
(2) The Meaning of Art, p. 2. 
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concomitants which may be described as secondary(1) 
qualities of the aesthetic experience; or, more shortly, 
secondary aesthetic qualities. 
Aesthetic experience, however, is not limited to 
passive indulgence of the sense of sight; it has an 
active or productive aspect of no less importance than 
the one which has been discussed. 
The productive aesthetic activity may be aroused 
either (a) by a desire to modify that which is perceived in 
order to render it more perfect to vision; or (b) it may be 
aroused in the course of a deliberate productive act. The 
first instance (a) is self -explanatory. The adjustment of 
flowers in a vase, the hanging of pictures, the arrangement 
of furniture or the lay -out of a table: these acts are 
typical of numberless manifestations of the productive 
aesthetic power, which occur almost every hour of the waking 
life of the ordinary man or woman. To many people the 
accomplishment of such acts occasions considerable pleasure, 
just as their omission may be the cause of much psychic 
discomfort or even pain. Aesthetic affective reactions, 
of course, vary immensely as between one individual and 
(1) On the basis of these secondary qualities psychologists 
have distinguished four main types of aesthetic judgment: 
the subjective, the objective, the associative, and the 
character types. Vide C. W. Valentine, The Psychology 
of Beauty, pp. 29 -31 and 81 -83. 
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another, but psychologically the experience is precisely 
the same, whether it be the position of the clock on the 
mantelpiece that is altered or the arrangement of the flowers 
on the table; that is to say, all such productive acts 
arise from dissatisfaction with the "look" of things. 
Where there is no practical motive at work, these altera- 
tions and appropriations from the environment are the 
direct manifestations of the aesthetic power; their goal 
is the satisfaction of the sense of beauty. 
In the second instance (b) the aesthetic power may be 
aroused either (1) in the course of a deliberate effort to 
construct a beautiful object, or (2) it may be aroused 
spontaneously through the conative activity of the organism 
towards some ideal goal or satisfaction. 
(1) That the production of an object capable of yield- 
ing pleasure to the aesthetic sensibility is possible by the 
mere intelliLent application of a few mathematical principles 
is evident to everyone who has studied current textbooks of 
geometrical drawing. Aesthetically pleasing formal designs 
and patterns may even be produced as a result of an idle 
hour's play with compasses and ruler describing arcs and 
drawing curves and breaking up geometrical figures into 
their mathematical subdivisions. 
main, it is possible, by a suitable course of technical 
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discipline in the manipulation of pencil and paint such as 
may be obtained at any art school, to produce drawings and 
paintings of great beauty. The studies of art students are, 
from the purely aesthetic point of view, frequently of a 
very high order in a class of which, at one time, the Aca- 
demy nude was the supreme type. Technical constructions 
of this kind are very often mistaken for works of art. 
(2) The satisfaction of the sense of beauty may be said 
to terminate the purely aesthetic psychological process. 
It is therefore only by recognising the nature, function and 
psychological limitations of the aesthetic power that it is 
possible to speak of it as 'productive.' A great deal of 
confusion has resulted from the long- established habit of 
regarding art as the product of the 'productive' aesthetic 
power. The confusion, of course, is again traceable to 
the predominance of the Greek ideal in European art. Greek 
art was an aesthetic art; beauty was the inevitable result 
of its ideal mode of expression. But beauty was not its 
aim. Indeed, the pursuit of beauty in the so- called Hellen- 
istic period was an outward sign of spiritual decadence. 
When it occurs the coöperation of art and beauty is purely 
fortuitous, and to regard them as constituting an inevitable 
partnership is to court a troublesome fallacy. The spon- 
taneous conative activity of the organism which leads to the 
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production of art is a capricious will o' the wisp. It 
cannot be controlled or directed; its end is not beauty; 
and the experience it yields, though often aesthetic, is 
never merely aesthetic. It is often painful, but it is 
always powerful in its psychological effect. 
Some light may be thrown upon the relation of the 
aesthetic sensibility tO art by considering examples of 
art where it is possible to observe the effects of the 
operation of the aesthetic sensibility upon formal con- 
structions, the existence of which cannot be traced either 
to an aesthetic or artistic aim. 
It is well known that the art of primitive peoples is 
closely connected to what Dr. Kühn, a recent writer on 
' Bushman art, guardedly calls "magical experience. "(1) By 
the symbolic representation of an event the primitive tribes- 
man believes he can bring about its actual occurrence. The 
desire for life after death, for successful sex experience, 
the exorcism or propitiation of inimical spirits - such 
cravings as these are known to constitute the motivating 
impulses behind the creation of many meaningful and express- 
ive symbols upon which an enlightened modern criticism has 
bestowed the title of work of art.(2) Now, many of these 
(1) Kühn, Herbert and Obermaier, Hugo, Bushman Art. 
(2) Cf. Loquet, G. H., "Le réalisme intellectuel dans l'art 
primitif," Journal de Psjchologie, Vol. 24, 1927. 
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artistically significant symbolic representations are from 
the purely aesthetic standpoint very pleasing; they present 
to naive perception a harmonious unity of formal relations. 
But this formal quality cannot be used as a criterion for 
a sheep- and -goat separation of the artistic from the less 
artistic or non -artistic examples of these productions. 
For their aesthetic character when present is merely the 
adventitious result of the felicitous operation of the 
aesthetic sensibility in combination with the deeper in- 
forming spirit, which might (and frequently does) achieve 
objective expression in a formal arrangement aesthetically 
indifferent or even ugly to Western eyes. 
0r again, take Peasant art, which is manifested most 
characteristically in the decorative embellishment of 
commonplace articles of everyday use - pottery, dress, culi- 
nary and technical utensils, furniture, carpets and so on. 
Here, if anywhere, it might be expected, the authentic 
aesthetic sensibility would be found functioning in all its 
pristine glory, in the production of simple harmonious 
forms. But, while it may be granted that Peasant art is 
almost always charming in its direct visual appeal, the 
closer it is studied the more it becomes apparent that be- 
hind the outwardly simple decorative purpose there lies an 
informing spirit whose cosmic suggestiveness immediately 
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links it up with those profound world tendencies and styles, 
which give to art a continuity of life and universal human 
significance. Writing of the "Evolution of Ornament" 
Mr. A. H. Christie points out(1) that "It is difficult to 
find a word to define aptly this (earliest) phase of design. 
To speak generally of all primitive devices and patterns 
as 'ornament' would be misleading. Unqualified use of the 
term at once introduces irrelevant issues, begging the 
questions of origin and purpose by covertly suggesting that 
the first attempts at design were wholly instinctive reac- 
tions to aesthetic impulse. The assumption is widely 
prevalent, but hard to justify. The word 'ornament' puts 
undue stress upon decorative attributes, qualities which 
acquired so long ago an importance they did not always 
possess that they now seem to be the essential purpose of 
all designs... Our obsession with the 'ornamental' idea, 
leading us to read all designs solely as decoration, makes 
it difficult for us to imagine a pattern lacking decorative 
intention. It is easy, however, to cite examples in which 
decorative intention plays a part so subordinate that it 
cannot have been their express purpose." The aesthetic 
sensibility, in other words, is the servant and not the 
..caster of the art impulse. 
(1) Traditional Methods of Pattern Designing,pp. 2 -3. 
81 
The bearing of the foregoing thesis upon aesthetic 
theory will be apparent. It suggests certain limitations 
to the scope and work of the science, which indeed have 
already been recognised to a large extent and put into prac- 
tice by the Science of Art school of thought, notably by 
A. Schmarsow, H. Wölfflin, W. Worringer, E. Utitz and 
M. Dessoir, all of whom advocate the separation of tradi- 
tional aesthetics from the philosophy of art (Philosophie 
der Kunst) and the general science of art (Allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft). Traditional aesthetics, since it has 
confined itself almost entirely to the investigation of ab- 
stract beauty, verifying its hypotheses for the most part' 
by the cold light of reason and by reference. to nature and 
classical art, is patently inadequate, as Utitz maintains,(1) 
to the whole field of art. The science of aesthetics, as 
already pointed out, was conceived at the time of its in- 
ception as a science of sensations to which beauty was limit- 
ed. It was primarily concerned with the immediate sensa- 
tional reaction to the object perceived, with what Dessoir 
calls the " Sinnesgefühle" and the " Formgefühle.'" It would 
appear, then, not only by the circumstances of its origin, 
the historical limitations of its scope, and its obvious 
(1) Utitz, E., Grundlegung der Allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft. 
82 
inadequacy to the wider field of non -European art, that 
there are very sound reasons for limiting the field of aes- 
thetics to the study of the beautiful, whether in art or 
nature, thus erecting a theoretical barrier between it and 
the objective study of art (Kunstwissenschaft or the Science 
of Art) on the one hand, and the philosophy and theory of 
art (die Philosophie der Kunst and die Kunstlehre) on the 
other. 
Aesthetics as conceived by Baumgarten was concerned 
with what might be described in modern terminology as the 
act of intuitive apprehension - the subject of the Aestheti- 
ca, states Bosanquet,(1) " is 'obscure conception' qua 
obscure, that is knowledge in the form of feeling and re- 
maining in that form." 'Obscure' as opposed to 'clear' 
knowledge meant a complex idea, such as a harmony of colour, 
which is incapable of linguistic reproduction. But, con- 
tinues Bosanquet,(2) That the 'confused idea' can have an 
order of its own, which is appreciable to feeling, seems to 
be presupposed in the idea of beauty, and insisted on by 
Baumgarten in his discussion." The sphere of aesthetic 
might then be construed as "the parallel or parody of reason 
in the province of confused knowledge... But (again) it 
(1) History of Aesthetic, p. 183. 
(2) Ibid. p. 184. 
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is not quite clear from this point of view, not as a parall- 
el in the form of feeling to logical processes, that the re- 
gion of the obscure ideas pressed itself on Baumgarten's 
attention. Such a treatment would still make the excellence 
of sensuous perception consist in a form of truth - which 
can only exist in so far as the perception is after all 
interpreted into a judgment, a feeling that 'something is 
so and so.(l)' Baumgarten maintained his distinction more 
(1) Cf. Stace, W. T., The Meaning of Beauty, pp. 20 -21. 
"It is true that the aesthetic experience has often been de- 
scribed, correctly I believe, as a feeling. It is not a 
judgment of the intellect based upon principles. It is 
immediate. But a feeling is not an emotion. A feeling, 
in this sense, is a cognitive act. Thus, in another sphere, 
we say that we feel that a ghost is in the room, or that 
someone is looking at us unseen, or that a man is to be 
trusted or distrusted, or that someone is hostile to us. 
We may explain such feelings as we will. They may be 
"intuitions," or they may be, as I believe they are, sub- 
conscious inferences. But they are certainly cognitive, 
since they contain implicit judgments. Instead of inferr- 
ing, from observations or principles, the truth of the judg- 
ment that A. is not to be trusted, we think that we feel it 
as an immediate conviction. But what we feel convinced of 
is none the less the truth of a judgment and the feeling is 
therefore cognitive. This is quite different from a pure 
emotion, such as fear or anger, which, in so far as it is 
pure, contains no implicit judgment or cognitive element of 
any kind. Or, to put all this in a sentence, an emotion 
as such is not a state of awareness, whereas the feelings 
that a ghost is in the room, or that A. is hostile to us, 
are obviously states of awareness of those facts. It is 
precisely in this sense that the awareness of beauty is 
described as a feeling. It means that I do not infer, 
deductively from any general principles or inductively from 
any observed facts, that a sonata is beautiful. I feel 
that it is beautiful, that is, I am apparently aware of this 
fact by an immediate process. But since it is an aware- 
ness of something, it is cognitive." 
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thoroughly than this... and gives to the perfection of 
sensuous knowledge, i.e. of feeling or sensation, the name 
of beauty, as the manifestation in feeling... of that attri- 
bute which when manifested'in intellectual knowledge is 
called truth.(1)" In other words, beauty for Baumgarten 
is a manifestation of the perfect or the real, which, for 
him as for Wolff,(2) means simply "the mere logical relation 
of the whole to part, or unity in variety;(3)" and, inherit- 
ing the Leibnizian view that the highest degree of perfec- 
tion was that revealed in the existing universe, Baumgarten 
maintained that nature is the highest embodiment of beauty. 
The exact imitation of nature, as the revelation of per- 
fection, must therefore be the supreme function of art. 
This demonstrates his preoccupation with the classical idea 
of beauty and art, an idea which despite its diversity of 
expression dominated the whole of aesthetic speculation 
both before and after Baumgarten in the great idealistic 
systems of the nineteenth century. Aesthetics, being thus 
preoccupied with intellectualistic conceptions of art as 
intuitive philosophy, was forced to ignore primitive and 
non -European art as so devoid of philosophical content and 
(1) History of Aesthetics, p. 184. 
(2) "Beauty may be defined as fitness for pleasing us or as 
obvious perfection." Empirical Psychology. 
(3) History of Aesthetic, p. 185. 
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so inferior in respect of technical accomplishment (i.e. 
resemblance to animate beauty and nature) as to be unworthy 
of discussion alongside the magnificent art of Greece and 
of the High Renaissance. 
A reaction against the abstract principle upon which 
these theories were founded was inevitable. It came about 
in the middle of the nineteenth century with the application 
of the methods of empirical science to the problems of 
aesthetics, and the revival, notably by Spencer and Taine, 
of hedonistic and utilitarian doctrines through biology 
and evolution. This, however, did not involve any breach 
with the traditional acceptance of the supremacy of the 
classical idea of art and beauty, as may be seen in the 
underlying hypothesis of formalistic aesthetic. "The world 
of Classical art," states GJorringer, "and of the later art 
derived from it, has long (since) been the subject of a 
codification of the laws underlying its forms: for what 
we call scientific aesthetic is nothing but (such) a psycho - 
logical interpretation of style applied to Classical works 
of art. The first requirement of Classical art was held 
to be that concept of beauty which aesthetics, despite the 
diversity of its methods of approach, is solely occupied in 
establishing and defining. But, because aesthetics applies 
its results to the totality of art, and believes that it has 
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explained also those artistic facts which have quite other 
presuppositions than this concept of beauty, its usefulness 
becomes detrimental, its authority becomes intolerable 
usurpation. A clear distinction between aesthetics and 
an objective theory of art is therefore the most vital 
necessity in a serious scientific investigation of art. 
To initiate and enforce that separation was Karl Fiedler's 
life task, but the habit of unjustifiably identifying the 
teachings of art and aesthetics - a habit which dates from 
the time of Aristotle and which has increased and spread 
through the centuries - this habit proved stronger than 
Karl Fiedler's clear arguments. He spoke to deaf ears.(U)Tr 
The claim for the differentiation of aesthetics from the 
objective study of art, expressed and reiterated 
by Worringer, is the fundamental tenet of the Science of Art 
school of thought. E. Utitz(2) and rat. Dessoir, 
(3) 
the most 
able exponents of the school, both insist on a sharp divi- 
sion being drawn between aesthetics and the philosophy and 
science of art. 
Now, while the differentiation of art and beauty must 
be insisted upon, it does not appear to be necessary to go 
(1) Form in Gothic, p. 8. 
(2) Grundlegung der Allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft. 
(3) iisthetik und A1.11Lemeine Kunstwissenschaft. 
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so far as Utitz, Dessoir and Worringer in so restricting 
the field of aesthetics as to confine it to the study of 
the cateLory of the beautiful, for it cannot be gainsaid 
that the pure aesthetic experience frequently constitutes 
a most important element in the experience of art, not only 
Classical but non -European. There is no apparently satis- 
factory reason why aesthetics, as a philosophy of beauty, 
should not enter the field of art, while confining its 
scope to the study and investigation of the phenomenon of 
beauty. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that such a 
discipline cannot possibly encompass as part of its work the 
essential nature and spirit of art, which may (and does) 
manifest itself in non -beautiful fabrications, unless beauty 
is divested of its traditional connotation and recognised as 
a fluctuating phenomenon revealing itself in diverse subtle 
and difficult appearances. It could not do justice to the 
totality of world art. Moreover, it would involve a com- 
plete reorientation of the science, necessitating its 
division into two distinct spheres of inquiry - the beauty 
of nature, etc., and the beauty of art - thus adding com- 
plexity to complexity and confusion to confusion. Besides, 
such a procedure would serve no apparently useful purpose, 
for the study of the phenomenon of beauty in whatever sphere 
it manifests itself is a legitimate and proper field of 
philosophic inquiry. 
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Aesthetics, then, must be regarded as the Philosophy 
of Beauty, in the most comprehensive sense of the term. 
Only the Science of Art (the objective study of art as a 
concrete formal achievement of man) and the Philosophy of 
Art (the subjective study of the nature and value of art 
as a characteristic aspect of the human spirit) can do 
justice to the wider and most fundamental aspects of the 
artistic activity.(1) For, through the agency of sense- 
perception, art stretches the mind beyond the range and 
limits of its own understanding to a supra -intellectual, 
transcendental realm of ideals, the intuitive apprehension 
of which brings "the simultaneous peace and delight of the 
mind and the senses." Contrary to the claim of Lord List - 
owel,(2) this view of aesthetics would make it a tributary 
study to the Science and Philosophy of Art. 
The objective approach to art has been fully justified 
by the achievement of the past seventy years. or it is 
only since its inception that the true path of art has been 
discovered. Untrammelled by the polemics of abstract 
philosophy, the rich possibilities of study have been brought 
within the range of complete accomplishment, and the horizon 
of art extended far beyond the limits of classical achieve- 
(1) Vide Table II, p.91. 
(2) Listowel, Earl of, A Critical History of Modern 
Aesthetics, p. 203. 
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ment. It may be asked: When the scientist and philosopher 
of art have passed out of the darkness of ignorance into 
the light of knowledge will the aesthetic philosopher be 
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Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century the 
history of aesthetics followed an uneven and deviating 
course of philosophical and metaphysical speculation. 
The method of inquiry was, of course, predominantly de- 
ductive; that is, it started from a consideration of man's 
moral and intellectual activity, and by a process of de- 
ductive reasoning constructed a system of abstract univer- 
sals comprising the Good, the True and the Beautiful as 
the fundamental and all- embracing realities. Philosophy 
assumes that the universe is accessible to mind as a 
rational and intelligible system; it is 
... the eye with which the universe 
Beholds itself and knows itself divine." 
Hence the problem which philosophical aesthetics sets 
before itself is: "dhat is the ultimate nature of Beauty 
and what is its relation to mind? 
It is doubtful whether in ancient thought there was any 
clear recognition of beauty as a discrete and independent 
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mode of experience,(l) for although Plato leaves no doubt 
as to his conviction that beauty exists in itself as an 
"idea," he nevertheless subordinates art to morality and 
urges that art should be encouraged only because of its value 
as an instrument for the attainment of the ultimate purpose 
of existence - the idea of the Good.(2) This confusion 
of values runs through the whole history of aesthetics. 
Plato's aesthetic is both metaphysical and general. 
It is metaphysical in that it is concerned solely with 
beauty as a universal law operating independently of human 
existence; it is general(3) in that it embraces the whole 
range of aesthetic feeling, artistic and non -artistic. He 
attempts, however, to formulate the notion of art, but, in 
regarding it as the mere imitation of physical appearances, 
he shows that he fails to grasp its true meaning as an 
independent and fundamental mode of human activity. 
If art is accorded a relatively subordinate place in 
the aesthetic speculation of Plato, it receives independent 
(1) Bosanquet, B., History of Aesthetic, pp. 10 -11. 
Knight, W., The Philosophy of the Beautiful, p. 19. 
"Probably no nation ever felt that the True, the Beautiful 
and the Good are one, in the same instinctive way that the 
Greeks felt it..." 
(2) Republic, Book III, pp. 96 -97 (Trans. Davies and. Vaughan) 
(3) This term is used here to distinguish "General Aesthetic$' 
from the Theory of Art (Kunstwissenschaft), a distinction 
which modern writers have found it necessary to make in 
order to separate artistic from non -artistic aesthetic ex- 
perience. 
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consideration by Aristotle. Although he does not recognise 
a philosophy of the Beautiful, his recognition of'art as 
an independent province of philosophical inquiry may be 
regarded as the first movement towards the foundation of 
an objective theory of art which foreshadows the more exact 
" Kunstwissenschaft" of contemporary aesthetics. For him 
art is imitation, but, contrary to the Platonic view, art 
is not the mere imitation of physical appearances, but of 
the "idea" of the universal and typical aspects of things. 
He also recognises the element of phantasy or imagination 
in art, regarding it as the idealising activity of the ar- 
tist, but he is no more successful than Plato in establish- 
ing the right relationship between this and the imitating 
sees the Beautiful and the Good 
overlap each other to a certain extent, he endeavours not 
to confuse them: the Good is realised in action only; the 
Beautiful, on the other hand, exists in repose. He further 
distinguishes the Beautiful from the Useful by pointing out 
that the contemplation of the Beautiful is disinterested and 
free from the desire to possess.(1) Aristotle's method is 
preeminently objective; and, although he "lacks an intimate 
personal relation to art," he investigates the works of art 
(1) 
Vide Kant's "form of teleolo gy without the idea of an end." 
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themselves, skilfully analysing their concrete elements, 
technical peculiarities and psychological antecedents; he 
inaugurates a method of approach to be revived and devel- 
oped by the English school of empirical psychology in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In effect, his doct- 
rine is an extension of the metaphysical treatment of the 
subject by Plato, but his actual theoretical achievement is 
little in advance of earlier speculation. Despite this, 
however, his psychological analysis of art a posteriori is 
a permanently valuable contribution to aesthetics and an 
important step towards the philosophic preparation of the 
ground for the fuller development of the science. 
The first important departure from the moralistic 
in theory(1) may be attributed 
to Plotinus (c. 205 -270), who rejects the Platonic conception 
of art as mere imitation of commonplace realities of 
(1) "The moralistic criterion," states Bosanqu.et, 
(History of Aesthetic, p.11), "arose from the principle 
that an artistic representation could not be treated 
as different in kind or in aim from a reality of ordinary 
life." 
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sense- perception,(1) and recognises that behind the 
sensuous form there is something of deeper significance 
and value. He is interested both in the productive aspect 
of the artistic activity and the intrinsic value of pleas - 
ure,(2) and refuses to renounce material beauty, regarding 
it as the physical (sensuous)(3) embodiment of divine 
(objective) reason, which is the self -animating formative 
influence (the absolute beauty) that raises formless 
matter to form (beauty). Accordingly, art is not imitative 
but expressive; it is not the mirrored reflection of 
perception, but the symbolic embodiment of intelligence 
acting upon and unifying matter, in itself amorphous and 
(1) "But if anyone censure the arts on the ground that their 
only copy the originals 
that natural objects, too, are copies of an Original. And 
further, we must recognise that the arts do not merely copy 
the visible world, but ascend to the principles on which 
nature is built up; and further, that many of their crea- 
tions are original. For they certainly make good the 
defects of things, as having the source of beauty in them- 
selves. Thus Pheidias did not use any visible model for 
his Zeus, but apprehended him as he would appear if he 
deigned to show himself to our eyes." Enneads: Philoso- 
phies of Beauty, E. F. Carritt, p. 48. 
(2) "What is it," he asks, "which opens the eyes of those 
who behold it, and attracts them, nay compels them toward 
itself, and makes them rejoice in the vision of it ?" 
Enneads. Ibid. p. 44, Cf. Plotinus, On the One and Good, 
Trans. by McKenna and Page, VI, 7, 29. 
(3) He also attributes a high value to the beauty of colour. 
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therefore ugly; and aesthetic interest consists in the 
soul's vision, by the "inward eye," of the ideal, the 
absolute beauty which the phenomenal and material world 
but dimly shadows forth. Further, art is superior to 
nature because it represents ideas of which natural things 
are the incomplete copies.(1) 
This almost mystical theory - a reaction from the 
severe analysis of matter -of -fact experience of Aristotle - 
is clearly an advance towards a comprehensive theory of 
aesthetics. Behind it there is a recognition of the real 
meaning of art, and the necessity for some connecting link 
between material and ideal beauty. This link, however, 
Plotinus has been unable to supply. But his theory in- 
augurates a break -away from the moralistic criterion, Beauty 
being given a coördinate place with the Good in the system 
of ultimate realities. The contribution of Plotinus is, 
then, notable in that it marks the first fruitful attempt 
to escape from the limitations of Greek theory, foreshadow- 
ing the modern conception of artistic idealisation. "The 
definite antagonism of the sensuous and spiritual world," 
states Bosanquet, "... meant the disintegration of ancient 
thought, and the genesis of what on the grand scale of world 
(1) A point of view revived in slightly different form 
by Schopenhauer. 
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history may fairly be called the modern mind.(l ) 
The long period between Plotinus and Kant's immediate 
predecessors, embracing the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, 
is peculiarly lacking in any noteworthy contribution to 
aesthetic theory. That this hiatus is not due to any 
backwardness in the aesthetic sensibility of the age is 
patent from the immensity and the merit of its artistic 
productions. Rather is it due to the very strength of the 
creative impulse itself and the urgency of the other prob- 
lems with which the mind of the period had to struggle in 
adjusting itself to the new conditions of life. The specu- 
lations of the Christian fathers bring no noteworthy contri- 
butions to the science; neither do the theoretical dis- 
cussions of the great masters like Leonardo la Vinci, 
Cenninni and Michelangelo. Augustine's opposition to the 
things of the world led him, even more vehemently than 
Plato, to reject art altogether as detrimental to the higher 
life and spirit of man. But the period of the Middle Ages 
is not barren of import in the history of aesthetics, for, 
although the predominating cultural influence of the age 
was not favourable to the progress of creative activity, 
it nevertheless supported art by establishing the supremacy 
(1) History of Aesthetics, p. 119. 
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of the Spirit over the Flesh and the Devil. And in supply- 
ing the material of art criticism it promoted and rendered 
possible the fuller development of the science in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Bosanquet shows(1) that two distinct tendencies, not 
fundamentally antithetic to each other, mark the early 
stages of philosophic speculation which prepared the aes- 
thetic problem in its modern form; (a) a "universal" 
tendency, which asserts that the universe is essentially a 
rational system capable of abstract intellectual analysis, 
and (b) an "individual" tendency, which starts from individ- 
ual feeling or sense -perception and requires that the theory 
of reality shall be derivative from what this is supposed 
to announce. The first, although emanating from Descartes 
(1596 -1650) is preeminently characteristic of pre-Kantian 
thought in Germany represented in the systems of Spinoza 
(1632 -1677), Leibniz (1646 -1716), Wolff(1679 -1764) and 
Baumgarten (1714- 1762); the second is predominantly 
British, starting with Bacon (1561- 1626), then Locke (1632- 
1704), Shaftesbury (1670 -1713), Berkeley (1685 -1753) to 
Hume (1711 -1776). In earlier speculation both tendencies 
had asserted themselves as logical complements, but they 
were never clearly differentiated and did not come into 
(1) Ibid. p. 170. 
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conflict either in the naturalistic thought of Greece or 
in the self- conscious reason of Christendom, in which the 
problems of the soul were brought into the focus of atten- 
tion. But in modern thought the thinking, feeling and per- 
ceiving subject is the common point of orientation for both 
lines of thought which converge upon Kant (1724 -1804), in 
whose hands aesthetics emerges from the cramping influence 
of an abstract intellectualism, on the one hand, and a no 
less abstract empirical sensationalism on the other. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries aes- 
thetics passes through a new phase of development - in Eng- 
land under the influence of the empirical psychologists, 
who seek to analyse aesthetic feeling psychologically, and 
in Germany under the influence of Baumgarten and Kant. 
The demarcation of Aesthetics from Logic and Ethics 
constitutes the principal contribution of Baumgarten to 
aesthetic science. Adopting the Leibniz- Wolffian theory 
of knowledge, he identifies the Beautiful with the Perfect 
and defines it as the apprehension of Perfection through 
the senses; or perfect sense - knowledge. Aesthetic 
judgment becomes an intellectual act. In the hands of Kant 
Baumgarten's theory of 'obscure' knowledge (Verworrene 
Vorstellungen) is developed into a logic of aesthetic 
judgment. 
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In opposition to the "dogmatic" philosophy of Wolff 
and Leibniz, Kant begins critically to examine man's 
rational faculties in order to establish the principles of 
knowledge on an a priori basis, since he holds that there 
can be no theoretic certainty about the ultimate nature of 
reality. He maintains that man has a knowledge of nature 
outside of himself and also knowledge of himself as a 'part 
of nature. The first is the concern of pure reason and 
its aim is truth (science); the second is the concern of 
practical reason and its aim is goodness (morality). In 
addition to these two forms of knowledge he recognises a 
judgmèntal mode (aesthetic), which judges independently of 
reason and produces pleasure from which practical desire 
and utilitarian are wholly excluded. In his 
three monumental works, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), 
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique of 
Judgment (1790) he discusses the three equally important 
departments of philosophy, "each of which has its own a 
priori principles.(1)" 
The historical importance of Kant's aesthetic may be 
attributed firstly to his denial of the objective existence 
of beauty. "The judgment of taste is ... not a judgment 
of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetica] 
(1) Letter to Reinhold. 
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by which we understand that whose determining ground can 
be no other than subjective.(1)" Secondly, to his asser- 
tion that the beautiful pleases "ohne Interesse," because 
in perceiving it the mind is free from all thought of the 
real existence of the object and from practical relation 
to it. A beautiful object is not pronounced beautiful 
because of any desire to possess it, but only because of the 
desire to be in its presence and to enjoy it in an act of 
pure contemplation. "The satisfaction which we combine 
with the representation of the existence of an object is 
called interest.(2) Such satisfaction always has reference 
to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground 
or as necessarily connected with its determining ground. 
Now when the question if a thing beautiful, do not 
want to know whether anything depends or can depend on the 
existence of the thing either for myself or for anyone else, 
but how we judge it by mere observation (intuition or 
reflection).(3)" Thirdly, to his claim that the subjective 
(1) 
Kant's Kritik of Judgment, Trans. Bernard, pp. 45 -46. 
(2) The term 'interest' is defined as pleasure in the idea of 
the existence of the object and is contrasted with pleasure 
in the presentation or sensuous idea of the object. Vide 
Bosanquet, History of Aesthetic, p. 263. 
(3). Kritik of Judgment, op. cit., p. 47. 
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validity of beauty is universal on the ground that the 
beautiful is the object of a universal pleasure, since the 
faculties of all men are essentially the same. "This 
merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the object, or 
of the representation by which it is given, precedes the 
pleasure in the same, and is the ground of this pleasure 
in the harmony of the cognitive faculties; but on that 
universality of the subjective conditions for judging of 
objects is alone based the universal subjective validity 
of the satisfaction bound up by us with the representation 
of the object that we call beautiful... The pleasure that 
we feel is, in a judgment of taste, necessarily imputed by 
us to every one else; as if, when we call a thing beautiful, 
it is to be regarded as a characteristic of the object which 
is determined in it according to concepts; though beauty, 
without a reference to the feeling of the subject, is 
nothing by itself.(1)" Fourthly, to his assertion that 
the judgment of beauty is independent of concepts. "The 
beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented 
as the object of a universal satisfaction... This explana- 
tion of the beautiful can be derived from the preceding 
explanation of it as the object of an entirely disinterested 
(1) Ibid. p. 65. 
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satisfaction. For the fact of which every one is conscious, 
that the satisfaction is for him quite disinterested, 
implies in his judgment a ground of satisfaction for all 
men. For since it does not rest on any inclination of 
the subject (nor upon any other premeditated interest), but 
since the person who judges feels himself quite free as 
regards the satisfaction which he attaches to the object, 
he cannot find the ground of this satisfaction in any 
private conditions connected with his own subject; and 
hence it must be regarded as grounded on what he can pre- 
suppose in every other person. Consequently he must be- 
lieve that he has reason for attributing a similar satis- 
faction to every one. He will therefore speak of the 
beautiful, beauty a characteristic the object 
and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the 
Object by means of concepts of it); although it is only 
aesthetical and involves merely a reference of the represent - 
ation of the object to the subject: For it has this simi- 
larity to a logical judgment that we can presuppose its 
validity for all men. But this universality cannot arise 
from concepts; for from concepts there is no transition to 
the feeling of pleasure or pain (except in pure practical 
laws, which bring an interest with them such as is not 
bound up with the pure judLAent of taste). Consequently 
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the judgment of taste, accompanied with the consciousness 
of separation from all interest, must claim validity for 
every man, without this universality depending on Objects. 
That is, there must be bound up with it a title to sub- 
jective universality.(l)" The predicate of the aesthetic 
judgment is the feeling of pleasure, but when the predicate 
is not this feeling but a relation to the idea of an end, 
the judgment is not aesthetic but teleological. And 
finally, to his insistence on the complete autonomy of the 
artistic mental power and his recognition of aesthetics as 
an independent philosophical science. 
Kant's system is the culminating point of a long pro- 
cess of philosophic preparation, but it is to him more than 
to anyone else that true and 
thetics owes its existence. He owes much to the Leibnizian 
school of Baumgarten, to lendelssohn and to Hume; but while 
these philosophers set him his problem he nevertheless 
brings to his task of reconstructing philosophy on an a 
priori basis a penetrating and original mind, which enables 
him to originate those major problems which occupy his 
successors up to the present time. The aesthetic question 
"How can a pleasurable feeling partake of the character of 
(1) Ibid. p. 55-56. 
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reason ? "(1) which urges itself upon him, is the direct ante- 
cedent of the more immediate problem of to -day, the problem 
concerning the aesthetics of form and of expression. This 
has run through the whole history of aesthetic theory, but 
it had not been clearly formulated until the appearance of 
Kant on the philosophic stage. If his answer is limited 
to a "negative and generic assertion of the beautiful," and 
if he is guilty of illogical inferences and inconsistency, 
he may nevertheless be credited with laying down once and 
for all the fundamental principles of a sound and compre- 
hensive aesthetic theory. 
But Kant only points out the way of aesthetics. In 
the hands of the formalists aesthetics leaves the narrow 
path of speculative philosophy and enters the field of psy- 
chology, where it becomes an observational and experimental 
science, aiming at precise analysis. The genesis of this 
movement may be traced (a) to the influence of the empirical 
psychologists in Britain, notably Francis Hutcheson (1694- 
1747), David Hartley (1705 -1757), David Hume (1711 -1776) 
and Edmund Burke (1729 -1797); and (b) to Kant's own pupil, 
J. G. Herder (1744- 1803), who vigorously opposed his 
master's idea of formal (objective)(2) beauty, arguing 
(1) Bosanáuet, B., history of Aesthetic, p.173. 
(2) Kant was not consistent in the exposition of his subjec- 
tive view of beauty, for not only does he recognise an ob- 
jective beauty - the beauty of form (cf. e.g. "Analytic of 
the Sublime," 48), but also introduces the idea of purpos- 
iveness, maintaining that the highest end of beauty is to 
symbolise the good. 
106 
that form as such is not of the essence of beauty but only 
the sensuous mode of expressing a deeper meaning. Herder's 
emphasis of feeling rather than reason gives an impetus to 
the movement of psychological analysis, but its development 
is early checked by the metaphysical aesthetic of the Ger- 
man idealists, especially Fichte (1762 -1814), Hegel (1770- 
1831) and Schelling (1775 -1854). With Herbart (1776- 
1841), however, the movement is revived. He is dissatis- 
fied with the abstract aesthetic of the idealists, particu- 
larly Fichte and Schelling, and seeks a more precise and 
definite statement of the formal conditions of beauty in 
the work of art itself. As a follower of Kant he believes 
in the subjectivity of beauty and its universal objective 
validity, but since pure form consists of abstract rela- 
tions, it is the work of aesthetic science to investigate 
these, first in their simplest and most elementary mani- 
festations and then in their more complex and diversified 
compositions. The task of investigating these aesthetic 
elementary factors (ästhetische elementaren Theile) is 
first attempted by G. T. Fechner (1834 -1887), who claims 
that the study of aesthetics ought to be prosecuted as an 
independent empirical science. Henceforward, in contrast 
to the traditional deductive and metaphysical treatment of 
the subject, aesthetics adopts a method which is preeminent- 
ly inductive and psychological. 
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purely speculative aesthetics based upon philoso- 
phical and metaphysical hypotheses belongs to the realm of 
pure knowledge; that is, it has no end beyond knowledge of 
the first principles of the aesthetic order as an aspect 
of being. Its limitations are therefore those of the specu- 
lative mind itself. It is abstract, reflective. Beyond 
the formulation of vague and highly disputable abstract 
hypotheses it cannot go. This is abundantly clear from 
the history of speculative aesthetics from Socrates to 
Croce, for, despite more than two thousand years of system- 
atic inquiry, very little advance has been made since the 
early Greek thinkers recognised beauty as presenting a prob- 
lem for philosophic investigation. R recent writer points 
out(1) that both in Germany and in England the following 
views may be found: (1) Beauty is a thing in itself and 
is not discoverable in an attribute of another thing. 
This view, originally expressed by Plato, was elaborated 
by Baumgarten, Kant and their followers in Germany and France 
and by the Intuitionalists in England. (2) Beauty can be 
analysed into elements such as order, symmetry and definite- 
ness. This view was set forth by Aristotle and enlarged 
by Herbart, Eessing and the Formalists in England. (3) Plo- 
tinus suspected that the ideas, or the intelligence, of the 
(1) Bird, r.ilton, Study in Aesthetics, pp.5 -6. 
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artist had something to do with the expression of beauty. 
Schelling and Hegel agree with him. Throughout this long 
period beauty occupies the same threefold hierarchy as it 
did,with the Greeks, and two thousand years later Bain's 
analysis of the aesthetic emotion agrees with Aristotle's. 
As these views are expressed, they are inconsistent with 
each other; the confusion remains, and the solution of the 
problem is yet to be found. 
Throughout the long history of aesthetics repeated re- 
actions have occurred against the quest a priori for first 
principles, as, for instance, in Aristotle against the ideal- 
ism of Plato, and in Herbart against the idealism of Fichte 
and the absolutism of Schelling, and more recently in the 
aesthetics of the psychological school against the ideal- 
istic philosophy of the great post -Kantian systems. Prior 
to the beginnings of experimental psychology, in particular 
the experimental work of Fechner, these reactions failed to 
produce any permanent results. But the need of a psycholo- 
gical basis for aesthetic became increasingly obvious with 
the growth of the new psychological method and the rapid 
development of art research. In this connection the works 
of Lipps and Volkeldt are by far the most important contri- 
butions which have as yet been made to psychological 
aesthetics. 
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The new aesthetics starts from the actual aesthetic 
experience of man as manifested in his spontaneous creative 
activities and his universal recognition and appreciation 
of aesthetic products. Instead of taking the object of 
art as its point of orientation, it begins on the one hand 
with the psychological antecedents of the productive artist- 
ic activity, the artistic psychic state in all its phases 
throughout the complete cycle of creative effort, and on the 
other, with the condition of mind in which the object is 
felt or recognised as belonging to that class of things 
known as works of art. It is concerned to investigate 
both the productive as well as the receptive aspects of the 
artistic activity, and it seeks to gather together and to 
probe all the relevant facts relating to the artistic 
activity, availing itself of the researches in ethnology, 
anthropology, folk -psychology, sociology and related sciences; 
and aims at a complete psychological theory of art and 
artistic development. 
But just as abstract metaphysical aesthetic produced a 
reaction which led to the foundation of the psychological 
school, so the psychological school caused a revolt which 
resulted in the foundation of the Science of Art school of 
research by the Bavarian architect G. Semper. The former 
is primarily concerned with the experiencing subject; the 
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latter with the material object. In contemporary theory 
the latter predominates. It is concerned to trace the 
fundamental factors which have produced the various historic 
world- styles and to reconstruct the essential motivating 
spirit of these different modes of artistic creation. It 
strives to disentangle the numerous determinants of art by 
an objective study of the actual conditions of life under 
which the great styles were produced, to relate these to 
individual productions by an objective examination of all the 
relevant facts, social, climatic, geographic, religious, 
technical, intellectual, psychological and philosophical, 
which operate on the creative mind, and to establish the 
underlying laws of artistic evolution. The Science of Art 
is, therefore, far wider in its scope and aims than Art His- 
tory. According to Schmarsow, one of the foremost adherents 
of the school, the history of art merely furnishes Kunst- 
wissenschaft with part of its data, the rest being supplied 
by the researches into the earliest(1) manifestations of art 
in the child and among primitive peoples. 
One aspect of modern theory demands special notice: 
the distinction which it has been found necessary to make 
between all those non- artistic modes of aesthetic perception, 
such as feelings for tone, colour and shape, that are in no 
(1) Zeitschrift für 1sthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissen- 
schaft, Bd. II, p. 307. 
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way connected with art, and the Theory of Art as the ordered 
expression of deep- seated feelings and intuitions. This 
distinction renders it possible to mark off two fundamental- 






which is the concern of General Aesthetics, and 
of artistic perception and creation, which is 
of the Theory and the Science of Art. 
In brief, while contemporary aesthetics, in contrast 
to the past, advances as an independent science having its 
own subject -matter, it comprises four principal branches 
of inquiry, whose subdivisions may be classified under the 
heads Subjective and Objective, according as they are con- 
cerned with the experiencing subject or the material object; 
Philosophical Aesthetics, which is purely speculative; 
Psychological Aesthetics, which is empirical and analytical; 
Kunstwissenschaft, or the Science of Art; and Kunstlehre, 
or the Theory of Art. (Table II). Although these differ- 
ent branches inevitably overlap each other, their boundaries 
are more or less clearly defined within the total field of 
theoretical discourse. Compared with the past, the scope 
and methods of the science have developed immensely as a 
result of the growth of the science itself and the vast 
additional knowledge furnished by research; but it is 
doubtful whether the very wealth of its resources and the 
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numerous divisions of inquiry do not constitute a danger to 
its inner unity, upon which its life and progress as an 
independent science depend. 
This is a danger, however, that threatens the whole of 
contemporary science, which tends more and more to divide 
into numerous restricted sciences, each with its own con- 
cepts and special problems. Unless the progress of the 
various sciences is accompanied by a corresponding progress 
in philosophy, the complete disintegration of culture is in- 
evitable. For, as Professor Whitehead has pointed out, 
"Philosophy is not one among the sciences with its own 
little scheme of abstractions which works away at perfecting 
and improving. It is the survey of sciences, with the 
special objects of their harmony and of their completion. 
It brings to this task not only the evidence of the separate 
sciences, but also its own special appeal to concrete ex- 
perience. It confronts the sciences with concrete fact. "(1) 
The vast and ever- increasing material of art researches, 
however, renders integration and coördination difficult of 
achievement. Specialised scientific research must 'continue 
in order to bring to light all the relevant facts; but 
these must be unified and harmonised in a single comprehens- 
(1) Whitehead, A. N., Science and the Modern World, Cheap 
Edition, p. 108. 
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ive philosophic system embracing every aspect of the 
artistic problem before aesthetics can be placed alongside 
the greater systems of cosmology. 
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CHkPTER IV. 
ápproaches to the Problem of .ñrtistic Creativity. 
ClTA PTER IV. 
Hirn observes that in the palmy days of philosophical 
aesthetics conditions were eminently favourable to universal 
l' 
generalisations. Classical antiquity and the Renaissance - 
the great periods of art - were so remote that only their 
simplest and most salient features were discernable. Art 
had not yet manifested that bewildering multiplicity which 
later research was to reveal. Savage art was practically 
unknown. Beauty, art, the ideal - these and all other 
general notions were suggested with unsurpassable simplicity 
by the apparent uniformity of artistic achievement. The 
eagerness and delight with which the early aestheticians 
formulated laws and drew conclusions is therefore easy to 
understand. And it was inevitable that, ás the province 
of art widened and its products became more differentiated, 
speculation would be checked by the recognition that many 
of the characteristic features of art could not be harmon- 
ised with the general formulae enunciated by speculative 
philosophy.(1) 
X11 Hirn, Y., The Origins of Art, p. 5. 
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The advent of Modern Art, coupled with the rapid 
development of anthropology, sociology, modern psychology 
and kindred sciences in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, prepared the way for a new orientation in aesthet- 
ic inquiry. This began by a change of attitude and out- 
look, which resulted in the disparagement of abstract spec- 
ulation based upon a priori beliefs and the inauguration of 
a method of inquiry which concentrated on concrete facts and 
first -hand experience. Scientific procedure replaced the 
dialectical treatment of the problem by the great philosoph- 
ers. Art ceased to be regarded as something to be deduced 
from the fundamental principles of philosophy and metaphysics 
and was approached from the standpoint of psychology as a 
specific human activity of the first magnitude, deriving its 
power from the deepest sources of psychic energy and ful- 
filling a primordial need of life. As such, its title to 
be treated as a special sphere of scientific research 
could not be contested. 
Unless art is an activity arising from the fundamental 
psychic needs of mankind, its existence would be nothing 
short of a miracle. Every investigation into the psycho- 
logical nature of art must be founded on this fact. Ethno- 
logical and anthropological research show the close relation' 
between art and the religious and magical life of primitive 
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peoples, and it is not difficult to discern in the works of 
the great masters the living substance of thought and ex- 
perience which they embody. Yet this obvious fact is only 
the point of departure for a psychological study of art. 
The investigator must reckon with the immense variability of 
human experience and the diversity of styles and modes of 
artistic expression in every quarter of the globe and every 
stage of its history. He must study the manifold condi- 
tions of life which lead to artistic production, endeavour- 
ing to trace the connections between the subjective facts 
and the concrete products of art, and. attempting to dis- 
cover, if possible, from the mass of evidence, historical, 
social, technical and psychological, the fundamental 
determinants of artistic expression. 
Such a task must involve numerous difficulties and en- 
cumbrances. In every aspect of his inquiry the investigat- 
or is hampered by the insufficiency of reliable evidence and 
the inadequacy of the technical methods of research at his 
disposal. The history of art is, for the most part, only 
a fragmentary and disjointed account of artistic products 
distributed over the face of the earth; it throws little 
light upon the conditions of which these products are the 
objective expression. The history of peoples is but the 
fringe of a vast domain which can never be fully explored. 
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Psychology is only beginning to establish its right of 
place alongside the great physical sciences, whose methods 
it is wont to employ and whose fundamental aims it shares. 
Its very subject- matter is still in dispute. Bullough 
points out that much detail, observation and record have 
been amassed, but that there has been little coördination 
of this material. Particularly has there been a lack of 
a "common stock" of knowledge; and he rightly emphasises 
that little progress can be hoped for without such a stock 
of common and accepted truths.(1) 
The fugitive and capricious nature of the artistic 
impulse precludes the possibility of subjecting it to exact 
methods of psychological analysis. It cannot be produced 
at will. Although anything capable of inducing an emotion- 
al attitude or affective state in the artist may arouse the 
activity instantaneously, it may, on the other hand, be the 
culminating point of a long process of mental preparation, 
conscious or unconscious, in which a whole complex of 
emotions, strivings, and desires are brought to a conative 
climax in a passionate act of formal expression. The 
executive act itself may occupy only a few hours of frenzied' 
spontaneous effort or many months of more or less painful 
struggle, during which the original motivation may undergo 
(1) Bullough, E., "The Relation of Aesthetics to Psychology,'" 
British Journal of Psychology, Vol. X, Nov. 1919, p.45. 
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numerous metamorphoses. Additional factors, themselves 
/non- artistic, are liable to invade the creative conscious- 
ness, modifying and colouring the whole character of the 
artist's activity and output. 
Two ineradicable difficulties, however, handicap the 
investigator at every point: on the one hand, the fatal 
limitations of his own artistic creative endowment, which 
preclude the possibility of that sympathetic insight from 
which alone a true and penetrating understanding of the 
artistic process may be gained; and on the other, the 
artist's proverbial inability to furnish an exact and trust- 
worthy account of his experience. 
Usually a philosopher or a scientist, the investigator's 
outlook is that of the logician, the physicist, the chemist; 
his interests and attitudes are fundamentally opposed to 
those of the creative artist; he seeks to analyse and to 
understand, whereas the artist is content to enjoy appear- 
ances for their own sake, to contemplate and create anew. 
Unlike the artist, who is primarily concerned with intuitive 
perceptions of things, of the world, time, space and eter- 
nity, the scientist and philosopher are preoccupied with 
abstract ideas and ultimate realities, with concepts which 
can be expressed in words and conventional symbols and 
communicated to their kind. In order, therefore, to 
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investigate and describe - and it is the aesthetician's 
business to investigate and describe - the nature of art and 
the artistic activity, he must project himself, as it were, 
into the mind and body of the artist in an endeavour to 
comprehend the physical and mental experience accompanying 
the creative process, or else rely upon doubtful testimony 
and limited data. The degree of success attending this 
effort must depend in the long run upon the artistic insight 
and sympathetic rapport of the investigator, but unless he 
is unusually gifted his observations are not likely to carry 
much authority. For, apart from the diversity of individual 
experience, the immensity of the gap between the elementary 
artistic impulse and the supremest moments of creative 
activity must conceal ingredients which the elementary 
impulse cannot possibly bring to the threshold of consciou- 
ness; these must for ever remain part of the privileged 
experience of the artist. 
The psychologist's source of evidence concerning the 
subjective aspect of the problem must always be the artist. 
He alone is in a position to speak of the higher creative 
activity at first hand. Yet it is just here where the 
experience is richest that the evidence is weakest, for few 
artists are by disposition and mental equipment capable of 
carrying out accurate introspective analyses of their mental 
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states. Their testimony, as ïvieumann shrewdly notes,(1) 
is usually psychologically inexact and too frequently 
coloured by prejudice. Adolf Hildebrand's Jas Problem 
der Form in der bildenden Kunst, for instance, is, accord- 
ing to iieumann, richer in reflection than exact observation 
and psychological insight. But, apart altogether from 
that, it is important to emphasise that immediately the 
artist turns from his creative activity to analyse his 
mental experience, the very thing he wishes to examine 
instantly vanishes. The creative experience is an all - 
absorbing one; it drains the mental energy into a single 
channel, leaving little trace of its operations in conscious 
memory. Consequently introspection, especially when it is 
unskilled, is an exceedingly difficult and clumsy affair: 
in the case of the artist it is liable to be little more 
than a mere account of what he thinks he ought to have felt 
rather than what he actually did. 
Furthermore, the creative activity is an individual 
experience; it is an activity which manifests itself diff- 
erently wherever it operates. No two artists enjoy ident- 
ical experiences; no two artists go to work in the same way 
or in the same frame of mind. Each displays a tendency to 
react strongly to particular phenomena, to create a particul- 
(I) Meumann, E., äisthetik der Gegenwart, p. 101. 
121 
ar form and composition, a characteristic Gestalt; each has 
his own peculiarities of style, technique and orientation. 
Whereas one artist will proceed by slow progressive stages, 
during which his creation gradually unfolds itself before 
his vision, another will proceed as in a frenzy of passion 
and agitation, achieving his aim with spontaneous rapidity 
and directness. 
There are works of art, Jung points out,(U which pro- 
ceed wholly from the artist's intention and resolve to 
produce specific effects. The author submits his material 
to definitely directed and purposeful treatment, adding to 
it and subtracting from it, emphasising this and modifying 
that effect, constantly observing the laws of style and 
form. He brings to his labours his keenest judgment, re- 
garding his material as subject to his will and purpose, an 
instrument in his hand; so that his artistic activity is 
identical with the creative process, whether he surrenders 
himself as the head of the creative movement, or whether 
the creative movement has seized upon him as a tool or instru. 
ment. There are other works of art, however, which flow 
more or less spontaneously and perfectly from the artist's 
hand. These works positively impose themselves upon their 
creators, bringing with them their own form, forcing the 
pli Contributions to Analytical Psychology, pp. 234 -236. 
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artist to add what he would decline and withhold what he 
would fain include. Before his own production he stands 
disconcerted and amazed, yet secretly recognising the em- 
bodiment of his own thoughts and hidden utterances. He 
merely obeys an apparently alien impulse, feeling that his 
work is greater than himself. He is not identical with 
the creative process, he stands, as it were, a spectator - 
as though he were another person who had fallen within the 
magic circle of an alien will. 
If there is anything, then, in psychological experi- 
ence corresponding to the concept of a characteristic ar- 
tistic impulse, it can only be a general human potentiality 
capable of manifesting itself in a multitude of ways, by 
means of the common psycho -physical mechanism with which 
mankind is endowed. The pure artist and the pure artistic 
activity are abstractions. Hence the most the investigat- 
or can hope to do is to track down, by .deans of the patient 
and sympathetic study of all the relevant subjective and ob- 
jective data available, those common ingredients which con- 
stitute the essential psychological nature of the artistic 
activity, wherever it operates. He must try to discover, 
first, what is most characteristic of the individual creative 
experience before he can hope to discover what is fundamental 
to its universal manifestations. 
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In approaching the problem of the nature and function- 
ing of the artistic activity the investigator may orientate 
from one or other of the following standpoints: 
I. Introspective Psychology. 
II. Objective Observation and hnalysis. 
III. Genetic Evolution. 
IV. Sociological Psychology. 
V. Experimental Psychology. 
VI. General Psychology. 
I. Despite its acknowledged difficulties and limita- 
tions introspection is the method par excellence of psycho- 
logical aesthetics. Its supremacy is in part due to the 
fact that skilled introspection is one of the principal 
methods of orthodox psychological inquiry, but chiefly be- 
cause of the subtle and capricious nature of the artistic 
experience, which still defies all endeavours to bring it 
under the exact procedure of laboratory technique. In all 
probability the introspective method of investigation has 
already reached its utmost limits of exactness. The un- 
reliability of the artist's introspective testimony.is a 
serious drawback which is not likely to be overcome; and 
for the artist, at all events as far as his productive 
creative experience is concerned, there is no adequate 
substitute. Nevertheless, the volume of evidence from 
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this source, if limited and of uncertain value from the 
standpoint of a scientific theory, must constantly furnish 
the investigator with material worthy of his closest scrut- 
iny. Here the psychologist, aided by his own introspection 
and the results of researches in other fields of psychology 
pertaining to artistic activity, is in a position to weigh 
and check the varied individual accounts and to formulate 
tentative hypotheses.(l) 
The ever- widening range of modern scientific research, 
particularly in the spheresof psychology, ethnology and 
anthropology, has immensely increased the possibilities of 
achieving a sound psychological theory of art. Eut un- 
fortunately too many of the workers in these fields who 
have atteLapted to formulate aesthetic hypotheses on the 
basis of their own and others' discoveries have revealed 
themselves insufficiently acquainted with the phenomenon 
they are trying to elucidate.(2) Artistic insight and keen 
discrimination are absolutely essential to the proper sift- 
ing of evidence that may be culled from the immense data 
(1) Vide American Journal of Psychology, XXXJI1I, 2. pp. 233- 
237, for an introspective report by the American musician 
Henry Cowell. This appears to be the only such report on 
record. The extension of this method could not fail to 
produce data of the utmost importance to the psychologist. 
(2) One notable instance will be examined in a later chapter 
(Chap. VI), viz., Professor Spearman's theory expounded in 
his Creative Mind. 
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which modern research is daily accumulating. The formula- 
tion of theories which are not grounded on sympathetic 
understanding and direct art experience constitutes one of 
the gravest dangers to which the scientific study of art is 
only too open. "The attempt," states Mr. Bullough,(l) "has 
often been made to fathom the mystery of Beauty by research 
into prehistoric and Primitive art, but it has resulted in 
mere imaginings and wholly unsupported constructions of what 
the men of Altamira or Neolithic man or the bower -bird 
thought and felt and meant when producing their 'art.' It 
has proved to be an entirely unwarranted substitution of our 
own ideas and views of the men of the Stone Age and certain 
animals. It has been a vicious circle of the worst descrip- 
tion and has meant the search after something which the 
searchers themselves neither knew nor were able to describe." 
The appositeness of :air. Bullough's criticism is by no 
means restricted to that aspect of aesthetic inquiry to which 
he particularly refers. That real insight is lacking be- 
hind a large amount of research work carried out during the 
past century in the name of research into the Psychology of 
Art is evident from the fact that much of it is concerned 
(1) "The Relation of Aesthetics to Psychology," British 
Journal of Psychology," Vol. .X., p. 48. 
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with processes which fundamentally have very little connec- 
tion with artistic creation.(1) Many of the psychological 
investigations into artistic ability carried out during the 
past half century and more have proceeded on the assumption 
that in the last analysis art depends upon the artist's 
technical skill - which has merely meant skill in represent- 
ing the appearance of things in terms of a particular 
medium.(2) Primitive, Classic, Byzantine and Oriental 
concrete achievement, however, clearly refutes the assump- 
tion, and any research founded upon it contains a fallacy 
which'might have been avoided had the investigators possessed 
a finer discrimination and deeper understanding of the 
(1) Cf. Martin, L., "xn Experimental Study of Fechner's 
Principles," Psychological Review, Vol. XIII, May 1906. 
(2) It is only just, however, to point out in this connec- 
tion that if most of those investigators referred to 
accepted the view that technical skill is fundamental 
to art, they were justified by the academic art of the 
period which strained after realistic representation 
based on classical ideals, which Winckelmann did so much 
to set up. Since the Impressionist revolt the view has 
daily gained discredit. 
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phenomenon they purport to be examining.(1) "'The new 
psychology," states Thorburn,(2) "has made its approach to 
art, knowing itself to be in the possession of a wonderful 
secret; in this knowledge it would explore the field of art 
in quest of more and more material for its own enlighten- 
ment and for its own purposes, extraneous to those of art. 
In some respects it may have gained those ends, but in othe 
there is a danger that the very wealth and resources of its 
own knowledge and the security of its own standpoint should 
make it blind to some essential qualities of the experience 
it proposes to scrutinise. We need the new psychological 
method and its application to the artist's work, not primari- 
ly to explain the aberrations of his temperament, but 
(1) Witness the data so patiently accumulated as a result 
of the labours of notable scientists like Albein ( "Der 
Anteil der nachkonstruierenden Tätigkeit des Auges and der 
Apperception an dem Behalten und der Wiedergabe einfacher 
Formen," Zeitschrift für experimentelle Pädagogik, V und VI 
Bd. 1907.); Meumann ( "Ein Programm zur psychologischen 
Untersuchung des Zeichnens," Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 1912; 
also "Die Analyse des Zeichnens und des Modellierens," 
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die experimentelle Pädagogik, 
1914,); Katz (Ein Betrag zur Kenntnis der Kinderzeichnung - 
en," Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnes- 
organe, 1906.); Kerschensteiner (Die Entwickelung der 
zeichnerischen Begabung, 1905.); and Levinstein (Kinder- 
zeichnungen bis zum 14 Lebensjahr, 1905.), which, despite 
its unquestioned importance from the wider point of view of 
psychology, has nevertheless proved of little positive value 
to the psychological theory of art. 
(2) Thorburn, J. M., Art and the Unconscious, p. 5. 
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because it is worth while more deeply to understand the 
nature of art itself, and to see its value in true per- 
spective with other values in life." Thorburn's warning 
cannot too often be repeated. The investigator cannot 
hope to elucidate the art experience until he has had it; 
he cannot know it until he has lived it and valued it for 
its own sake. For art does not exist until it has worked 
its effect upon the human mind. 
II. The "objective" approach involves inter alla the 
study of the artist's behaviour during the act of creative 
production, his attitudes, gestures, facial expression, 
technical procedure, his methods of working and controlling 
his material, etc. I.n this way the investigator may gain 
insight into the purely physical processes by means of which 
he may be enabled to infer something of the kind of expéri- 
ence the artist is undergoing. The possibilities of such 
a method are obviously very limited; they must be supple- 
mented by the artist's answers to carefully selected ques- 
tions, directed with the object of elucidating his motives 
and feelings. The method may further be supplemented by 
the evidence of ethnologists, who have observed the creative 
process in operation among primitive peoples in different 
parts of the world and in different times and circumstances, 
and by the close study or the artistic activities of 
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children of different ages. In this latter field of re- 
search there exists a considerable literature of immense 
value to the investigator.(1) foremost among the objective 
studies of child art may be mentioned the work of Ricci,(2) 
Wulff(3) and Eng,(4) each of which is a rich mine of in- 
formation, observation and analysis. Important also for 
the investigator are the autobiographies, biographies, 
diaries and obiter dicta of artists, which throw a flood 
of light upon their aims, methods and practical experience. 
Without this previous objective work the psychology of 
artistic creativity would be a hopelessly abstract and 
arbitrary theoretical construction. 
By Objective Analysis is meant the empirical study of 
concrete art with a view to discovering among its diverse 
manifestations what is universally typical, general and 
fundamental in formal structure, plan and theme. This in- 
volves also the study of the materials of art, its techni- 
cal instruments and processes, and their influence upon 
the concrete product. Foremost in this field is the work 
(1) Vide Bibliography. 
(2) Ricci, C., L'Arte dei Bambini. 
(3) Wulff, Oscar, Die Kunst des Kindes. 
(4) Eng, H., The Psychology of Children's Drawings. 
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of H. Wölfflin,(l) the eminent German historian. Professor 
W6lfflin is concerned to demonstrate the existence in Euro- 
pean art since the Renaissance of certain clearly dis- 
tinguishable forms or modes of "imaginative beholding "(2) 
(vision). "The mode of vision ... of imaginative behold- 
ing, is not from the outset and everywhere the same, but 
like every other manifestation of life has its development. 
The historian has to reckon with stages of the imagination. 
We know primitively immature modes of vision, just as we 
speak of 'high' and 'late' periods of art. Archaic Greek 
art, or the style of the sculptures on the west portal of 
Chartres, must not be interpreted as if it had been created 
to -day. Instead of. asking 'How do these works affect me, 
the modern man ?' and estimating their expressional content 
by that standard, the historian must realise what choice 
of formal possibilities the epoch had at its disposal. An 
essentially different interpretation will then result. "(3) 
Of these modes of vision (the basis of style) there is 
a marked contrast between the linear "das Lineare" and the 
painterly "das iÄalerische;" whereas the former sees things 
(1) Wölfflin, H., Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: 
English translation. The Principles of Art History. 
(2) Ibid. p. VII, Preface to the English edition. 
(3) Ibid. 
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in outline - "the eye is led along the boundaries and 
induced to feel along the edges "(1) - the latter sees them 
in masses or volumes - the eye "withdraws from the edges," 
the outline becomes "more or less indifferent to the eye 
as the path of vision, and the primary element of the im- 
pression is things seen in patchies. "(2 "The great con- 
trast between linear and painterly style corresponds to 
radically different interests in the world. In the former 
case, it is the solid figure, in the latter the changing 
appearance: in the former, the enduring form, measurable, 
.finite; in the latter, the movement, the form in function; 
in the former, the thing in itself; in the latter, the 
thing in its relations. And if we can say that in the 
linear style the hand has felt out the corporeal world 
essentially according to its plastic content, the eyein 
the painterly stage has become sensitive to the various 
textures, and it is no contradiction if even here the 
visual sense seems nourished by the tactile sense - that 
other tactile sense which relishes the kind of surface, the 
different skin of things. sensation now penetrates 
beyond the solid object into the realm of the immaterial. 
(1) Ibid. p. 18 et. seg.. 
(2) Ibid. 
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The painterly style alone knows a beauty of the incorporeal. 
From differently orientated interests in the world, each 
time a new beauty comes to birth. "(1) But it is important 
to note that while the painterly mode is the later, it is 
not to be regarded as absolutely superior. "The linear 
style developed values which the painterly style no longer 
possessed and no longer wanted to possess. They are two 
conceptions of the world, differently orientated in taste 
and in their interest to the world, and yet each capable of 
giving a perfect picture of visible things. "(2) The primi- 
tives were essentially linear artists; so, for instance, was 
Dürer as opposed to Rembrandt and the Impressionists, whose 
art was fundamentally painterly in style. 
Professor Wölfflin also recognises four distinct and 
antithetical developments of style. (i) Despite the fact 
that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries art possessed 
the means of representing pictorial space, the vision be- 
hind it was fundamentally- planimetric, that is, it stressed 
consistently the dimensions of length and breadth. "The 
more art overcame the constraint of primitive beholding 
which, with the clearest desire to get free of the mere 
plane, still remained firmly held in it by one foot, the 






resources of foreshortening and spatial recession, the 
more decidedly does the desire make itself felt for 
pictures which have assembled their content in a clear 
plane. "(1) (ii) In contrast to this, the desire for the 
illusion of recession and depth predominates in the art of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (iii) Although 
every work of art displays a certain inevitability (self - 
containedness) in its composition, this quality may be 
achieved either by "closed" or "open" form. By "closed 
form" is meant the type of composition which emphasises 
the isolation of content from its surroundings - "makes of 
the picture a self - contained entity pointing everywhere 
back to itself. "(2) (iv) This type of composition is 
characteristic of the eighteenth century, the classical age. 
(1) Ibid. p. 101. 
(2) Ibid. p. 124. 
(3) "'Klassisch.' The word 'classic' throughout this book 
refers to the art of the High Renaissance. It implies, 
however, not only a historical phase of art, but also a 
special mode of creation of which that art is an instance." 
Note by translator, p. 15. Vide p. 126. "Classic art is an 
art of definite horizontal and vertical directions. The 
elements are manifested in their full clearness and sharp- 
ness. Whether it is a portrait or a figure, a sacred 
picture or a landscape, the picture is always dominated 
in all its parts by the opposition of vertical and horizon- 
tal.... In contrast to this, the baroque inclines, not to 
suppress these elements, but to conceal their obvious 
opposition." 
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Open form on the other hand means the type of composition 
which looks limitless and points everywhere beyond itself, 
but which yet appears through its "secret limits" self - 
contained in the aesthetic sense. "Although a hidden con- 
gruity ... continues to play its part, the whole is meant 
to look like a piece cut haphazard out of the visible 
world.."(l) This mode of composition is characteristic of 
baroque art. Professor Vdölfflin, however, does not stress 
the importance of these four stylistic developments. 
In addition to the foregoing, two further distinctions 
are noted: the distinction between "multiple unity" and 
"unified unity" on the one hand, and on the other, between 
"absolute" and "relative" clearness of pictorial rendering. 
The difference between multiple unity and unified unity is 
illustrated by a comparison of classical and baroque art: 
in the former unity is achieved "by making the parts in- 
dependent and free members;" in the latter uniform inde- 
pendence of parts is sacrificed in favour of a more unified 
total motive. In other words, in classical style there is 
coördination of the accents; in baroque style the accents 
are subordinated so that they lose their individuality and 
separate existence in an absolute and harmonious whole. 
"On principle, the baroque no longer reckons with a 
(1) 
Ibid. p. 126. 
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multiplicity of co- ordinate units, harmoniously interdepend- 
ent, but with an absolute unity in which the individual 
part has lost its individual rights. "(1) s with the 
linear and painterly styles, multiple unity and unified 
unity are the offspring of different modes of vision. The 
styles of absolute and relative clearness of representation 
form a contrast to which the preceding concepts are parallel. 
They correspond to two radically different attitudes. 
Classical art bends every resource to the service of formal 
clearness as in Dürer and Leonardo; baroque seeks a beauty 
in an obscurity which swallows up form as in Rembrandt and 
the masters of the rococo. The difference is not one of 
capacity, but wholly a difference of vision and purpose. 
III. The genetic method of attacking the problem in- 
volves the examination of the most primitive art of the pre- 
historic era as well as the study of the genetic develop- 
ment of fundamental attitudes and states of mind. Here 
the investigator may draw from the vast sources of evidence 
accumulated in recent years by ethnology, ethnography, 
folk- psychology and related sciences. For although biolo- 
gists have rejected the theory that ontogenesis recapitulates 
phylogenesis, there is yet sufficient justification for 
assuming certain analogies between the mind and. art of 
(1) ibid. p. 157. 
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prehistoric man and that of the extant savage.(l) ivir. A. 
H. Christie points out that "Comparison of ancient pattern - 
work with similar work current wherever conditions resembl- 
ing those existing in prehistoric ages still continue leads 
definitely to the conclusion that, however far separate may 
be their occurrence in time and place, this art in both an 
ancient and modern community may be, broadly speaking, in 
the same stage of development. "(2) Perhaps Ar. Christie 
goes further than the evidence would warrant when he states 
in the next sentence that "The ways of life followed by the 
primitive peoples now living amongst us are much the same as 
those followed by their forerunners in the past, and their 
common needs are met by similar ways of thought and work." 
For, as Lord Listowel points out,(3) "We cannot suppose that, 
when all things mortal have been touched by the hand of 
change., primitive peoples should have remained completely 
stationary and motionless during thousands of years." But, 
on the other hand, when Lord Listowel states that "It appears 
highly probable, indeed, that the comparatively unprogressive 
societies of the present day are only the weak and degenerate 
(1) Schuwer, C., "La Signification de l'art primitif," 
Journal de Psychologie, Vol. 28, 1931, p. 140. 
(2) Christie, A. H., Traditional iviethods of Pattern Designing 
p. 228. 
(3) Listowel, Earl of, A Critical History of iviodern Aesthet- 
ics, p. 228. 
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descendants of those Stòne and metal Age peoples from whose 
vigorous youth civilisation ultimately sprang," he seems to 
be thinking of those attributes of progress which issue in 
intellectual activities, overlooking the crucial fact that 
both prehistoric man and certain extant primitive peoples 
manifest an innate sense of form that is hardly inferior 
to that of their civilised descendants of the present day. 
Moreover, apart from this confusion of intellectual and 
artistic culture, it must be borne in mind that where art- 
istic decadence has set in among living primitive peoples, 
it is not infrequently a comparatively recent phenomenon. 
Br. Kühn points out,(l) for instance, that it appears highly 
probable that Bushman art was still at its zenith a few 
centuries ago, and that decadence began as a result of Negro 
and White influence, which undermined their native talent 
and destroyed a great part of their indigenous traditions 
and customs. A comparison of prehistoric or modern Negro 
art(2) with that of the richest periods of world art appears 
to suggest that, while man's intelligence has developed 
immensely, his innate sensibility to form has remained 
(1) Obermaier and Kühn, Bushman Art, pp.19 et seq. 
(2) 
The comparison is a fair one. Mr. Clive Bell states: 
"Judging from the available data ... I would say that Negro 
art was entitled to a place among the great schools, but 
that it was no match for the greatest. With the greatest 
I would compare it." Since Cézanne, p.114. 
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comparatively static.(1) Hence the instinctive appeal of 
primitive art to the modern man of unsophisticated 
sensibility. 
The art problem to which the psycho -geneticist must 
address himself is not, according to Bullough, "a question 
only or even predominantly of the origins of those objects 
which we call art. It is also and especially a question 
of the origins of the types and attitudes of mind that 
created those objects. "(2) In other words, how and when 
did a self- conscious art spring into existence? Anthro- 
pology has shown that the greater part of what is known as 
Primitive Art "was not art to the men who made it. And 
once this discovery had been made concerning primitive art, 
a good deal of what hitherto had been considered without 
question as Art, even in highly advanced stages of culture, 
has become similarly suspect" ... "Even the Greeks treated 
their architects as we treat our masons; we call Architect- 
ure the 'Mistress-Art' and in the Chinese Canon of the Fine 
Arts we find included therein Archery, Mathematics and 
Manners. Here again Aesthetics demands an aesthetically 
directed psychological research into those internal 
(1) Whether this has any bearing upon the recapitulation 
theory is a question that may be left to the biologist. 
(2) Bullough, E., "The Relation of Aesthetics to Psychology," 
British Journal of Psychology, Vol. X, p. 46. 
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developments of culture, whereby an originally undiffer- 
entiated system of traditional sentiments and conceptions 
became split into those separate strands of feeling, those 
distinct systems of ideas, which we have come to term 
Religion, Magic, Justice, Right, Truth, Craftmanship, Art. 
These developments must have taken place - within historical 
times they are known to have taken place - concomitantly 
with important external changes in the objects connected 
with these systems, under the stress of the division of 
labour, distinctions of craftmanship and public castes, 
guilds, priest and layman, the development of media of 
currency, imports and exports, the effects of war and travels 
interferences of cultures and a number of other factors, 
which may perhaps all be considered as the outward mani- 
festations of those inward changes which are the true ob- 
jects of aesthetic research. "(1) 
Camille Schuwer has also emphasised the fact that what 
to -day is regarded as primitive art was not art to the 
primitive man, when he states that "presque tous ces docu- 
dients, qu'une ethnographie naïve interprétait comme des 
objets de beauté, créés pour produire an plaisir esthétique, 
une science mieux avisée reconnaît aujourd'hui leurs 
significations réelles, utilitaires, sociales, magiques 
(i) ibid. p. 48. 
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ou religieuses."(1) Yet in stressing the distinction 
between the unselfconscious attitude of primitive man and 
the fully conscious attitude of the modern artist there is 
a danger of interpreting the fundamental facts of art too 
abstractly. For, from the point of view of the universal 
fact of art, it is very doubtful whether mere selfconscious- 
ness is of much importance - and especially does this apply 
to the vanguard of modern art. The artist of to -day, 
although fully conscious of his ability to produce art, 
does not deliberately set out to do so, however much he is 
bound by economic need and constrained by extraneous cir- 
cumstances; like primitive man he is motivated by funda- 
mental needs and aspirations and is guided by innate capa- 
cities, whose mechanism is to him a mystery only half re- 
vealed; he is conscious only of his technical means; he is 
the vehicle of a purpose which lies beyond the frontiers of 
his conscious experience. L.11 art is the outcome of an 
emotional attitude to things. Ideally, the artist surrend- 
ers to this attitude, and under the stress of his feelings 
and guided by his innate sensibility t6 form, he constructs 
a formal equivalent to his emotion, thereby achieving a 
satisfaction which is enduring in space and time. From 
(l) Schuwer, C., "Sur la Signification de l'art primitif," 
Journal de Psychologie, Vol. XXVIII, 1931, p. 125. 
141 
time immemorial art has fulfilled this rôle, answering 
the calls of man's spirit for something that is independent 
of the flux of existence. And it is doubtful whether the 
extended range of man's intelligence and cosmic under- 
standing have materially altered this primordial fact. 
"However much the artistic impulse may become differentiated 
with the progress of culture," states Hirn,(1) "its inner- 
most nature will always remain the same. "(2) Nor have the 
material products of art fundamentally changed in more than 
two thousand years of artistic achievement, for what to 
primitive man.were perhaps merely propitiatory or magical 
symbols are yet capable of arousing the genuine artistic 
experience in modern man. Born either of fear or lust 
these symbols were nevertheless forged under the guidance 
of an unerring sensibility, which is the fundamental pre- 
requisite of art. 
IV. Since the artist, like the ordinary individual, 
is not an isolated and self - contained unit of society, shut 
off from all contact and intercourse with the life and 
thought of the community, art is not peculiarly a private 
and esoteric thing, but the common focus of individual and 
(1) Hirn, Y., The Origins of Art, p. 100. 
(2) "'The concept of progress was first applied to literature 
in the seventeenth century, but at the very outset _Pascal 
pointed out that a distinction must here be made between 
science and art;. that science advances by accumulation of 
knowledge, while the changes of art cannot be reduced to any 
theory of progress." Spingarn, J. E., The New Criticism, 
Edited by E. B. Burgum, p. 23. 
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communal aspirations. The investigator has therefore to 
reckon with reciprocal relations of the individual and 
social factors, not only in art but also in the psychology 
of the artist. Now, prior to the last decade of the nine- 
teenth century the social aspect of art had scarcely been 
recognised as a subject for special study, but under the 
influence of sociological research, especially in France, 
a new school of "Sociological Aesthetics' has been estab- 
lished. This school regards art as essentially a social 
phenomenon, the achievement of the group, the product of 
society - a point of view which appears to be strongly 
supported by ethnological and anthropological research; for 
it is now generally accepted that in its earliest phases 
art was closely bound up with the rites and practices of the 
tribe and the race. This is also true of the art of 
primitive peoples of to -day. An exclusively sociological 
theory, however, cannot do justice to all the facts and 
aspects of the creative activity. By emphasising its 
social aspects it tends to underestimate the importance of 
other fundamental factors, thereby limiting itself to utter- 
ing hopelessly inadequate generalisations. It omits from 
its survey the individual and subjective character of the 
experience, the unique sensibility of the artist, his innate 
tendencies and dispositions, without which art could not 
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exist; it stresses what is merely conventional and object- 
ive, disregarding those inscrutable psychological attrib- 
utes which distinguish the inspired genius from the compe -. 
tent mediocrity. The proper sphere of sociological 
aesthetics is the study of the combinations and interactions 
of individual and social factors and their effects upon the 
psychology of the artist and his work, and this, it need 
scarcely be emphasised, is a necessary and important branch 
of theoretical inquiry, but it cannot be regarded as furnish- 
ing the data for a complete theory of the artistic activity. 
Historically the relations between art and society 
have undergone immense fluctuations; they have never been 
(and never can be) completely severed. C. Lalo,(1 ) in a 
detailed investigation of these from the historical stand- 
point, has attempted to trace the influence of the various 
aspects of social activity upon the life and development of 
art. He shows how organised and collective labour (especi- 
ally in the life of primitive peoples), family life, econom- 
ic and political conditions, cultural diffusions, war and 
religion have exerted influences, both directly and indirect- 
ly, upon the creative activities and productions of various 
peoples in different times and circumstances. Y. Hirn, in 
(1) L'Art et la Vie Sociale. 
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his brilliant and immensely documented study of the origins 
of art,(l) has likewise dealt with its social aspects from 
the standpoint of its psychological genesis. For him, art 
is the expression of emotion which is both an individual 
and social phenomenon,(2) always tending to manifest itself 
outwardly.(3) Externalisation of emotional states both 
enhances its pleasurable concomitants and relieves its 
accompanying pain;'(4) and, in addition to those effects, 
it arouses in others who perceive it a sympathetic emotion 
which, in turn, intensifies the original emotion. "By the 
reciprocal action of primary movements, which mutually 
imitate each other, the social expression operates in the 
same way as the individual expression. And we are entitled 
to consider it as a secondary result of the general 
(1) Hirn, Y., The Origins of Art, pp. 1 -142. 
(2) "The instinctive tendency to express overmastering feel- 
ing, to enhance pleasure, and to seek relief from pain, 
forms the most deep- seated motive of all human activity. 
We can therefore derive the distinctive qualities of artist- 
ic production from this impulse only when it has been proved 
that art is better able than any other kind of mental func- 
tion to serve and satisfy the requirements which arise from 
this impulse when it occurs in its purest form... That this 
is the case is the fundamental hypothesis upon which this 
work is based." Ibid. pp. 73 -74. 
(3) Ibid. pp. 137 -139. 
(4) ibid. pp. 43 -55. 
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expressional impulse, that when mastered by an overpowering 
feeling we seek enhancement or relief by retroaction from 
sympathisers, who reproduce and in their expression repre- 
sent the mental state by which we are dominated. "(1) Of 
all human activities by means of which the expressional 
impulse seeks gratification, none is more efficacious than 
artistic production, for through this activity the artist 
attains both the satisfaction of his own emotions and their 
immortalisation in a form "capable of imparting to all men 
of every country and every age the same enhancement and the 
same rapture which he has himself experienced." Thus art, 
the highest manifestation of the expressional impulse, "can 
be fully explained only by reference to the enhancing and 
relieving power of social expression. "(2) The essential 
importance of sympathy is likewise the cornerstone of 
Guyau's aesthetic theory.(3) Wundt regards art as one 
(1) Ibid. p. 83. 
(2) Ibid. p. 101. 
(3) "En résumé l'art est une extension, par le sentiment, 
de la société a tous les êtres de la nature, et même aux 
êtres conçus comme dépassant,la nature, ou enfin aux êtres 
fictifs créés par l'imagination humaine. L'émotion artis- 
tique est donc essentiellement sociale; elle a pour resul- 
tat d'agrandir la vie individuelle en la faisant se con- 
fondre avec une vie plus large et universelle. Le but le 
plus haut de l'art est de produire une émotion esthétique 
d'un caractère social." Guyau, M., L'Art au point de vue 
sociologique, pp. 8 -21. 
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of the fundamental modes of human activity whereby the 
individual and collective mind finds expression.(1) 
Customs, mythology, religion, language and art, although 
traceable to individual mental functions, "seelische 
Funktionen," derive their collective significance from 
the conditions of life obtaining in the social community 
to which they belong; they are not the accidental dis- 
coveries of an individual, but the products of the community 
of peoples.(2) From the standpoint of psychology art 
stands between speech and myth (mitten inne zwischen 
Sprache und Mythus steht für die psychologische Betrachtung 
die Kunst),(3) its earliest content being derived from 
the latter source. Like Hirn, Wundt recognises the close 
relation between outward gesture and art which is, indeed, 
the enduring crystallisation of expressive movements. 
Tolstoi's point of view "To evoke in oneself a feeling one 
has experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then, by 
means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms ex- 
pressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others 
may experience the same feeling - this is the activity of 
(1) Wundt, W., Völkerpsychologie, pp. 3 -5. 
(2) Ibid. p. 2. 
(3) Ibid. p. 5. 
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art "(l) - is in substance and import similar to those of 
him and Wundt. 
V. There exists no laboratory technique which can be 
regarded as being primarily concerned with the productive 
aspect of the artistic activity, although there is a con- 
siderable literature dealing with the results of experi- 
ments in appreciation. The special difficulties confront- 
ing the investigator have already been discussed, and it is 
not surprising that the leading contemporary aestheticians 
are agreed that the application of an exact scientific 
technique to the productive artistic activity is impossible. 
Psychology, however, is continually perfecting its experi- 
mental methods, but while it is not improbable that means 
will be devised whereby certain characteristic aspects of 
the activity may be more exactly examined, it is highly 
unlikely that the whole experience will ever be scientific- 
ally analysed. 
VI. The psychological approach consists in the study 
of the artistic activity from the standpoint of the general 
principles of mental functioning. Among the first questions 
which the investigator must face in approaching the subject 
from this angle is whether the art impulse is fundamentally 
(1) Tolstoi, L. N., What is Art, p. 50. 
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identical with other activities of mind and conforming to 
general psychological laws, or whether it is a special 
activity possessing unique psychological characteristics 
and independent laws. Guyau sees no fundamental difference 
between art and other manifestations of human activity nor 
between art and pleasure in general.(1) Freud likewise 
assumes that art can be explained in terms of the general 
laws enunciated by psycho -analysis. On the other hand Hirn, 
in accord with the standpoint of the majority of aesthetic- 
ians, states that "It is evident that if artistic creation 
were in no wise different from other examples of autotelic 
manifestations, there would be no ground for considering 
the art- impulse as a separate or distinctive problem." (2) 
Mr. Clive Bell goes so far as to postulate a special emotion 
peculiar to the artistic experience(3) - a point of view 
which has been challenged by Ogden, Richards and Wood,(4) 
who maintain that "Introspective analysis ... has not con- 
vinced psychologists that the postulated emotion can be 
(1) Guyau,'.;i., Les Problénies de 1TLsthétique Contemporaine, 
pp. 15, 24. 
(2) Hirn, Y., The Origins of Art, p. 20. 
`3) Bell, C., Art, 
(4) Ogden, Richards and Wood, The Foundations of Aesthetics, 
p. 56. 
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admitted. It is not otherwise known, has never been 
described, and is much in need of identification. It would 
be foolhardy to dogmatise at the present juncture in view 
of the absence of established criteria founded upon exhaust- 
ive and coördinated study, but until it is shown that there 
is no fundamental difference between art and other human 
activities the art impulse must be considered independently 
as constituting a special province of psychological 
investigation." 
That the principles of general psychic activity apply 
to the art impulse cannot be questioned, and much is to be 
gained by observing them at work in the creative process; 
but what mainly concerns the art psychologist, however, is 
not the general laws of mental activity, but their partic- 
ular manifestations in the artistic activity. Practically, 
it is more important to study the combinations of processes 
involved in creativity than to observe the activities separ- 
ately. General psychology, for instance, can throw a great 
deal of light upon the purely technical aspects of art, but 
since technical skill is often possessed by artists of 
mediocre capacity it must be considered in combination 
with the artist's total psychology before the real artistic 
problem can be investigated. 
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CHAPTER V. 
Croce's View of Art as Intuition -Expression. 
CtïAYT V. 
"From the beginning of days until now there has been 
a tremendous suggestion of creativeness in the dust of the 
earth... The dust of the earth, moistened - clay, chalk 
moistened - with water or oil - marble, bricks, stone, 
there is a principle of continuity and evolution here that 
begins in dust, but everywhere ramifies, diverges, and 
presents new possibilities. Whether you choose water or 
oil to moisten your earth is a point of divergence of extra- 
ordinary significance, indeed, but only typical of the 
branch -like divergencies that one finds on the 'technical' 
side of art. And there must be a primitive sensuousness 
and sensuality in the artist towards the medium - or there 
his nothing at all. It is the 'feel' of the wet clay, the 
'feel' of the pianoforte keys that count." 
J. M. Thorburn, Art and the Unconscious. 
Author of one of the most widely favoured theories of 
art ever propounded, the name of'benedetto Croce is writ 
large over the pages of contemporary aesthetics. Although 
contradictory and obscure, his various publications in aes- 
thetics abound in acute observations and striking passages 
born of a penetrating vision and rich experience, but they 
are spoiled by an uncompromising dogmatism and a too facile 
propensity to prescribe for a customary terminology mean- 
ings which would be hard to justify. Yet, despite the 
recognised defects and incompatible presuppositions of his 
theory, its flagrant disregard of plain psychological fact 
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and common practice, it has won a place in the history of 
contemporary theory that is quite inconsistent with its 
positive merit. Indeed, in Croce's theoretical exposition 
no more striking proof could be found of Pater's remark, 
that the value of aesthetic philosophy "has most often been 
in the suggestive and penetrating things said by the way. "(1) 
Champion of the expressionist school, Croce has gained 
quite a notable following in this country. "I believe," 
declares Mr. E. F. Carritt, "that a greater amount of truth 
is contained in Croce's Estetica than in any other philo- 
sophy of beauty that I have read, "(2) and elsewhere he 
states(3) that "If I had to choose two authors who might 
give most insight into what is meant by aesthetic, I should 
choose one from each end of the series, Plato and Croce." 
Mr. R. G. Collingwood has likewise professed his allegiance 
to the Italian philosopher.(4) On the other hand three 
Cambridge philosophers, Messrs. Ogden, Richards and wood, 
state that "As there is no reason to doubt his sincerity 
(1) Pater, W., The Renaissance, Introduction. 
(2) The Theory of Beauty, p. 281. 
(3) Philosophies of Beauty, Introduction, LVI. 
(4) 
Outlines of a Philosophy of rrt, Preface. 
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and as his literary, dramatic and historical writings are 
of such undoubted value, the most charitable explanation... 
would be that Croce, preoccupied with the metaphysics of 
creative idealism, is endeavouring to say in speculative 
language something exceptionally obvious - for which he has 
attempted to create a personal vocabulary by exploiting the 
suggestive powers of accepted phrases. "(1) The theory has 
found little support in Germany, where the leading aesthet- 
icians are definitely hostile to it, Volkelt declaring it 
ambiguous, inexact and founded upon an exceedingly obscure 
(s) 
psychology. And in Italy Croce's erstwhile follower 
Giovanni Gentile has so far renounced his allegiance as to 
formulate a theory of his own, which challenges that of 
his fellow- countryman.(3) 
(1) The Foundations of Aesthetics, pp. 44 -45. 
(2) "Es gibt in Croces Buch kaum eine Seite, die nicht Un- 
überlegtheiten énthielte. Er arbeitet durchweg mit un- 
gefähren, vieldeutigen, unanalysierten Begriffen. Der 
psychologische Boden, auf dem er sich bewegt, ist von einer 
Ungeklärtheit, wie man sie nun selten antreffen dürfte. 
Allen feineren Problemen gegenüber zeigt er eine auffallende 
Blindheit. denn Croce recht hätte, so würden die ästhet- 
ischen Fragen erstaunlich leicht und einfach zu lösen sein. 
Dabei herrscht in der Auseinanderfolge der behandelten 
Fragen eine Sorglosigkeit, die zum Gegenteil von aller 
Ordnung und allem Zusammenhang führt." Volkelt, J., 
System der Asthetik, Vol. III, p. 368. 
(3) Gentile, G., The Philosophy of Art. 
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The fundamental orientation of Grocers aesthetic is 
that language is identical with expression and that express- 
ion is the essential aesthetic fact.(1) Between aesthetics 
the science of art (scienza dell' arte) and philology, the 
science of language (scienza del linguaggio), there is no 
distinction; what in general Linguistica is reducible to 
philosophy is simply Aesthetic. Philosophy of language 
and philosophy of art are therefore identical.(2) Art and 
philosophy are the two fundamental theoretic phases of the 
spirit. But whereas art, which is prior, is independent 
of the concept, philosophy and all concepts depend upon 
art or intuition. 
Art and Beauty are likewise coincident with each other; 
they are the spiritual experience of man in its primordial 
simplicity, disembarrassed of concepts or logical knowledge 
and independent of truth and falsehood, reality and unreal- 
ity. Art, however, is a foroi of knowledge, not logical 
knowledge but intuitive; it belongs to the theoretic as 
opposed to the practical aspect of man's nature. For know- 
ledge is of two kinds: that which is obtained through imag- 
ination (la fantasia) and that obtained through the intell- 
ect (l'intelletto).(3) In its true or philosophical form 
(1) Filosofia dello Spirito, pp. 168 -169; also p. 17. 
(2) Breviario, p. 55. 
(3) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, p. 5. 
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logical or conceptual knowledge is realistic inasmuch as it 
aims at distinguishing reality from unreality, or at reduc- 
ing unreality by including it in reality as a subordinate 
moment of reality itself.(1) In intuition, on the other 
hand, the distinction between reality and'unreality is 
extraneous and irrelevant, since what is important here is 
the image as mere image, that is, in its pure ideality, 
stripped of all those attributes attached to it by the 
reflective mind. b hypothetical individual having his 
first experience of theoretic life would have intuitions 
only; he would have a simple spiritual experience of real- 
ity devoid of all distinction between real and unreal images 
upon which conceptual knowledge of reality is founded. 
Such intuitions would indeed be no mere intuitions of the 
real or the unreal, nor yet perceptions, but pure intuitions. 
"Dove tutto é reale, niente é reale. "(2) 
Croce's hypothesis of a preconceptual phase of mind is 
indissolubly linked with the two coincident concepts of In- 
tuition and Expression. These two terms are reiterated 
again and again, as if to emphasise their fundamental iden- 
tity as descriptive of a single experience of the spirit - 
(1) Breviario di Estetica, p. 23. Cf. Filosofia dello 
Spirito, Vol. I, p. 6. 
(2) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, p. 6. 
ILA 
the experience of art. Now art is nothing more nor less 
than vision (visione) or. intuition (intuizione), which in- 
herently and essentially is imaginative expression,(1) the 
ideal apprehension of things prior to their perceptual dis- 
crimination. It is not a physical fact, because physical 
facts are utterly unreal, mere constructions of the intellect 
for the purposes of science.(2) it is not a utilitarian 
act which aims at achieving pleasure and avoiding pain. 
Pleasure, in so far as it accompanies art, must not be con- 
fused with pleasure in general, for aesthetic pleasure, 
1,accompagnamento edonistico of art is but a particular 
form of the pleasurable . (3 ) It is not a moral act, for 
that belongs to the practical life as opposed to the theor- 
etic life and is governed by volition. Ind since art does 
not issue from the will, it is not subject to moral judg- 
ii.ent.(4) Finally, it is not a form of conceptual know- 
ledge, but pure intuition.(5) Every true intuition, how- 
ever, is also expression, for that which does not objectify 
(1) Breviario, p. 14; also p. 52. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 16, 18. 
(3) Ibid. pp. 18 -20. Cf. Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, 
pp. 111 -112. 
(4) Ibid. pp. 20, 23. 
(5) Ibid. p. 23 -24. Cf. Saggi Filosofici, Vol. I, p. 15 
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itself in expression is not intuition, but mere sensation 
or natural (mechanical, passive) fact.(1) Thus no experi- 
ence which is incapable of being clearly formulated mentally 
in terms of actual or imagined verbal or non- verbal images 
can be art. For the fundamental condition of art is the 
ideal (non -conceptual) apprehension of an image, which is 
the expression of that which is presented to the mind by its 
own intuition. In other words, art exists only when the 
matter before the mind is given form, becomes indissolubly' 
fused with its intuition; or, what amounts to the same 
thing, when the mind contemplates without judging its own 
expression. 
The alogical character of art Croce regards as the most 
important affirmation, since the history of aesthetics is 
for the most part the history of "conceptualistic" theories, 
propounded and supported by the authority of great philoso- 
phers like Schelling and Hegel, who regard art as a special 
kind of philosophy. These theories are not without merit, 
recognising as they do the theoretic character of art and 
claiming to determine the relation between imagination (la 
(1) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, p. 11. Cf. Breviario, 
p. 49, where reference is made to dell' indistinguibile, 
dell' intuizione in intuizione ed expressione; Vide also 
Saggi Filosofici, Vol. I, p. 11. 
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fantasia) and logic, between art and thought,(1) but they 
fail inasmuch as they confuse the mere arbitrary and inco- 
herent play of images which is fancy ( l'immaginazione) and 
the imaginative construction of a coherent image, which is 
the expression of a state of mind or of .the spirit 
(2) 
- in 
other words, pure imagination (la fantasia). Whereas fancy 
merely combines particular images in the spirit and is ster- 
ile, imagination is the true artistic faculty productive of 
pure images, expressions of states of mind, or intuitions. 
Fundamentally, intuition consists in this simple act of 
imagination. But it may be asked: What is the vital 
principle animating intuition -imagination, giving it unity 
and coherence? To this Croce replies that it is feeling 
(il sentimento), a state of the soul, an aspiration.(3) 
Artistic intuition is therefore always lyrical (sempre 
lirica).(4) And that which is truly admired in genuine 
art is the perfect imaginative form the state of the soul 
assumes: this is its life, its unity, and its fulness. 
The problems of content and form in art, expressed in 
(1) Breviario, p. 27. 
(2) Ibid. p. 30-31. 
(3) Ibid. p. 36-38. 
(4) Ibid. p. 38. 
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Gestaltsästhetik and Formästhetik respectively, are dis- 
missed by Croce as non -existent. That content and form in 
art must be clearly distinguished, he admits, but they can- 
not be separately qualified as artistic, because their rela- 
tion only is artistic. This relation consists in their 
living unity, the synthesis a priori of the spirit. Con- 
tent is not something which is to be given form, for content 
and form appear in the mind pari passu as a single creation, 
an expressed intuition. And apart from intuition, ex- 
pression does not exist; apart from intuition, expression - 
content does not exist. Thus intuition- expression is both 
content and form. Art is a true aesthetic synthesis a 
priori (sintesi a priori estetica) of feeling and image in 
intuition, for feeling and image do not exist for the 
artistic spirit outside the synthetic spirit. They may 
exist in another sphere of knowledge, but feeling will then 
be related to the practical life, and the image will be an 
element of mere fancy. Feeling regarded as content in art 
is not a particular content, but the total universe appre- 
hended sub specie intuitionis. Outside it there is no 
conceivable content which is not also a different form from 
that of intuition; not thoughts, which are the total uni- 
verse sub specie cogitationis; not physical things and 
mathematical entities, which are the total universe sub 
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specie schematismi et abstractionis; not 'wills, which are 
the whole universe sub specie volitionis.(1) 
In order to remove possible misunderstandings two im- 
portant distinctions must be emphasised: on the one hand, 
the distinction between intuition and perception, and on 
the other, between expression and impression. The term 
'intuition' is employed specifically to denote the simplic- 
ity of the artistic vision and its priority in the life of 
the spirit. It signifies man's primary experience of the 
phenomenal world, prior to the development of perception 
(which presupposes the logical activity)(2) and the discrim- 
ination of the real and the unreal. Intuition does not 
affirm; it merely feels, represents, or portrays; it is, 
in Croce's own words, l'unitâ indifferenziata della perce- 
zione del reale e. della semplice immagine del possibile.(3) 
The term 'expression' emphasises the peculiar quality of 
the true imaginative formulation by which the activity of 
expression is differentiated from the passivity of brute 
(1) Breviario, pp. 44 -45. Cf. ilosofia dello Spirito, 
Vol. I, pp. 18 -19. 
(2) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. II, pp. 105 -108. 
Cf. TI n 11 Vol. I, pp. 5 -6. 
Also Breviario, p. 70. 
(3) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, p. 6. 
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sensation or impression, the spiritual fact from the natural 
fact. The spiritual fact is expression in the 'aesthetic' 
sense (i.e. in images), whereas expression in physical mat- 
erial is merely expression in the naturalistic sense (senso 
naturalistico), and must not be confused with the former, 
because it lacks the very character of spirituality.(1) 
To speak of the words of the poet, the notes of the musician, 
and the figures and colours of the painter as expressions 
is to use the term only metaphorically, for words, notes, 
figures and colours are merely the physical facts, by means 
of which the preservation and reproduction of man's intui- 
tions are rendered possible. And the production of these 
physical facts is a practical activity guided, as in all 
practical activity, by knowledge, and for that reason the 
productive process is called tecnical.(2) h. "everyone can 
experience," states Croce, "the internal illumination that 
occurs when he succeeds, and only up to the point that he 
succeeds, in formulating to himself his impressions and his 
feelings. Feelings or impressions then pass by means of 
words from the obscure region of the soul into the clearness 
of the contemplative spirit. "(3) Feelings, however, may 
(1) Filosofia dello .spirito, Vol_ 1, pp.111 -112. 
(2) ibid. p.114. (Cf. Breviario, pp.49 -51.) 
(3) ibid. p.11. 
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also be expressed in line, colour and sound,(1) and this 
giving form to what is felt and suffered is expression. 
What is generally known as technique, as distinct from ex- 
pression, is nothing more than the physical issue of a 
practical act, and as such is in no way connected with the 
theoretic character of art, being external to it. And since 
no object exists unless it is known, the physical work of 
art does not exist outside the knowing spirit, for in reality 
nothing is known but expressed intuitions. The physical 
work of art, like all physical objects, is simply a con- 
struction of the intellect.(2) 
The fundamental implication of Croce's doctrine is that 
art or beauty is nothing more nor less than an experience 
the human spirit, and, indeed, the most elemental of 
spiritual experiences, since it implies the existence of all 
other forms of the spirit. It is the focussing of the mind' 
upon its own expression, the pure image and utterance of 
feeling. knd the destruction of this primary function of 
mind would mean the complete negation of life and the inex- 
orable darkness of oblivion. Art thus lives solely in the 
imagination, for whenever a man concentrates his whole state 
of being into an image, which is the perfect expression of 
(1) Ibid. Cf. Breviario, p. 47. 
ï'sreviL.rio , pp . 47-48. 
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that state, the spirit of art is awakened. It is of no 
importance if he remains forever mute and uncommunicative, 
for the word 'artist,' far from indicating certain particu- 
lar individuals only, signifies man. Every man is 
an artist, because of his humanity. He is an artist even 
if his art manifests itself merely in his ability to talk 
well of everyday life and to give correct expression to his 
elementary and most obvious sentiments. And, since art is 
nothing but imagination, beauty is simply imagination re- 
joicing in itself, which is the very essence of imagination. 
Genuine imagination springs from sentiments alone, from 
aspirations, inclinations, rebellions, affections, aversions. 
Art, then, may be defined as the reflective form of senti- 
ment. In imagination, sentiments become mental images, 
life becomes contemplation, and the passionate impulse 
(itself mute) finds expression; in other words, sentiments 
are changed into consciousness - not logical or historical 
consciousness, but the spontaneous and immediate conscious- 
ness of intuition. This is the nature of art, and this is 
its proper and indispensable function in the life of the 
spirit. It is, in truth, a preparation for the logical 
life of thought or philosophy. And, since imagination and 
art are essential elements of the reflective life upon which 
activity is founded, the practical and moral importance of 
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art may be said to be revealed in the fact that art, while 
in no sense determining the mind, yet renders possible the 
further determination of perception and moral duty by pre- 
senting human sentiments and passions as a spectacle.(1) 
Although Croce's aesthetic theory is preeminently 
metaphysical in orientation, its superstructure is in the 
main psychological, and for that reason, coupled with his 
world -wide reputation as the champion of the expressionist 
school, no justification is necessary for undertaking in 
this study a critical examination of his doctrine. And, 
in point of fact, it is precisely his psychology that pre- 
sents to the reader the most glaring anomalies, for to say, 
as Croce in effect does say, that all expression is art, is 
to be gzilty of the most flagrant misinterpretation of plain 
psychological fact. That there can be little doubt as to 
his sincerity will readily be granted, but it cannot be 
gainsaid that his uncompromising subjectivism and his zeal 
for synthesis have led him into committing the grossest 
errors, not to mention affronts to common sense. 
From the standpoint of psychology the first stumbling 
(1) Vide Croce's article in Ideals, Aims and Methods in 
Education, (New Educator's Library), pp. 48 -49. Through- 
out this article Croce employs the word 'fancy,' but 
from the context it is clear that he means 'imagination.' 
Vide p.157 supra. 
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block to be encountered in a perusal of Croce's theory is 
his hypothesis of the existence of intuition as a funda- 
mental function of mind. Psychology has not shown itself 
disposed to recognise this faculty, and the bulk of contemp- 
orary research appears to justify the scepticism of science 
as to its reality. It is, however, unnecessary at this 
juncture to raise the psychological issues involved in 
Croce's postulate. Let it suffice to point out (a) that 
he may claim the authority of a long and distinguished line 
of philosophic thought dating as far back as Descartes, the 
first philosopher to propound a definition of the meaning 
and function of intuition, and (b) that Mr. G. B. Dibblee, 
at the end of a detailed study of the problem psychologically 
and physiologically, concludes that an intuitive faculty 
does exist "outside the limits of conscious operation. "(1) 
The deeper issues may therefore be waived in order to pro- 
ceed to an examination of the wider implications of Croce's 
doctrine. 
In consequence of the continuous reiteration of the 
term 'expression' throughout his writings, it is difficult 
to make out precisely what he means to convey by it, so 
manifold are the contexts in which it appears, so diverse 
the shades of emphasis and implication. That his use of 
( 1) _Dibblee , G. B., Instinct and intuition, p. 364. 
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the term differs radically fróm its everyday use is, however, 
quite clear. His distinction between expression in the 
'aesthetic sense' and expression in the 'naturalistic 
sense'(1) is accompanied by an account of different uses 
of the term in common speech. For instance, the words of 
the poet, the notes of the musician, or the figures of the 
painter are frequently designated 'expressions;' likewise 
the external signs of shame, anger and joy. It is also 
used in respect of heat as the 'expression' of fever, baro- 
metrical readings as the 'expressions' of atmospheric con- 
ditions, Stock Exchange figures as the 'expression' of the 
Market, and so on. Such uses as these are merely metaphor- 
ical. "One can well imagine," he states, "what kind of 
scientific results would be attained by allowing oneself to 
be governed by verbal usage and classing together facts so 
widely different." And he adds: "Darwin's book on the 
expression of the emotions in man and animals does not 
appertain to ..esthetic; because there is nothing in common 
between the science of spiritual expression and a Semiotic, 
whether it be medical, meteorological, political, physio- 
gnomic or chiromantic. "(2) 
Now it may be conceded that to class together such 
(1) Vide p. 162 supra. 
(2) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. , p.112. 
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facts as those mentioned above as mere facts would indeed 
be a very strange thing to do, and it is more than doubtful 
whether even the ordinary man, unaccustomed as he is to 
adopt a scientific attitude, would be so utterly uncritical 
and obtuse.as to class them together as expressions, how- 
ever vague his concept of the term might be. loreover, it 
might safely be asserted of any man who has attained such a 
degree of intellectual development as to be seriously inter- 
ested in the abstract problem of expression at all, that he 
would be certain not to fall into the trap of identifying 
the obviously metaphorical with the more or less established 
use of the term, as indicating the outward manifestations of 
inner facts. But Croce is so obsessed with his own concept 
of expression that he fails to observe the weakness and 
puerility of the point he makes with such an air of profund- 
ity and scientific candour. It is hard to justify his 
attempt to waylay the reader by such an intrusion, the effect 
of which is to obscure the issue by raising obstacles that 
are at best purely fictitious. That it would be very un- 
scientific procedure to accept without careful scrutiny the 
verbal usages of everyday language will readily be admitted; 
but surely it is equally unscientific to assume offhand that 
common speech is devoid of value to the scientific investiga- 
tor. Yet this is precisely Croce's point of view, for he 
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does not deign to recognise that, underlying the manifold 
uses of the term 'expression,' there may be something funda- 
mental to them all, a common core of meaning and implication. 
That this, however, is frequently lacking in various occurr- 
ences of a .particular term, all of which constitute examples 
of well -established usage, is pointed out by Professor 
Ducasse. Nevertheless it is not advisable to assume a 
priori that in any given case there is no such core of com- 
mon meaning. The procedure proper to a scientific method 
would not be to dismiss the possibility off -hand and to 
appropriate the word to individual purposes in defiance of 
such usages of the term as are already established, but to 
scrutinise carefully the manner in which the term is actually 
employed in established language, "and to formulate tentative 
definitions covering such usage or variety of usages, 
checking the correctness of such definitions by their capac.' 
ity to cover not only the cases of which they represent an 
analysis but also other cases that were as yet unexamined. 44 
Croce, however, sees no need for such a procedure, but 
cavalierly dismisses as merely metaphorical all usages of 
the term 'expression' other than he himself prescribes for 
it. And in doing so he courts the charge of violating the 
established usages of language, and of inventing arbitrarily 
(1) Ducasse, C. (T., The Philosophy of art, p. 44. 
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a private language of his own, which he expects the reader 
to accept in the interest of scientific method. 
It may be granted that the use of the term 'expression' 
with reference to the fluctuations of the barometer and to 
other phenomena of the outside world (especially those con- 
trolled by physical laws) is not particularly apt, but it is 
arguable that the variation in the Stock Exchange figures 
is in a sense (perhaps in the long run remote) an expression 
of the temper of those minds which constitute the concrete 
institution. In other words, the Stock Exchange figures 
are expressions of confidence or lack of confidence (i.e. 
states of mind), as the case may be. Likewise, the physic- 
al concomitants of fear, anger, love, joy and so on are 
expressions (outward manifestations) of psychic states, and 
to deny the accuracy of the term is to be guilty of verbal 
quibbling. The other instances quoted by Croce are ambigu- 
ous: he does not state whether he means the notes of the 
musician, the words of the poet, the figures of the painter, 
qua notes, words, figures, in isolation, as it were, from 
any apparent context or relation, or the saine items regarded 
as elements of a coherent and ordered system. If the for- 
mer, it is at least arguable that, in certain circumstances, 
such apparently bare senses may nevertheless be expressions, 
albeit in an exceedingly low degree, as in the quiet sigh of 
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blissful contentment or in the mild ejaculation of surprise. 
s mere physical phenomena they cannot be regarded as ex- 
pressing anything except what is imputed to them by the 
percipient. If, on the other hand, Croce means the notes, 
words and figures of the musician, poet and artist as such, 
that is, not as mere human beings but as artistic agents, 
then it may be asserted that these items are expressive 
(each in a contributory sense) of states of mind which 
brought them into existence. 
Since Croce appeared on the speculative stage the term 
expression has been surrounded by a tangle of metaphysical 
mysteries, which have obscured the fundamental issues under- 
lying the problem of the psychological nature of art, and 
no amount of hair - splitting will contribute one jot to its 
elucidation. The fundamental weakness of his hypothesis 
is nowhere more apparent than in his psychology, with which 
the present study is chiefly concerned and which will be 
examined presently. For the moment it will be instructive 
to glance at the literal meaning of the term expression, and 
to see how far the foregoing interpretation is justified by 
literal implication and common usage. 
"The term 'expression,'" states Ar. L. A. Reid, (1) 
"means, literally, a 'pressing' or 'squeezing out.' 
(1) Leid, . L. A., r, Stud in 1,esthetics, p. 47. 
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But in 
any sense at all relevant to our discussion it is obvious 
that the phrase must be accepted not literally but merely as 
a vivid metaphor, and even then a metaphor to be used with 
caution, a metaphor perhaps to be rejected in the end as 
dangerous. Expression, we shall argue, implies 'ealbodi- 
meat ' of some sort of a 'body.' This is the 'out' aspect. 
And in some sense something other than the 'body' must be 
'embodied.' This will represent roughly what is 'squeezed 
out.' The 'squeezing' part of the metaphor must be taken 
with a very large dose of reserve indeed... But taking 
the metaphor for the little that it is worth, and for no 
more, one kind of what which is embodied or revealed in the 
outside world will be states of mind." ú1r. Reid goes on 
to discuss in brief a few well -established and justifiable 
uses of the term, such as expressions of inner tension, 
expressions of satisfaction, and self- expression, all of 
which are external manifestations of mental states. 
From this analysis two principal points emerge: (i) the 
term 'expression' implies the pre -existence of an inner 
something; and (ii) an outer something which in some way 
is the complement of the inner. In other words, expression 
takes place only when the inner fact is directly' manifested 
in the outer, or, what in more concrete terms amounts to the 
same thing, when the outer encloses the inner in such a- 
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manner as to constitute its external equivalent. third 
and very important point emerges, however, from the fact 
that between (i) and (ii) a connecting link, an expressing 
agent, must exist, in order to facilitate the process of 
embodiment. Now, since mere dead matter of itself cannot 
function as an expressing agent, (although it may function 
as a medium of expression), to speak of the falling of the 
barometer "expressing rain" or the degree of heat "express- 
ing fever" is to use the term only metaphorically, as Croce 
rightly maintains.(l) On the other hand, it cannot be ad- 
witted. that Croce is right in regarding also as metaphorical 
those uses of the term which refer to the outer physical 
manifestations accompanying fear, anger, love and so on, 
such are but the essential external em- 
bodiments of facts, existing in the mind of the expressing 
agent. gill such manifestations in a living agent may be 
legitimately called expressions. Croce, however, is forced 
to deny this as a consequence of his peculiar psychology. 
If this view be sound it will be apparent that the 
term expression might be applied alike to the outward 
(1) It is, of course, arguable that even in the physical 
world there is an agent, a force at work, behind such 
'expressions' as rain and heat. This, however, is a meta- 
physical question which need not be discussed in the present 
context. 
173 
manifestations of inner states in the animal, as well as the 
human sphere. But as the former lies outside the scope of 
the present topic, the latter only will be discussed, since 
art belongs to man alone. flow, then, it may be asked, are 
ordinary or naturalistic expressions to be distinguished 
from those expressions which are called art? To Croce 
such a question would appear utterly absurd, for he main- 
tains that there is but one expression, and one only, and 
that is art. The only difference between expressions is 
a quantitative one. Certain men have a greater inclination 
and aptitude than others to express complex states of mind, 
and in ordinary language these men are called artists. chid 
some very complicated and difficult expressions are frequent- 
ly achieved, and these are works of art. "The limits 
of the expression - intuitions which are called art, as opposed 
to those vulgarly called non- art," Croce concludes," are 
empirical and impossible to define. "(1) Fundamental to his 
whole philosophy are those considerations, which lead Croce 
to enunciate this principle of singleness in expression, 
and it will be worth while at this juncture to examine his 
hypothesis in some detail, before attempting an answer to 
the question pointed above. It will be argued that the 
whole superstructure of his theory is seriously weakened 
(l) Filosofia dello ;spirito, Vol. I, pp.16, 17. 
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and rendered false by his ignoring two facts of crucial 
psychological importance: (i) the dependence of images 
upon percepts; and (ii) the importance of material in art- 
istic expression. 
"Everyone," Croce declares, "can experience the inter- 
nal illumination that occurs when he succeeds, and only up 
to the point that he succeeds, in formulating to himself 
his impressions and his feelings. Feelings or impressions 
then pass by means of words from the obscure region of the 
soul into the clearness of the contemplative spirit. "(1) 
Words, however, are not the only terms in which feelings 
and impressions may be formulated; they may also be formu- 
lated in non -verbal terms such as line, colour and sound.(2) 
And this formulation, this giving form to what is felt or 
suffered, is expression. Elsewhere he states that clear 
expression is tantamount to clear inward vision before 
statement, and that is art, poetry, speech, writing, draw- 
ing, music.(3) 
(1) Filosofia dello 3.oirito, Vol. I, p.11. (Already quoted). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Aesthetics and Education, Section IX, Ideals, Aims and 
Methods in Education, p.49. Vide also Filosofia dello 
Spirito, Vol. I, p.13, where he states "11 pittore e 
pittore perché vede ciò che altri sente solo, o intravede, 
ma non vede." Cf. Problemi di Estetica, p. 251. 
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These definitions, it may be observed, cover one sense 
in which the term expression is used in everyday language, 
viz., internal or subjective (as opposed to objective) ex- 
pression, which of course implies the use of images, as in 
inner speech, and the mental picturing of things not present 
to sense. And this is what Croce apparently means to 
imply by the above statements, for how else could formula- 
tion occur unless in terms of actual or imagined words, 
lines or sounds ?(1) In other passages, however, he makes 
his meaning abundantly clear. For instance, he states 
that to no intuition, be it pictorial, verbal or lausical, 
can expression in one of its forms (i.e. words, lines or 
sounds) be wanting, for intuition and expression are in- 
separable. And he asks how would it be possible to intuite 
a geometrical figure without possessing so accurate an 
image of it as to be able to represent it on paper or a 
blackboard.(2) The significance of word- images, colour - 
images and sound -images is further illustrated by the 
following passages from his Breviario di Estetica.(3) 
"In realtá noi non conosciamo altro che intuizioni expresse: 
un pensiero non é per noi pensiero se non quando sia 
(1) "In fancy (i.e. imagination) sentiments become mental 
images." Ibid. p.48. 
(2) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, p.11. 
(3) Breviario di Estetica, p. 47. 
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formolabile in parole, una fantasia musicale se non quando 
si concreti in suoni, un' immaginazione pittorica se non 
quando sia colorita." It is unnecessary, however, that 
these word- images be declaimed in vocal utterance, that 
the sound -images issue in physical musical performance, or 
that the colour -images be translated into physical pigments; 
"ma è certo che, quando un pensiero á veramente pensiero, 
quando é giunto alla maturità di pensiero, per tutto il 
nostro organismo corrono le parole, sollecitando i muscoli 
della nostra bocca e risonando internamente al nostro 
orechio; quando una musica è veramente musica, gorgheggia 
nella gola o freme sulle dita che scorrono su ideali tasti- 
ere; quando un' immagine pittorica è pittoricamente reale, 
siamo pregni di linfe'che sono "(1) Thus thought, 
music, art do not exist at all until expression in images 
occurs. 
Croce's thesis, that, prior to the practical activity 
of producing his picture, the artist is in possession of an 
image of it so precise in all its details that he is able 
immediately to translate it into physical terms, is as 
impossible to admit as it is to construct the evidence upon 
which it is based. For, although there are a few cases on 
(1) Breviario di Estetica. 
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record(1) which appear prima facie to support the thesis, 
Croce does not specifically mention any particular instance 
except that of Leonardo, from whose words spoken to the 
impatient Prior of the Convent of the Graces he infers the 
artist's possession of a precise image of the picture, which 
he ultimately transferred to the Convent wa11.(2) But even 
if it be granted that evidence of a sort may be adduced, it 
is nevertheless impossible to justify Croce's sweeping 
assertion that all artistic expression demands '?clear in- 
ward vision before statement." Besides, the claim is un- 
equivocally refuted by the testimony of living artists and 
by contemporary aestheticians of repute. Delacroix, for 
instance, points out "it is rare that the image arises 
complete in all its details, "(3) and it may be recalled 
that Galton found that a number of Royal academicians of 
his time reported little or no visual imagery.(4) The fact 
1 
Vide p.182-6 seq. 
(2) There is no evidence at all that would justify the ass- 
umption that Leonardo possessed the gift of imagining his 
pictures in detail prior to painting them. It is true he 
recognised the value of imagery, but this does not justify 
the assumption that he always possessed clear mental images 
of his artistic creations prior to their execution. 
(3) Delacroix, H., Psychologie de l'art, p.157. 
(4) Galton, F., Inquiries into Human Faculty, p.61. 
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is that if the possession of a precise image of the project- 
ed work of art were a fundamental condition of all artistic 
expression, then very little art could be brought into 
being. For, as Professor Alexander very truly points out, 
the artist, far from having a clear mental image of his 
picture prior to its physical creation, does not know what 
he means to express until he has in fact expressed it.(1) 
And this fact Croce himself appears unwittingly to imply 
when he states that "However great the artist, however in- 
tense his work, he will never derive from it any real, 
direct satisfaction except that of seeing his sentiment 
fully and clearly unfolded and outlined in word, rhythm or 
line?() To reconcile this statement with those already 
quoted above is obviously impossible; and from the context 
it is apparent that he means not word- images, but "the 
words used by man not only in ordinary, but also in extra- 
ordinary and solemn moments." It is true, however, that 
in his later writings Croce tends to retract from his 
(1) Alexander, S., "The Creative Process in the Artist's 
:Iind," British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XVII, April 
1927, p.311. 
(2) Aims, Ideals and 1Jiethods in Education, op. cit., p.50. 
Cf. "... cosi chi s'illude sulla ricchezza dei propri 
pensieri e delle proprie immagini e ricondotto alla realtà, 
allorché é costretto ad attraversare il ponte dell' asino 
dell' espressione - Numerate - diciamo al primo:- parlate, 
eccovi una matita e designate, esprimetevi, - diremo all' 
altro." Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. 1, p.14. (Present 
author's italics.) 
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original ontological conception of the material media of 
art, dwelling more and more on the importance of physical 
embodiment, thereby imperilling the foundations of his 
theory. nevertheless, he consistently denies that 'tech- 
nique' has any connection with ar-t, which is a state of the 
spirit requiring no physical embodiment, except as a means 
of making permanent the artist's spiritual labour.(l) 
Croce's dilemma will be brought to a clearer focus in his 
psychology of imagery which will now be discussed. 
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that ex- 
pression consists essentially in giving form to what is felt, 
desired, suffered, aspired to; and further, if it be granted 
that the expression must be expression in terms of word - 
images, sound -images, colour - images and so on, it is obvious 
that no formulation could take place, independently of 
previous experience of the medium in which the images are 
constructed. For instance, it would be a sheer impossibil- 
ity for a man to construct a clear mental image of a feeling 
which he desired permanently to enshrine in marble, without 
previously having acquired experience of its physical 
(1) Vide p. 162 supra. It should be noted that Croce 
himself regards his Breviario di Estetica as the more mature 
presentation of his thought, and for that reason emphasis 
should be laid upon this work. (Vide footnote in Carritt's 
philosophies of .ieauty, p.233) 
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attributes and its plastic potentialities. And, in point 
of fact, to have an image at all in this sense implies hav- 
ing an image of a plastic material whereith to form the 
image, (and an image without form is a contradiction), for 
clearly a feeling cannot be formed in terms of itself, un- 
less all feelings manifest themselves as images; in which 
case, according to Croce's interpretation, all feelings 
would be art and would not need to be expressed. But even 
Croce would not admit this, for in his view mere feeling is 
nothing but brute sensation or impression, which must be 
Liven form (i.e. expressed) in order to become art. ges- 
thetic expression is expression in images. Croce, however, 
consistently ignores the plain psychological fact, which 
may be found in every elementary text book in psychology, 
that all images are images constructed on a basis of per- 
cepts, and that what really is imaged is material - stone, 
paint, colour, line, words, sounds and so on. L.nd when he 
refers to the celebrated retort of Leonardo to the prior of 
the Convent of the Graces, he overlooks the fact that the 
great artist could have no images at all relevant to his 
purpose, except those derived from his previous experience 
as a practical artist working in terms of a concrete medium. 
"According to Croce's doctrine," Professor Ducasse points 
out,(1) "Beethoven, had he lived two thousand -years earlier, 
(1) 
Ducasse, C. J., The Philosophy of Ait, p.49, footnote. 
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could have composed all his music even then, since all art - 
creation takes place in Imagination, which needs no instru- 
ments or technique; but he could not have played it!" 
Criticising this, he continues: "The actual fact, however, 
is that the scope of the Imagination, although wider than 
past experience, is rather closely dependent upon past ex- 
perience. For this reason the feelings which artists 
express, even in mere imagination, do not go very far beyond 
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what they are able to embody in some perceptible medium - 
be it, perhaps, as tenuous as words. 1.s new musical or 
other instruments are invented, artistic creativeness is 
made aware of new ranges of possibilities. Feelings which 
before had to remain unexpressed even in there imagination 
now reach objectification, and so do the far more numerous 
ones which are the progeny of these, that is to say, the 
feelings which the artist comes to have at all, owing to 
the fact that he has already objectified others, and been 
able to contemplate the objective embodiment of those others:" 
This criticism is both psychologically sound and consistent 
with the known facts of artistic creation. 
The evidence in support of Croce's thesis is on the 
whole both scanty and ambiguous. Perhaps the most remark- 
able case is that of Mozart quoted by lvr. . Carritt (1) "My 
(1) Carritt, E. F., The Theory of Beauty, p.181 (footnote). 
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ideas come as they will, I don't hnoau how, all in a stream. 
If I like them I keep them in my head, and people say that 
I often hum them over to myself. dell, if I can hold on 
to them, they begin to join on to one another, as if they 
were bits that a pastrycook should join together in his 
pastry. JA.nd now my soul gets heated, and if nothing dis- 
turbs.me the piece grows larger and brighter until, however 
long it is, it is all finished together in my mind, so that 
I can see it at a glance, as if it were a pretty picture 
or a pleasing person. Then I don't hear the notes one after 
another, as they are hereafter to be played, but it is as if 
in my fancy they were all at once. 1í11d that is a revel 
(das ist nun ein Schmaus). while 'm inventing, it all 
seems to me like a vivid dream; but that hearing it all 
at once (when the invention is done), that's the best. 
what I have once so heard I forget not again, and perhaps 
this is the best sift that God has granted me." Less 
striking, however, are two cases quoted by Delacroix: the 
first, that of hichter, who says: "wand le crépuscule 
survint et que je mis de côté le livre et m'approchai des 
vitres obscurcies, ma composition, â laquelle je n'avais, 
pas songé le ''oins du monde, surgit d'un coup devant moi, 
toute terminée et comme vivante dans sa forme et sa couleur. 
Transporté de ravissement, je pris en hâte un fusain et 
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malgré l'obscurité envahissante je mis le tout sur le 
carton. "(1) The second citation refers to Puvis de Cha- 
vannes' vision of the Lucius pro patria, which appeared to 
him from a train window:(2) "La vision avait été pour moi 
si intense qu'il me semblait qu'une observation sur place 
en eût affaibli la sensation et m'aurait exposé a n'en 
retrouver, plus tard, qu'une image réduite, confuse et 
sans vie." Records such as these are obviously too vague 
to be ranked as valid evidence in a scientific investigation, 
(1)Delacroix, H., psychologie de l'art, p.157 (foot -note) 
from Richter, L., Lebenserinnerungen eines deutschen Malers, 
p. 165. 
(2) Ibid.. p. 158: from René Jean, Puvis de Chavannes. 
Delacroix also mentions relevant statements by (1) Ingres 
and (2) Rodin among others: (1) "Ayez tout entière dans les 
yeux, dans l'esprit, la figure que vous voulez représenter, 
et que L'exécution ne soit que l'accomplissement de cette 
image déjà possédée et préconçue." (2) "tuand un bon 
sculpteur modèle une statue, quelle'qu'elle soit, il faut 
d'abord qu'il en conçoive fortement le mouvement general; 
il faut ensuite que, jusqu'à la fin de sa tâche, il main- 
tienne énergiquement dans la pleine lumière de sa conscience 
son idée d'ensemble, pour y ramener sans cesse et y relier 
étroitement les moindres details de son oeuvre. Et cela 
ne va pas sans un très rude effort de pensée." These 
statements, however, are of no special significance to the 
present issue, although they imply that their authors re- 
gard clear images as essential to the artist. Delacroix 
himself expresses doubt on the point, for although he says 
that "il est rare que l'image surgisse toute faite, arrêtée 
dans tous ses détails," he does not claim "que l'exécution 
matérielle soit toujours nécessaire a l'élaboration de 
cette image. Il se peut que l'élaboration reste tout 
intérieure et que l'exécution suive." 
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and must be taken cum grano salis. Besides, Richter's 
statement contains a contradiction, for he states that the . 
composition rose before him "complete and alive in form and 
colour," and that with charcoal he put it all on paper! 
The case of Puvis de Chavannes is likewise too inadequately 
stated to be taken at its face value: and the same may be 
said of iiiozart's. But be that as it may, the fact remains 
that neither Richter, Puvis de Chavannes nor jvíozart could 
have any images, independently of their previous experience 
of the perceptible material, in terms of which the image is 
imaged. This, however, Croce denies, and thus comes into 
conflict with the facts of psychology, a position from which 
he cannot withdraw without abandoning the very foundations 
upon which he takes his stand. Croce's theory, states 
Bosanquet,(l) is deeply rooted in the "philosophic blunder" 
of thinking "that you can have them (things) completely 
before your mind without having their bodily presence at all. 
lend because of this blunder, it seems fine and 'ideal' to 
say that the artist operates in the bodiless medium of pure 
thought or fancy, and that the things of the bodily world 
are merely physical causes of sensation, which do not them- 
selves enter into the effects he uses." If he admits the 
importance of technique (and it ht-:.s been shown that he does, 
(1) Bosanquet, B., Three Lectures on .esthetic, p.69. 
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but with important reservations which are tantamount to a 
denial of it), he contradicts himself; if he denies it 
(which he does in no equivocal terms), he commits a first - 
rate psychological error. Croce's dilemma is complete.(1) 
In consequence of the fact that proof is impossible, 
it is as unprofitable to deny as it is to assert that some 
artists, because of their special endowment, are able to 
imagine their pictures in complete detail before translating 
them into physical material. But on psychological as well 
as practical grounds the affirmative proposition is highly 
suspicious. Tracing the usefulness of sentience (affection) 
in thought, Spearman concludes "that even in the performanc- 
es where introspection unanimously proclaims images to be 
useful, even there - and a fortiori in other performances - 
they really render little or no service. Against drawing 
such a conclusion," he continues," only one objection seems 
to have been attempted. It has been suggested that images 
may render very great service, but still do so with equal 
efficacy even when they are of the poorest quality. For 
the best work is everywhere done with the best tools. If 
images are to serve. as fixation points because of their 
superior stability, surely they ought to serve those 
(1) 
Cf. Reid, L. A., A Study in Aesthetics, pp. 166 -170, 
where Mr. Reid curiously puts forward a defence of Croce to 
the effect that Croce does not mean to deny the importance 
of physical embodiment! 
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individuals best with whom they are most stable." He then 
quotes from the experimental report of Martin: "The experi- 
mental subjects commenced with the traditional opinion, 
that the images would help them in reproducing the cards. 
In the course of the experiments, however, they became 
sceptical as to the power of images to inform. This 
doubtless arose from their fruitless efforts to produce 
a picture able to help them when they could not remember 
the card in a notional manner (unanschaulich). One subject 
said towards the end of the series: 
"'id opinion is that my images are only what I know, 
.and that they do not always contain all that I know. So 
far as I am able to determine from these experiments, these 
images were of no use to me in any way.'" 
From this he concludes that "this investigation, the 
most conclusive of all as to the efficacy of images, would 
appear to be the most adverse of all. "(1) 
It is undoubtedly true that the majority of artists 
possess images of a sort. Such images, however, may or 
may not be relevant to the work of art as it will appear 
when created: they may be (a) images more or less connected 
with a particular subject-matter or theme, which is to be 
translated in artistic form; or (b) they may be images of 
(1 ) Spearman, C., The Nature of Intelligence, p__:.190 -191. 




(as when the artist visualises 
himself at work); or (c) they may be images of the picture 
or statue as it will probably appear when completed; or (d) 
a confused pattern of images comprising types (a), (b) and 
(c), intermingled with each other, but all associated with 
the artist's affective state and present creative mood. 
The type or types of imagery which a particular artist may 
have will depend to a large extent upon his innate mental 
make -up, his acquired habits, training and past experience, 
and to assume like Croce that there is only one type of 
artistic imagery is palpably absurd. Further, it is as 
improbable that the same artist will always experience the 
same type of imagery; indeed, it is extremely doubtful 
whether the artist's work must pass through an imaginal 
phase prior to its physical creation. The artist, for 
instance, may be seized by a sudden onrush of creative 
energy, a sudden desire to paint, and, as not infrequently 
happens, he may put his picture directly on to the canvas, 
externalising all his imagery immediately, as it were, in 
the concrete without the aid of any images whatever. 
" ith Chopin," says Georges Sand, "creation was spontaneous, 
,diraculous; he wrought without foreseeing. It would come 
(1) Cf. L. xrréat's "images de traduction," Mémoire et 
Imagination, p. 28. 
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complete, sudden, sublime: "(1) again, the artist may be 
literally compelled to draw or paint by the mere sight of 
a new canvas or the seductive surface of a i+hatman board:(2) 
in which case he may proceed directly to create as in the 
previous instance. ( ) 
Broadly speaking, pre- artistic images may be grouped 
into two main classes: (i) those directly called up by or 
associated with a particular subject -matter; and (ii) those 
related to the process of technical execution or the finished 
product - "images d'interprétation ou de traduction" - the 
work as it will appear when completed. The first class 
requires a word of explanation. Subject -matter sometimes . 
signifies ideas or thoughts (concepts), which the artist 
conveys or means to convey in terms of representations of 
phenomenal forms; or, in other words, what the picture or 
statue is about, the 'idea' it portrays. At other times, 
especially when there is no apparent story or idea, it sig- 
nifies only the things represented, as, for instance, in 
(1) hibot, Th., Essay on the Creative Imagination, p.b2. 
(2) inn experience well -known to artists and probably due in 
part to a horror vacui and partly to the fascination of 
material. 
(3) It is worth noting that hibot's claim (Ibid. p.187) that 
for the painter images have a very high precision of details 
conflicts with the findings of Galton. 
189 
still life paintings. Such uses of the term are both 
useful and legitimate in everyday discourse about art, but 
they are apt to be misleading in aesthetics. For instance, 
there is a prevalent but palpably false view which pre- 
supposes that such subject- matter is absolutely essential 
to all great art. And this view is indissolubly bound up 
with another no less false, which regards technical finish 
and accuracy of rendering as fundamental attributes of 
crucial artistic importance. Neither of these views, 
though held with varying modifications by many distinguished 
writers,(1) merits serious discussion at this stage in the 
history of aesthetic theory, for not only do they fail to 
discriminate between artistic technique and mere manual 
dexterity,(2) but they confuse all manner of irrelevant con- 
cepts which cannot be admitted into the aesthetic purview. 
But what is more to the point, they overlook the important 
fact that it is not the- subject- matter the artist desires to 
portray - that can be done by photography - but feelings and 
intuitions aroused by the subject -matter which he desires to 
express in form. The subject- matter is only his point of 
departure, the flare which fires his imagination. And, 
although it may occupy an important place in the forefront 
(1) 
Cf. Lalo, C., Introduction à l'Esthétique, pp.138 -145. 
(2) Cf. daritain, J., Art and Scholasticism, p.13. 
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of his attention, as soon as he begins to work it fades 
into the half -light of memory and may rapidly pass beyond 
the range of his immediate conscious experience. with the 
first brush stroke on the virgin canvas a new and vital 
stimulus is called into being, the germ of a new reality of 
the artist's own creating, which gathers into itself all 
the diffused and indeterminate feelings and representations 
aroused by the original subject -matter, presenting them in 
clearer focus before the artist's vision. "When a subject 
comes into the brain of a creative writer," declares De 
Santis,(1) "it at once dissolves that part of reality which 
suggested it. The earthly images seem to fluctuate, like 
objects in a mass of vapour seen from above. The figures - 
the trees, the towers, the houses - disintegrate, become 
(1) Santis, F. de, History f Italian Literature, Vol.I, 
pp.177 -178. Cf. the following passage: "In so far as 
images arise within the perceptual process and fail to blend 
or to coalesce with the perception, but become detached from 
it, these images are useless and irrelevant. Perception, 
therefore, does not offer scope for images that begin to 
assume any kind of separate or individual existence. 
Imagery, as such, tends to destroy perception, and floods 
of imagery will change the entire process and take it alto- 
gether away from the perceptual. When, on the other hand, 
images rush in upon the artist as he watches the object 
transferring itself through his medium, these images are 
precious. They are the very content of his vision, or at 
least they may become such. The richer the flow of imagery, 
the greater at all events are the resources at his command." 
Thorburn, J. M., Art and the Unconscious, p.102. 
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fragmentary. To create reality, a poet must first have the 
force to kill it. But instantly the fragments draw to- 
gether again, in love with each other, seeking one another, 
coming together with desire, with the obscure presentiment 
of the new life to which they are destined. And the first 
real moment of creation in that tumultuous and fragmentary 
world is the moment when those fragments find a point, a 
centre around which they can press. It is then that the 
poet's creation comes out from the unlimited, which makes 
it fluctuant, and takes on a definite form - it is then that 
it comes to birth." Such images as may have been aroused 
directly by the subject -matter will likewise fade and dis- 
appear, giving place to (ii) images of the picture (includ- 
ing technical operations) in advance of actual execution. 
The transition may be complete and immediate, or partial or 
gradual, according to circumstances, but it is of first -rate 
psychological significance. For it indicates the passage 
from imagination in the general sense of the term to creative 
imagination, the progress of man, as man, to man as 
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artist.(1) 
All images of the technical activity of expression 
(the (b) type) are directly dependent upon previous experi- 
ence of technical processes, the manipulation of paint, 
metal, stone and clay, and the handling of brushes, pencil, 
charcoal, chisel and modelling tools. Without such previous 
experience it would obviously be impossible for the artist 
to imagine his technical procedure in advance of actual 
execution. Although primarily visual, it is probable that 
these images will be accompanied by appropriate kinesthetic' 
(1) In passing it should be noted (a) that it is not here 
implied that it is essential the subject -matter should be 
actually present to sense; it may arise spontaneously in 
the artist's mind or it may be deliberately called up from 
past experience. :gut in general where the subject- matter 
is present to sense, such images as may arise in the artist's 
mind prior to the creative process will tend to be images 
directly connected with it, rather than images called up by 
free association. And (b): it is a debatable point 
whether subject -matter is absolutely essential to.artistic 
creation. Picasso, for instance, declared to M. Zervos 
that "I put on canvas the sudden apparitions which force 
themselves on me. I don't know in advance what I am going 
to put on the canvas, any more than I decide in advance 
what colours to use. Jhilst I work I take no stock of what 
I am painting on the canvas. Every time I begin a picture, 
I feel as though I were throwing myself into the void." 
(Quoted by Herbert Read, Art Sow, p.123) But perhaps it 
is too early to pronounce judgment upon Picasso's paintings. 
The fact remains, nevertheless, that at least one artist of 
the front rank proceeds in this way, and it is a matter 
which psychological aesthetics cannot lightly dismiss. 
It can do so only at its peril. Cf. Alexander, S., 
Art and Material, p.12. 
193 
and tactile- motor(1) (perhaps even auditory(2)) imaginal 
concomitants; they may also be accompanied by incipient 
movements of hands and arms and bodily gestures aroused by 
empathetic responses to images of shapes, lines and postured 
figures which he proposes to execute in material. The 
painter, for instance, in addition to visualising the effect 
of the technical operation in advance, will 'feel' himself 
executing the appropriate movements, he will 'feel' the 
brush or charcoal in his hand and the quality of the surface 
upon which (in imagination) he is working; the sculptor 
will have a like experience, as he imagines himself chipping 
away the sparkling marble or manipulating his docile clay 
into form. To most artists images of technical procedure 
are invaluable, and to many they are indispensable accom- 
paniments of creative production, since, by imagining opera- 
tions and effects in advance, time and effort may be con- 
served and irreparable errors avoided. Few artists, how- 
ever, trust to, their imagery alone, and because of this the 
long established practice of "roughing out" a cartoon or 
scale model of the projected picture or statue is still 
(1) Vide hibot's essay on the Creative Imagination, 
pp. 187 -188. 
(2) For example, the rasping sound produced by drawing in 
charcoal or pencil on paper or canvas; the sound of the 
chisel on the surface of stone; the odour of paint; and 
all the other ingredients which together constitute the 
'exciting' atmosphere of the studio. 
194 
the principal method of the majority.(l) But there is a 
more potent reason for this practice: it is literally the 
only way the artist has of discovering what he really means 
to express, and his only way of knowing how he is going to 
express it. "The urge that prompts them (works of value 
that will live) either by direct vision of nature or in- 
directly from stored knowledge drawn out by the imagination 
will be indefinite until its execution begins in the material 
adopted; then it clarifies itself slowly by the stern help 
of the material. The artist, in tackling his material, is 
searching not only for a means to express his vision, but 
for light upon thevision itself. What we call his tech- 
nique is a means not only of re- creation but of creation. 
The vision, as well as the image that will be made of it, 
depends for its existence on this technique, and the whole - 
idea, manipulation and eventual object - grow together, 
always on the ultimate margin of the present. "(2) No 
(1) 
"The revelations of inventors or of their biographers 
leave no doubt as to the necessity of a large number of 
sketches, trials, preliminary drawings, no matter whether 
it is a matter of industry, commerce, a machine, a poem, 
an opera, a picture, a building, a plan of campaign, etc." 
Hibot, op. cit. p.163. If artists as a rule had clear 
images of their work in advance of execution such a proced- 
ure would hardly have developed. 
(2) Copley, John, "True and False Technique," Print 
Collector's Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 1. 
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matter how vivid and seemingly clear may be the artist's 
images and no matter how definite his intention, the natural 
qualities of his medium, its tractability or recalcitrancy, 
will materially and inevitably influence his concrete ex- 
pression in a manner which it is impossible for the artist 
either to avoid or to foresee. In point of fact, it is 
extremely doubtful whether any artist, who depends at all 
upon the aid of imagery, ever executes a painting or a statue 
without encountering unexpected technical problems, the 
handling of which materially modifies the previously imag- 
ined formal character and quality of his work.(1) Material 
demands a treatment appropriate to itself, and for the artist 
the full recognition of this is always a significant factor 
in his procedure and aim. 
To the painter the importance of the sympathetic ex- 
ploitation of his material medium is perhaps not so funda- 
mental to the success of his activity, but to the sculptor 
('1) "The material chooses and modifies the images and the 
artist finds himself compelled by his material to fresh and 
altered imagination." (Alexander, S., Art and Material, 
p.30) Vide also the same author's Beauty and Other Forms of 
Value, p.67, where the following statement occurs: "... as 
the details (of the picture) are transcribed they affect 
and affected by the rest of the composition, and either 
themselves must undergo change, or they alter the total. 
The sculptor I observed when he introduced a touch with his 
knife into the clay model's nose or eyes, found he had 
affected the unity of his model and so he was always working 
over the whole head at once." This is an experience with 
which every artist is familiar; it is inescapable. 
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wood and stone and metal appeal to something deep in his 
mental constitution. "If we would understand a visual 
art," states ,Zr. Adrian Stokes,(1) "we ourselves must 
cherish some fantasy of the material that stimulated the 
artist, and ourselves feel some emotional reason why his 
imagination chose, when choice was not altogether impelled 
by practical, technical and social considerations, to employ 
one material rather than another." It is often said that 
the sculptor thinks in stone, just as the poet thinks in 
words. This is no mere rhetorical embellishment, but a 
matter -of -fact statement of immense psychological signific- 
ance. Croce, however, with his intransigent metaphysical 
outlook, entirely ignores the fact that the artist's 
affective responses to his material are actual ingredients 
of his creative mood, and in so far as this is satisfactori- 
ly expressed, these responses, these intuitive feelings for 
his material are embodied in his concrete expression. 
This is seldom recognised by philosophers and psychologists 
who write about art, and the fact cannot be too strongly 
emphasised. Professor Alexander, one of the most instruct- 
ive and illuminating living British theorists, who has 
emphasised so cogently and with so much knowledge the 
(1) Stokes, Adrian, Stones of Rimini, p.20. (Cf. Chapter 
I as a whole; also Kantor, J. R., Principles of Psychology, 
Vol. II, p.54: material as psychological stimulus.) 
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fundamental importance of medium in art, and iQir. Edward 
Bullough, are notable exceptions., No writers on art have 
shown so much insight and sympathetic understanding in their 
respective treatments of the problem of art and creative 
activity. Ir. Bullough with rare perspicacity insists 
that the artist's "attitude to medium and its technique 
forms an integral part in the creation of a work;" "the 
vision of the artist," he very rightly points out, "is pro- 
foundly affected by the medium, for unless the vision is 
conceived in terms of the medium, it would be almost an 
abuse of language to call it vision at all." The influence 
penetrates the vision in its minutest details, "in propor- 
tion to the perfection of the adaptation between the mind 
and the medium... "(1) 
So far no mention has been made of the special type of 
imagery known as eidetic, to which an increasing amount of 
attention has been given in recent years, mostly in Germany. 
Optical perceptual (eidetic) images, states Professor E. R. 
Jaensch,(2) one of the foremost workers in this field of 
research, are phenomena which assume an intermediate position 
between sensations and images. Like ordinary physiological 
(1) "Mind and Medium in Art. "(IV). 
Psychology, Vol. XI, p.37. 
(2) Jaensch, E. R., Eidetic Imagery,.pp. 1, 2. 
British Journal of 
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after -images they are always seen in the literal sense. 
This property they have of necessity and under all condi- 
tions, sharing it with sensations. In other respects they 
can also exhibit the properties of images ( Vorstellungen). 
In these cases in which the imagination exerts little 
influence, they are merely modified after- images, deviating 
from the norm in a definite way. When that influence is 
nearly or completely zero, they become slightly intensified 
after -images. In the other limiting case, when the influ- 
ence of the imagination is at its maximum, they are pro- 
jected, like after -images, outward and literally seen. 
Just as there are different shades of orange, allaying 
somewhere between pure red and pure yellow, so, too, the 
slightly intensified after -image and the projected, liter- 
ally visible memory -image are the limiting cases between 
which the eidetic images lie. 
Now the point of special importance to the present 
discussion is the supposed connection between the eidetic 
disposition and the artistic capacity. Although eidetic 
images are rare among average adults,(1) "there are to be 
(1) Ibid. p.3. Most children, it is held, pass through an 
eidetic phase which gradually diminishes as puberty is 
approached. JaenschTs work was with subjects of ten years 
of age and over, but he mentions (p.84) that other investi- 
gators (Goss and Rossler) found the maximum period to be 
the sixth year of age. 
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found among artists numerous personalities that permanently 
keep the characteristics of the youthful eidetic phase of 
development. "(1) The extraordinary successes of the 
painter Erwin Heckmann in the Deutsches Landerziehungsheim 
in Castle Ettersburg are due, he claims, "to his using and 
preserving the mental characteristics of the eidetic phase 
in the children." The work of O. Kroh,(2) who made a study 
of a number of German poets and concluded from the evidence 
that many were eidetics, adds support to this thesis. 
With the wider implications of the theory of eidetic 
imagery as propounded by Professor Jaensch and his collabor- 
ators, at all events as far, as it bears on the psychological 
theory of art, the present discussion is not concerned. 
it is scarcely necessary, however, to emphasise that it 
would be absurd in the present stage of research to assume 
that all artists are either partially or predominantly of 
eidetic constitution. The immediate question is What 
relation (if any) does eidetic imagery(3) bear to the 
process of artistic creation? Is the eidetic artist's 
(1) Ibid. p. 47. 
(2) Kroh, 0., "Subjektive Anschauungsbilder bei Jugendlichen,T 
(mentioned by Jaensch.) 
(3) It should be kept in mind that psychologists are not en- 
tirely in agreement as to the existence of eidetic imagery. 
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picture (as Croce would have it, if he recognised the exist- 
ence of eidetic imagery) merely a copy of the image or 
images he sees (in the literal sense) before him? This 
question raises no point that has not been dealt with in the 
preceding argument. The only matter that requires to be 
settled is the question:- To which of the two groups does 
the eidetic image belong: those excited by or connected 
with the subject -matter of the picture or those connected 
with technical procedure or with the picture as it will 
probably appear when completed? There appears to be no 
evidence on the point upon which to found an answer, but, 
having regard to the generally accepted theory, which main- 
tains that the phenomena of eidetic imagery are due to the 
psycho- physical constitution of the individual personality,(l) 
it is more than probable that the images of the eidetic 
artist belong essentially to the first group, i.e. those 
excited by or connected with the subject- matter of the 
(1) Jaensch, op. cit., pp. 3 and 10. 
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picture he intends to produce:(1) in which case the eidetic 
artist's image, in common with other images, will undergo 
modification during the process of concrete artistic pro- 
duction. It may, therefore, be concluded with Professor 
Alexander(2) that eidetic imagery is but an additional 
gift, possessed by certain artists in devising their sub- 
ject- matter or in constructing their work. 
Having dealt with fundamental psychological errors 
underlying Croce's conception of artistic expression - a 
conception which makes it impossible for him to recognise 
any distinction between the stage which precedes the act of 
(1) This would correspond to what Jaensch designates (p.8) 
"an emotionally toned situation." ... "One should always 
note whether eidetic images occur spontaneously under 
special circumstances, particularly in emotionally toned 
situations. Even in the weak cases that have a. conceptual 
component, such occasional, spontaneous images are hardly 
ever lacking, since emotional participation is an important 
factor in this component." The psychological situation 
is different, however, when the images are aroused by 
optical stimulation alone, for in this case the eidetic 
images will modify perceptions either by distortion of 
form or colour or both. But whether this modification 
is influenced by the artist's knowledge of the qualities 
of his medium is a doubtful point. In any event, this 
would not adversely affect the above argument: it would 
merely mean including such images among the second group. 
(2) Alexander, S., Beauty and the Other Forms of Value, 
p. 69. 
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physical creation and the physical creation itself(1) - it 
will now be possible to resume the main argument, by attempt, 
ing to define the psychological difference between these 
expressions which may properly be included within the con- 
cept art and these which may not: in other words, the 
difference implied by the terms ordinary or naturalistic 
expression and artistic expression. 
It will be worth while at the outset to recall what 
Croce himself has to say on the matter, bearing in mind of 
course that he recognises one kind of expression and one 
only, and that is art. In his chapter on the "Physically 
Beautiful "(2) he points out that, just as the existence of 
the hedonistic side of the aesthetic activity (the practical 
aspect of aesthetic value and disvalue)(`) has led to the 
confusion of that activity with the useful and the pleasur- 
able, so the existence of - or, as he is careful to 
emphasise - the possibility of constructing the physical 
side, has given rise to the confusion between aesthetic 
(1) The distinction which common sense makes between the 
terms 'art' and 'artist' is likewise, according to Croce, 
impossible to maintain; art is an experience of the spirit 
and the artist is the spirit that experiences art. 
(2) Filosofia dello Spirito, Vol. I, Chap. XIII, p.111. 
(3) "Che sono come la risonanza pratica del valore e 
disvalore estetici." 
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expression and expression in a naturalistic sense. Ex- 
pression in the latter sense, he states, is simply devoid 
of expression in the spiritual sense: which unfortunately 
is not particularly illuminating. Continuing, he recog- 
nises four stages in the complete process of artistic pro- 
duction: (a) impressions;(1) (b) expression or spiritual 
aesthetic synthesis, i.e. "the essential aesthetic fact, "(2) 
giving form to (a), intuition; (c) hedonic accompaniment 
or aesthetic pleasure; (d) translation of the aesthetic 
fact into physical terms. Now, according to Croce, it 
(1) It is not clear what Croce means exactly by impressioni. 
At one point he appears to identify impressions with sensa- 
tions, at another point with feelings (sentimenti); for 
instance (p.11), "Cio che non si oggettiva in un' espressi- 
one non e intuizione u rappresentazione, ma sensazione e 
naturalità," and further on the same page: 
impressioni passano allora... "; again, (p.16), "Ció che 
comunemente si chiama, per antonomasia, l'arte, coglie in- 
tuizioni piú vaste e complesse di quelle che si sogliono 
comunemente avere, ma intuisce sempre sensazioni e impressi- 
oni, é espressione d'impressioni, non espressione dell' es- 
pressione." A sensation is not an impression, nor is an 
impression (impressione) a feeling (sentimente). It would 
appear, however, from the following passage (p.14) that 
what he means by the term impressioni is simply brute sensa- 
tion: "e quanto poco un pittore possiede delle intuizioni 
di un poeta, o di quelle anche di un altro pittore! Pure, 
quel poco é tutto il nostro patrimonio attuale d'intuizioni 
o rappresentazioni. Fuori di esse, sono soltanto impressi- 
oni, sensazioni, sentimenti, impulsi, emozioni, o come altro 
si chiami ció che é ancora di qua dello spirito, non 
assimilato dall' uomo." Filosofia dello Spirito. 
(2) Ibid. p. 168. 
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should be obvious to everyone that (b), which is absent 
from naturalistic expression, is the only stage that can be 
called aesthetic and truly real. It would be necessary to 
Lo a long way with Croce to be able to claim that these 
statements are in any way enlightening to the present topic; 
it simply amounts to saying in other words what he has al- 
ready said, i.e. expressions which lack what aesthetic 
expressions have are not aesthetic but naturalistic, 
mechanical or passive facts. But what he apparently means 
to convey here is that 'expressions' which lack form (not 
expressed in images) are not expressions at all, not art, 
but mere impressions Or sensations, feelings, impulses, 
emotions, or whatever is not 'echoed in the spirit, is not 
assimilated by man. And, since expression for him is 
essentially and solely a spiritual affair, having no reality 
outside the spirit, it is impossible for him to admit that 
there can be any such phenomenon as that which has here been 
frankly designated ordinary or naturalistic expression. 
It has been submitted that all images immediately 
relevant to artistic production are images of perceptible 
material, and that this material imposes restrictions upon 
the artist which necessitate more or less modification of 
the images in the process of externalisation. Further, it 
has been claimed that the artist's reactions to his material 
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are essential ingredients in his creative mood, both prior 
to and during actual production, and that these ingredients 
are embodied in the final achievement. It has also been 
argued - and this cannot be too strongly emphasised - that 
the artist does not know exactly what he means to express 
until he has in fact expressed it: which means, contrary 
to the thesis advanced by Croce, that physical expression 
is absolutely essential to the very existence of art. It 
may now be submitted that all human expressions, which are 
in no way influenced by the inherent qualities of the 
medium of expression and ordered by the agent's innate 
sensibility to form, are not artistic but naturalistic. 
There is a wide abyss, Croce declares,(1) between a man who 
is the prey of anger and äll its natural manifestations and 
another who expresses it aesthetically; between the cries 
and contortions of one, who is grieving through the loss of 
a dear one, and the words or song with which the same person 
portrays his suffering at another time; between the grimace 
of emotion and the gesture of the actor. The difference 
referred to here is due simply to the fact that in the one 
case (as, for instance, that of the man who is the prey of 
anger), the expression is unordered and undirected, whereas 
in the other it is ordered, directed and moulded, alike by 
(1) Ibid. p. 112. 
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the agent's sensibility to formal relations and his intuit- 
ive awareness of the inherent qualities of his medium. 
In this concept of order lies the crux of the matter. 
Order, however, does not imply any fixed or rigid system 
of arrangement, but the perceptual result of manipulating 
plastic material in such a manner as to create a formal 
equivalent of an inner state of being. 
No aesthetic writer has had a greater or more powerful 
following than Croce; no writer has shown keener insight 
into the esoteric realm of art, combined with greater 
ignorance of commonsense reality and plain fact. his 
influence has been immense; but he "belongs rather to trie 
company of those who make the world interesting' than to 
the company of those who satisfy the mind's demand for 
intelligibility. "(1) 
(1) Gilbert, K., Studies in Recent Aesthetic, p. 113. 
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CtiA NTER VI. 
iJoegenesis and rtistic Creativity. 
CHAPTER VI. 
"The creative operations of the human mind, whether 
conscious or unconscious, are intrinsically orderly. Only 
through such psychic orderliness is there possibility of 
communication between the artist and him who appreciates 
the work of art." 
F. J. Mather, Concerning Beauty. 
The enthusiastic reception accorded in so many quarters 
to Croce's theory is symptomatic of the leaning towards the 
non -conceptual, alogical or intuitional aspects of the cog- 
nitive life which has marked the progress of philosophic 
thought during the past two or three decades. Exactly how 
far the recent revival in aesthetics may be attributed to 
this tendency it would be difficult now to determine, but 
it can hardly be gainsaid that as a result of the palpable 
failure of the intellectualistic theories of art the time 
was ripe at the inception of this revival for a new orienta- 
tion based upon direct experience and psychological investi- 
Eation. Psychology itself, turning more and more towards 
the study of the fundamental motivations of human activity, 
came to regard the study of art as one of the most fruitful 
fields of research, promising to yield results of far- 
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reaching importance to the science. The psychology of art 
thus acquired a new significance in the study of mental 
life. Anthropological and ethnological research in turn 
presented psychology not only with fresh material for in- 
vestigation, but forced aestheticians to recognise the 
extreme narrowness of the traditional (intellectual; concept 
of art inherited from the academic aesthetic philosophers 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to extend 
the connotation of the term by including within its scope 
all manifestations of artistic productivity, primitive and 
civilised alike. The way was thus prepared for a new 
approach to the problem, starting from the most elemental 
aspects of creativity lying beyond the fringe of rationality 
and conscious endeavour. From the point of view of contemp- 
orary theory the highest significance of Croce's aesthetic 
is precisely his insistence upon the directness of artistic 
experience and its complete independence of verbal concepts 
and syllogistic processes. But, as has been shown in the 
preceding chapter, in attempting to rescue aesthetics from 
the confused and nebulous heights of system- building philo- 
sophy, he has merely succeeded in casting it into the utter- 
most depths of psychological vacuity. 
In direct opposition alike to Croce's standpoint and 
to advanced contemporary opinion stands the theory of 
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Professor Spearman, which purports to explain creative 
ability in terms of his celebrated doctrine of Noegenesis.(1) 
Were it not for the fact that professor Spearman is 
one of the most distinguished of British psychologists, 
whose work in the field of intelligence and cognition has 
gained world -wide acknowledgment, it would scarcely be worth 
while stopping to examine a theory which tacitly accepts as 
its frame of reference the discarded artistic dogmas of the 
nineteenth century academies. Not only so; it is per- 
meated by numerous dogmatic statements, doubtful hypotheses 
and false preconceptions as to the nature of art and artistic 
experience. The theory, however, demands respectful con- 
sideration for another reason than that of Professor spear - 
man's high professional standing: it is the only attempt to 
furnish a complete and systematic account of the fundamental 
psychology of creative ability that has yet been published. 
In any study of art, therefore, it has a legitimate claim 
to serious consideration. 
At the very outset of his book(2) Professor Spearman 
makes some curious statements, the effect of which is 
immediately to cast suspicion not, to be sure, upon his 
(1) Propounded in The Nature of Intelligence and. tige 
Principles of Cognition. 
(2) Creative Mind. 
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competence to deal with "the great realm of mental creativ- 
ity," but upon his equipment to deal with mental creativity 
in so far as it issues in the production of works of art. 
For it should be pointed out that he is concerned not only 
with artistic creativity but with creativity in its "general 
sense," as signifying "much the same as originating, gener- 
ating, producing, making and the like. "(1) Thus he would 
include within the scope of his theoretical inquiry not 
only the fine arts but the physical and mental sciences, 
political systems, social organisations, engineering, 
commerce and conduct. In point of fact, however, the major 
portion of his booic is devoted to the study of the fine 
arts, pictorial art and music. He leaves no doubt, then, 
as to what he has in the forefront of his mind when he 
speaks of the "great realm of mental creativity." 
The first question that confronts the reader of Pro- 
fessor Spearman's book is whether he is justified in assum- 
ing that fundamentally there is little or no difference 
psychologically between originating, generating and produc- 
ing on the one hand, and artistic creating on the other. 
in its most general sense the term 'creating' means, as 
Professor Spearman suggests, "bringing into existence of 
that which did not ever exist previously. " and this in 
(1) Ibid. p.l. 
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fact is one sense in which the term is not infrequently 
employed; that is, as a synonym for making or producing. 
But in everyday usage the term means much more than mere 
making; it carries with it the connotation of uniqueness, 
individuality, newness - in a word, what is vaguely called 
originality. In the field of art and aesthetics, however, 
the term connotes not merely the bringing into existence of 
something which did not previously exist, but the production 
of an external, visible, formal equivalent of an affective - 
intuitive experience, embodying immediate and universal 
value. This use of the term thus transcends all other 
attributes of creativity such as are implied by the word 
'originality' and its synonyms, and to employ it as Professor 
Spearman does is to rob it of its most pregnant and signifi- 
cant content.(l) And, since Professor Spearman is primarily 
concerned with creating in the artistic sense, the connota- 
tion which he ascribes to the tern is both inadequate and 
arbitrary, however well it may accord with the theory he 
propounds. 
(1) It is worth noting that the term 'creation' is often 
used to denote some quality of excellence which other words 
such as originality and its synonyms fail to signify. 
Dresses by the foremost dress designers are frequently 
referred to as 'creations,' implying thereby something 
greater than originality, something, in fact, of the nature 
of art. 
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The fundamental psychological difference between creat- 
ing in the general sense and creating in the artistic sense 
is easily demonstrated; one example will suffice. An 
aeronautical engineer sets out to build a new type of aero- 
plane - such a machine, for instance, as the one recently 
constructed for the Britain- Australia air race by kr. de 
Haviland. Obviously his first business is to acquaint 
himself with all the necessary data concerning the partic- 
ular requirements of a machine which is to do the journey 
satisfactorily. He must, that is to say, collate and study 
all the available facts before he can apply his practical 
experience and technical knowledge to the problem of design- 
ing and constructing the machine. His next business is to 
set about making tentative designs. In the course of this 
preliminary work he will encounter various unforeseen diffi- 
culties, each requiring special attention before it is over- 
come. As his experiments proceed he will be obliged again 
and again to refer to the fundamental facts and data, alter- 
ing this and eliminating that, until he achieves a model 
that will conform as nearly as possible to essential re- 
quirements. Further experiment will thereafter be necessary, 
particular tests applied and detailed records of performance 
noted and critically examined, before the final design is 
decided upon and the machine constructed. 
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Here is an undoubted example of creating, embodying in 
a high degree all those attributes of creativity mentioned 
by Professor Spearman. To identify such a work of creative 
mind with a work of art is (1) to ignore certain crucial 
psychological facts_ and (2) to confuse others. 
(1) In the first place it should be noted: (a) the 
ehdineer is moved to action by his recognition of a clearly 
defined practical(i) problem and his desire to solve it; 
(b) that the problem is not a purely private one, in that it 
does not exist solely for the engineer, but also for anyone 
else capable of recognising it and desiring to solve it; 
and (c) that its solution is not determined by subjective 
conditions but pre -determined to the extent that it is 
governed by immutable objective facts, such as are formu- 
lated in the great body of scientific laws and by the estab- 
lished conventions of technical procedure. Clearly, then, 
the more facts bearing upon the problem known to the engi- 
neer, the greater will be the probability caeteris paribus 
of his achieving his objective. The material which he has 
tó manipulate (apart from the purely technical aspects of 
(1) This word may present a difficulty: in one sense all 
problems are practical. But it is necessary to distinguish 
between those problems which can he solved only by the aid of 
reason and those which can be solved only by the construc- 
tion of forms by a direct process. Here the word is used 
in its everyday sense, meaning "non -theoretical." 
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production) consists of facts - physical, mathematical, 
mechanical, climatological, meteorological, topographical 
and geographical _ and the degree of success attending his 
efforts will depend upon his ability to manipulate these 
facts intelligently and, of course, imaginatively. with 
this Professor Spearman would, no doubt, in the main entirely! 
agree. The facts are the fundaments, the given percepts or 
ideas; the relation of the facts to each other and to the 
problem as a whole exemplifies the principle of relation; 
the construction of the machine to meet the particular needs 
is the concrete exemplification of the principle of correl- 
ates - th:e eduction of the required correlates which, accord- 
ing to Professor Spearman, "is the utmost to which the'human 
mind can under any cónditions possibly attain."(1) 
Now, in creation of the artistic sort, instead of being 
motivated by a desire to solve an external(2) problem in the 
face of certain pre -determined given facts, the artist is 
motivated by an urge emanating from within himself, over 
which he has no effective control (3) and about which he can 
have no precise knowledge. No external conditions, except 
(1) Creative Mind, p. 26. 
(2) Condition (b) above. 
(3 ) Granted he may by an act of will refrain from indulging 
the urge by inhibiting the appropriate active response, but 
he cannot adequately satisfy it, except by abandoning him - 
self to its sway and submitting to its demands. 
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those inherent in his medium, govern his activity; he is 
beyond all laws except those of his own being. He may do 
with his material what he can make it do without violating 
its inherent nature; he may combine in one work anything 
he likes, irrespective of the laws of reason and the dictated 
of common experience, so long as he achieves the goal of his 
desire. This difference of orientation and the almost 
total absence of external restrictions are the fundamental 
differences between general creative activity and artistic 
creative activity. In the former the mental process in- 
volves the manipulating of previously given objective facts 
in the light of past experience, in order to solve a problem 
practical or theoretical; in the latter the process is one 
of manipulating a medium, in order to construct a physical 
(sensuous) object, which shall be the external equivalent 
of an inner state. Expressed in other words: the engineer 
orientates from given facts and achieves his objective by 
intellectual processes;(1) whereas the artist starts from 
an inner impulsion and reaches his goal directly, simply by 
the process of, painting or sculpting as the case may be. 
"The inventive activity," Kantor points out,(2) "represents 
(l) 
Cf. "In all science ... we start from facts derived 
from observation and experiment." Ribot, Tri., Essay on the 
Creative Imagination, p.252; "The question of art begins 
where the question of fact ends," Fry, R., Vision and Design. 
(2) Kantor, J. R., Principles of Psychology, Vol.1I, P.61. 
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an attempt to achieve some particular type of result based 
upon specifications supplied by the stimulus situation... 
In decided contrast with the mechanical, inventive type of 
imagination is the creative conduct of literary production. 
... Very noticeable ... is the freedom and spontaneity of 
action that is checked very little by specification and 
indicated necessities." Substantially the same statement 
is made by Ribot:(l) "The mechanical imagination... is arbi- 
trary neither in its choice nor its means; it is not a free 
creature having its end in itself. In order to succeed, it 
is subjected to rigorous physical conditions, to a determin- 
ism..." "We may say without exaggeration that the success 
of many mechanical creations depends upon the skilful mani- 
pulation of materials." From a more or less diffused feel- 
ing, agitation or excitement, the artist's psycho- physical 
state passes into a more or less determinate awareness, 
according as his activity approaches its desired end. +'hat 
directs him is not apodeitic knowledge, but his inner urge 
operating through his sensibility for form. The impulsion, 
it is true, may be aroused by external facts or events; but, 
contrary to the procedure of the engineer, it is the impúl- 
sion and not the external facts and events that determines 
the course of his activity; and this impulsion is none other' 
(l) Ribot, Th., op. cit., pp.264; 264-265; 276-280. 
218 
than the urge to create a formal equivalent of what is 
subjectly experienced. 
A painter of an historical picture, it may at once be 
conceded, must needs begin by acquainting himself with all 
the relevant historical facts of his subject, but unless the 
facts awaken in him the desire to form, to create something 
outside of himself, a work of art is impossible of creation. 
No matter how beautifully(1) and truthfully the artist may 
represent (the word is worth noting) the historical facts, 
his production is in no sense a work of art, unless the 
facts represented are subordinated to the feeling aroused 
by them and embodied in form. But the artist cannot pro- 
duce feeling by an act of will. This cannot be too strongly 
emphasised. The engineer, on the other hand, may by sheer 
effort of will continue to work at his problem long after 
his interest in it has diminished to zero, and yet solve it 
satisfactorily and completely. That is to say, the engineer 
may direct and control his energy where aild how he likes, 
without necessary detriment to his work; the artist, on the 
other hand, is entirely dependent for the success of his 
effort upon the spontaneity of his creative urge. On this 
point Professor Spearman's theory of creativity is seriously 
defective; for he fails to show what causes the artist's 
(1) Vide Chap. II supra. 
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flow of energy and what controls and directs it into 
particular channels. 
(2) Before attempting to deal with the second point 
it will be necessary to make a preliminary survey of the 
sources of human activity, with special reference to the 
points at issue. All hi an activity manifesting itself 
in external conscious acts is initiated by a striving to- 
wards a more or less clearly or dimly cognised goal, deter- 
mined in the first instance by the particular predominating 
impulse in active operation, and in the second instance by 
the innate psychological constitution and established habits 
of the experiencing agent. Such striving may manifest it- 
self, on the one hand, as a desire for a definite and more 
or less clearly cognised goal, such as sex experience or 
food; or, on the other hand, it may manifest itself as a 
more or less diffused tendency to act without reference to 
any specific object; in which case a state of agitation or 
mental tension ensues and persists, causing the agent to act 
this way and that way until complete or partial satisfaction 
is attained in appropriate activity. All striving, that is 
to say, tends towards an appropriate goal, the attainment of 
which brings about its fulfilment or satisfaction. 
Now the fundamental springs of all human activity may 
conveniently be grouped into two principal classes: (a)those' 
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that are chiefly bodily, arising out of organic or biolog- 
ical needs and tendencies, and (b) those that are purposeful 
in the sense that they imply some prevision of a goal, in- 
dependent of and beyond the mere satisfaction of bodily 
needs and tendencies. Instinctive springs of activity, as 
more than one school of contemporary psychology has been at 
pains to emphasise, are perhaps the most potent (because the 
most elementary) of the organic group, since they embrace 
the most vital of human as well as animal impulses which are 
directly related to bodily needs. All such activity in man, 
however, has a mental aspect; the activity of food seeking, 
for instance, implies not only some consciousness of the 
need for food, but also the consciousness of the need for 
some particular kind Of food. A further stage is reached 
vdrlen there is an awareness of various means of procuring 
food and alternative methods of treating it for consumption. 
When this is reached, the purely instinctive activity has 
already been sidetracked and other tendencies evoked, whose 
origins are no longer traceable to bodily need. But, in 
view of the predominance of the bodily as distinct from the 
mental factor in instinctive activity, it is theoretically 
convenient to mark off such activities by grouping them 
together in one principal class. 
(b) The second group includes practically the whole 
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field of purposive endeavour and intelligent action, in 
which selection and discrimination as between one goal and 
another and one means and another are clearly manifest. 
Between this group and the former, however, it is exceeding- 
ly difficult, if not impossible, to draw a hard and fast 
line, since so many activities are in the long run traceable 
to bodily needs and tendencies. The dancing of primitive 
peoples.is a case in point. Here it is difficult to say 
just to what extent this activity is due to the physiological 
processes and tendencies of the organism and to what extent 
it is due to psychological need. Both factors do, in fact, 
play an important part in this activity. & further diffi- 
culty arises from the fact that not all instinctive activi- 
ties are directly related to bodily needs and tendencies. 
The instinct of curiosity appears to have only an indirect 
bodily function; yet it is capable of evoking a very im- 
perious impulse to action exemplified, for instance, in the 
absorbing pursuit of scientific ends. Despite these diffi- 
culties, however, it may confidently be asserted that the 
whole history of art, science and religion bears eloquent 
witness to the fact that from time immemorial man has en- 
gaged in activities, whose springs cannot be attributed 
either to bodily or biological sources, but to something 
generic to the constitution of the mind alone. 
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From the standpoint of the present discussion the most 
significant of the purely mental sources of activity is the 
need for order among sense impressions, without which 
human experience would be nothing short of a "big, blooming, 
buzzing confusion." That this need exists as a fundamental 
fact of mental life will doubtless not be questioned, but 
it is important to point out that, owing to the intellectual- 
istic bias of philosophic thought since Descartes' time, 
emphasis has been placed upon its intellectual implications 
to the almost total neglect of its bearing upon the purely 
sensory -perceptual aspect of experience. The Gestalt 
school has demonstrated that an object(l) is not merely an 
association of elements, but a total situation, and that 
organisation (configuration, Gestalt, form) is the funda- 
mental sensory fact upon which all experience is essentially 
founded.(2) Without 'configuration' perception simply 
(1) Using the word in the widest sense as meaning any 
perceptible situation. 
(2) Köhler, W., Gestalt Psychology, pp.148 -186. It is too 
soon yet to formulate any systematic account of man's activ- 
ity as artist on the basis of Gestalt theory, since as yet 
very little has been done in the field of conation. The 
probable explanation would be that since perception of con- 
figurations relieves brain tensions, those configurations 
which relieve brain tensions in the most efficient manner 
are most likely to be formed. This, however, leaves out of 
account the all- important question of values upon which 
Gestalt psychology has little to contribute. 
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could not exist; and, since art is first and foremost a 
sensory- perceptual experience, it may be submitted that 
the need for order among sense impressions constitutes 
the fundamental precondition of all formal expression.(1) 
Perhaps it would be well at this juncture to point out. 
that, according to Professor Spearman, all configuration is 
simply an instance of his second quantitative law, the 
. "eduction of relations," which states that "The mentally 
presenting of any two or more characters tends to evoke 
immediately a knowing of the relation between them, "(2) and 
that further their unitariness (insisted upon by the Gestalt 
theory) is explained by his second qualitative principle of 
retentivity, which states that "The occurrence of any cog- 
nitive event produces a tendency for it to occur after - 
wards."(3) The question, however, as to whether the unity 
of configurations is sui generis and unanalysable remains 
open. Spearman himself would agree that even at birth 
there may be some configuration, and therefore some aware- 
ness of relations, but he would deny that, because certain 
(1) How it comes about that man seeks to objectify his formal 
impressions by expressing them formally is a metaphysical 
"question, the discussion of which must be waived. But for 
the present it may be suggested, first, that it is because 
he finds himself by nature impelled to do so, and second, 
that it is because he finds such expression psychologically 
,valuable. 
(2) The Nature of Intelligence and Principles of Cognition, 
p. 63. 
(3) Ibid. p.132. 
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configurations are not (even to the adult) introspectible 
into separate processes of relation eduction, they are 
therefore unitary.(1) In Spearman's view where no rela- 
tions exist, no configurations can exist. 
Be that as it may, it may be taken as established that 
there is in the human mind a generic propensity to extract 
order or formout of the multiplicity of sense impressions 
continually bombarding it. Whether this order manifests 
itself in configurations (Gestalt school) or as analysable 
relations (Spearman) is a problem, the solving of which may 
be left to future research. What is important from the 
standpoint of the present discussion is the fact that some 
sort of order is essential to the idea and existence of the 
mind, and that this order manifests itself in man's higher 
activities and particularly in his literary and artistic 
productions. 
Now, in actual practice, order may be experienced 
either (aa) visually,(2) as belonging to externál concrete 
things, or appearances (called up by memory or by spontan- 
eous imagination), or (bb) mentally, as belonging to abstract 
thoughts or ideas. Visual order is the fundamental condi- 
tion of all visual art, including painting, sculpture, 
(1) Ibid. pp.155 -174. 
(2) and, of course, auditorily. 
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architecture and all the arts of spatial form. Subjective- 
ly experienced order, on the other hand, is the fundamental 
condition of all literary art in the widest sense of the 
term, including not only literature and poetry, but also 
all philosophy and literary science; it is also the condi- 
tion of all science both pure and applied. But between 
visually and mentally experienced order a further distinc- 
tion must be drawn, a distinction which is of first -rate 
psychological significance for art. Visual order, as mani- 
fested in spatial art, is both an immediate experience and 
an end in itself, being independent of conceptual thought 
and practical purpose. It is an experience of pure vision;) 
(U Cf. Schopenhauer's "Beschaulichkeit," Die Welt als Wille 
und Vorstellung, p.220; also the following: "Wenn man, 
durch die Kraft des Geistes gehoben, die gewöhnliche Be- 
trachtungsart der Dinge fahren lässt, aufhört, hur ihren 
Relationen zu einander, deren letztes Ziel immer die Rela- 
tion Zum eigenen Willen ist, am Leitfaden der Gestaltungen 
des Satzes vom Grunde, nachzugehen, also nicht mehr das Wo, 
Das Wann, das Warum und das Wozu an den Dingen betrachtet; 
sondern einzig und allein das Was; auch nicht das abstrakte 
Denken, die Begriffe der Vernunft, das Bewusstseyn ein- 
nehmen lässt; sondern, statt alles diesen, die ganze,,diacht 
seines Geistes der Anschauung hingiebt, sich ganz in diese 
versenkt und das ganze Bewusstseyn ausfüllen lässt durch 
die ruhige Kontemplation des gerade gegenwärtigen natür- 
lichen Gegenstandes, sei es eine Landschaft, ein Baum, ein 
Fels, ein Gebäude oder was auch immer; indem man nach 
einer sinnvollen Deutschen Redensart, sich gänzlich in 
diesen Gegenstand verliert, d.h. eben sein Individuum, 
seinen Willen, vergisst und nur noch als reines Subjekt, 
als klarer Spiegel des Objekts bestehend bleibt; so das es 
ist, als ob der Gegenstand allein da wäre, ohne Jemanden, 
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the direct sensuous awareness of the visual aspect of things 
stripped of all associative and rationalistic concomitants 
and practical significance, for when it is perceived, a 
goal is reached and an end fulfilled. In literature and 
science, on the other hand, the experience of order is con- 
ditioned by the awareness in thought of abstract characters, 
which must be thought of before the material for literature 
or science is made available for ordered presentation. 
Order is here the experience of unitary abstract characters 
with which objects are invested by the mind. The distinc- 
tion is an important one, for it separates the world as 
experienced visually from the world as experienced conceptu- 
ally - in a word, it separates the world of spatial art 
from the world of informative literature and science. 
"der ihn wahrnimmt, und man also nicht mehr den Anschauenden 
von der Anschauung trennen kann, sondern beide Eines ge- 
worden sind, indem das ganze Bewusstseyn von einem einzigen 
anschaulichen Bilde gänzlich gefühlt und eingenommen ist; 
wenn also solchermassen das Objekt aus aller Relation zu 
etwas ausser ihm, das Subjekt aus aller Relation zum dillen 
getreten ist; dann ist, was also erkannt wird, nicht mehr 
das einzelne Ding als solches; sondern es ist die Idee, 
die ewige Form, die unmittelbare Objektität des aillens auf 
dieser Stufe; und eben dadurch ist zugleich der in dieser 
Anschauung Begriffene nicht mehr Individuum: denn das Indi- 
viduum hat sich eben in solche Anschauung verloren: sondern 
er ist reines, willenloses, schmerzloses, zeitloses Subjekt 
der Erkenntnis." Ibid. pp.210 -211. 
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Throughout the foregoing discussion it has been nec- 
essary, in order to keep the argument within proper limits, 
to pass over a considerable number of points, the intrusion 
of which would have introduced unnecessary difficulties and 
obscured the main issue; which was to show that order could 
be an end in itself as in visual art, or a means to an end 
as in literature and scientific procedure. No mention, 
for instance, has been made of the distinction between 
visual order (or form) in general and order as an artistic 
attribute. It is only when order is impregnated with value 
through its affective significance that it becomes artistic 
form. But to raise the whole question of artistic form 
would not only have been impossible but wholly out of place 
at this stage. For the same reason the relation of order 
to form in imaginative literature, poetry and music has 
likewise been passed over. Both imaginative literature and 
poetry involve special difficulties in view of their intimate 
connection with linguistics; and music is so inextricably 
bound up with the intricacies of instrumental technique and 
the conventions of musical structure that no discussion is 
possible without expert knowledge. But it may be submitted, 
pending more detailed discussion in a later chapter, that 
order or form is the Ultimate goal of a fundamental psycho- 
logical need, and that the satisfaction of this need is the 
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primary condition of all artistic achievement, since with- 
out order no art could exist. 
fter this prolonged - and, it is hoped, not unwarrant- 
ed - preliminary discussion, it will now be possible to 
return to the submission that Professor Spearman in identi- 
fying the engineer's creation with that of the artist 
appears to confuse two distinct facts of psycholo gy (1) 
It was suggested (a) that the engineer is moved to action by 
his recognition of a clearly defined practical problem and 
his desire to solve it; (b) that the problem is not a purely 
private one like the artist's; (c) that its solution is not 
determined by subjective conditions, but predetermined to 
the extent that it is governed by immutable laws. On the 
other hand, it was suggested that the artist is motivated by 
an inner urge, over which he has no effective control, that 
he is not governed by any conditions except those inherent 
in his medium, and that he is outside the scope of any other 
restrictions than those of his own being. 
Enough has been said to show that the engineer and the 
artist are each motivated by different impulsions, and that 
each proceeds by different means towards radically different 
ends. It will now be argued that, whereas the engineer's 
purpose is privately to solve a public problem, the artist's 
(1) Vide pp. 214 -216 supra. 
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is publicly to solve a private one. What, then, it may 
be asked, is the nature of these problems? 
It will be recalled that the en-ineer's problem - what 
he set out to do - was to construct a machine to fulfil a 
particular purpose under particular, previously known and 
unalterable conditions. His problem, that is to say, was 
a practical one in that it could not be solved merely by 
clear thinking, but by external action; it did not arise 
out of theoretical speculation, but out of the demand% for 
something functional and useful. But his external action, 
in so far as it was directed to the solving of the problem, 
was to a very large extent governed and controlled by immut- 
able and unalterable conditions. He was not free to make 
his Own conditions, but had to bring his knowledge and ex- 
perience to bear upon them before he could act at all in any 
way relevant to the purpose of solving the problem. His 
only freedom consisted in his selecting and inventing means. 
The problem, then, was not a private problem; it was not 
determined by him, or within him, but for him by an outside 
agency. For although he had his own conception of the prob- 
lem, it was nevertheless only a private conception of a pub- 
. 
lic problem - public in the sense that it was available for 
anyone capable of recognising it and desiring to solve it. 
But his solution was a private matter, the product of his 
private knowledge and experience. The product may,,- be 
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publicly shared, but not his knowledge and his experience 
as such, for these must ever remain his private possession. 
The artist's problem is in almost every respect the 
exact antithesis of the engineer's, for it is neither prac- 
tical nor public, but formal (in the artistic sense of the 
term) and private. It is formal in that it demands for 
its solution form appropriate to the subjective need whose 
satisfaction is sought in external expression. What the 
artist strives for is, in effect, to produce, in terms of 
form, the equivalent of his inner state of feeling, agita- 
tion or emotional excitement; and when this form is pro- 
duced he has achieved his goal and satisfaction. Fór form 
is an end, a Hterminál object, "(1) the realisation and per- 
fection of an artistic ideal. It is private in that he 
alone is aware of it; it is not like the engineer's, pre- 
sented to him by public agency or held by him in the capacity 
of a public agent, but arises within himself spontaneously, 
and in him alone resides the power to solve it. The public 
aspect of the situation is the availability of the formal 
creation to public enjoyment, whereby mankind may publicly 
share and experience in varying degree what was and must for 
ever remain a unique private possession of the artist. 
It may be well to interpolate here some remarks on the 
concepts 'public' and 'private.' Ir. Arthur Sewell in his 
(1) Mr. L. A. Reid's term. 
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recent book, The Physiology of Beauty, propounds the view 
that since "Reality means nothing because it may mean any - 
thing, "(l) the term must be abandoned in philosophical dis- 
course as "a concept without content, making no comment on 
nor contribution to our view of the external world. "(2) 
Reality for William James was what truths have to take 
account of: sir. Sewell's proposition is that ",publicity 
is what truths have to take account of." The division 
between the public and the private is capable of refine- 
ment: the public is the communicable; the private is the 
incommunicable. It is customary to think and hold views 
about the 'external' world; in Ir. Sewell's opinion it is 
more useful to think of a 'public' world, a world that may 
be talked about and communicated. But as he orientates 
from the biological standpoint, established by Pavlov in his, 
Conditioned Reflexes, ne states that this world is not 'pub- 
lic' merely to men and women; it must be public in the full 
sense of the term: to men,, women, dogs, cats and all ani- 
mate and inanimate things. This, however, is not to say 
that it is a so- called 'real' world, for the notions of 
reality and unreality do not enter into its consideration. 
"It is a world of happenings... It is the world not as it 
(1) Sewell, Arthur, The Physiology of Beauty, p.6. 
(2) Ibid. p.9. 
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appears to me: not as it appears to and colleagues: but 
it is the world that they and may speak of and make our- 
selves understood. The test of a true judgment about such 
a world is that it should be public. "(l) The notion of 
reality, then, must give place to the notion of publicity. 
And he argues that it is the business of science to make 
more and more refined generalisations about the public world. 
But these generalisations may introduce no addition to the 
happenings that are generalised: "they mad concern, in the 
last analysis, particularity of structures and behaviours 
and they may concern or postulate nothing else but these. 
These are indeed enough for a complete refinement of the 
public world. "(2) 
The private is whatever many not be communicated. Lan- 
guage regarded in terms of human behaviour is a conditioned 
stimulus, the signal for a response, and the mechanism of 
the conditioned response is the mechanism of communication. 
The nature of language, Mr. Sewell therefore concludes, 
cannot be other than the nature of the complicated stimuli, 
which it is when regarded as human behaviour. Pavlov's 
dogs were alert both to a change in the incident stimuli 
operating upon their receptive organs and to the structure 
of that change. They 'discriminated' by means of their 
(1) Ibid. pp.29-30. 
(2) Ibid. p.49. 
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analysers the relevance of the change; they responded to 
behaviour and discriminated objects. Any conditioned 
stimulus, then, involves two operant elements, namely, 
behaviour (variation in circumstances or surroundings) and 
particularity. And it is these operant elements in a con- 
ditioned response which are public and capable of communica- 
tion. The public world, then, must be a world of behaviour 
and particularities. "Names may refer publicly only to 
what is received by the receptor organs and analysed by the 
analysers. They refer, then, to things and happenings 
localised; they refer to particularities. If I discover 
the particular happenings or set of happenings that deter- 
mine my particular response to a particular word or a partic- 
ular conditioned stimulus, then I can discover also a public 
relation between the word and the stimulus. But until I 
can establish the chain of happenings publicly, that relation 
remains something private and enjoyed beyond the reach of my 
speculation." "With language, then, we do two things. We 
establish signs for conditioned stimuli: these are names 
that refer to discriminated objects in the public world. 
Such words stand in the place of the stimuli and recall to 
as the discrimination. We also establish signs for the 
responses; these are names that are themselves conditiöned 
stimuli. Tney do not discriminate particularities in the 
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public world: they discriminate responses in the private 
world. And the confusion of language and of all thought 
is the confusion of these two, the stimulus and the res- 
ponse, the public and the private. "(1) 
Ir. Sewell gives a striking instance which illustrates 
the distinction between the public and theprivate.(2) In 
the University of Cape Town three men spoke into a voice - 
recording apparatus: when they heard their voices repro- 
duced each said that the voices of the other two were per- 
fectly recorded; but each asserted that his own had not 
been faithfully reproduced. Each man heard his own voice 
'publicly' for the first time, not 'privately' as hitherto. 
The difference in reception is the difference between public- 
ity and privacy. A similar distinction may be observed 
when one sees a photograph of oneself or looks at oneself in 
a mirror. In the mirror,as in a photograph, personal 
features are seen the wrong way round and the response is 
differently determined from the response to the featurés of 
others.(3) Seeing them 'publicly' can only call forth a 
private judgment of this publicity; other may make a public 
(1) Ibid. pp.61-62. 
(2) Ibid. p.53. 
(3) Cf. Bullough's concept of "psychical distance." 
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judgment. "All things," he concludes, "are private that are 
'enjoyed:' all things are public that are 'discriminated.'" 
This is not the place to offer any criticism of 
riIr. Sewell's behaviouristic thesis; but it will be admitted 
that the distinction between the public and the private is 
both important and useful. It does contribute something 
towards the solution of the reality dilemma and towards the 
stud, of 'conscious behaviour,' and if it does nothing more 
than offer a new orientation it will have served a useful 
purpose at a time when traditional philosophy is on the 
verge of dissolution. 
In the preceding discussion such a distinction as 
Zr. Sewell makes was clearly necessary. The business of the 
engineer is the business 'of science in general; it is public 
business, and his function is to construct a socially share- 
able instrument on the basis of socially shareable facts and 
propositions. What he constructs is public to mankind and 
himself as a member of mankind; it is the embodiment of 
communicable facts and propositions; but his relation to 
the thing constructed is private and incommunicable. The 
artist's business, on the other hand, is private business; 
his function is to construct a unified form that will satisfy 
his private need and aspiration, What is public and 
communicable is this form in its particularity, not its 
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content, which is private and incommunicable. Hence the 
work of art is the public solution of a private problem. 
It is difficult to see why so profound a thinker as 
Professor Spearman should identify artistic creation with 
scientific invention and discovery and adaptive behaviour 
in general. Both science and art, he maintains, are com- 
posed of precisely the same ultimate elementary processes, 
"both alike attain their supreme degree of creativity by 
virtue of the process which has been called the educing of 
a 'correlate'. "(l) kpparently it did not occur to him that 
it might be worth while to examine the term 'creating' from 
the standpoint of everyday language, with a view to discover- 
ing whether or not there was any common core of meaning in 
its various uses. In many instances the established usage 
of a term may contain no such common core of meaning, but 
there is as much reason to assume a priori that there may be 
as to assume the contrary. lit all events the philosophic 
scientist cannot afford to neglect the conventional meaning 
and connotation of common words. Had Professor ápearman 
carefully scrutinised the term, he would not have been 
content merely to say that the word 'creating' "signifies 
much the same as originating, generating, producing, making 
and the like." For in everyday language the term carries 
(1) Creative Mind, p.110. 
237 
a specifically artistic connotation, which serves in prac- 
tice as well as in theory to mark off in linguistic usa -e 
those objects and activities that pertain to art from those 
that do not. It is not usual to speak of the 'creations' 
of the enginèer, the scientist and the philosopher: here 
the terms 'inventions' and 'constructions' constitute the 
accepted common usage. On the other hand, it is customary 
to speak of the 'creations' of the dress designer! The 
distinction is not a mere accident of usage. It is signif- 
icant of something fundamental to the structure of thought 
and experience, and no one is entitled to ignore it. In 
identifying creating with originating and like terms Pro- 
fessor Spearman lays himself open to the charge of disres- 
pecting the niceties of scientific language and of abrogat- 
ing the principles of scientific method. lind not only so; 
it has had serious theoretical consequences, for it leads 
him into thinking that he is explaining the process of artis- 
tic creation when, in fact, he is merely explaining the pro- 
cess of technical invention in art. The only charitable 
view of the matter is that his own intellectualistic orienta- 
tion has foreclosed his mind to the possibility' of a non - 
intellectualistic interpretation of art, and rendered his 
native sensibility impotent as a means of checking his theor- 
etical speculation and guiding his concrete preference. 
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.Before proceeding; to a closer examination of Professor 
Spearman's theory, there is one further point about his 
orientation worth remarking, because it displays a curious 
unwitting confusion of thought. In approaching "the great 
realm of mental creativity," two alternative policies are 
available: one consists in surrender to the emotional ex- 
citement which the subject is liable to produce, the other 
is that of cold- blooded investigation. The first, Professoz 
Spearman declares, "is easy to achieve, wins favour from 
almost everyone, and warms the writer with moral complacency;, 
the second entails the arduous task of taking the creative 
faculties to pieces, "in order to find out the trick of 
them." And he quotes the well -known passage of Stevenson's 
about the "springs and mechanisms" of art,(1) adding that it 
is just these which are the object of his pursuit, for "In 
the end, a better understanding of how great works are 
created does not abate our sense of their greatness but only 
enhances it. Look at the artists themselves! Are they 
not day and night talking and thinking about their 'springs 
(l) "There is nothing more disenchanting to man than to be 
shown the springs and mechanisms of any art. All our arts 
and occupations lie wholly on the surface; it is on the 
surface that we perceive their beauty, fitness, and signif- 
icance; and to pry below is to be appalled by their empti- 
ness and shocked by the coarseness of the strings and 
pulleys." 
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and mechanisms' without thereby incurring the least abate- 
ment of their artistry... Why they so concern themselves 
with the machinery, is, of course, because they desire to 
gain more perfect mastery over it. And this is what all 
science is really aiming at. If it so persistently analys- 
es things into last elements and reduces events to ultimate 
laws, all such activity is by no means disinterested and 
solely for its own sake. The quarry it hunts is not 
theoretical alone, but in still higher degree practical." 
And he concludes: "If ever we should succeed in prying out 
any secrets as to how the mind achieves its creativeness, 
it will be in the hope that such a better understanding may 
aid us to appreciate and to create the more effectively. "(l) 
The point of particular interest is contained in the senten- 
ces which have been italicised. 
Owing to the ambiguity of the phrase 'springs and mech- 
anisms,' it is impossible to make out what precisely Profess- 
or Spearman means to convey by the passage just quoted. 
The phrase in question is open to two distinct and equally 
legitimate interpretations: it might be interpreted as mean- 
ing either the formal structural principles and technical 
devices underlying the physical work of art or the ultimate 
psychological processes which govern the production of works 
(l) Creative find, pp. 4 -5 (present author's italics). 
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of art. What Stevenson was thinking about when he wrote 
the passage quoted by Professor Spearman is of no particular 
moment to the present discussion, but, having regard alike 
to the general context in which Spearman uses the phrase 
and to the avowed object of his study, there can be no 
question as to how the passage ought to be interpreted. 
But it is no less clear that he does not intend the passage 
to be construed with reference to the ultimate psychological 
processes governing mental creativeness, for he pointedly 
refers to the artists' 'talking and thinking' about their 
'springs and mechanisms;' which can only mean structural 
principles and technical devices, since the artist qua 
artist is not concerned either from constitution or necessity 
with the psychological processes underlying his own creative 
ability, but with the exercise of that ability. It seems 
hardly credible that Spearman should be unaware of the vast 
difference between what the artist regards,as his 'springs 
and mechanisms' and what the psychological aesthetician 
understands by the same term. It is no less difficult to 
believe that it is a mere oversight. But unless some such 
explanation is offered there appears no alternative means 
of accounting for what is undoubtedly an extraordinary piece 
of confused thinking.(1) And if artists concern themselves 
(l) 
One is entitled to assume that Professor Spearman is 
acquainted with the 'studio talk' of artists, which is al- 
most wholly concerned with technical means. 
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with the 'machinery' of their art in order to gain more 
mastery over it, it is emphatically not the kind of machin- 
ery with which Professor Spearman is concerned: it is tech - 
in the same nical, not psychological. But when, as it were 
breath, he suggests that the artist's desire for mastery 
over his machinery is identical with that of the scientist 
(whose business it is to analyse things into last elements 
and to reduce events to ultimate laws), he strains almost to 
breaking point the reader's confidence and patience. 
"Those who have mastered the wisdom of the scientific 
method and are able to think scientifically experience many 
charming temptations," declares Anton 'Tchekhov.(1) "Archi- 
medes wanted to turn the earth upside down, and our present- 
day hotheads want to grasp what is scientifically ungrasp- 
able; to discover the physical laws of creative art; to 




them instinctively, creates musical compositions, 
novels, etc. Such formulae probably do exist in 
We know we can find in nature A, B, C, D, do, re, 
Dui, fa, sol, and curves, straight lines, circles, squares, 
green, red, blue; we know that all this in certain combina- 
tions produces a melody, or a poem, or a picture, just as 
(1) Life and Letters of Anton Tchekhov, (Trans. by Kotelian- 
sky and Tomlinson), pp.129 -130. 
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simple chemical substances in certain combinations produce 
a tree, a stone, or the sea. 4e are aware that the combi- 
nation exists, but the law of the combination is hidden from 
us. Those who possess the scientific method feel with 
their souls that a musical composition and a tree have some- 
thing in common, that both are created in accordance with 
equally regular and simple laws. Hence the question: 
What are these laws? hence the temptation to work out a 
physiology of creative art (like Boborykin) or, with younger 
and more timid men, to base their arguments on science and 
the laws of nature (Merezhkovsky). The physiology of crea- 
tion probably does exist in nature but dreams of discovering 
it should be cut short at the very outset. If the critics 
insist upon taking their stand on scientific ground no good 
will come of it; they will waste a dozen years, write a lot 
of rubbish, make the question still more confusing - and get 
nowhere. To think scientifically is good in everything, 
but the trouble is that scientific speculation about creative 
art will sink in the end to searching for the "cells" or the 
"centres" which control the creative faculty; and then some 
stolid German will locate those cells somewhere in the tempor. 
al region of the brain, a second German will disagree with 
him, a third will agree, and a Russian will glance through 
an article on cells and reel off a paper for the'3everny 
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Vestnik; the Vestnik Europa will criticize that paper, and 
a stupid craze will be hanging over Russia for three years, 
providing popularity and a living for blockheads and filling 
sensible people with nothing but irritation. For those who 
are inspired by the scientific method, to whom God has grant- 
ed the rare talent of thinking scientifically, there is, in 
my opinion, but one way out - the philosophy of creative 
art. It is possible to gather together all the best that 
has been created by artists throughout the ages, and, em- 
ploying the scientific method, to grasp that common element 
which makes them like one another and conditions their 
value. That common element will be the law. Works which 
are called immortal have a great deal in common; if that 
common element were excluded from each of them the work 
would lose its value and its charm. It follows, then, that 
that universal element is essential and forms the conditio 
sine qua non of every work that aspires to immortality." 
And William James has said:(1) "It strikes me that no good 
will ever come to Art as such from the analytic study of 
Aesthetics - harm, rather, if the abstractions could in any 
way be made the basis of practice. +fie should get stark 
things done on system with all the intangible personal je ne 
sçais quaw left out. The difference between the first - and 
(1) Letters (II), (Ed. by Henry James), pp.86 -87. 
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second -best things in art absolutely seems to escape verbal 
definition - it is a matter of a hair, a shade, an inward 
quiver of some kind - yet what miles away in point of 
preciousness! kbsolutely the same verbal formula applies 
to the supreme success and to the thing that just misses it, 
and yet verbal formulas are all that your aesthetics will 
give." Warnings such as these cannot lightly be brushed 
aside. Spearman's ideal is a practical scientist's ideal, 
but it is the ideal of a scientist whose philosophy of art 
is obsolete. 
"The world of classical art, and the later art derived 
from it, has long ... been the subject of a codification of 
the laws underlying its forms: for what we call scientific 
aesthetic is nothing but ... a psychological interpretation 
of style, applied to classical works of art. The first 
requirement of classical art was held to be the concept of 
beauty which aesthetics, despite the diversity of its methods 
of approach, is solely occupied in establishing and defining. 
Eut because aesthetics applies its results to the totality of 
art, and believes it has explained also those artistic facts 
which have quite other pre- suppositions than the concept of 
beauty, its usefulness becomes detrimental, its authority 
becomes intolerable usurpation. A clear distinction between 
aesthetics and an objective theory of art is therefore the 
most vital necessity in a serious, scientific investigation 
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of art. "(1) 4orringer is not led to this utterance by any 
grudge against psychologists, but by his recognition of a 
serious scientific need. .A.nd it is unfortunate that 
Professor Spearman lias not remarked its importance. For it 
is difficult to avoid the impressions that underlying his 
theory of artistic creativity is the ancient fallacy that 
art and beauty inevitably co- exist; that what is beautiful 
is art and what is art is beautiful. Bound up with this 
fallacy is, of course, the beauty- pleasure fallacy, which 
maintains that a work of art must yield pleasure in contem- 
plation and that a work of art (so- called) which does not 
yield pleasure in contemplation cannot be a work of art; 
or, at all events, cannot be a good work of art. Both 
fallacies have already been traced(2),to the uncritical 
acceptance by most European philosophers up to recent times 
of the classical ideal of beauty as the one and universal 
criterion of artistic excellence, to which all artists must 
aspire and by which all art must ultimately be judged. It 
would be tiresome togo over the ground already covered in 
Chapter II; let it suffice to reiterate that it is no longer 
possible for investigators' to assume, without laying them- 
selves open to serious criticism, that in investigating the 
(1) Worringer, N., Form in Gothic, p.8. 
(2) Chapter II supra. 
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problem of the production of beauty in art they are ipso 
facto investigating the problem of artistic creativity. 
nowhere, however, does Professor Spearman specifically 
declare leis acceptance of the classical concept of beauty; 
but, without taking into account diverse direct and indirect 
references to certain technical devices and principles, such 
as unity, variety, repetition and balance, characteristic 
of traditional pictorial composition, and classical theory, 
it may be submitted that.theimpressiol just referred to is 
more or less confirmed by certain definite statements(l) 
contained in his analysis of "the main achievements of 
pictorial art" under the headings of Truth, Beauty, 
Emotionality, Exaggeration and Self- expression.(2) 
According to Spearman, in so far as pictures attain to 
likeness they possess their first supreme virtue, that of 
Truth - truly a classical doctrine! But since the artist 
is not limited to the bare service of imitating nature, he 
must have some further aim or 'function; and this, according 
to "a wide consensus of opinion" is the production of an 
object which will give "delight simply on being contemplated! 
"Pursuing their explanation most writers go a little 
(1) 
Cf. Creative land, p.88. "The beauty sought by the 
painter is, in the main, that of his medium itself; his 
aim is not so much to represent beautiful nature as to 
represent.nature beautifully." 
(2) ibid. Chapter V. 
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further" and "attribute the delightfulness of the artistic 
object or scene to its 'beauty.'" But "trouble descends 
on them when they try to agree as to what this word beauty 
is intended to signify." -A:ost definitions no doubt have 
some truth on their side, but for the "most comprehensive 
and fundamental explanation" of the "delight in contemplat- 
ing" beauty, Spearman believes that recourse must be taken to 
Aristotle, who wrote:(1) "Pleasure is attendant upon every 
sense, as it is also upon every act of intellect and contem- 
plation. But the most perfect is the most pleasant; and 
the most perfect act is that whose energy is well- disposed 
with reference to the best of all the objects which fall 
under it." And. on the basis of this he proceeds to apply 
his doctrine of noegenesis to five pictorial works of art, 
three of which belong to the classical tradition - liadame 
Récamier by David, Dreamers, by ,:joore , and Golden Stairs 
by Burne -Jones - and two to the Renaissance - Birth of Venus 
by Botticelli, and Descent from the Cross by hubens. 
It should be pointed out, however, that Professor Spear- 
man does not confine his analysis to what he calls 'ortho- 
dox' art,(2) but includes within the scope of his exposition 
(l) Nicomachean Ethics, Book k., Chap. IV. 
(2) "That which rests on the philosophical doctrine of the 
plain man." Op. cit., p.62. 
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the whole field of modern art. His attitude to the new 
movements beginning with impressionism, however, is such 
that he is unable to conceal his undivided adherence to the 
ideal of beauty and his utter contempt for the "astonishing 
harvest," "not indeed of beauty but of emotion- play," that 
has been produced by the modern schools, who "wanted to do 
something new" in order to "escape from comparison with 
masterpieces of older times," and vied "with one another in 
the licence they permitted themselves." "But along this 
path of subjectivity," he continues, "the new artists soon 
came upon what might almost be called unfair cómpetition. 
The fantasies introduced into visual appearance by even the 
most skilled among them found more than a match in those 
which were introduced without effort by certain persons 
suffering from schizophrenic insanity. From this embarrass- 
ing situation two remedies were found. One was for the 
artists to follow the insane. The other was for the insane 
to become artists. Both solutions have had their follow- 
ers - with honours divided. "(l) This from a scientist 
whose avowed policy was to be "cold- blooded analysis" is 
surely a travesty of scientific procedure! if what has 
been given here were all, it might be passed over as a 
temporary lapse, but his analysis of Braque and Picasso(2) 
(1) Ibid. pp.65 -66. (Present author's italics.) 
(2) Discussed on 1)4.282, 283. 
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reveals a lack of sensibility and knowledge of fundamental 
artistic principles that is equalled only by his prejudice 
and his intolerance of any art that does not set forth in 
an acceptably idealistic manner the average greengrocer's 
vision of the world. 
Pursuing his examination of pictorial art :Professor 
Spearman asks :(1) "Under what conditions ... will the 'ener- 
gy' of art be more 'well- disposed' or 'perfect' ?" ind, as 
current psychological text books are unable to furnish even 
the basis of an answer, it is necessary to turn to the doc- 
trine of noegenesis, particularly that part which announces 
that "Every mind tends to keep its total simultaneous cog- 
nitive output constant in quantity, however varying in 
quality. "(2) In art this law "bids the artist eliminate 
everything irrelevant to his aim" - everything that is 
'meaningless,' or 'catches the eye' or anything that 
disturbs 'balance.' 
This energy, however, in conformity with the quantita- 
tive process of clearness- variation,(3) "tends to adopt a 
(1) here it has been considered desirable to maintain as far 
as possible Spearman's own phraseology. The following 
account has therefore been summarised from his own chapter. ' 
No further apology need therefore be offered for over- 
loading the text with quotations. 
(2) The Nature of Intelligence, p.131. 
(3) Ibid. pp. 139-140. 
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unified mode of distribution, namely, that of a single in- 
tense focus shading off into a less and less intense back- 
ground. To obtain the perfect energising required by 
pictorial art, then, one primary requisite is that the 
aesthetic interest of the picture should be adapted to such 
a uni -focal distribution of the energy." And this psycho- 
logical fact, Professor Spearman finds, has been taken into 
account "in all good paintings," differentiating them from 
"inartistic photographs." The device of linking "the focus 
of aesthetic interest" to a "single principal light" is 
well -known in pictorial art and reaches its climax in the 
works of Rembrandt. 
Also contributing to perfect energising is the principle, 
of retentivity, which states: "The occurrence of any cognit- 
ive event produces a tendency for it to occur afterwards. "(1) 
All mental acts are facilitated or 'perfected' by repetition, 
which "is in good truth one of the foundation pillars of 
pictorial composition." In Moore's Dreamers each time one 
glances from one of the three figures to another "the facili- 
tation by similarity and the feeling of this facilitation 
gives to the spectator a fresh shock of joy." But an im- 
portant distinction must here be made between the mere 
occurrence of similarity (or any other relation) and its 
being perceived to occur. That the one can happen without 
(1) Ibid. p.132. 
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the other is obvious from the fact that innumerable sidililar- 
ities occur which are never noticed; but when the act of 
perceiving them does occur, it "affords a further and often 
greater joy on its own account. To distinguish between 
these two different sources of delight is of greater import- 
ance even for ordinary practical purposes, since the two 
require different mental attitudes. The bare facilitation 
is best enjoyed by a passivity which merely lets the per- 
ceiving of the picture take its idle course. But the other 
joy, that of perceiving the similarities, can only be secured' 
in highest measure by an activity which goes keenly in pur- 
suit of them." Botticelli's birth of Venus, because of 
its "delightful repetitions," affords a splendid opportunity 
of comparing the passive and active attitudes in perceiving 
similarities. 
Now, in addition to the facility for repetition pro- 
duced by the principle of retentivity, it also produces the 
process of anoegenetic(l) reproduction, whereby "items are 
brought into the cognitive field in a manner which postu- 
lates their having been there previously. "(2) It might be 
expected, then, "that the energy of an act of perception 
would be well- disposed by the fact of its objects being 
(1) 
"In the sense that they neither have the nature of self - 
evident propositions nor generate any new items in the 




intimately related with one another." Art furnishes a 
"close conformity" to this principle. The intimate inter- 
relation of the figures in Iubens' Descent from the Cross 
"renders.the picture an intelligible unified whole," 
yielding delight not only by facilitation and the realisa- 
tion of its cause, but "by actively perceiving the relations 
and the unity they constitute. Once again, then, each 
kind of aesthetic reward has its own most favourable road 
of approach: by way of indolence, and by that of diligence." 
Mere repetition, however, is by no means aesthetically 
pleasing, because of the operation of the principle of 
fatigue: "The occurrence of any cognitive event produces 
a tendency opposed to its occurring afterwards. "(1) The 
principle of retentivity which demands repetition must, 
then, be supplemented by the principle of fatigue which 
requires variety. Again, the aesthetic reward is twofold: 
"variety not only brings a passively enjoyable recovery 
from fatigue, but also furnishes material for delightful 
activity in perceiving further relations." In the Golden 
Stairs, by Burne- Jones, the many repetitions do not produce 
fatigue, because every figure presents its own distinct 
individuality. Repetition and variety are not loosely 




arrangement of likeness and difference is itself continu- 
ally repeated with variations; and all this again, in 
rising order of relativity; such is the essential nature 
of degree of 'organisation.' Out of these two virtues, 
variety and repetition ... there springs the miracle that 
is multiplicity in unity; differentiation with integration," 
from whichaerive harmony, rhythm and balance." 
The fourth quantitative principle states that "The 
intensity of cognition can be controlled by conation." 
Not by rendering the flow of energy more perfect does this 
principle function in art, but rather by indicating how far 
it is so. A person who feels his energising well disposed 
towards a picture does not base this evaluation on "the 
absolute amount of the stream," but on the ratio of this to 
the effort he makes. And he evaluates the energising of 
the artist himself in a similarly relative fashion. "To 
such an origin may in part be attributed ... the usual high 
appreciation of slight sketches." Now "Every manifestation 
of the preceding four quantitative principles is super-im- 
posed upon, as its ultimate basis, certain primordial but 
variable individual potencies. "(1) Hence, in order that 
the energy of any person should be well disposed towards its 




the result will be failure, which is the reverse of per- 
fection. A picture which elicits perfect energising in 
the sophisticated expert may produce only confusion and pain 
in the spectator, whose capacity and training belong to 
other spheres. 
These five principles have been concerned only with the 
perfecting of the energy in respect of its flowing with the 
least possible hindrance. For energising to be perfect it 
must be obedient to the person's want. The deeper aspects 
of this proposition raise, however, the whole problem of 
motives as well as that of the relations between knowing, 
striving and feeling, which Professor Spearman begs leave 
to pass over lest "that way madness lies." But the cona- 
tional factor in its more specific references cannot well be 
ignored. So, for the sake of argument, he assumes that 
"all persons do always want their energy to spring forth 
as unimpeded as possible, and that they find their pleasure 
in its doing so." It remains true, however, that they 
differ as to which channel they wish it to follow. "Apply- 
ing this to the case of painting, it may be inferred that 
if any person, whether by conviction, tradition, or mere 
habit has adopted any particular artistic theory, then any 
contrary instance will thwart his conation and vitiate his 
energising. For him at any rate the beauty will be 
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defective. And there would seem to lie the most prolific 
source of discord between rival artistic schools." 
In the light of the qualitative laws of noegenesis 
professor Spearman begins his psychological analysis(1) 
with the simplest activity, that of imitating nature, 
"serving the cause of truth." Suppose a person is con- 
fronted with two sheets of paper, the one on his left (A) 
presenting a horizontal straight line and the other blank(B), 
A B 
He is then asked to imagine on sheet B a line similar to 
that on A. In such a situation, then, he is given two 
things: (i) the horizontal line on A; and (ii) the rela- 
tion of similarity, which he remembers from experience of 
it between things that, in general, were not such lines. 
His task is, then, to displace this relation from the things 
where it was really discovered to quite a different thing, 
the line A. By doing so, he creates mentally (and after- 
wards physically) the correlative line on B (the 'correlate') 
A more complex case arises where the object has not to be 
(1) Summarised from Chap. VI, Creative i4Lind, pp.67 -68. 
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copied absolutely, but relatively. The subject, for in- 
stance, may have been asked to make his new horizontal line 
on B in the same ratio to the vertical line on B as the 
horizontal on A is to the vertical on A: 
A B 
here two essential processes are involved: first, the 
person perceives the relation of the vertical to the hori- 
zontal line on A; and second, he transfers the relation to 
the vertical line on B. The first is an example of the 
second quantitative principle; the second a case of the 
third. 
Now in turning from "such bare production of truth" 
to the production of beauty, the form of the process is 
similar. It may be recalled that primary among the needs 
of beauty was repetition. And this, at its simplest, is 
nothing more than what has just been illustrated; the fig- 
ures B were repetitions of those on A. But, in order to 
bring in the indispensable complement of repetition - 
variety - the form of the process is unchanged; only the 
relation of likeness has to be replaced by that of unlike - 
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ness. The form merel,y becomes more complex, not essenti- 
ally different, when the likeness and the unlikeness have 
to be intimately blended together, and, furthermore, are 
extended to wholes of higher and higher order. 
Rubens' picture, the Descent from the Cross, is an 
example in which the relations are other than those of like- 
ness or unlikeness. Professor Spearman sets forth his 
'analysis' as follows: "Now, by the time that Rubens had 
decided upon his general theme, he naturally must have 
known the appearances of the principal personages in their 
normal attitudes. Accordingly, he would now have to ask 
himself: how will their normal appearances be modified by 
their helping in the drama of the Descent? To solve this 
problem, the general form of the mental process cannot well 
be other than that which occurs in the ordinary test, where 
the subject is shown a folded piece of paper with a notch 
cut in it and is asked how the paper will look when unfolded. 
In either case a situation is given (the normal appearances 
of persons, or the folded paper). So is also a relative 
character (the taking down of a heavy object, or the being 
unfolded) which has really been known in different circum- 
stances. The task, then, is to transfer the given relative 
character to the given situation, thus educing the 'correlat- 
ive' situation. Once more, clearly, the third principle 
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is called into play." 
It will be convenient to deal with Professor Spear- 
man's arguments seriatim, as they have been presented in 
the preceding summary. 
Theoretically every act of artistic creating comprises 
two aspects: (1) the subjective, characterised by the 
impulsion to create; and (2) the objective, characterised 
by the actual process of physical creative production.(1) 
The first includes, presuppositionally, not only those more 
or less enduring elements of the artist's past experience, 
which constitute the subjective background of his being at 
any given moment of his life as an ordinary member of man- 
kind, but also those special elements which, at the partic- 
ular moment of his experiencing the impulsion to create, 
make him what he is and cause him to desire what he desires. 
The second includes, in addition to the foregoing, all 
those elements of experience derived from the production and 
contemplation of works of art in the past as well as those 
arising out of and involved in the present activity of 
creative production. In actual practice, however, at all 
(1) Art "is not practised in order to communicate to others 
thoughts and fancies which otherwise the poet must keep to 
himself and remain as much a poet; he is not a poet till he 
has spoken or a painter till he has painted, and produced 
something outside of himself." Alexander, S., "The Creat- 
ive Process in the Artist's Mind," British Journal of 
Psychology, Vol. XVII, pp.306 -307. 
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events in the typical case, the two aspects are so intimate- 
ly blended organically as to present to the artist a single 
indivisible experience:(1) that is, when technical ability 
functions pari passu with artistic need, or when the flow 
of energy is perfectly divided between the different psy- 
chological "engines" 2) involved. 
Now if the total simultaneous cognitive output is con- 
stant in quantity, it is obvious that the greater the 
amount of 'energy' usurped by the purely subjective, psychi- 
cal part of the artistic creative experience, the less there 
will be available for the objective physical part; and, 
conversely, the greater the amount usurped by the physical 
part, the less there will be available for the psychical 
part. Such a proposition, however, requires both ampli- 
fication and clarification: indeed, as Professor Spearman 
(1 ) "The work of art consists of materials which assume a 
form, two things which are separable only in thought and 
not in reality." Alexander, S., Beauty and Other Forms 
of Value, p. 54. 
(2) "But if this term (energy) be adopted, we must remember 
that mental just as much as material energy is incapable 
of acting in a vacuum. There is absolute need of the 
supplementary concept of a system of psychical, or at least 
psycho- physiological "engines" into any one or more of which 
the energy can alternatively be diverted; for the theory to 
be rational, this second factor is as necessary as the first. 
On the psychological side, a different engine must be 
allowed for every different kind of mental operation." 
The Nature of Intelligence, p.132. 
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admits, this matter of the disposal of energy "opens up a 
pretty vista of metaphysical dialectics "(1 and raises 
questions of the utmost importance to the psychology of art. 
,:erely to assert that the law of constancy of cognitive out- 
put bids the artist eliminate everything irrelevant to his 
aim is not particularly illuminating, for this matter of aim 
contains the crux of the whole problem of art. 
But, supposing for the sake of arglment that the art- 
ist's sole aim is to produce a beautiful object, the above 
assertion, true as it probably is, gives no indication 
whatsoever as to what controls and directs the flow of 
energy into those channels underlying the production of 
beauty. It does not say how the artist arrives at the 
most perfect or the 'best -fitting' relation. It cannot be 
purely a matter of successful energising, according to 
Professor Spearman's theoretical explanation of the process. 
Nor, indeed, does it follow that perfect energising on the 
part of the artist necessarily leads to the production of 
beauty in the classical (i.e. Spearman's) sense of the term. 
If, on the other hand, the artist's aim is to produce a 
form appropriate to his desire, it may not demand beauty at 
all, but something radically different, yet none the less 
valuable artistically and psychologically. An attempt 
(l) 
Creative Mind, p.51. 
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must therefore be made to deal with the problem of the 
relation of the purely psychical part of the artistic 
creative process to the physical or technical part. 
It is at once obvious that if the artistic creative 
process is regarded as purely mental (i.e. taking place in 
the mind alone) it follows that what is known as 'technique' 
must be a separate process involving a different 'engine' 
or set of 'engines.' It also follows that the artistic 
creative process - since ex hypothesi it does not include 
the physical part - must be a different manifestation of 
creativity from technical expression. Or is technique, as 
Croce maintains, merely the mechanised reproduction of what 
has already been created in the mind ?(l) In other words: 
if it is a fact that the artist first creates in his mind, 
then translates into physical terms what he has created, 
technique must be either a further. creative process of 
educing- new correlates from the previously created funda- 
ments or a purely mechanical act. But since any mechanist- __ 
ic theory of activity is not only incompatible with Spear - 
man's fundamental hypothesis but with the very idea of creat- 
ivity, the latter may be ruled out as irrelevant. There 
remains the first, which involves the complete separation of 
artistic creation from technique; and this in turn involves 
(l) Vide Chap. V supra. 
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the division of the total energy available for art into two 
independent streams. 
Waiving the second part of the proposition pro tem., 
the question arises: Can artistic creation take place in- 
dependently of technique - that is, independently of physic- 
al expression? Since this question cropped up in a slight- 
ly different context in dealing with Croce's theory, it will 
not be necessary to go over the ground a second time. The 
answer is an emphatic negative, for, as Professor .lexander 
has rightly emphasised, the artist is not an artist until 
he has produced something outside of himself. No artistic 
creation exists independently of real (or imagined)(1) 
physical material. The notion of artistic creation, apart 
from the living (or imagined) artistic reality, is a 
meaningless psychological abstraction. 
(1) It may be objected that this is a tacit admission of the 
whole case against which the argument is directed. Not 
so; for in the first place an imagined work of art (if such 
could exist) is not a work of art until it is translated 
into physical material; and in the second place the idea 
of an imagined work of art includes of necessity the imag- 
ined technical manipulation of material. .and this simply 
means that both the creative process and the technical 
process have been carried out in the mind prior to the act 
of physical construction. But as has been argued else - 
where an imagined work of art can at best be only a partial 
or incomplete work of art: its completeness is imaginary. 
Vide footnote p.202 supra. 
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That such an abstraction appears to lie at the very 
foundation of Spearman's theory of artistic creativity is 
evidenced in particular by the following specific state- 
ments: "the final and most highly 'creative' act of the 
artist derives from transposing relations from their orig- 
inal fundaments to others, thereby creating (mentally) the 
correlative fundaments. "(1) But here it is important to 
proceed with caution, for the word 'final' is ambiguous. 
The discussion leading up to this declaration might suggest 
that Spearman is referring to the artist's final brush 
stroke, but the parenthesis in the sentence rather suggests 
the contrary construction, namely, the final mental act. 
And this latter interpretation seems to be the correct one, 
for he states at the beginning of the chapter from which the 
quotation is taken that his main task is to examine how 
far and in which way the mind displays the power to create;T 
and again at the end that "our examination has resulted in 
(1) Creative Mind, p.72. (present author's italics). Cf. 
the following from The itirature of Intelligence, p.92. 
"Just as by virtue of the second principle a person hearing 
two tones may immediately know that the relation between 
them is a musical fifth, so also by virtue of the third 
principle when a single tone has been sounded and the relat- 
ion of a fifth (as an abstract concept) has been mentally 
presented, the person may immediately have a presentation 
of the further tone which bears such a relation to the one 
given. He may furnish a palpable proof of such a presenta- 
tion by actually singing the correlative tone." 
(2) 
Ibid . p.67. 
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showing that the final act in creativity must be assigned 
to the third noegenetic process; that of displacing a re- 
lation from the ideas which were its original fundaments 
to another idea, and thereby generating the further idea 
which is correlative to the last named, and which may be 
entirely novel." Thus willy -nilly he has committed himself 
to the.Crocean view of the relation of technique to artistic 
creation - a view which has already been condemned as un- 
tenable,(l) not only on the ground that it is psychologically 
false, but also because it ignores the fundamental import- 
ance of material to all artistic production. 
Throughout his whole discussion of artistic creativity 
there is hardly anything to indicate that it has ever 
crossed his mind that artistic creation is always creation 
in physical material and not merely a mental act. Thus, 
when he appears to be explaining artistic creation, he is 
merely explaining the mental aspect of technical invention, 
which precedes the actual production of physical beauty. 
There is therefore nothing anomalous about the proposition 
stated above, namely, that if the artistic creative process 
is regarded as purely mental, then technique must be a 
separate inventive process involving a different 'engine' 
or set of 'engines.' But, because artistic creation is not 
(1) 
Chap. V supra. 
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a purely mental act, Professor Spearman's theory of creativ- 
ity is totally inadequate as an explanation of the creativity 
of the artist (as distinct from the mere producer of beauty). 
The purely mental aspect of artistic creation is nothing but 
the preliminary stages of it, which precede the real art- 
istic creative achievement. Artistic creation "is gener- 
ated in and through the expression itself. "(1) 
To some extent the foregoing discussion has prepared 
the way for an answer to the question of the relation of 
the mental part of the artistic creative process to the 
technical part. In view of what has just been said, it 
is impossible to regard technique merely as the means of 
objectifying what is already created mentally, something 
supervening upon and independent of the mental creation. 
For such a view either reduces art to a metaphysical abstrac- 
tion, or if not this, it implies that any mental creation 
which has not been objectified in physical terms is incom- 
plete to the extent that it requires material objectifica- 
tion to realise it fully - which is tantamount to saying 
that it is not an artistic creation at all, but merely an 
imaginative experience. This, however, would be a refuta- 
tion of the thesis that the final and most highly 'creative' 
act of the artist derives from transposing relations from 
(1) Alexander, S., Art andth aterial, p. 17. 
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their original fundaments to others, thereby creating 
mentally the correlative fundaments. From this dilemma 
it is difficult to see any means of escape which would not 
undermine the whole foundation of the theory. 
Professor Spearman' s difficulty arises from his (per- 
haps) unwitting acceptance of an all too prevalent and 
utterly false assumption that 'art' and the 'technique of 
art' are separable phenomena.(1) "';e often hear," states 
(1) 
To trace the historical background of this dichotomy 
would involve a too lengthy digression from the immediate 
topic, but it is worth remarking that it was Lessing (1729- 
1781) who first originated the idea of technique in fine 
art, and it is closely associated with the question of 
'form' and 'content' which has occupied such an important 
place in modern theory. For Lessing one art differed from 
another only in respect of medium, and believing that the 
end of fine art was to give pleasure he adopted three criter- 
ia of aesthetic excellence: (a) the beauty of the subject 
portrayed; (b) the accuracy of the representation; (c) the 
technical skill of the artist. Prior to the latter part of 
the eighteenth century the distinction between 'art' and 
'technique' hardly received notice, although there was much 
disputation about the 'kinds' of art and their relation- 
ships. During the Renaissance the common denominator of 
painting and sculpture was drawing and their sole aim was 
the accurate representation of natural phenomena. No con - 
sideration was given to technique in the modern sense of the 
term as meaning (according to the Oxford English Dictionary) 
the "mechanical skill in art." This originated in the 
metaphysical dialectics of the eighteenth century aesthetic 
philosophers. It became a cardinal point in the philosoph- 
ical speculations of the nineteenth century and strongly 
influenced the academic art of the period. Vide Chambers, 
The History of Taste, passim; Bosanquet, History of Aes- 
thetics, pp.217 -229; ailenski, The Modern Movement in Art, 
passim. 
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Mr John Copley,(_) "that this or that man would be a great 
artist if he knew what to do with his skill; that he has 
every resource of his medium at his command but no purpose 
to which to put it; or, conversely, that a man is a great 
artist though he lacks the technique to execute his concep- 
tions." If these assertions were sound "We should be able 
to separate creative design from executive skill and to find 
men perfect in one but wholly lacking the other. It would 
be so simple ... but it would not be true... 'There is a 
skill that grows with the need of it, as a work of art 
develops; and there is a 'skill' that exists by and for 
itself. The latter kind is easy to see and wears badly, 
the former is harder to find and endures. True technical 
skill and false technical skill are as distinguishable as 
great art and bad art, with which they are intimately 
allied. Great art begets great skill; and bad art may be 
the vehicle for clever tricks... Execution cannot be de- 
tached from design." Mr. Copley's argument is sound; it 
is as impossible to separate technique from art as it is to 
separate art from the material of art. lit and what is 
spoken of as the 'technique of art' are merely different 
aspects of a single phenomenon; art is creation in material 
and technique is simply "that which appertains to material 
(1) "True and False Technique," _Print Collectors' Quarterly, 
Vol. XXI, No. 1, January, 1934. 
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in art. "(l) Artistic creation is possible only through the 
manipulation of material in such a manner as to reveal the 
creation to the creator, the artist. And even if the creat- 
ive process took place in the mind alone (which it cannot) 
it would necessarily include the imaginary manipulation of 
the medium of expression. The term 'technique' therefore 
has no meaning in the theory of art except as the vehicle 
of the artist's state of mind producing the impulsion to 
create; take away technique and nothing remains that has 
any artistic significance; and take away "the living spring 
which rises by its own power in pure and abundant jets" and 
nothing remains but manual dexterity.(2) The relation of 
the purely psychical part of the creative process to the 
physical part is such therefore that it is impossible to 
disengage one from the other without mutilating both. The 
artist "can bring up between himself and the object that 
medium of his vision that he thinks will most intensify it 
(1) Copley, John, op. cit. 
(2) 
Cf. 14i.aritain, J., Art and Scholasticism, p.13. 
"Manual dexterity therefore is no part of art, but merely 
a material and extrinsic condition; the labour by which a 
virtuoso who 'plays the harp' acquires agile fingers does 
not increase his art itself or produce any special form; it 
merely removes a physical impediment to the practice of the 
art: non generat novam artem, sed tollit impedilentum 
exercitiiejus: art remains entirely by the side of the 
mind." Also pp.7 -8. "The work of art has been pondered 
before being made ... before emerging into matter... Its 
formal element ... is its being controlled and directed by 
the mind. If this formal element is in the least lacking, 
. the reality of the art becomes correspondingly dissipated." 
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in its imaginative character and that will most completely 
make it vision indeed. This bringing up of the medium we 
might almost regard as the authoritative gesture, as the 
act of psychological command, that exorcises the sterile 
spirit of the practical intellect and liberates the creative 
forces of the imagination. "(1) 
it may be submitted, then, that Professor Spearman's 
'final and most highly creative act,' far from being the 
final act in the artistic creative process, is merely the 
preliminary and more or'less inchoate part of aesthetic in- 
cubation.(2) For, as has already been indicated, even 
when the agent's sole aim is the production of a beautiful 
object, the transposing of relations by means of the second 
and third noegenetic processes cannot present to the mind 
the correlative fundament in any determinate sense; it 
requires the further process of physical production before 
the precise correlate is established. In producing his 
picture Lines Expressive of Storm all Crane had to do 
(according to Spearman) was to increase the bending of the 
trees beyond his previous experience and thereby produce 
the appearance of a storm that also transcends experience. 
(1) 
Thorburn, J. M., .Lrt and the Unconscious, p.101. 
(2) 
In the limited sense of the term, i.e. pertaining to 
beauty. 
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Here the relation is the relation of "more so" - "the simple 
device of exaggeration." Surely Professor Spearman would 
not insist in suggesting that in educing this required re- 
lation Crane had achieved in his mind the whole creative 
process by apprehending the precise correlate he required? 
Yet that is what his theory implies. The relation of "more 
so" is simple; but just how much more so is the real ques- 
tion. And that cannot be determined in the mind but in 
material. "The essence of the work of art is that in it 
creative mind and the material are indissolubly fused. 
That this fusion is the meeting of two separate beings, the 
man who creates and the material which receives from him 
its form, is indeed vital to the artistic situation, but 
arises from the finitude of the creator and his material.TT(1) 
Thus, where his theory seems soundest, as in its application 
to creation of the non- artistic sort, it may break down in 
practice just as it has broken down here, through his fail- 
ure to recognise the fundamental importance of material to 
all aesthetic and artistic production. And this failure, 
it is only charitable to suggest, is probably due to lack 
(1) Alexander, S., "Artistic and Cosmic Creation," Proceed- 
ings of British Academy, Vol. XIII, p.259. Cf. also: he 
"physical material work is organic to artistic creation. 
Artistic production is on a line with the other organic 
actions by which we become aware of physical things in per- 
ception... (pp.252 -253) ... the material of the work of art 
is no mere technical ingredient but vital..." (p.257). 
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of knowledge and practical experience, which he could not 
reasonably be expected to possess. 
The bearing of the foregoing discussion upon the ques- 
tion of the disposal of the artist's energy will be obvious. 
It was contended that Professor Spearman's theory involved 
the division of the total energy available for artistic 
creation into two independent streams, as it were, one serv- 
ing the process of mental creation, the other serving the 
process of physical expression or technique. Now if it 
were true that artistic creation proceeded in the manner 
suggested by Spearman, it would be necessary to postulate 
such a twofold distribution of potential energy. The whole 
process may be symbolised by a diagram. (Fig. 1). 
It will be observed that the energy absorbed by C and 
T flows in two parallel but independent streams, between 
which at F 1 , F and F3 there are possible points of con- 
fluence. These are intended to represent the possibility 
of imagining the physical manipulation of the medium in ad- 
vance of the actual process of execution. This, however, 
does not occur in every instance; the strems are therefore 
represented as flowing direct, through the agency of the 
body, to the physical product where they become interfused. 
Now, since it has been shown that in artistic creation 
the creative process and the technical process do not derive 
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i'C tFo PRoCES 
PHYSICAL PRODUCT 
E - Total Energy. 
El - Energy absorbed by Mental Creation. 
E2 - Energy absorbed by Technical Processes. 
C - Creation. 
T - Technical Ability. 
Fl, F2, F3 - Inter - mental Paths. 
A - Artistic Content. 
T - Technical Content. 
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from independent functions but from one function (the immed- 
iate artistic exigency, it follows that no such absolute 
division is possible. The available energy does not cir- 
culate, as it were, in a constantly moving pool, but presses 
out here and there into different channels of coördinated 
activities both physical and mental, according to the in- 
herited or acquired dispositions of the individual. Art- 
istic activity is such a coördinated activity involving 
complementary mental and physical functions.(1) "The urge 
that prompts" the production of works of art, states 
Mr. Copley,(2) "either by direct vision of nature or indir- 
ectly from stored knowledge drawn out by the imagination, 
will be indefinite until its execution begins in the material 
adopted; then it clarifies itself slowly by the stern help 
of the material. The artist, in tackling his material, is 
searching not only for a means to express his vision but for 
light upon the vision itself. What we call technique is a 
means not only of re- creation, but of creation. The vision, 
as well as the image that will be made of it, depends for 
its existence on this technique, and the whole - idea, 
manipulation and eventual object - grow together, always 
on the ultimate margin of the present..." Without tech- 
nique artistic creation simply could not take place. This 
(1) 
"Every time I paint a picture," says anet to ilallarme, 
"I throw myself into the water that I may learn to swim." 
(2) Up. cit. (present author's italics). 
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PHYSICAL PRODUCT' 
E - Total Energy. 
E 1 - Energy absorbed by Mental Artistic Incubation (pre - 
creative) 
E2 - Energy absorbed by Technical Processes. 
CT - Creative Impulsion associated with Technique. 
TC - Technical Ability associated with Creative Impulsion. 
A - Work of Art. 
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process may be symbolised by a further diagram. (Fig. 2). 
Comparing this diagram with the preceding one the 
following points of difference may be noted: (a) In Figure 
1 the purely creative act is represented as taking place in 
C independently of T, which must be regarded as a latent 
capacity until stimulated by an act of will (the will to 
execute); whereas in Figure 2 Cl and TO are complementary 
to each other, (b) In Figure 1 the energies emanating 
from C and T flow in parallel but (more or less)(1) inde- 
pendent streams to produce (via the agency of the body) a 
physical product invested with two values, namely, artistic 
idea or content and technical skill or form; whereas in 
Figure 2 the energies emerging from CT and TC flow into 
each other and emerge again into a single stream to produce 
(via the bodily agency) a physical product invested with a 
single value - form - content or an artistic creation. In 
other words, Professor Spearman's theory of creativity in- 
volves two different abilities, creative ability and tech- 
nical ability: whereas the present one involves not two 
but one, which is Art. 
"The topic or subject," as Professor Alexander has 
said, "interests or agitates the artist and throws him into 
an excitement in which we can discriminate two sorts of 
(1) Because of F1, F2 and F3. 
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elements, the passions appropriate to the subject and the 
passion proper to the artist.-.. I shall call these res- 
pectively the material passions and the formal passions. 
The formal passion ... is fed and controlled by the pass- 
ions aroused by the subject, but is, though dependent on 
them, superadded to them, as their fine flowering into 
something they do not themselves contain. "(1) And again, 
"The poem is not the translation of the poet's state of 
mind, for he does not know till he has said it either what 
he wants to say or how he shall say it. The imaginative 
experience supposed to be in his mind does not exist there. 
What does exist is the subject which detains him and fixes 
his thoughts and images and passions and gives his excite- 
ment a colour and direction which would be different with 
a different subject- matter. Excitement caused and detained 
by this subject, and at once enlarged, enlightened and 
inflamed by insights into it, bubbles over into words or 
the movements of the brush or chisel. When the artist has 
achieved his product, he knows from seeing it or hearing it 
what the purpose of his artistic effort was. He makes the 
discovery of what were the real directive forces of his 
action. All that he was aware of before, so far as he was 
Cl) Beauty and Other Forms of Value, pp. 54 -55. 
pp. 75 to 83, Chap. V, Form and Content. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 59 -60. 
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Vide also 
aware of them, was the thoughts and emotions of the subject - 
matter directly produced or indirectly suggested, and doubt- 
less often presented in imaginative form. These combine 
with, or in part are identical with, the more or less un- 
conscious movirigs and emotions yielded by his 'visione and 
faculty divine' and with the gathered expertness of his 
technical flair, to guide his hand or his voice or his 
speech into the movements which end in the material work 
of art. 
"Two. conclusions follow from this statement, which 
have been anticipated. The external work being an organic 
part of the creative process, it ceases to be possible to 
hold that the external material is needed merely in order to 
communicate the artistic experience to others. That experi- 
ence would not exist except for material embodiment... 
Next, it follows that dordsworth was, I must believe, mis- 
taken when he said that there are many poets in the world, 
who have "the vision and the faculty divine; yet wanting 
the accomplishment of verse;" as if verse were a charm 
superadded to the real poetic gift. His own words about 
,the poet give a truer view: "he murmurs by the running 
brooks a music sweeter than their own." Poets and all 
artists, it will be admitted, are more sensitive to things 
and persons than ordinary men. Such greater sensitiveness 
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does not, however, make them poets. You have only to com- 
pare the magnificent lines describing the mystical absorp- 
tion of the youth in the spectacle of nature, in the same 
poem, with Spinoza's scientific account of the 'intellectu- 
al love of God' in order to recognise that two great men 
may have like emotions and the one be a poet and the other 
a philosopher, and the expression of each be perfect.in its 
kind, but that of the one a poet's work, and that of the 
other a philosopher and scientific man's. In the second 
case the words only catch fire from the subject- matter, in 
the other the words themselves are on fire." 
Before concluding, it will be well to pass in review 
quite briefly Professor Spearman's examination of pictorial 
art under his remaining headings of Laotionality, Exaggera- 
tion and Self- Expression. 
The affective aspect of artistic activity which lies 
in a peculiar way at the very foundation of the problem is 
treated as a matter of very minor importance: it is regard- 
ed as merely a further means of making pictures more delight- 
ful, consisting at bottom in exciting emotions over and 
above these which derive from beauty and reality.(1) These 
emotions are of a 'make -believe' sort and afford another 
channel for perfect energising through feeling rather than 
(1) 
Creative 53-55. PP 
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perceiving. Heal emotions also may play a part both in 
the creating and the enjoyment of art. But, because these 
emotions are apt to derive from unpleasant situations, 
frequently involving laborious and disagreeable responsive 
behaviour, they may seriously thwart the perfection of 
energy. Make- believe emotions, on the other hand, are 
facile and 'cheap;' they rise up spontaneously by associ- 
ative reproduction. "For innocent recreation. they have 
not their match. And our enjoyment of them even achieves, 
by some strange twist of thought, the surplusage of titillat- 
ing our vanity." 
In pictorial art 'make- believe' emotions adhere to 
their objects; they tend to be projected from the subject 
to the object. "Instances are when a vast abyss shows 
signs of antiquity and power; or armies suggest the cruel 
shedding of blood; or a smile gives token of gaiety and 
friendliness. Even the simplest constituents of a pictor- 
ial object, its curves, its colours, and so forth, are rich 
in such associative emotions." "In general the artists 
giving more support to this second kind of aesthetic work 
are those of the vague, mystical, and storm -tossed, 'roman- 
tic' school," and their preference is for "what is vague and 
indefinite, such as imperceptible gradations rather than 
sharply cut lines." Here again.:rofessor Spearman shows 
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his complete lack of sensibility to the most fundamental 
aspect of the problem of artistic creativity, namely, the 
formal aspect, which derives primarily not from emotional 
responses to 'real' objects and sensations but from emotion- 
al responses to real or imagined forms (including colours) 
or from emotional situations which demand form for their 
release and appeasement. And such emotions are just as 
real as the real emotions cited by Spearman. Indeed all 
emotions aroused directly by the artistic situation (whether 
in its creative or its receptive aspect) are real emotions; 
the real and 'make- believe' emotions referred to by Spear - 
man are quite irrelevant to art, and he is quite right in 
calling the latter facile and cheap! But when he states 
that the simplest constituents of the pictorial object, 
such as its curves and colours, are rich in associated 
emotion, he misses the whole artistic significance of form. 
Enough has already been said to show the weakness of 
his examination of exaggeration in pictorial art.(1) His 
analysis of "Self- Expression" displays the same failure to 
grasp fundamental issues. "The abandonment," states 
Spearman,(2) "of plain correspondence between the picture 
and what is depicted results only in introducing some 
(1) 
Vide p.270 supra. 
(2) Creative Mind, pp. 70 -71. 
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further and more complex relation between the two. Common- 
ly, this further relation is one which may be described as 
that of 'best -fitting.' This becomes an appreciable factor 
even in what is called painting with breadth; here the 
exceedingly numerous gradations in the original objects 
are replaced by a small number in the picture; clearly 
these few have at any rate to be made to 'fit' as best 
the, can. .Lnd with those schools of painting where the 
departure from the original grows more extravagant, then 
the use of this relation becomes more and more conspicuous." 
The first instance he gives is that of a picture entitled 
The Ship by Friesz, "where natural hard angular rocks are 
replaced - to carry on the motif of sex - by best fitting 
soft pulpy masses." The second is Picasso's Lady, where 
each natural projection is represented in the picture "by 
the best fitting prismatic body." Now, apart from the 
very doubtful validity of Spearman's interpretations, the 
relation of 'best -fitting' is exceedingly vague; it might 
mean anything. s an explanation it is valueless- indeed, 
misleading, for it implies a process which is foreign to 
the artist's experience. His third instance is a Still 
Life by Braque, to which reference has already been made. 
In this picture he states "the original material is supposed 
to have been some tiles or sheets of metal on either side 
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of a beam of wood, together with fragments of musical 
instruments. Those in the picture are mingled higgledy- 
piggledy, superposed on one another as if partially trans- 
parent, and mixed up with abstract designs. Indeed, the 
fitting of the picture which the artist has chosen as the 
best possible might perhaps to other persons appear more 
like the worst possible." And he adds "It may be compared 
with the picture by a schizophrenic patient. "! Had Profess- 
or Spearman been able to overcome his own aesthetic pre- 
conceptions and prejudices he might have been enabled to 
perceive in this picture not a higgledy -piggledy arrange- 
ment of heterogeneous materials, but an exquisitely organ- 
ised and coherent structure of shapes and textures producing 
a formal effect at once fascinating and satisfying.(1) But 
Professor Spearman is so enslaved by the doctrine of the log- 
ical coherence of pictorial content that he is unable to see 
in modern art any form whatever, only symbols of insanity. 
Any theory of artistic creativity which fails to include 
within its scope the idea of abstract form must be condemned 
at the outset as totally inadequate and falsely conceived. 
Finally, it may be remarked - in amplification of the 
statement regarding Professor Spearman's competence to deal 
(1) Vide Art Now, by Herbert Read, pp.121 -132, for an 
analysis of the problem underlying Picasso's art. 
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with artistic creativity - that if the preceding criticisìn 
of his theory appears to be undulÿ severe and lacking in 
respect for authority, it may be claimed, with regard to 
the first, that in the exigencies of the case such censure 
could not very well be avoided; and with regard to the 
second, it may be urged that any impression of disrespect 
is neither intended nor implied. It is merely claimed 
that his theory, however adequate to an explanation of in- 
vention, origination and so on, is totally inadequate as an 
explanation of artistic creation. That there may be an 
inventive aspect of artistic production is not denied; 
this, however, refers not to the fundamentally creative part 
of art, but rather to technical procedure - the eduction of 
satisfying or beautiful relations. These, it has been 
shown, not only may be produced mechanically, but belong to 
beautiful art such as the art of Greece and all classical 
derivative art, but not necessarily to art in its generic 
manifestations. The production of beauty can be learned; 
the production of art can only be fostered by sympathetic 
guidance and encouragement. The work of art is not an 
invention, but a discovery of value beyond the range and 
function of intellectual cognition. Had Professor Spear - 
man established his fundamental assumption that there is no 
essential difference between creativity of the general sort 
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and artistic creation, his theory would have been of 
immense importance to the theory of art. As it stands, 
the most that can be said of it is that it offers an 
ingenious explanation of certain aspects of the psychology 
of technical procedure. From the point of view of the 
Theory of Art it is a psychological throw -back. Already 
it has earned a considerable measure of discredit, and it 
may be expected to go the same way as all intellectualistic 
theories have gone. 
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CHAPTER VII. 







"Son of man, hast thou seen what the ancients of the 
house of Israel do in the dark; every man in the chamber 
of his imagery." 
Ezekiel,VIII, 12. 
"A great statue or picture grows under the power of 
the artist as a child in the mother's womb: and the very 
mind which directs the hands in formation is incapable of 
accounting to itself for the origin, the gradations or 
the media of the process." 
Shelley. 
I. 
"'Imagination' shares Ivith 'beauty' the doubtful 
honour of being the chief theme in aesthetic writings of 
enthusiastic ignorance." Professor John Dewey's state- 
ment expresses a lamentable truth.(1) That art depends 
in the last analysis upon the imaginative power of the mind 
is probably the tritest of all ideas propounded in the lit- 
erature of art and aesthetics. It is a commonplace obser- 
vation that art could not exist at all were it not for this 
peculiarly mysterious- power. A recent writer(2) declares 
(1) 
Art as Experience, p. 267. 
(2) Gordon, Kate, "Imagination: A Psychological Study," 
Journal of General Psychology, Vol. XII, No.1, January 
1935. 
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there is hardly to be found in the realm of literary criti- 
cism a more important category. From Philostratus (reputed 
to be the first writer to use the term)(1) to Croce and 
Santayana scarcely an aesthetic philosopher of any signifi- 
cance has failed to attribute to imagination a premier place 
in artistic creation, or to refer to the fundamental import- 
ance of the power in one or other of its many appelations. 
Yet it is a remarkable fact that although the term is used 
glibly, both in scientific and everyday discourse, as if it 
possessed a clear -cut meaning, there exists no common 
agreement as to what imagination is or what the term really 
signifies. 
(1) 
"'Are you going to tell me, then,' said Thespesion, 
'that your Pheidias and Praxiteles went up into heaven and 
took casts of the gods' features and then fashioned them 
artistically, or had they any other guidance in their model- 
ling?' 'Yes,' said Apollonius, 'a guidance pregnant with 
wisdom.' 'What was it ?' said he; 'surely you cannot mean 
anything but imitation ?' 'Imagination,' replied the other, 
'fashioned these works, a more cunning craftsman than imita- 
tion. For imitation will fashion what it has seen, but 
idiagination goes on to what it has not seen, which it will 
assume as the standard of the reality. And imitation is 
often baffled by awe, but imagination by nothing, for it 
rises unawed to the height of its own ideal. If you have 
envisaged the character of Zeus, you must see him with the 
firmament and the seasons and the stars, as Pheidias strove 
to do in this statue; and if you are to fashion Athene, you 
must have in your mind strategy and counsel and the arts 
and how she sprang from Zeus himself." Quoted from Philo- 
sophies of beauty, Carritt, E. F., pp. 42 -43. 
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Most critics from Webbe to Johnston affirm that the 
object of poetry is the pleasure of the imagination. The 
word, however, is used very ambiguously. In Bacon's view 
history is the product of memory, philosophy the product of 
reason, and poetry the product of the imagination - a sub - 
mission or adaptation of the shows of things to the desires 
of the mind. In Locke, and almost every other English 
psychologist down to Herbert Spencer, the imagination is 
disregarded and treated as mere illusion. Most commonly 
it is described as a department of memory. For the Greeks 
the muses were the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne. Aris- 
totle attributes memory,and fantasy to the same region of 
the mind. In like manner Wolff, in his Rational Psychology. 
treats of memory in his chapter on imagination; in his 
Empirical Psychology he treats of imagination and memory in 
separate chapters; in his Rational Psychology he would 
treat them both as phases of the same power. In a word, 
philosophers have never been in agreement as to whether it 
is better to treat imagination as a department of memory 
like Locke, or memory as a department of imagination like 
Z,alebranche, or to regard the one as identical with the 
other like Hobbes. Wordsworth, on the other hand, identi- 
fies imagination with reason - a view which may be traced 
back to the speculations of the early logicians, who 
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divided their science into two compartments of invention 
and judgment. In the language of the Schoolmen dragons 
were described as beings of reason - entia rationis. For 
Richter, "Die Phantasie ist die Weltseele der Seele, und 
der Elementargeist der übrigen Kräfte." The imagination 
in Coleridge's view is either primary or secondary. "The 
primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime 
agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite_ 
I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former." 
In words which "come from his mouth like emperors from 
the purple, "(1) Ruskin expresses the view that the faculty 
of imagination is inexplicable. 
"'Imagination,'" states Ir. Livingston Welch,(2) "is a 
term which has figured largely in the analyses of human 
nature made during the last two hundred years, and has a 
history that goes back to Greek thought. To -day the pre- 
ponderance of usage designates by 'imagination' a power res- 
ident in the human mind of producing something new, and it 
is generally agreed that there is a fairly definite activity 
which can be so distinguished in human nature. The term 
'imagination,' however, has not always had this meaning; 
(1) 
Vide Dallas, E. S., The Gay Science, Vol.I, pp.164 -193. 
Imagination and Human Nature, p.9. 
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nor have analyses of human nature always singled out for 
attention such a distinctive power. The term itself has 
been employed to represent a variety of things in different 
types of thought; and the synthetic power which contempor- 
ary thinkers find in the mind has been frequently not recog- 
nized at all, and frequently when recognized it has been 
attributed to other faculties, functions, or processes of 
mind. Thus imagination is not a term with a content that 
has remained stable; nor is the power which contemporary 
usage denotes by that term a definite mental process that 
can be isolated and described. It is indeed clear that 
the concept of 'the imagination' is but one member of a set 
of distinctions which have been used in various ways to 
analyse the common subject- matter of human nature; and that 
the terms representing these distinctions receive definite 
meaning only as a part of a particular psychological scheme.' 
As long ago as 1866 Dallas declared that the "power of 
imagination is so vast and thaumaturgie that it is imposs- 
ible to lift a hand or move a step in criticism without 
coming to terms with it, and understanding distinctly what 
it is and what it does. On the threshold of every inquiry, 
it starts up,a strange and unaccountable presence that 
frights thought from its propriety and upsets all reason." 
But "when we come to ask what it really means, we are 
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amazed at the woful deficiency of the information which we 
can obtain about this all sufficient power." And he com- 
plained that "Those who give up a rounded theory of imagin- 
ation ignore half the facts;" and "that those who recognise 
nearly all the facts are driven ... to confess that they 
are a mystery inscrutable ... or throw up their pens with 
a sigh ... because their explanations would be unintellig- 
ible... "(l) Forty years later Ribot states(2) that "con- 
temporary science" has studied with great eagerness and 
success the reproductive imagination, but has "almost en- 
tirely neglected" the creative or constructive imagination. 
"Treatises on psychology," he asserts, "devote to it scarce- 
ly a page or two; often indeed do not even mention it." 
Substantially similar statements have recently been made by 
an American investigator: which is indeed a curious comment 
on the progress of a science of such immense human import- 
ance. "The word imagination," the investigator points out, 
"is used in many different ways; and the various meanings 
seem at first sight unrelated to one another... Some 
writers of important texts in the field of psychology do not 
treat the subject at all." And it is roundly asserted 
that "what a man imagines is the most significant thing 
(1) 
Op. cit., pp.167-173. 
(2) Preface to his Essay on the Creative Imagination. 
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about him. "(1) Very little has been done to improve the 
deplorable state of knowledge concerning this, perhaps the 
greatest of human powers; to -day, despite the progress of 
psychological research and the vast accumulation of data, 
the position is much as it was thirty years ago, when 
ìibot published his celebrated essay. 
Hollingworth remarks(2) that, along with memory, the 
concept imagination has been very loosely used in the his- 
tory of psychology, and "is often applied to diverse situa- 
tions which have at most but few common features." And, 
without professing to offer anything more than a mere 
sampling of its different applications, he recounts six 
examples.(3) Titchener(4) points out that "Two hypotheses 
(1) 
Gordon, Kate, op. cit., p.194. 
(2)Hollingworth, H. L., Psychology: Its Facts and 
Principles, p.278. 
(3)The first is used to indicate the mere presence of mental 
imagery; second, it is used to denote any mode of symbol- 
ising or representing past or absent events; third, it is 
used to contrast it with memory; or fourth, to indicate 
any "uncontrolled play of symbols;" fifth, the term is 
frequently employed to denote "extreme subjective events, 
unconfirmed by the reports of other observers;" and fin- 
ally, the term is applied to those instances in which prompt 
and animated responses follow upon subtle clues. 
(4) A Textbook of Psychology, p.442. 
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of the nature of the imaginative consciousness are sharply 
opposed in current discussion. According to the one, the 
imaginative idea or constellation comes as if from without, 
by inspiration; the poem sings itself, the painting groups 
and colours itself to the mental ear and eye; imagination 
is a native gift or endowment that finds rather than seeks 
expression. According to the other, the imaginative con- 
sciousness is profusely imaginal; associations throng 
about the focal process; and the product of imagination 
is the result of choice and arrangement of these associated 
ideas. On the former hypothesis, the imaginatively gifted 
individual is the dreamer of dreams and the seer of visions; 
on the latter, he is the planner, the moulder, the con- 
structor. So imagination appears now as the typically 
passive and now as the typically active temperament... 
And witnesses can be brought on both sides. We have not 
the data for a final characterisation." 
More forceful are the comments of R. G. Collingwood, 
who remarks(1) that in Professor McDougall's Outline of 
Psychology imagination is not even mentioned in the proper 
sense of the term. "The very paragraphs," he states, 
"which deal with 'imagining' define it as 'thinking of 
(1) Ihe Mind, ed. by IcDowall, h. J. S., p.239, footnote. 
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remote objects,' i.e.- objects not affecting the senses at 
the moment of thinking of theca. To call the meeting of 
Bacchus and Âriadne 'an object not affecting our senses at 
the moment of thinking of it,' apart from the misuse of the 
word 'thinking' would be a suppressio veri; to call it 'a 
remote object' would be a suggestio falsi, as encouraging 
a confusion between existing somewhere else and existing 
nowhere at all. The object of imagination in the proper 
sense of the word is not remote; it is non -existent. 
Until that fact is faced not a single step has been taken 
towards a theory of imagination." 
Every investigator, then, is hampered from the beginn- 
ing by the bewildering mass of complexities and contradic- 
tions which the history of imagination contains. "The im- 
portance of the subject is, however, equalled only by its 
difficulty. The chief difficulty is that 'imagination' 
belongs to a class of words, unhappily tending to increase, 
that have been used in so many meanings that they have al- 
most ceased to have any meaning. "(1) Another, and yet 
more troublesome and embarrassing handicap arises from the 
fact that psychology has no theory of imagination as a 
normal function of the mind to propound. There is a lack 
even of a commonly accepted theoretical groundwork. Indeed, 
(l),Babbit, I., On Being Creative, pp.101 -102. 
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as Miss Gordon points out,(1) some writers of importan 
texts do not even mention the term. Thus Köhler does not 
speak of imagination in his recent book,(2) for, although 
he deals with "organisation" in connection with sensation 
and perception, he has not so far made any attempt to treat 
the problem of creative productivity. But what other psy- 
chologists have called imagination is really a series of 
configurations or traces of previous configurations. In- 
deed, anything which other psychologists have included in 
reason or imagination is contained, for Köhler, in his 
concept of insight. 
The failure of psychology to provide any satisfactory 
account of the nature of creative imagination is a serious 
matter from the point of view of the art psychologist. 
For rightly or wrongly imagination has lain at the root of 
the problem of aesthetics from the classical age onwards. 
Not only does this failure hinder progressive research in 
this field, but it has tended in recent years to give psycho- 
)analysis a quite false position in relation to the psychol- 
ogy of a wide, immensely important and vaguely demarcated 
province of human activity. For, apart from idealistic 
(1) 
Op. cit. p.293 supra. 
(2) Gestalt Psychology. 
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metaphysics, psycho- analysis is the only branch of theoret- 
ical knowledge which can lay claim to offering an explana- 
tion of imagination as a vital, creative force. One writer 
of the new school of aesthetics goes so far as to suggest 
that "The new psychology would seem to have been specially 
designed to explain the poet."(1) Psychologists are 
apparently divided as to whether imagination is essentially 
or mainly imaginal and reproductive or essentially or main- 
ly synthetic and creative. To -day the predominating ten- 
dency is either to regard imagination and reason as funda- 
mentally the same type of mental activity, or, instead of 
speaking of imagination, to employ such terms as Geist, 
Esprit or Intelligence, including within their scope and 
meaning those functions and attributes usually connected 
with imagination and reason.(2) The distinction between 
mere imaginal propensity and the ability to create out of 
three sounds not a fourth but a star, which is fundamental 
to any psychological theory of art, has been tardy in gain- 
ing recognition by psychologists as offering a fruitful 
field for research. Psycho- analysis stresses the generative 
rather than the reproductive aspect of imaginative activity 
(1) 




and purports to account for its origin and mechanism. It 
is therefore in line with the needs and outlook of the art 
psychologist and may well claim his serious attention. 
The fundamental importance of drawing a clear dis- 
tinction between imagination as a universal mode of intra- 
psychic experience (ranging from the "airy gratifications" 
of the greengrocer to the sublime unexpressed dream exper- 
iences of the artist) and imagination as an artistic elem- 
ent or attribute cannot be too strongly stressed in any 
discussion of the problem of the meaning and nature of im- 
agination in art. "The most important distinction made 
by Joubert," says Irving Babbit,(l) "is that between an 
imagination that does not rise above the impressions of 
sense and an imagination that gives access to the super - 
sensuous, that is, in short, an organ of insight." Be- 
tween the 'imaginative' activities of the genuinely 'imagina- 
tive' layman and those of the creative artist there is a 
world of difference. This difference, it may be submitted, 
is of far greater psychological significance than is gener- 
ally recognised. ivlerely to say that one is 'passive' and 
the other 'active' is not particularly illuminating. This 
distinction, nevertheless, is of great importance. For the 
very distinguishing feature of the artist is not so much 
(1) 
Op. cit., p.122. 
298 
the kind or quality of his imagination, but his peculiar 
activity. He is moved by imperious needs to act in a 
particular manner in response to an inner urge. Unlike 
the ordinary individual in his greater moments or the great- 
er individual in his ordinary moments, he is not content 
with the mere psychic experience, the mere "illusion of a 
higher reality," however fascinating, exalting, bemusing 
his experience may for the moment be, but is driven on to 
definite external acts of behaviour which have as their 
goal the satisfaction of a need to realise fully potential- 
ities but vaguely foreshadowed.(l) The artist's mind is 
active, but it has no focal point of rest, no object upon 
which to train its energy, which is the ultimate need of 
the inward eye. Hence the urgency of his activity to 
create - to create that eternal value which his mind alone 
can neither produce nor apprehend within the limitless con- 
fines of its own horizon. The ordinary man - and the art- 
ist in his ordinary moments - remains in his subjective 
shell, alert perhaps but passive, unproductive. 
"Complete imagination demands externality... Hamlet 
as a poem in Shakspere's imagination is already a fusion 
and incarnation of Shakspere's spirit in features of the 
external world, forms of verse, forms of language: 'ringing 
(1) 
Cf. pp. 329-33Ü. 
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words' as Croce well says... A Hamlet which is less than 
this is not Hamlet. A Hamlet which is as much as this 
has sprung from an imagination wedded to the spoken language 
of England, schooled and inspired by its energy and sonor- 
ousness. A poem without its sound, I must maintain, is 
incomplete as a work of imagination. Shakspere was taught 
and disciplined by the spirit which lived in England and in 
English speech. Without this externality there could be 
no Hamlet. To say that externality as a category of 
spirit involves a dualism is to say that it is a dualism 
when the musician's work is interpreted by the full orches- 
tra... To treat this performance as a practical means 
for ensuring the preservation and communication of an imag- 
ined beauty separate from it, is surely the very feeble ex- 
pedient of a philosophy which finds itself trying to put 
asunder what the universe has joined together. "(1) 
Between the 'imaginative' activities of the scientist 
and the artist there is likewise a wide gap. Attempts 
have been made to show that in the last analysis they are 
alike.(2) That this is not so was argued in some detail 
in the preceding chapter. The scientist is concerned. with 
(1) Bosanquet, B., "Croce's Aesthetic," vïind, Vol. I , 
pp. 214 -215. 
(2) For example: Spearman (Creative rand); Titchener (Out- 
line of Psychology); Paulhan (r'sychologie de l'invention. 
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facts relating to the structure of the physical universe 
and the organisation of these facts into universal laws; 
whereas the artist begins, as Roger Fry insisted, where the 
scientist ends. "'T'he difference between the mind of Homer 
and the mind of . ristotle - the mind of art and the mind of 
science - is not the difference between less and more in the 
amount of hidden action ...., but it is the difference be- 
tween possessing and being possessed bd it - the difference 
in proportion of energy between the known and the unknown 
halves of the mind. "(1) Questions of fact do not concern 
the artist, qua artist; that is not his province; he is 
concerned exclusively with his relationship to the world, to 
men and things, to space, time and eternity, with the out- 
ward expression of his deepest moods and intuitions in terms 
of plastic material. His imagination is untrammelled, it 
does not operate within the limited framework of his intell- 
ectual knowledge, but ranges beyond into worlds where the 
moon may be blood and the stars leopards' eyes, where he 
knows not the constraint of laws except those of his own be- 
ing and those inherent in the medium which he employs and 
patiently bends to his will. In his own world the artist is 
the freest of mortals. "The value of the imagination that 
is ... free to 'wander wild,' that is not in other words 
(1) Dallas, E. S., op. cit., pp. 263-264. 
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disciplined to any norm, is precisely the problem raised by 
the whole modern movement. "(1) If imagination means any- 
thing other than a general originative power inherent in the 
nature of mind, then psychology must face the difficult 
task of explaining why one man's imagination issues in the 
production of art and another man's remains latent and 
unproductive. 
"There is a saying, as old at least as Horace, that 
the mind is most vividly impressed through the eye, and it 
is but natural that when left to itself it should dwell 
most on the shows of vision - images - whence arises the 
name of imagination. According to any and every theory 
of imagination which has been propounded, the name is of 
less extent than the faculty, and takes a part for the 
whole. "(2) The word imagination by its very etymology 
appears to imply the co- existence of images, with something 
that is imageless, yet mentally significant (psychic tension, 
(1) Babbit, Irving, op. cit., p.91. 
(2) Dallas, E. ä., op. cit., 
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intuition, imageless thought?) ; (1) and an image is a mental 
(1) 
"The word 'imagination' comes fro_n the Latin imaginatio, 
which like the verb imaginor appears first in the post - 
.ugustan era, in Quintillian, Pliny, and Tacitus, to trans- 
late a conception already familiar in Greek thought. The 
Latin term was constructed from the older imago, long used 
to mean a copy or likeness of almost any sort, and found in 
Plautus, Virgil, and Cicero,' for example, with meanings as 
diverse as statue, signet, shade, and spirit. Cicero, 
however, under the influence of Greek thought, employs it 
also more technically to stand for "an image of a thing 
found in the mind, a conception, a thought, an idea," al- 
though he did not use the more abstract imaginatio. Imago 
is a close equivalent of the Greek Eb<c v , signifying image, 
copy, or likeness; and thus the Latin imaginatio was 
formed on the analogy of the Greek term cigacria. ¡from É[Kcv 
"to be like. ") Greek also possesses another term,#avraa-ia- 
(from aivw , "to appear, Ito be apparent ") , and after .ris- 
totle avraaaa, rather thaneLKaoria, is the term technically 
employed in the analysis of the processes of knowledge. 
Thus imaginatio, though formed on the model of eiKCtaia. , is 
really the translation of the Greek $6avracria.. 
Both these Greek terms0avra.oria.and e2Kao -ia had origin - 
ally no special psychological connotation; yet when there 
grew up a distinction between the stimulus and the resulting 
sensation, for which Democritus seems to have been largely 
responsible, the termOavracriacame to be associated with 
sensation and impression as a process of the Tvxl , rather 
than with a kind of object to be known as existing objective- 
ly in the world. ECKQoi a , on the other hand , failed to ac- 
quire any such subjective connotation, and is used quite 
objectively in Plato to denote a certain type of object of 
knowledge. It would be interesting to trace the genesis. 
of tnis new usage of avraarict in the discussions of the 
Sophistic period, but we 'hardly find adequate materials for 
analyzing any distinct and definite form of a theory of 
knowledge until we come to the so- called later dialogues 
of Plato." Livingston welch, op. cit., pp.25 -26. 
(The present writer is indebted to .Liss E., Lindsay for 
the following comments: although hcKaa14, and enCw have the 
same fundamental root, it seems relevant to point out that 
¿cKacrta has its immediate derivation from ducavu a fact- 
itive verb form which means not to "be like" but to "repres- 
ent, by an image or likeness;" similarly0avracrais derived 
from avraSw which means not to "seem" but to "make visible. ") 
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picture' or representation of an object, action or situation 
Snot present here and now to sense or direct perception. 
So it happens that in the term there is implicit the notion 
of co- existing images. But the mere existence of images 
in the mind cannot be regarded as imagination in any very 
significant philosophical or psychological sense. Besides 
images there must needs be some sort of coherence, some 
unifying principle linking one image with another, produc- 
ing a meaningful, emotionally valuable or logical configur- 
ation. The highest general sense of the term appears to 
postulate an intellectually or emotionally integrated 
image -pattern. At the other end of the scale imagination 
implies a mere riot of imagery, mere phantasy which is but 
a step from psycho -pathology. 
There is, however, another and deeper sense in which 
the term is employed, mostly in humanistic and pseudo- philo- 
sophical literature: the sense which implies an extension 
of the ordinary range of human perception, a species of in- 
sight into the unknown, a revelation or apprehension of 
meaning and value beyond what is immediately given or 
apparent - that "illusion of a higher reality" which for 
Joubert was "an integral part of reality." "Often you 
find in men an absolute incapacity to realise an unfamiliar 
situation, to grasp conditions which are not immediately 
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visible, to recognise facts which to others are a plain and 
patent element in their lives. That incapacity springs 
fróm a dull and uncultivated imagination... A House of 
Parliament without imagination is a dangerous House. "(1) 
This particular use of the term, taken from a speech by 
Goschen, does not appear to imply the existence of an in- 
tegrated image configuration: emphasis rather falls upon 
the character of intuitive apprehension than upon purely 
imaginal characters. "Wordsworth claimed imagination as 
his supreme gift, but at the same time he bestowed on the 
word 'imagination' a new meaning almost entirely opposed to 
the ordinary one... In his loftier moods, he used 'imagin- 
ation' as a synonym for 'intuition,' of seeing into and 
even through reality... "(2) 
The historical use of the term in reference to art - 
at all events since the publication of Addison's articles 
on the imagination in the Spectator (1712), when the phrase 
'creative imagination' first began to gain currency - 
appears to have implied both an imaginal and a rational 
ingredient. The work of art, that is to say, was regarded 
as the product both of imagery derived from sense impress- 
ions of the real world and of reason or philosophic 
(1) Quoted by Spearman, C., Creative Mind, p.8. 
(2) Irving Babbit (quoting M. Legouis), op. cit., p.94; 
cf. Dewey, J., Psychology, p.50. 
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reflection. To -day the term 'imagination' when applied 
to art appears to imply almost similar psychological in- 
gredients - images and a binding element, intuitions, 
feelings, affections, etc. - co- existing with one another. 
It is so vague, however, that it defies accurate analysis. 
Whether, considering the historical preponderance of opin- 
ion and usage in favour of the 'image' concept of imagina- 
tion, the aesthetic connotation of the term is justified by 
the psychological facts of artistic creation is a question 
that will have to be left to future research. "or the 
present it may be claimed that there is a good body of evi- 
dence (some of which has been brought forward in the two 
preceding chapters) in support of the contrary view that 
artistic imagination is not necessarily imaginal and is 
frequently not so. .ßîr. E. bullough writes:(1) In spite of 
much writing on the subject we can hardly be said to have 
advanced beyond the fringe of the unknown. The chief ob- 
stacles to progress seem to we to have been a long standing 
confusion of imagery with imagination and the attempt to 
deal with imagination on far too narrowly intellectualistic 
a conception of novelty and originality as a characteristic 
feature of imagination." T. E. Lawrence, it may be noted 
(1) "Mind and Medium in Art," British Journal of Psychology, 
Vol. XI, p.39. 
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not inappositely, remarks in his Introduction to the cata- 
logue of Eric Kennington's Arab Portraits in 1921: "I saw 
slim doing one of these things and can testify that he did 
not now why he was working, or how he was worming. When 
he felt that he knew, things went badly." 
Any attempt to give a more or less complete historical 
survey of the aesthetic use of the term would not only in- 
volve an unwarrantable digression into the history of aes- 
t_etic philosophy, but sucL a survey would require a con- 
siderable volume to itself, since the term has never ac- 
quired any stability of meaning. But in any study.of the 
problem of the nature and place of imagination in the psycho- 
logy of art, the distinction between imagination regarded 
either as a synthetic or analytic faculty of mind and 
imagination as an artistic element or attribute is of prime 
importance. Imagination and art are not synonymous terms; 
indeed, when a sound psychology of imagination comes to be 
written, it may be revealed that there is little or no 
connection between what is vaguely termed 'artistic imagina- 
tion' and artistic procedure. The present position seems 
to be this, that there are three alternatives: either (A) 
imagination may be regarded as a general function of mind, 
which may manifest itself in diverse ways independently of 
any!,extra- psychic productive activity; or (B) imagination 
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may be regarded as a general function of mind, which mani- 
fests itself essentially in productive activities of all 
kinds, from the scribblings and mutterings of the child to 
the monumental creations of great artists, architects, en- 
Fineers, scientists, mathematicians and philosophers; or 
(G) imagination may be regarded as a special function of 
.mind manifesting itself solely in the artist and his works. 
Just as the aesthetic concept content apart from form 
is without meaning, so from the point of view of the psy- 
chology of artistic production imagination has no meaning, 
apart from the physical fact, the picture, statue, or other 
work; the physical fact is indeed the only evidence there 
is of the existence of the power. h disembodied imagina- 
tion is no less a psychological aostraction than a bodiless 
content. There can be no fruitful discussion of creative 
imagination apart from its product; unless it be assumed 
that purely intra -psychic activities, such as phantasy and 
day -dreaming, are synonymous with it, but less intensive. 
To proceed on such an assumption, however, would immediately 
remove the discussion beyond the ambit of psychology. Im- 
agination cannot function in vacuo, as Bosanquet rightly 
insists; to discuss it in the abstract is to abandon the 
field of psychology for the intangibilities and "transcend- 
ental tautologies" of metaphysics. The only sound and 
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legitimate psychological approach to the problem is through 
lived experience as manifested and revealed in artistic pro- 
ducts. What, then, is to be understood by imagination in 
art? 
One of the earliest and most acute studies of imagina- 
tion in the English language is that of Eneas Sweetland 
Dallas, student of Sir William Hamilton, "The Times" re- 
viewer of Adam Bede, The xüll on the Floss, Enoch Arden, 
Great Expectations, Silas Marner and many other classics 
of his time. His work is particularly interesting in the 
present connection, not only because of the general sound- 
ness of his standpoint and the light he throws upon the 
problem, but because he anticipated much that is now current 
in the psycho- analytic literature of art and aesthetics. 
Imagination, in Dallas' view, is not a special faculty 
of the mind, but a special function. "It is the name 
givers to the automatic action of the mind or any of its 
faculties - to what may not unfitly be called the Hidden 
Soul." His automatic action takes place unawares; "and 
when we come to analyse the movements of thought, we find 
that to be quite sure of our steps we are obliged very much 
to identify what is involuntary with what is unconscious. "CL) 
Dallas' purpose, as he himself states, "is not so much to 
(1) 
Op. cit., Vol. I, pp.194-19b. 
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identify imagination with what may be called the hidden 
soul, as to show that there is a mental existence within us 
which may be so called - a secret flow of thought which is 
not less energetic than the conscious flow, an absent mind 
which haunts us like 'a ghost or a dream and is an essential 
part of our lives. Incidentally, there will be no escaping 
the observation that this unconscious life of the mind ... 
bears a wonderful resemblance to the supposed features of 
imagination... To lad bare the automatic or unconscious 
action of the mind is indeed to unfold a tale which outvies 
the romances of giants and ginhs, wizards in their palaces 
and captives in the Domdaniel roots of the sea... The 
hidden efficacy of our thoughts, their prodigious power of 
working in the dark and helping as underhand, can be com- 
pared only to the stories of our folk -lore, and, chiefly to 
that of the lubber -fiend who toils for us when we are asleep 
and when we are not looking. "(1) 
The notion of the unconscious mind had been recognised, 
as Dallas points out, by Leibniz. It had already taken 
root in the German system of thought, had "grown ... fructi- 
fied and run to seed," and expanded into all the "absurdities 
and extravagances of the transcendental philosophÿ." 
Though much of that philosophy is "mere folly" and though 
(1) Ibid. pp. 199-200. 
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most of it is "unintelligible," it "has a foundation of 
fact," which is "recognised by our most sober thinkers" 
who "at least never quit the ground of common sense." 
That they "admit the principle" is for Dallas "the great 
point. "(1) 
"Outside consciousness there rolls a vast tide of life, 
which is, perhaps, even more important to us than the little 
isle of our thoughts which lies within our ken. Compari- 
sons, however, between the two are vain, because each is 
necessary to the other. The thing to be firmly seized is, 
that we live in two concentric worlds of thought, - an 
inner ring, of which we are conscious, and which may be 
described as illuminated; an outer one, of 'which we are 
unconscious, and which may be described as in the dark. 
Between the outer and the inner ring, between our uncon- 
scious and our conscious existence, there is a free and 
constant but unobserved traffic for ever carried on. 
Trains of thought are continually passing to and fro, from 
the light into the dark, and back from the dark into the 
light. When the current of thought flows from within our 
ken to beyond our ken, it is gone, we forget it, we know 
not what has become of it. After a time it comes back to 
us changed and grown, as if 'it were a new thought, and we 
(1) 
Ibid. pp.201 -202. The sober thinkers are Sir tlilliam 
Hamilton, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. 
311 
know not whence it comes. "(1) 
The unconscious or hidden soul may be divided like the 
conscious soul into three faculties of memory, of reason, 
and of feeling, each of which secrets its own knowledge and 
performs its own hidden action. Summarising the evidence 
for these powers, he points out that the mind never forgets: 
"Thus beams upon us the strange phenomenon of knowledge, 
possessed, enjoyed, and used by us, of which nevertheless 
we are ignorant - ignorant not only at times, but also in 
some cases during our whole lives. " 
(2) 
11,nd the memory of 
things not understood may be vital within us; we may be 
"unconscious of the automatic energy within us until its 
work is achieved and the effect of it is not to be resist- 
ed. We see the finished result; of the process we know 
nothing. "(3) Out of these unconscious rental ongoings 
there emerges "the fact that the mind keeps watch and ward 
for us when we slumber; that it spins long threads, weaves 
whole webs of thought for us when we reek not. In its 
inner chamber, whither no eye can pierce, it will remember, 
brood, search, poise, calculate, invent, digest, do any 














The extraordinary similarity of these views to contemp- 
orary psycho -analytic theory needs no emphasis. Dallas is 
fully alive to the fact, that the activities and ways of 
the conscious mind can be accounted for and explained only 
by assuming that it is frecuently fulfilling desires of 
which the agent is entirely oblivious. His recognition 
of the relation of dreams to the unconscious is also strik- 
ingly modern. "Like those heavenly bodies which are seen 
only in the darkness of night," he says,(1) "the realities 
of our hidden life are best seen in the darkness of slumber." 
Vith a wealth of illustration he shows how the unconscious 
mind works and overtakes results that the conscious mind 
would either fail to approach or would approach with falter- 
ing steps. Coleridge, for instance, composed the following 
lines from Kublah Khan during sleep induced by opium:- 
A damsel with a dulcimer, 
In a vision once I saw: 
It was an Abyssinian maid, 
And on a dulcimer she played, 
Singing of Rïount Abora. 
Although it can hardly be said that Dallas completely anti- 
cipated the premises of psycho- analysis, there is little 
doubt that he recognised the existence of the facts and 
phenomena upon which the psycho- analytic doctrines of con- 




recognition, too, of the role of instincts in stimulating 
the unconscious mind is another example of the acuity of 
his psychological insight. "The mere existence of such 
forces as instinct and passion is," he says, "a vulgar 
fact which to those who read it aright will at once tell a 
tale of the hidden soul." 1) Again, his view of the mind 
as a functioning whole contrasts markedly with the compart- 
mental psychology of his contemporaries. "The most royal 
prerogative of imagination is its entireness, its love of 
wholes, its wonderful power of seeing the whole, of claim- 
ing the whole, of making whole, and.- shall I add - of 
swallowing whole... Left to itself ... the mind acts more 
as a whole, and taxes more to wholes; "(2) "it is like the 
cloud that moveth altogether if it move at all. "(3) Pre- 
cisely the same claim is made by the Gestalt psychologists. 
Take a quotation from Köhler:(4) "According to the most 
general definition of Gestalt, the processes of learning, 
of reproduction, of striving, of emotional attitude, of 




(2) Ibid. pp. 269-270. 
(")) Ibid. p.305. 
(4) Gestalt Psychology, p.193. 
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matter of Gestalt -Theorie in so far as they do not consist 
of independent elements, but are determined in a situation 
as a whole." 
But it is with his exposition of the relation of the 
hidden soul to art that the present discussion is princip- 
ally concerned. The great source of all art is "the felt 
existence within us of an abounding inner life that tran- 
scends consciousness. We feel certain powers moving within 
us, we know not what, we know not why - instincts of our 
lower nature, intuitions of our higher, dreams and sugges- 
tions, dim guesses, and faint, far cries of the whole 
mind. "(1) Imagination looks for resemblances rather than 
for differences: there is the one half of his doctrine. 
It looks for the resemblances of wholes rather than of 
parts: there is the other half. "It is because imagina- 
tion looks out for resemblance rather than difference that 
it leaps to wholes. It is because imagination keeps to 
wholes and avoids analysis that it overlooks difference 
and seizes on resemblance. "' The mind's habit of catch- 
ing likenesses, Dallas points out, has been assigned to 
fancy; its power of discerning unity and grasping wholes 
has been allotted to imagination. But for him the 
(l) 
Ibid. p. 246. 
(2) 
Ibid. pp. 270 -271. Cf. "Irving Babbit's definition of 
imagination as the power "that reaches out and seizes like- 
nesses and analogies." Op. cit., Introduction xxx. 
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distinction is of little importance; there are not two 
faculties, one going by the name of fancy, the other by 
the name of imagination. The imagination, he concludes, 
"is the automatic action or play, not of any special facul- 
t , but of any and every faculty ... in one word, the play 
of thought. "(l) The true artist recognises, however dimly, 
the existence within us of a double world of thought, and 
his object is, by "subtle forms, tones, words, allusions, 
associations, to establish a connection with the uncon- 
scious hemisphere of the mind and to make us feel a mysteri- 
ous energy there in the hidden soul." 
This is as far as Dallas goes. Of form he has little 
more to say than what is contained in the following quota- 
tions, except that the wholeness that marks all the work of 
the imagination is due to the wholeness of the mind's func- 
tioning. although the painter's art is evidently tied to 
fact more strictly than that of the poet, mere accuracy, 
mere matter -of -fact representation is no better than photo- 
graphy. "it is the artist's business, by the capture of 
evanescent and almost impalpable expression, by the un- 
fathomable blending of light in shadow, by delicacies of 




grace that is beyond calculation ... to convey to the imag- 
ination a something beyond nature... 'The light which 
never was on sea or shore.'" h. man may paint a picture 
well, and yet his picture for all the clearness and fulness 
of knowledge it exhibits may not be art, "because it wants 
something which a great artist once described by snapping 
his fingers. 'It wants,' said Sir Joshua Reynolds, 'it 
wants that!,,,(1) 
From Dallas' exposition several highly important points 
emerge, which must be regarded as fundamental to any satis- 
factory theory of imagination as a crucial factor in artist- 
ic productivity. In stressing the fact that imagination 
is not a special faculty of mind but a special function he 
enunciates in principle an established contemporary doctrine. 
"The imaginative experience such as the artist in particular 
lives in',' states Bullough,(2) "is more nearly the imagina- 
tive counterpart of actual experience than imaginings 
wholly outside the range of normal experience - which is 
true rather of people generally called 'unimaginative.' 
The novelty and originality of the artistic imagination lies 
far less in its excentricity to normal life than in its 
(1) 
Ibid. PP.331-332. 
( 2 ) "1Jiind and ledium in Art," op. cit., p . 39 . 
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being the reflexion of an intensely and intimately individ- 
ual experience, transferred to the sphere of imagination, 
thereby removed from its personal reference and rendered 
accessible to and effective for the sympathy, understanding 
and appreciation of others." Dallas fails, however, to 
show that he understands the essential nature of the rela- 
tion of the automatic working of the mind to the productive 
creative activity, being content to establish the nature 
of the imaginative activity itself, without reference to 
"the circumstances under which the tenaency is exerted." 
It is not sufficient to establish the nature of the imag- 
ination; imagination alone never produced a work of art. 
x work of art is first and foremost a physical object, the 
material result of an activity of the whole mind -body com- 
plex, and any theory which is supposed to cover the imagina- 
tive activities of the productive artist must take into 
consideration the crucial fact that any imaginative experi- 
ence which the artist may have prior to expression. is psy- 
chologically inferior to its externalised equivalent. In 
other words, imagination must be regarded as a function of 
mind which manifests itself essentially and characteristic- 
ally in extra -psychic activities of all kinds, and ideally 
in the creations of artists. The difference, then, be- 
tween the imagination of the ordinary man, who in numberless 
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ways is continually operating on and changing his physical 
environment in order to bring it nearer to his "heart's 
desire," and the artist who rejects the real world for the 
time being in order to construct a new reality shut off 
from practical reality, is not fundamentally a difference 
in kind, but a difference in quality and intensity of ex- 
perience. The day- dreaming and reverie types of "imagina- 
tive" experience do not constitute imagination (they are 
unproductive, uncreative) but mere phantasy. If the artist 
were able fully and clearly to 'imagine' his profoundest 
apprehensions and aspirations within the confines of his 
own psyche, he would have no need to paint unless as a 
means of producing a permanent record of a private psychic 
event or process. L.rt would thus be reduced to a state 
of mind - which, save to a thorough -going subjectivist like 
Croce, is absurd. The artist's imagination requires a 
medium for its highest activities, a means of expressing 
itself; it does not manifest itself in external activities 
and events, but in external productive acts; and it is in 
and through these acts that the artist solves the mystery 
of his "divine unrest," finding thereby the form that 
expresses himself to himself, lighting up the "night side 
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of his soul. "(l) The creative act is, therefore, a real 
enlargement of his total field of consciousness. Not only 
so; it is the focal point of all the most vital forces of 
a single life - "those faint, far cries of the whole mind" 
of which Dallas speaks - and a precious addition to the 
world of psychologically valuable objects - in a word, the 
revelation and expression of a rich personality. 
II. 
Before the rise of modern psychology it was possible 
to regard imagination as a comparatively harmless impediment 
(1) 
Cf. Professor Dewey, hrt as Experience, p.268. "There 
is a conflict artists themselves undergo that is instructive 
as to the nature of imaginative experience. The conflict 
has been set forth in many ways. One way of stating it 
concerns the opposition between inner and outer vision. 
There is a stage in which the inner vision seems much richer 
and finer than any outer manifestation. It has a vast and 
enticing aura of implications that are lacking in the object 
of external vision. It seems to grasp much more than the 
latter conveys. Then there comes a reaction; the matter 
of the inner vision seems wraith -like compared with the 
solidity and energy of the presented scene. The object is 
felt to say something succintly and forcibly that the inner 
vision reports vaguely, in diffuse feeling rather than or- 
ganically. The artist is driven to submit himself in 
humility to the discipline of the objective vision. But the 
inner vision is not cast out. It remains as the organ by 
which outer vision is controlled, and it takes on structure 
as the latter is absorbed within it. The interaction of 
the two modes of vision is imagination; as imagination 
takes form the work of art is born." 
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to knowledge. Philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza 
objected to the imagination because it was an obstacle to 
truth. Truth, as they conceived it, was achieved only by 
abstract reasoning. Pascal attacks it in the name of re- 
ligion, calling it a "proud power" and a "mistress of error, 
which overwhelms reason." But with the advent of psycho- 
analysis, imagination has acquired a new significance. 
Far from being a mere harmless impediment to the acquisition 
and formation of knowledge, it is regarded by the psycho- 
analytic school as a manifestation of fundamental drives 
which govern the whole field of human activity, whether it 
be scientific investigation, political propaganda, social 
reform, art or religious devotion. 
It is not within the scope of the present inquiry to 
examine the fundamental hypothesis of psycho- analysis in so 
far as it pretends to offer an account of the sources and 
mechanisms of human activity in general. 3ut it will be 
advisable to glance at the theory in so far as it bears 
upon the topic under discussion, sketching at the same time 
the main outlines of psycho- analytic theory as developed by 
Sigmund Freud and his disciples during the present century. 
The keystone of psycho -analytic theory, it will be re- 
membered, is the idea of a perpetual conflict between 
primitive sexual drives and the demands imposed by the 
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social conditions into which every child is born. This 
"conflict" leads to the "repression" of libidinous wishes 
into the "unconscious" mind, wherein are created complicated 
systems of drives or impulses known as "complexes," which 
manifest themselves in diverse ways, particularly in dreams 
and phantasies associated with all forms of neurosis and 
mental disease. Imagination, then, according to psycho- 
analytic theory is a pathological phenomenon arising from 
ungratified libidinous wishes, which have been repressed 
into the "unconscious" as a result of the internal conflict 
between opposing psychic exigencies. These wishes are im- 
prisoned there by repressing forces collectively termed by 
Freud tie " Censor." Eut, during sleep and sleeplike states 
such as reverie and day -- dreaming, the Censor is less vigil- 
ant, with the result that the repressed tendencies find a 
means of escape in dreams and dreamlike occurrences such as 
phantasies and imaginings. These manifestations of re- 
pressed tendencies are not direct expressions of the origin- 
al wish or wishes, but transposed, camouflaged and distorted 
"representations." This disguising of the real meaning of 
the wish is necessary in order to evade the action of the 
Censor. The "manifest dream content," as distinct from 
the dream product, thus reveals itself as a compromise be- 
tween the conflicting forces. Further, the censorial 
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function is itself entirely unconscious and works under the 
control of the "Super -Ego," which is regarded as a definite 
entity within the mind. The Super -Ego acts as a kind of 
unconscious moral force, but its morality differs from that 
of the conscious Ego in that it is probably of very much 
earlier origin and more severe in its demands. 
In addition to dreams and dreamlike manifestations, 
in which the real motivations of the repressed tendencies 
are disguised in order to elude the Censor, there are other 
means whereby these expressions reveal themselves: for in- 
stance, in "free association" and art. Of the indirect 
modes of manifestation the most important is that of sym- 
bolism, by means of which inhibited wishes and impulses are 
revealed in a manner not immediately comprehensible. Sym- 
bolism is held to be a general characteristic of the working 
of the human mind, whereby repressed tendencies find an 
outlet and attain at least partial satisfaction. Behind 
all symbolism there is a meaning, a mental relationship 
between the symbol and what is symbolised. 
In the course of man's mental development the primitive 
innate tendencies hidden in the unconscious mind are "dis- 
placed" by means of the process of "transference," whereby 
an emotional attitude is transferred from one idea to an- 
other. According to psycho -analytic theory the displace- 
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ment mechanism is of immense importance in the development 
of mind. In the course of the development certain dis- 
placements are produced which are of great social and cul- 
tural value. Thus, the whole of what is called civilisa- 
tion is dependent upon these deflections of libidinous 
energy into desirable channels through sublimation. 
1ccording to Freud, it is by just such a process of 
sublimation that art comes into existence. For him art is 
the means whereby the artist finds relief from the mental 
tension arising from his inner conflicts. The work of art, 
that is to say, is nothing more nor less than one of those 
day -dreams in which men seek(through the imagination) ful- 
filment of ungratified libidinous wishes. "There is ... a 
path from phantasy back again to reality, and that is art," 
says Freud. "The artist has ... an introverted disposition 
and has not far to go to become a neurotic. He is one who 
is urged on by instinctive needs which are too clamorous; 
he lon _:s to attain to honour, power, riches, fame and the 
love of women; but he lacks the means of achieving these 
gratifications. So, like any other unsatisfied longing, 
he turns away from reality and transfers all his interest, 
all his Libido, too, on to the creation of his wishes in 
life ... he understands how to elaborate his day- dreams, 
so that they lose that personal note which grates upon 
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strange ears and becomes enjoyable to others; he knows, 
too, how to modify them sufficiently so that their origin 
in prohibited sources is not easily detected. "(1) Freud 
thus makes it quite clear that from the psycho-analytic 
point of view imagination is the crucial factor in artistic 
production. 
In recent years there have been attempts to develop a 
theory of art on the basis of the Freudian postulates. 
The work of art is regarded as the outward projection of 
the artist's unconscious drives in the form of symbolic 
images translated into terms of form and colour. Charles 
Baudouin h propounded such a theory of art, first in his 
sychoanalysis and r.esthetics and, more recently, in his 
(1) Introductory Lectures, p.314. Cf. the following state 
ment from his Autobiography (An Autobiographical Study, 
1935): "The realm of imagination was evidently a 'sanctu- 
ary' made during the painful transition from the pleasure 
principle to the reality principle in order to provide a 
substitute for the gratification of instincts which had to 
be given up in real life. The artist, like the neurotic, 
had withdrawn from an unsatisfying reality into the world 
of imagination; but unlike the neurotic, he knew how to 
find a way back from it and once more to get a firm foot- 
hold on reality. His creations, works of art, were the 
imaginary gratifications of unconscious wishes, just as 
dreams are; and like them they were in the nature of com- 
promises, since they too were forced to avoid an open con- 
flict with the forces of repression. But they differed 
from the asocial, narcissistic products of dreaming in that 
they were calculated to arouse interest in other people 
and were able to evoke and to gratify the same unconscious 
in them too." 
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Psychanalyse de l'J.rt. Two classes of complex are postu- 
lated by Baudouin: "les complexes personnels," situated in 
the subconscious and determined by the individual's environ- 
ment and past experience, and "les complexes primitifs," 
situated in the most primitive unconscious and common to the 
whole human race.(l) For him, as for Freud., art is the 
imaginative gratification of unconscious sexual drives. 
Psychoanalysis and .Lesthetics is primarily a psycho -analytic 
study of the poet Verhaeren: the poet's work is "analysed 
with the same rigorous method as that employed in the analy- 
sis of dreams" - "by unravelling the condensations of 
imaginative creation, and disentangling displacements and 
repressions." In this study Baudouin claims also to "have 
laid the foundations of the psychology of art, of a science 
of aesthetics which shall be genuinely scientific. "(2) 
._nother writer of importance in this connection is 
Otto Eank, who, in two remarkable works,(3) has advanced 
theory of art of Freudian orientation. Rank regards the 
artist as "Der Typus des ideel schöpferischen Menschen," 
the type of the imaginatively creative being as distinct 
(1) Psychanalyse de 1'xrt, p.6. 
a 
(2 
Psychoanalysis and .esthetics, p.33, Introduction: vide 
also Psy chanaly se de l'krt , introduction. 
3) Der Künstler and Das Inzest Motiv in. Dichtung und. Saga. 
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from the practically creative type, "Der praktisch schöpfer- 
ische Typus." The former includes the religious man, the 
philosophic thinker and the researcher; the latter, the 
man of action.' Art, like myths, legends, fairy tales, 
religion and philosophies is the manifestation of deep - 
seated libidinous drives, but, because of the artist's 
special gift of "sublimation," he is able to transform his 
libidinous impulses in such a manner as to render them 
acceptable to cultured society.(2) Thus the artist, al- 
though a neurotic, is distinguished by virtue of this gift 
from both the mere neurotic and the dreamer. 
Freud himself has never attempted to formulate a com- 
plete psycho- analytic theory of art. Indeed, it is doubt- 
ful whether he would recognise the possibility of such a 
theory. In his Autobiography he states that "ghat psycho- 
analysis was able to do was to take the interrelations be- 
tween the impressions of the artist's life, his chance ex- 
perience, and his works, and from them to construct his 
constitution and the impulses at work in it - that is to 
say, that part of him which he shared with all men." It 
was from this point of view he embarked upon his celebrated 
study of Leonardo da Vinci, which, as he himself declares, 
(1) 
Der Künstler, p.7. 
(2) Ibid., pp.51 -81. 
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"is based upon a single memory of childhood related by him 
and which aims chiefly at explaining his picture of àt.Anne 
with the Virgin and Child. The layman may expect too 
much from analysis ... for it must be admitted that it 
throws no light upon the two problems which probably inter- 
est him most. It can do nothing towards elucidating the 
nature of the artistic gift, nor can it explain the means 
by which the artist works - artistic technique. "(1) Freud 
is, therefore, under no delusions as to the value of psycho- 
analytic theory and technique to the psychological theory 
of art. 
One of the most noteworthy theoretical expositions of 
art based on the ps- -cho- analytic doctrine of wish- fulfil- 
ment is that of Professor De bitt Parker,(2} Professor of 
Philosophy in the University of ihîichigan. Apart from the 
question of the merits of the theory, Professor Parker's 
graceful style and insight, his obvious candour and sensi- 
bility, his enthusiasm and able argument render his book at 
once pleasant to read and instructive to study. No more 
important contribution to the theory of art has been pub- 
lished in the English language, but its underlying 
(1) 
Leonardo da Vinci, pp.119 -120. (Present author's italics) 
(2) The Analysis of Art. 
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hypotheses are so unstable as to render the whole theoretic- 
al superstructure weak and precarious to a degree. 
The core of Professor Parker's theory is that "art is 
the imaginative expression of a wish. "(1) Thus he declares 
his adherence to Freudian psychology. krt belongs to the 
sphere of imagination, and the purpose of imagination is to 
provide satisfaction for moods and desires. In support of 
this contention he invokes the name of Freud. There are 
two ways in which wishes may be gratified: (a) the real or 
practical way in which what is wished for is appropriated 
from the environment; and (b) the dream way in which "the 
wish is satisfied by something that occurs entirely within 
myself, within my own mind and body, in the realm of phan- 
tasy."(2) What occurs within the self is, nevertheless, 
believed to be real; the dream mode of satisfaction of a 
wish is as genuine as the other; for the time being, at 
least, the wish is fulfilled. This reality, however, is 
never absolute; a part of the self believes while another 
part disbelieves, and it is this equipoise between belief 
and unbelief, this as if" attitude, which characterises 
those dreams called art. But, whereas ordinary dreams 
exist entirely within the imagination, art dreams assume 
(1) Ibid. p.19. 
(2) Ibid. p.4. 
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sensuous form. "A work of art is born only when imaginat- 
ive vision is wedded to sensuous shape... To be an artist 
always involves being more than a dreamer or seer; it in- 
volves mastery of a material as well; the mere dreamers 
are only half artists... The artist must be able to cre- 
ate, in the external world, something to charm the senses 
as well as to speak to the mind. It is as if the artist 
were not content to realise his wishes in the closed room 
of his imagination, but desires to step out into reality 
and find satisfaction there.(1) iet the artist never does 
.. achieve reality ... he submits the mere shows of things 
to the desires of the mind. He takes the senses into the 
imagination, he does not leave the world of the imagination.n 
The work of art "is a play not of images merely, as in a 
dream, but of sensations." Thus the sense medium is it- 
self a part of the (artist's) dream and an expression of 
his desire.(2) 
Between the dream expressed and a mere dream there is 
a difference: the dream expressed "possesses a poignancy, 
an objectivity, an additional tang of reality, while remain- 
ing nevertheless a dream. Through its connection with the 
sense world, it is partly dissociated from the rest of the 
(1) Cf. p. 299 supra. 
(2) The :analysis of Art, pp.21 -22. 
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self, and so seems to be external, like the colour or sound 
in which it is embodied. It belongs to the outer as well 
as to the inner world; it confronts as; it draws atten- 
tion to itself; we are awake to it, not asleep in it, as 
we are in a dream," and "its purpose is the clarification 
and communication of imagination, with its values. "(1) 
In brief: "rrt, like the dream and many forms of play, 
is a mode of imaginative realisation of desire. This is 
the primary source of its value and the initial motive to 
creation. But in art this impulse is connected with the 
impulse to express and communicate, so that art may be re- 
garded as a mode of expression or language. It is ex- 
pression for the sake of expression, because in the process 
of expression a dream is embodied, a wish satisfied. 
lríoreover, when expression becomes an end in itself, it tends 
to assume a harmonious, delightful form - design. Finally, 
through expression, the dream is clarified and socialised, 
and instead of remaining a purely private possession, be- 
comes the dream of all men and the surcease of superabund- 
ant desire. "(2) 
Throughout professor Parker's whole study, and partic- 
ularly throughout his first chapter, of which the preceding 
(1) 
Ibid. pp.23-24. 
(2) Ibid. p.30. Vide also p.48. 
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is a brief summary, three concepts of vital importance in 
his theory continually recur: "imagination," "reality" and 
"wish." He states "that the imagination itself, including 
all its forms, not excepting art, is no independent auto. - 
nocious thing, functioning according to mechanical laws of 
similarity or contiguity, but is, in a sense, secondary, 
being always under what, without too much misunderstanding, 
we may still venture to call a 'wish.' The imagination 
exists for a purpose, to provide satisfaction for moods and 
desires.. "(l) Wishes, it will be recalled, may be satisfied 
either the "real" way or the "dream" way, by appropriating 
from the environment what is wished for, or by giving way 
to the play of phantasy. The mode of satisfaction is as 
efficient and "genuine" whichever .tray is adopted: for the 
time being, at least, the wish is fulfilled and a state of 
contentment is achieved. In a dream it is "as if" things 
and situations were real; indeed, they must seem to be real, 
or the wish would not be able to fulfil itself in them!(2) 
In accordance with the terms of this hypothesis rrofessor 
Parker maintains that, since works of art are products of 
imagination, the "as if" attitude dominates the appreciation 
(l) 
Ibid. p.3. (For the definition of the term wish, the 




of the normal types of painting and sculpture. In Cézanne's 
landscape, The Poorhouse on the Hill, it is for the specta- 
tor as if the hills and trees were there in reality evoking 
the interests and feelings called forth by real things. 
indeed, he asserts that there is absolutely no test of 
good drawing or painting except the capacity of the artist 
to make people believe in the image which the artist 
creates in the semblance of reality! 
From Professor Parker's use of the term 'imagination' 
it would appear, first, that imagination provides experi- 
ence of reality in an imaginary (as if) way; it creates a 
semblance to reality and yields the satisfaction which real- 
ity normally gives. Thus he argues that the spectator, in 
watching a dancer, enjoys the spectacle fully only when it 
is as if he, too, were dancing; when, in the imagination, 
he moves with the motions of the dancer and experiences 
vicariously her ease and her joy. Matching the dance,, he 
maintains, "is clearly an imaginative experience" - in other 
words, a wish -fulfilment. But, in the second place, imag- 
ination is contrasted with reality. heality is the "prac- 
tical" world from which the necessary appropriations may be 
made in order really to satisfy wishes; whereas imagination 
is an inner world in the semblance of the outer practical 
world. "The artist must be able to create in the external 
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world something to charm the senses as well as to speak to 
the mind. It is as if the artist were not content to real- 
ise his wishes in the closed room of his imagination, but 
desires to step out into reality and find satisfaction there. 
Yet the artist never does ... achieve reality.... He takes 
the senses into the imagination, he does not leave the world 
of imagination. His work remains a show, a make- believe, 
to the end; or rather it makes of reality itself a show. 
it is a play, not of images merely, as in a dream, but of 
sensations.rr(l) Reality here denotes the sensuous physical 
actual world of things and events - the practical life; 
imagination, on the other hand, is the dream world of things 
and events, a world in which things and events are with- 
drawn from the influences and restrictions of practical life 
and physical causation. In the third place, it would 
appear that the work of art, or, at all events, its sensuous 
appearance - while being a bit of reality, a number of sensa- 
tions, is yet, "despite its sensuous side," a piece of 
imaginative experience. The paint and canvas, the objects 
represented, are merely make -believe objects, "only visual 
sensations in the mind of the beholder; they might as well 
be hallucinations. "(2) It will be convenient to discuss 
(1) 
Ibid. pp.21-22. 
(2) ibid. p.22. 
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these three points before proceeding to investigate the 
significance of the term "wish." 
Professor Parker's case is that imagination creates a 
semblance to reality and yields the satisfaction which 
reality normally gives. The first point, then, raises two 
questions: (a) whether the dance as viewed by the spectator 
is, as Professor Parker maintains, only a simulation of 
reality, a make- believe, or whether it is a part of reality 
like any other observed event or situation taking place in 
the outside world; and (b) whether the satisfaction of the 
wishes, which according to him takes place, is a real and 
effective satisfaction or only an imaginary one - a hallucin- 
ation - and whether an imaginary satisfaction effectively 
satisfies the wish or wishes from which the imaginative ex- 
perience is supposed to emanate. The answer to the first 
of these questions (a) is clearly this: that the dance is 
to the spectator a part of reality, a part which is capable 
of being regarded as a work of art or experienced as part 
of the reality called art. It is emphatically not a simu- 
lation of reality, but is itself a part of reality, since 
the spectator could have no awareness of it whatsoever did 
it not exist in terms accessible to sense. There is no 
other sense in which the dance can be said to exist at all 
unless reality be regarded as consisting entirely of art: 
which is absurd. Professor Parker's whole case is founded 
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on the antithesis of reality and imagination. Reality for 
him is the actual; imagination is a substitute, reality 
existing entirely within the self and the offspring of 
deep - seated unconscious wishes. From the dancer's point 
of view, it may be submitted, the dance is likewise a real 
experience, an experience of the reality called life, of 
which dancing is to the dancer a very real element. It is, 
as Professor Parker himself declares, "a satisfaction of 
impulses through occurrences within her own mind and body" 
But why such a satisfaction should be denied the status of 
reality and regarded as possessing "the essential (make - 
believe) character of imagination" is difficult to compre- 
hend, unless the terms "imagination" and "reality" are 
emptied of the commonsense content and given a wholly hypo- 
thetical and arbitrary meaning. rind this, of course, is 
what Professor Parker does. .ill he says in justification 
of his conclusion that the dancer's experience is essenti- 
ally an imaginative experience is that.. "For the moment it is 
as if sne were having her on way, only not through some 
purposive adjustment to her environment, but through action 
within her own self. "! Thus, from the standpoint adopted 




desire to satisfy impulses occurring within the mind and 
body is an imaginative experience, if it sloes not involve 
"purposive adjustment" to the environment or appropriation 
from the environment of that which is essential to the real 
(practical' gratification of the impulse or impulses caus- 
ing the activity. t'or him the essence does not consist in 
physical movements of the body, but in the inner experience 
of which the physical movements are but the overflow into 
the body, and (as is the case with colours in painting) 
might as well be hallucination. yho, asks Professor Park- 
er, has ever set the limits of the mind or the body? - and 
leaves the question at that. Surely the occurrences which 
he alleges take place within the dancer's own mind and body 
must of necessity be dependent upon the physical movements 
of the dance. how else could the occurrences take place 
unless in a dream? - and a dream, he insists, is not art. 
To assert, as he does, that the satisfaction derived by the 
dancer in the act of dancing is a substitute satisfaction 
for some other desired satisfaction, whose real nature is 
hidden from the conscious mind, is merely a wild hypothesis. 
It is not a substitute satisfaction, not a satisfaction 
occurring in the "dream" way, which ought more appropriately 
to be achieved in the "practical" way, but a genuine satis- 
faction of the dancer's impulse to dance. 'Ind this, 
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despite Professor Parker's clever argument, is surely the 
very essence of the art of dancing. , his antithesis of 
reality and imagination is refuted time and again by his 
own expositions. 
The question of satisfaction leads on to the second 
point (b): whether the 'satisfaction' of the unconscious 
wishes is a real and effective satisfaction or only an 
imaginary one, and whether an imaginary satisfaction. can 
effectively dispose of the wish or wishes from which the 
imaginative experience is supposed to emanate. Professor 
Parker states quite definitely that "the artist never does 
achieve reality." This ought to be an adequate answer to 
the query. it is impossible, however, to square this state - 
ment with a previous one, to the effect that the "dream" 
mode of satisfaction of a wish is as genuine as the othe31)' 
The word "genuine" here presumably means real, effective. 
Yet he maintains that the artist never does achieve reality; 
which may fairly be construed to mean that he never does 
achieve adequate satisfaction of his wishes. This, no 
doubt, is perfectly true, as it is probably also true of 
every individual. But, from the point of view of the 




satisfaction of which professor Parker speaks cannot be a 
"genuine" satisfaction at all; it can only be a hallucina- 
tion, a make- believe. li.nd if the satisfaction is make - 
believe, so also, on his hypothesis, is all art, since art 
is "the imaginative satisfaction of. desire. "(l) But here 
Professor Parker is entirely consistent: the work of art 
"remains a show, a make -believe, to the end. "(2) "The pig- 
ments and the canvas are ... physical objects, as real as 
sun and moon... Yet the paint and the canvas are relevant 
to the aesthetic experience only through what can be seen 
of them in the picture; as parts of the aesthetic object, 
they are only visual sensations in the mind of the beholder; 
they might as well be hallucinations." xs long as the 
spectator - and for that matter the artist - believes in 
the presentation, that presentation is a work of art and 
the experience he undergoes is the experience of art. More- 
over, the colours in a picture - for instance, in Vermeer's 
Young Woman with a Jug, which he reproduces - "are the col- 
ours of the woman's face, of her garments, of the casement 
and the map. Now, admittedly, all these things are not 
real; despite the convincing art of the painter they are a 
make- believe, that is all. .nd, notwithstanding; their 
(1) Ibid. p.48. 
(2) Ibid. p.21. 
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intrinsic beauty, the colours are, for aesthetic apprecia- 
tion, constituents of these make- believe objects, nothing 
more. "(1) 
Could any doctrine be further divorced from plain 
fact? Professor Parker reduces art to a state of mind; 
but apparently he overlooks the fact that the state of mind 
could not exist unless the work of art, which is its ex- 
pression, also existed. The expression is as essential to 
the state of mind as the state of mind is to the expression; 
the one could not exist without the other. His position 
is not unlike Croce's. Paint and canvas "might as well be 
hallucinations," merely means of enabling the artist to be- 
hold his own dream steadily and clearly, means of repeating 
experience.(2) It is likewise open to the same objections. 
It implies, for instance, that the work of art is merely a 
copy of what already pre -existed in the mind of the artist - 
a proposition which is as false as it is ridiculous. That 
he does, in fact, hold this view is clear from the follow- 
ing statement. "It (the work of art) is a play; not of 
images, as in a dream, but of sensations. They are chosen 
partly for their ability to embody the dream, but also for 
(1) 
Ibid. p.22. 
(2) Ibid. p.177. 
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their own intrinsic beauty. Thus in a song, like Der 
Erlkönig, the musical tones are merely an embodiment in 
sound of Goethe's ideas as Schubert made them his own; but 
independently, as mere sound, they are an expression of 
vague moods and desires; and the colours in a painting 
are not only the right colours from the point of view of 
representation, but beautiful on their own account, apart 
from any representation. A picture is first of all a 
pattern of expressive colours and lines, just as music is 
first of all an arabesque of beautiful sound. Thus the 
sense medium is itself a part of a dream and an expression 
of the artist's desire. "(1) The italicised words clearly 
indicate that he holds that the work of art is a mere copy 
of a dream (in images) pre- existing in the mind of the 
artist prior to his productive act. This passage, however, 
is worth quoting for another reason: it contains a complete 
refutation of his statement (quoted above) to the effect 
that the colours (of the woman's face, garments,etc.), "not- 
withstanding their intrinsic beauty," are for "aesthetic 
appreciation" constituents of these make- believe objects, 
nothing more. For he states that the musical tones and 
the colours in a painting as mere sound and colour are 
(1) Ibid. p.22. (Present author's italics.) Cf. also: 
"In life aesthetic expression is casual and transient; in 
art it is made permanent for all who can understand its 
language." (p.26.) 
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expressions of "vague moods and desires," and for that 
reason are "beautiful on their own account. "! 
If the work of art is a mere make-believe, it is be- 
cause Professor Parker recognises one type of art and one 
only: representational art - art which is concerned solely 
with the representation of the phenomena of the internal 
world in terms of the external. The work of art, he states, 
must yield a "feeling of reality." Painted hills must 
give the illusion of real hills. In his own words: "There 
is absolutely no test of good drawing or painting except 
the capacity of the artist to make us believe; his work 
may be realistic or highly stylised, either method is good 
as art, so long as it creates an image in which we believe." 
Yet in another connection he declares that "art is never 
reality, nor is it ever mere representation of reality as 
such; it is an expression for the imagination of the values 
of reality. "(1) For Professor Parker the highest :manifes- 
tations of art are those which generate in the benolder the 
strongest feelings of reality, and tuie best work of art is 
that which engenders in the spectator the strongest belief 
in his experience regarded as an experience of reality. 




creates in the spectator's mind an interesting dream of 
nature. "(1) If these statements are true, if art must 
yield a vivid feeling of reality, it is difficult to under- 
stand precisely what Professor Parker means by the term 
"reality." On the one hand he has denied that art is 
ever reality; on the other, he asserts that art must 
yield a vivid feeling of reality. 
There appears to be only one interpretation: reality 
is the actual world of things and events, the "practical" 
world. "Ii work of art," he states,(2) "is a fragment of 
sensuous experience, given meaning for imagination and be- 
come an image of desire." If, then, reality means the 
practical, sensuous world, there is no valid reason why the 
work of art should not be regarded as a fragment of that 
world, and the experience derived from contact with art, as 
an experience of that reality. For Professor Parker, how- 
ever, the work of art can be no part of reality, because 
reality is its subject -matter, and its raison d'être is to 
simulate reality. To regard the experience of art as an 
"imaginative" experience - a substitute wish - fulfilment - 
is to do a monstrous injustice not only to art, but also to 




a very valuable part of life itself. It makes of art a 
fake reality, a secondhand experience of reality; and it 
makes of that part of life which is lived in the presence 
of art a sham and a delusion. The work of art is the con- 
crete embodiment of a state of mind and body, it is the 
focal point of lived experience and the means of enlarging 
that experience. As such, it is a part of man's physical 
and spiritual environment just as much as trees and fields, 
sun, moon and stars. A large part - perhaps, indeed, the 
most significant part - of man's environment is a man -made 
reality; to call his reactions to that immense field 
"imaginative," a semblance to reality, is to strip reality 
of the accumulated wealth of centuries of human effort and 
creation, and to reduce it to a mere "state of nature." 
In a word, reality for Professor Parker is nothing but 
"nature in the raw." Likewise, for Freud "Art does not 
seek to be anything else but illusion. Save in the case 
of a few people who are, one might say, obsessed by art, it 
never dares to make any attacks on the realm of reality. "(l)! 
The utter inadequacy- of the psycho- analytic concept of 
reality to which Professor Parker has committed himself has 
been noted by the fa.144rer Dean of St. Paul's in a recent 
lecture delivered before the Institute of Medical 
(1) New Introductory Lectures, p.205. 
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Psychology.(1) In this lecture he states that "the pre- 
judice that nature is 'real' while nothing else is, rests 
upon the dogmatic assumption that sense experience is the 
only contact we have with reality. In fact, the procedure 
of psycho- analysis in this matter of religion appears to be 
an elaborate example of the fallacy of 'begging the ques- 
tion.' Religion is represented as the product of the 
Pleasure Principle which succeeds in covering reality with 
fantasy. But it is assumed that the nature of reality is 
known, at least that it is known by the psycho- analyst." 
ilere the Dean quotes from nr. Lawrence Hyde (The Learned 
Knife, p.129), who states in reference to psycho -analysts, 
that "Their pages are filled with endless descriptions of 
the ways in which the pleasure principle is capable of 
gratifying its desires. But the nature of Reality is 
simply taken by them for granted. All we can find about 
it is that it is neither art nor religion, but something 
which contrives at the same to be 'actual facts' and 'the 
pressure of education in the widest sense.' Ün turning, 
however, to the actual analysis performed by these psycho- 
logists, one has little difficulty in seeing that what they 
really mean by reality is the world as it is presented to 
(1) 
"Psychology and the Future of Religion," published in 
Psychology and :Modern Problems, (Ed. Hadfield), pp.223 -225. 
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the consciousness of the unimaginative, unaesthetic, mater- 
ialistic type of man. It is to this world that the patient 
is called upon to adapt himself." 
"It would seem," continues the Dean, "that many expon- 
ents of the psycho- analytic theory of religion and art have 
never troubled to ask themselves how they arrive at the con - 
cept of reality which they assume, and have never understood 
what philosophy is all about, or why there is such a thing 
as the philosophical problem. The real point of contro- 
versy between those who believe that religion is a pathway 
to reality and those who do not is precisely the question: 
What is reality? ixrt, no less than religion, has claimed 
to be something more than a merely subjective reaction or 
the expression of purely private emotions. The great art- 
ists, poets and composers have believed themselves to be in 
contact with reality, and to be not only creators, but in- 
terpreters; and religion has promised to open the eyes of 
the spirit to the supreme Reality which is behind the every 
appearance of things. The conception of reality with which 
the psycho- analytic theorists on religion work excludes 
from the outset all these claims. It is not surprising, 
then, that the conclusion is easily drawn that they are 
nothing but the play of fantasy." 
To discuss the question from a philosophic point of 
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view would be an irrelevant undertaking here. It has been 
claimed, and with some justice, that art is no mere "simula- 
tion of reality," but is itself a part of reality, philoso- 
phically as well as psychologically speaking. " spontane- 
ous creation of mind," states Santayana,(1) "can be more 
striking and living than any reality, or any abstraction of 
realities. The artist can invent a form which, by its ad- 
aptation to the imagination, lodges there, and becomes a 
point of reference for all observations, and a standard of 
naturalness and beauty. A type may be introduced to the 
mind suddenly, by the chance presentation of a form that by 
its intrinsic impressiveness and imaginative coherence ac- 
quires that preëminence which custom, or the mutual rein- 
forcement of converging experiences, ordinarily gives to 
empirical percepts... This method of originating types is 
what we ordinarily describe as artistic creation." 
The term "wish" as used by Professor Parker is like- 
wise ambiguous and unsatisfactory. For a definition of the 
term the reader is referred to Professor F. B. Holt's book, 
The Freudian Wish, from which the following excerpt is taken. 
"This 'wish,' which as a concept Freud does not analyse, 
includes all that would commonly be so classed, and also 
whatever would be called impulse, tendency, desire, purpose, 
(1) 
The Sense of Beauty, p.180. 
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attitude and the like; not including, however, any emotion- 
al components thereof... An exact definition of the 'wish' 
is that it is a course of action which some mechanism of 
the body is set to carry out, whether it actually does so 
or does not. All emotions, as well as the feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure, are separable from the 'wishes'... 
The wish is any purpose or project for a course of action, 
whether it is being merely entertained by the mind or is 
being actually executed... We shall do well if we consider 
this wish to be, as in fact it is, dependent on a motor 
attitude of the physical body, which goes over into overt 
action and conduct when the wish is carried into execu- 
tion."(1) In no place does Professor Parker attempt to 
define the concept; he uses it as though it possessed a 
clear -cut meaning and connotation, although, as Professor 
Ducasse shows,(2) it may mean quite a number of different 
things in the analysis of art which he propounds. 
In the first place there is the artist's wish that ex- 
pression shall take place rather than not take place. This 
wish, however, has clearly nothing to do with what is to be 
expressed. From Professor Parker's point of view it is the 
wish that a dream will find appropriate expression. iut it 
(1) 
The Freudian Aish, pp. 
(2) 
The Philosophy of .63-66. 
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is not this wish that is expressed; the "wish" that, accor- 
ding to Professor Parker's theory, is expressed is the 
"wish" which emanates from some unconscious motivation. 
The wish that a "course of action" be carried out is not 
expressed; it is indulged, satisfied practically, just as 
the wish to eat food is satisfied by eating. In this sense 
of the term, then, art cannot be defined as "the imaginat- 
ive expression of a wish." The wish that a "wish" shall 
find appropriate aesthetic satisfaction cannot itself be 
satisfied aesthetically; it can be satisfied one way and 
one only, namely, practically. in the second place, there 
is the wish that expression shall be complete and unimpeded; 
there is the wish implicit in every creative act, that the 
"ecstatic moments" may endure as long as 
is 
there 
is the wish that the appropriate colours shall be found and 
the right form achieved. xll these are wishes entering 
into the productive artistic situation, and for the same 
reason as that already stated, none of these wishes can be 
expressed aesthetically; they can only be expressed 
practically. 
what, then, it may be asked, does Professor parker 
mean when he defines art as the imaginative expression of 
a wish? If he accepts (as it must be presumed he does) 
Professor Holt's view that a wish "is any purpose or project 
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for a course of action dependent on a motor attitude of the 
physical body," he fails to show how this purpose or course 
of action can be expressed in any but a practical way. 
Supposing, for instance, the "artist" is motivated by a 
wish for love, then the "expression" of that wish would 
take the form of an imagined situation in which his love 
was satisfied in a practical way; that is to say, he would 
not imagine a situation in which love was only imaginatively 
satisfied. In other words, the "artist" would imagine a 
real situation in which he had his own way. But this, it 
should be noted, is to relinquish his status as an artist 
and to become a dreamer like any other imaginative layman. 
To retain his status as an artist he must concern himself 
(perhaps imaginatively in the first instance) with artistic 
situations, composed not of "real" objects, but symbolic 
objects so arranged as to satisfy his sensibility, not mere- 
ly to produce an illusion of reality. Ind this again is 
to satisfy his wish (the wish to produce a work of art) in 
a practical way. 
The distinction, then, which Professor Parker makes 
between the dream way and the practical way of achieving 
the satisfaction of wishes is entirely erroneous; there is, 
in fact, only one way of satisfying wishes and that is the 
practical way - by appropriating from the environment what 
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is necessary or by altering the environment in a manner 
appropriate to the satisfaction of the wish. If the wish 
is for love, then the appropriate satisfaction can be gained 
only by appropriating from the environment the requisite 
means; if the wish is to paint a picture about love, then 
the appropriate satisfaction is to be found only in paint- 
ing the picture. Both are practical satisfactions. The 
satisfaction of a wish may occur really or else it ma, only 
be imagined to occur. 
When analysed, Professor Parker's theory of wish-ful- 
filment by the imagination turns out to be no genuine satis- 
faction at all, but merely a process of imagining that the 
wish is genuinely satisfied - which, as Professor Ducasse 
points out, is quite another thing! To imagine that the 
wish is genuinely satisfied may dispel the wish, but its 
dissipation cannot be called its satisfaction. It is the 
sublimation of the wish. tend in this sublimation, what is 
sought or wished for is not really achieved; something else 
is achieved and enjoyed, namely, the act of dreaming as 
distinguished from the situation dreamt. The wish which 
is satisfied, not fictitiously in the dream, but really by 
the act of dreaming, is simply the wish to dreaia,whereby the 
original wish is sublimated. 
But there are further weak points in Professor Parker's 
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armour, and it will be worth while drawing attention to them 
before leaving this topic. Although again and again he is 
at pains to drive home his argument that art is the imagina- 
tive expression of a wish, he frequently declares in import- 
ant passages that art is also the expression or "embodiment" 
of feelings and emotions. For instance: "What, then, can 
be the truth which all artists say they are seeking? We 
can answer this question only if we keep in mind the funda- 
mental nature of art as the expression of the imagination, 
and remember that the imagination itself exists for the sake 
of satisfying some wish or emotion. Emotion is, therefore, 
the basic thing in art, and what the painter and the sculp- 
tor are trying to do, above all things else, is to communi- 
cate the way they feel about things." . The artist "is 
superior to the common man only in that his ways of feeling 
are new and powerful, and that he can communicate them to 
others. "(1) Again he states: "sut the artist, as aiming 
always at the expression of feeling, is not interested even 
in the primary qualities of nature for their own sake, but 
only in so far as they are embodiments of emotion. "(2 ) 
(1) The Analysis of Art, pp.69 -70. (Present author's italics) 
(2) 
Ibid. pp.78 -79. (Present author's italics.) 
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Other instances could be given,(1) where he unwittingly 
comes into conflict with Holt's definition of 'wish' and 
with his own confident pronouncements. It cannot be that 
he regards feelings, emotions and wishes as identical psy- 
chological entities. Yet that is the only apparent expla- 
nation of his blunder. "till emotions," as Professor Holt 
points out, "as well as the feelings of pleasure and dis- 
pleasure, are separable frail]. the 'wishes.'" 
So far the discussion of .Professor Parker's theory has 
been limited to the "content" of art. His discussion of 
"form" must now be examined, since he maintains that content 
and form "are inseparable not only in fact but in origin "... 
and "come from precisely the same source., from desire. "(2) 
He begins with a curious statement: "It is a remark- 
able fact, challenging to the curiosity of every student of 
art, that not only is design a universal characteristic of 
all art, but that its fundamental structure is the same 
everywhere. If, for illustration, you place alongside of 
(l)E.g. 
"Consider any work of art as an example of pure de- 
sign, and a more careful consideration will show that it is 
an expression of ibeling as well," p.33; also p.26 and p.178, 
where he states that "art is never - or seldom - the simple 
expression of emotion, but rather an expression of emotion 
as transformed by thought." 
(2) Ibid. p.33. Cf. Herbert, S., The Unconscious in Life 
and Art, pp.159 -190, where a similar view is expressed. 
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each other the most diverse examples of the sculptor's art: 
works proceeding from antiquity and modernity ... different 
as they are, you will find them all alike in respect to 
their underlying design. Or if you choose a series of 
paintings or buildings or oriental carpets or musical com- 
positions or poems; or even if you select at random for 
comparison a statue, a painting, a poem, a sonata, a beauti- 
ful vase; the same observation would hold: all these so 
diverse works would be the same in form." He continues: 
"Of course, when I say that the form of all art is the same, 
I refer only to the most abstract aspects of form" not "with 
the characteristic or unique quality of any species of form 
or of any individual form ... despite the varieties of form, 
there is a common structure, law, or pattern in all aesthet- 
ic form. "(1) This statement is curious, because few people 
would subscribe to it. It is a generalisation, the very 
comprehensiveness of which renders it extremely suspect and 
totally unsuited as the foundation for a dogmatic hypothesis. 
But it will be as well to examine his case. 
..esthetic form, he states, is "the form which a thing 
should have if it is to be in fact the imaginative satis- 
faction of desire. "(2) It is "desirable form" and is 
(1) Ibid. pp.31-32. 
(2) Ibid. p.48. 
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reducible to six principles: (1) the principle of organic 
unity, or unity in variety; (2) the principle of the theme; 
(3) the principle of thematic variation; (4) balance; 
(b) the principle of hierarchy; and (6) evolution. 
(1) The principle of organic unity means that each 
element in a work of art is necessary to its value, that 
it contains no elements that are not thus necessary and 
that all that are needful are there. This unity, however, 
is the unity of a counterpart within the experience of the 
beholder and presumably the artist; it is the embodiment 
of the artist's imagination and the spectator's as well; 
and it is the master principle of aesthetic form, for all 
the other principles serve it. 
(2) First among these is the principle of the theme, 
Taine's idée mére. In every complex work of art there is 
at least one preeminent shape, colour, line, melodic pattern 
or meaning, in which is concentrated the characteristic 
value of the whole; this is the theme - the work of art 
in little. 
(3) The mere statement of the theme, however, is not 
sufficient; it must be elaborated and embroidered. And 
one of the prominent ways of doing so is to repeat it with 
a difference - by transposition, inversion and so on. 
(4) Balance is equality of opposing or contrasting 
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elements. It is a species of aesthetic unity. Generally 
speaking, painting exemplifies three types of balance: 
horizontal, perpendicular, and radial or diagonal - between 
the upper and lower portions, and between what may be 
roughly called the corners. 
(5) Many works of art, however, are superficially con- 
sidered rhythmical rather than balanced. But rhythm is 
really built upon two fundamental aesthetic forms, namely, 
thematic repetitions and balance. Every rhythm is a motion 
of waves, all of relatively constant or lawfully varying 
shape and temporal and spatial span, with balancing crests 
and troughs. When balance appears to be replaced by rhythm; 
balance is nevertheless present, only it is not the simple 
type of balance, but balance as an element in the complex 
structure of rhythm. This type is found in "open" composi- 
tions where the ordinary mode of balance is rejected. 
(6) The final type of unity Professor Parker calls 
evolution: by which he means "the unity of a process when 
the earlier parts determine the later, and all together 
create a total meaning." The course of a well - fashioned 
story is a typical example. Or, in the sphere of plastic 
, art, any line which appears to have a beginning, middle and 
end, and any composition of figures in which the spectator 
is led from one figure or group of figures to another; for 
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there, although the figures be physically static, apprecia- 
tion of them is a process in time, and through the process 
the meaning of the whole is evolved. El Greco's paintings, 
Professor Parker thinks, provide the best illustrations 
of evolution. 
Evolution, though allied with rhythm, is not the same 
as rhythm. For, unless it is combined with evolution, 
there is no obvious development, no tendency toward a goal. 
Furthermore, a distinction must be drawn between dramatic 
and non -dramatic evolution. In the former there is present 
an element of overshadowing importance, the climax or goal; 
in the non -dramatic type this element is lacking. Thematic 
variation, balance and evolution are the fundamental and 
irreducible types of aesthetic unity. The principle of 
hierarchy is not so much a mode of organic unity like these 
types, but rather a species of organisation of elements 
in each of these modes. 
Professor Parker's analysis is nothing if not ingeni- 
ous, but it suffers from a strong academic bias and arbit- 
rariness, and it abounds in nebulous conceptions. when he 
states that aesthetic form is "desirable form," he says 
nothing affording the slightest enlightenment. The state- 
ment is a mere truism. His analysis is equally nebulous 
and follows for the most part those "rules" practised and 
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formulated by the academic writers and painters of the nine- 
teenth century, out of which have evolved the rather vague 
conceptions of artistic structure known as the "principles 
of composition." It is, of course, unnecessary to point 
out that these "principles" sprang from an exclusive study 
of classical models, which, after all, belong to one of the 
great world art styles, and which, for good or for ill, has 
dominated practically the whole history of European art and 
the speculationsof most European aesthetic philosophers 
until modern times. Classical form is essentially beauti- 
ful form, and, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, 
art and beauty are not identical phenomena. 
A theory of art which regards all art as the manifesta- 
tion par excellence of beauty is a theory whose limitations 
render it totally inadequate to explain the phenomena which 
constitute its subject -matter. It is true that a work of 
art must have unity, a theme, balance and so forth; but all 
these terms, despite Professor Parker's ingenious analysis, 
are so utterly vague that it is quite impossible to demon- 
strate the existence in art of the phenomena they are sup- 
posed to denote. How is it possible, for instance, to say 
with any degree of finality what makes for the unity of 
iviiehelangelo's "Last Judgment" in the Sistine Chapel, or 
El Greco's "The Conversion of St. hïaurice" in the Escorial? 
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What are their respective themes? What gives each its 
balance? Such questions, it may be submitted; are un- 
answerable. Formal analysis is almost useless as a mode of 
criticism; psychological analysis is speculative; ontogen- 
etic analysis is scientifically impossible. In a word, 
scientific criticism is as yet an unrealised ideal, and un- 
til such terms as Professor Parker employs are scientific- 
ally defined, their use only leads to confusion and empty 
polemics. 
But Professor Parker is not afraid to enunciate prin- 
ciples and to demonstrate their connection with his theory 
that aesthetic form is precisely the form that things must 
possess in order to constitute that imaginative satisfaction 
of desire which is art. Not only does he set himself up 
as a critic as well as a theorist - and this is a great mis- 
take, as Mr. Wilenski maintains - but he uses his terms 
without defining them, thereby obscuring his meaning and 
embarrassing his reader. His use of the word 'rhythm,' for 
instance, is challengeable; it certainly would not be accep- 
ted by Professor Sonnenschein nor by Professor Percy Gardner, 
both of whom are agreed as to the lack of propriety in 
applying the term to static art.(1) Furthermore, he appar- 
ently does not recognise the distinction between the 
(1) Vide Sonnenschein E. A. Rhythm, p.16 and p.202. , y   °, 
359 
physical organic unity of the work of art and its psycholog- 
ical unity, or between its physical organic evolution and 
psychological evolution. The perception of the work of art 
is not always governed, as he appears to assume, by its 
structural character; perception may be determined solely 
by the immediate apprehension of its vital subjective prin- 
ciple, by its psychological "togetherness," its affective 
wholeness, its symbolic unity. When he says,(1) "Notice 
how we do not view the picture (Inter Artes et Naturam by 
Puvis de Chavannes) from a vertical central axis, but 
rather from left to right, taking each group of figures in 
turn as an element in a rhythmically disposed sequence of 
filled and empty spaces "(2) he is merely stating what he 
thinks happens when he looks at the picture. The fact is 
that the ways of perceiving the same picture are infinite; 
they are not reducible to definite modes. This has been 
clearly demonstrated by Professor G. T. Buswell,(3) who 
examined under exact experimental conditions the eye move- 
ments of subjects in the presence of works of art. His 
(1)Cp.cit.p.42. 
(2) Cf. p.43: "in (El Greco's Crucifixion)... we follow an 
intensely dramatic movement from the lower to the upper 
part of the picture." 
(3) How People Look at Pictures. 
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findings expose a common fallacy upon which many glowing 
appreciations have been founded. That Professor Parker 
should proceed to elaborate his thesis on such doubtful - 
not to say demonstrably false - assumptions, reveals a 
weakness in his critical acumen that ill accords with his 
comfortable assurance and easy style. 
In order that art may achieve its purpose two condi- 
tions, according to Professor Parker, must be satisfied: 
first, the utter plasticity of the materials of art; and 
second, the isolation of the experience in which the wish 
is fulfilled. These conditions are perfectly realised 
only in the dream and in those voluntary constructions of 
the imagination which, embodying dreams, are called works 
of art. The materials of the dream are images, things 
freed from the laws and conditions of reality, perfectly 
plastic to the dreamer's desire. It follows that, since 
a work of art is a dream objectified and clarified, it is 
the translation of images into concrete substance. In 
Professor Parker's opinion the conditions of complete wish - 
fulfilment are the exact counterpart of the principle of 
organic unity (the master principle of aesthetic form) and 
the principle of organic unity is itself a derivative of 
the wish. This completes his thesis: the remainder of 
his book is, for the most part, concerned with its 
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amplification and elucidation. 
Two points call for special notice. In the first 
place, his statement that the materials(1) of art (the items 
or data in which dreams are expressed) are images, perfectly 
plastic to the artist's desire, is not only at variance 
with other statements of his (already noted), to the effect 
that art is the expression of feelings and emotions, but it 
is also at variance with the psychological facts. In the 
second place, the statement implies that the work of art is 
merely a copy of the images, which, in his view, are images 
representing the wish fulfilled - "as if" they were reality. 
Here once again it must be urged in criticism of this view 
that, even if it were true that the "materials" of art are 
images, he has failed to take into account the impossibility 
of copying exactly an image of reality (using the term in 
his own sense as meaning nature); it is only in so far as 
the image is an image already made to conform to the demands 
of a material medium that it is possible to copy an image;(2) 
and, as has been emphasised in an earlier chapter, a copy 
(1) From the context it is clear that the word "materials" 
here means content. 
(2) If, for example, the image comprised a group of coloured 
bottles or a bowl of fruit, and the artist's medium were 
charcoal or red chalk, it would be impossible to copy it 
exactly. 
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of such an image, apart from the psychological question of 
the relevance of images to creative procedure, is bound to 
differ in various important ways from the original. But, 
according to Professor Parker's own account of the nature 
of art, the image already modified in terms of the artist's 
medium would not be an image of reality (since all art is 
illusion), and ipso facto could not form part of the materi- 
als of art at all! 
His statement that the conditions of complete wish - 
fulfilment are the exact counterpart of the principle of 
organic unity could be regarded as probably true only by 
construing the term "wish" in a sense radically different 
from that upon which he seems to proceed. That is to say, 
it could be regarded as probably true if by the term "wish" 
were meant the desire to paint rather than not to paint, 
for then the wish would be to achieve a pictorial arrange- 
ment which was the formal equivalent of a valuable psychic 
experience, and the images (provided the artist worked by 
their aid) would be images which had already been moulded_ 
to the demands of his medium.(1) 
(1) This statement requires qualification. The fulfilment 
of this wish would not necessarily comply with Professor 
Parker's architectural notion of form. For form, contrary 
to his claim, does not manifest everywhere the same funda- 
mental structure and is not founded upon demonstrable ab- 
stract rules or principles: it is the offspring of the 
artist's individual mind and sensibility and of the spirit 
of the period in which he lives and works. 
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hgain, his statement that design(1) is a universal 
characteristic of all art means no more than that all ob- 
jects have form. But to assert that all form reveals the 
same fundamental structure implies an experience and know- 
ledge of art that could not be encompassed within the 
limits of a single lifetime of travel, study and research. 
The assertion may, therefore, be dismissed as unworthy of 
serious discussion. 
What Professor Parker apparently means when he says 
that the conditions of complete wish -fulfilment are the ex- 
act counterpart of the principle of organic unity is that 
since every psychic experience is bound to have a beginning 
and an end, is bound to cohere, the formal expression of 
that experience, provided it is complete and precise, is 
bound also to manifest unity in the arrangement of its data. 
This may be granted. But the experiences from which art 
springs are wishes, and wisnes are always manifested in or 
are accompanied by images representing ideal satisfactions. 
So, in applying his theory, it follows that a dream in which 
this ideal satisfaction is achieved and objectively expressed 
in sensuous form is a work of art, and as such is bound to 
be an organic unity. This, however, does not prove his 
contention that the unity of the dream experience determines 
(l) 
he uses the word 'design' as a synonym for form. 
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the unity of the form assumed by the work of art; it merely 
begs the question by assuming or implying that the images 
form a unified constellation, which, if translated into 
sensuous terms, would constitute an organic unity. .knd 
from Professor Parker's point of view an organic unity is 
merely "desirable form," an organisation of dream items 
freely constructed by the imagination "under the dominion of 
a wish." It entirely ignores the artist's sensibility to 
form per se and the influence of material upon his work and 
experience; so that his fundamental hypothesis, that art is 
the imaginative expression of a wish, and his theory of form 
must be rejected as not only unsupportable but fallacious. 
vLany of the objections which have been put forward in 
criticism of Professor Parker's theory are mainly attribut- 
able to his acceptance of psycho- analytic postulates and 
preconceptions as to the nature of artistic productivity. 
The wish- fulfilment theory when analysed reveals inconsist- 
encies and ambiguities, which render it useless as a founda- 
tion of a scientific investigation of artistic activity and 
phenomena. The term "wish" itself is ambiguous; Freud 
himself, Roger Fry has pointed out,(l) takes liberties with 
his own definition, and is inconsistent in his use of the 
term. Further, any theory of art which fails to distinguish 
(l) 
The Artist and Psycho- Analysis, Hogarth Essays, p.17. 
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between imagination which has to do with wishes (in the 
Freudian sense of the term, i.e. mainly sexual) and imagina- 
tion which has to do with the production of original ob- 
jects, or between images of "real" objects (objects not 
present to sense) and images of potential future objects 
not yet in existence, displays a crucial psychological o- 
mission, which renders it totally inadequate to account for 
the existence of art. Such an omission is one of the fatal 
psychological blunders of Professor Parker. Other defects 
could be shown - for instance, no explanation is offered 
(nor could be on his postulates) of the phenomenon of style, 
which constitutes the vital qualities of form and line(1) 
but it was mainly with his fundamental ideas that the pre- 
ceding examination was concerned. 
III. 
There is one aspect of the psycho- analytic theory of 
art which is of peculiar importance because of the place it 
holds in the general Freudian theory of mental processes - 
the theory of symbolism. It will be recalled that 
(l) His only reference to style shows that he has not under- 
stood its meaning: "It is the theme which gives to life, 
as well as to art, what we call style, distinctive pattern, 
and clarity." ibid. p.54. Distinctive pattern and 
clarity, indeed! 
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symbolism is regarded as a general characteristic of the 
functioning of the human mind,(1) whereby libidinous ten- 
dencies find an outlet from behind the screen of conscious- 
ness and attain symbolic (imaginative) satisfaction on the 
conscious level. "The artist," states Freud, "understands 
how to elaborate his daydreams so that they lose that per- 
sonal note which grates upon strange ears... he knows, 
too, how to modify them sufficiently so that their origin 
in prohibited sources is not easily detected." 
It is important to be clear about the meaning of the 
(1) "Now the unconscious is the region of symbolism par ex- 
cellence, and wherever we have regression into the uncon- 
scious there we find symbolism at play. In order, there- 
fore, to understand the working of the unconscious mind we 
must first of all free ourselves from the habit of judging 
it by the canons of logic, but must learn rather to attach 
full value to symbolic thinking. Symbolic reference has 
the same meaning and value for the unconscious as logical 
thought has for the fully developed conscious personality. 
The difficulty of making this distinction is the great 
stumbling -block for all those who for the first time encoun- 
ter the problem of the unconscious. The unconscious seems 
absurd and meaningless only if we apply to it rational 
standards brought from the conscious. Judging it from 
the rational point of view we naturally find it wanting. 
It is as if we were to try and appraise a picture by its 
appeal to our logical faculty. Symbolism has a value all 
its own and must be appreciated on its own merits as a 
fundamental activity of man." Herbert, S., The Unconscious 
in Life and Art, p.167. 
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word 'sy mbol.'(1) A symbol is a "Thing regarded b y general 
consent as naturally typifying or representing or recalling 
something by possession of analogous qualities or by associa- 
tion in fact or thought: a mark or character taken as the 
conventional sign of some object or idea or process... "(2) 
This sense of the term covers a wide field. It includes 
all symbols used in mathematics, chemistry, musical nota- 
tion, shorthand, etc. Symbols of this kind are fixed con- 
ventions and have the same meaning for all who employ them. 
They are signs whose meaning is apprehended by the rational 
intellect; they point beyond themselves to something extrin- 
sic. 
There is, however, another kind of symbol distinguished 
by the emotional associations with which it is invested - 
the emblem. The cross, for instance, is the emblem as well 
as the symbol of Christianity. Certain mystical or emotion- 
al qualities appear to belong to emblematic symbols in the 
same way as scent belongs to a rose. The swastika is to 
the mass of the German people an emblem of Hitlerian policy 
and ideals; to the French it is a symbol of aggressive 
(1) 
For a careful analysis of the term see Jung's 
Psychological Types, pp.601 -610. 
(2) Concise Oxford Dictionary. See also Pfister, The Psy- 
cho- Analytic Method, pp.273 -302. 
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militarism. The heart shape is the emblem as well as the 
symbol of love. Both these types of symbol have a public 
significance or character and may conveniently be termed 
"public "(1) symbols. 
There are other types of symbol less easy to differ- 
entiate, and because of their esoteric character they may 
conveniently be classed as "private." The private symbol 
does not point beyond itself, does not - to borrow an idea 
from Sir William laitchell - does not express itself as in a 
casket, but is itself the personal symbol made visible and. 
tangible - "c'est une manière d'organisme vivant, et en qui 
nous sentons la chaleur de la vie. "(2) Constable's land- 
scapes, for instance, are symbols of his affective and crit- 
ical reactions towards the English landscape; they are the 
symbols of his private reactions to a public possession. 
But they are also public symbols to the extent that their 
significance is capable of being apprehended and shared 
publicly; and that is precisely to the extent that it is 
possible for a plurality of sensitive people to experience 
them at the same time, thereby sharing Constable's meaning 
as well as finding in his symbol a meaning expressed which 
has remained mute and inarticulate. 
(1) Corresponding to Jung's "Semiotic:" Psychological Types, 
p.601. 
(2) Baudouin, C., Psychanalyse de l'art, p.221. 
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It is therefore possible theoretically to distinguish 
between fixed conventional symbols and emblems, and those 
private visible and tangible constructions, which appear to 
be embodiments of a vital principle like a living organism. 
The field of art is obviously that of the private 
symbol. The work of art has an organic life of its own. 
It is the living symbol of a vital experience; it is a 
fragment of life itself brought to rest in sensuous material 
From the psychological point of view a symbol, as 
Baudouin points out,(1) is a system not of two terms like 
-the allegory, but a system of several items. It is always 
a concretion of affectively significant items; a general 
emotional tone suffuses the whole, linking one item with 
another in such a manner as to mean the total affective 
experience of which it is the visible and tangible sign. 
In Baudouin's view a symbol is "la représentation d'un 
complexe, c'est la projection - comme sur un écran - du 
dynamisme du complexe sur le plan statique de l'image. "(2) 
A further point: The items of a symbol may assume 
different forms; they may assume the recognisable forms 
of the ordinary corporeal world as in the case of Constableb 






generally; they may assume quite arbitrary or "abstract" 
(subjective- ideal) forms as, for instance, in the more 
recent compositions of Picasso and in many of the "abstract" 
paintings of modern times; or they may assume forms 
which are combinations of subjective abstractions and 
physical appearances as in the so- called Surréaliste art. 
The representational symbol, it should be observed, is 
not the same as the symbol which possesses a representa- 
tional value. The representational symbol is first and 
foremost a representation, a likeness; it stands for or 
symbolises something else. The symbol which possesses 
a representational value is not primarily a representation 
of a "real" object, though it may be so incidentally; 
it is characterised by its pronounced emphasis of some- 
thing other than representational truth and accuracy. 
In other words, what it represents is not phenomenal 
character but psychological character. Symbols of the 
"abstract" type may be abstractions from "integral "(1) 
visual experience or they may be pure subjective abstrae- 
tions emanating from the deepest recesses of the mind. 
(1) The term is used by Herbert Read, Art Now, p.77. 
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A psycho -analytic symbol is a disguised wish- fulfil- 
ment,(l) "la représentation d'un complexe, "`2) as Baudouin 
declares. The work of art is the symbolic manifestation 
of deep - seated libidinous drives residing in the artist's 
unconscious mind, the libidinous forces having been "trans- 
ferred" pr "displaced" from the real object of desire and 
centred in the symbol. The symbol, it should be noted, 
however, is not a representational symbol; psychologically 
it is not the visible likeness of an object or situation, 
but the symbolic manifestation of "set" unconscious desires 
and motivations, which present to the conscious(3) mind of 
the artist a concatenation of affectively relevant images 
all suffused with the same affect, but varying in their 
(l) 
Of. Pfister, Oskar, The Psycho- Analytic Method, p.274. 
"I as that provisionally the expression 'symbol' be all- 
owed to apply to all events in which a symbol represents 
the pictorial representation of an idea related by content 
but still aiming at something else ... : under symbol 
understand provisionally the veiled,'masked expression of a 
thought in a phantastic form which contains an analogy." 
Also p.278: "The symbol includes not only reality as it is. 
It embraces all possible characteristic elements borrowed 
from reality, also such as correspond to our wishes. On a 
basis of analogies existing in reality, the symbol makes a 
comparison in which the traits which are undecided in real- 
ity are decided according to the wish." Passim. 
(2) 
Baudouin, G., Psychanalyse de l'art, p.221. 
(3) 
By what mechanism this is achieved psycho- analysis 
gives no clue. 
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affective significance or stress. In psycho -analytic 
terms the symbol is primarily a "condensation," the items 
of which vary in importance according to their affective 
significance at any given moment. It is a synthesis, the 
act par excellence of creative imagination, "le mode par 
lequel la vie intérieure se reconstruit et se renouvelle 
sans cesse. "(1) 
The work of art is a private symbol; but it is a pri- 
vate symbol with a public aspect. For, according to psy- 
cho- analytic theory, especially the theory of Jung, many 
wishes, especially those emanating from the primitive sexual 
level, are common to all mankind, and are supported by sym- 
bols which possess a universal significance (social 
symbols).(2) Hence the artist's symbol is both private 
(1) 
Ibid. p.225. 
(2) "The living symbol shapes and formulates an essential 
unconscious factor, and the more generally this factor pre- 
vails, the more general is the symbol; for in every soul 
it touches an associated chord. Since on the one hand the 
symbol is the best possible expression of what is still un- 
known ... it must proceed from the most complex and differ- 
entiated contemporary mental atmosphere. But since, on the 
other hand, the living symbol must embrace and contain that 
which relates a considerable group of men for such an effect 
to be within its power, it must contain just that which may 
be common to a large group of men, hence this can never be 
the most highly differentiated or the highest attainable, 
since only the very few can attain to or understand it; but 
it must be something that is still so primitive that its 
omnipresence stands beyond all doubt. Only when the symbol 
comprises this something, and brings it to the highest 
possible expression has it any general efficacy." Jung, 
op. cit., p.604. 
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and public, personal and impersonal, the dream of the art- 
ist and of mankind objectified and clarified. "L'art 
s'efforce de généraliser constamment à toutes les régions 
de l'esprit - y compris les plus hautes.... L'art s'effor- 
ce de faire vibrer à l'unisson, dans un symbole donné, 
toutes les couches superposées de l'esprit: l'idée et 
l'image, la pensée et le sentiment, l'aspiration supérieure 
et l'instinct adoptent le même rhythme et confondent un 
instant leurs démarches... Le symbole ainsi conçu est 
une construction, qui, certes, s'inspire du symbole spon- 
tané, qui même adhère constamment à lui, mais qui en pro- 
longe singulièrement l'étendue et la portée... Le symbole 
de l'art établit, entre les diverses régions de l'esprit, 
une harmonie qui n'existait pas avant lui. "(1) 
The psycho- analytic view of art as symbolism is open 
to three principal criticisms. In the first place it is 
no more than an ingenious hypothesis founded upon assump- 
tions which are highly speculative and vulnerable. A sym- 
bol is a condensation of images or representations which 
are the product of libidinous impulses - the ultimate 
source of all mental phenomena, conscious or unconscious - 
the representations constituting the connecting link between 
(1) 
Baudouin, C., op. cit., p.228. 
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the organic (sexual) processes of the body and the mind. 
if this is so, then it may be asked, as r,ilers(1J does, 
how the impulses, being simply functions of the organism 
and closely related to organic processes (such as changes 
within the sexual glands) can become contents of "lived" 
experience. The nature of the impulses themselves does 
not involve anything that would cause representations to 
arise, but the transformation must take place somewhere. 
Either psycho- analysis is forced to introduce a further 
set of impulses producing mental phenomena from the others, 
in which case it becomes an infinite regress; or it must 
concede that beyond the organic functions and structure, 
and therefore beyond the impulses, there exists yet another 
region within the personality. In short, like any other 
monistic conception, psycho -analysis must contradict it- 
self or the plain facts. 
In the second place; If a symbol is a phantastic 
"representation" in the conscious mind which promises the 
"i.;iaginative" satisfaction of an impulse (or wish) ; and 
if the work of art is (as evidently it must be) a transla- 
tion of the symbol into concrete sensuous form, psycho- 
analysis must either (a) commit itself to the thesis that 
(1) 
Allers, Rudolf, The New Psychologies , ( Essays in Order, 
No. 9) , p.13. 
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the peculiar form assumed by the physical reproduction of 
the symbol is of no value in the artistic situation - a 
thesis which is as essential to the symbolic theory of art 
as it is untenable in the face of the plain facts observ- 
able in the responses of people of sensibility to the beauty 
of proportion exemplified., for example, in architecture; 
or (b) it must undermine its own foundations by conceding 
that the form assumed by the inner symbol (the original of 
the outer symbol or work of art) is defective, in that it 
is inadequate to fulfil the immediate psychic need in evert 
respect; for in order to account for this other require- 
ment it .gust concede the existence of another region within 
the human personality: which is, in fact, the requirement 
of design or form. 
Professor Parker, it will be recalled, emphasised the 
fundamental importance of form in art and tried to show 
that form and content sprang from the same source - desire. 
he failed, however, to prove his contention. Dr. S. her- 
bert has made a similar claim. Eut, whereas Professor 
Parker makes an honours -even division, Dr. Herbert stresses 
the importance of form, but fails utterly to account for it 
psychologically. "in art the manner is more important 
than the matter," he declares.(l) "it is only by the 
(1) 
The Unconscious in Life and i-irt, p.182 -3, (Present 
author's italics.) 
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fusion of the idea with an adequate form that a true work 
of art is created. It is poetic form that raises the con- 
tent to the appropriate artistic level. If the work is 
the manifestation of the artist's unconscious, then the 
mode in which the artist expresses himself must be similarly 
significant of his deepest personality. Translated into 
psychological language this means that expression. is the 
outward symbol of the inner emotion. Indeed the artist 
has only symbolic means by which to express his most inward 
feelings. Whether in poetry, music cr the plastic arts, 
he can only paint his own soul by symbolisation... There 
are certain devices by which the artist achieves the desired 
result... In modern painting we have the Cubist school 
that cuts up the objects of nature into geometrical patterns 
and juxtaposes them in order to create an impression which 
is intended to represent not so much a picture of nature, 
but a picture as seen by the inner vision of the artist." 
It is hardly necessary to point out the futility of 
this kind of argument; it is a first -rate example of the 
psycho -analytic aesthetic dilemma - a dilemma which Iireud 
himself recognised, when he states towards the end of his 
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Autobiography(1) that it must be admitted that psycho- 
analysis throws no light upon the two problems of elucidat- 
ing the nature of the artistic gift and of explaining the 
means by which the artist works. 
The only criterion of value which psycho- analysis can 
apply to art is that of symbolism: which means in practice 
that the greater the libido there is expressed in a work of 
art, the higher it must be ranked in the artistic scale. 
Jung states(2) that the symbol is always an extremely com- 
plex creation, since data proceeding from every psychic 
function are woven into its composition. Its nature, 
therefore, is neither rational nor irrational; one side 
accords with reason, another side is inaccessible to reason. 
"The living symbol cannot come to birth in an inert or 
poorly-developed mind, for such a man will rest content 
with the already existing symbols offered by established 
tradition. Only the passionate yearning of a highly- devel- 
oped mind, for whom the declared symbol no longer contains 
the highest reconciliation in one expression, can create a 
(1) 
pp.119 -120. Cf. also his Leonardo da Vinci, p.124, 
where he states that "if after accomplishing these things 
(tracing the artist's work to an Oedipus situation) I 
should provoke criticism from even friends and adepts of 
psycho -analysis, that I have only written a psychological 
romance, I should answer that I certainly did not over- 
estimate the reliability of these results." 
(2) Psychological Types, pp.606 -608. 
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new symbol. But inasmuch as the symbol proceeds from his 
highest and latest mental achievement and must also include 
the deepest roots of his being, it cannot be a one -sided 
product of the most highly differentiated mental functions, 
but must at least have an equal source, in the lowest and 
most primitive motions of his psyche... Through the activity 
of the unconscious, a content is unearthed which is con - 
stellated by thesis and antithesis in equal measure, and 
is related to both in a compensatory relation. Since this 
content discloses a relation to both thesis and antithesis, 
it forms a middle territory, upon which the opposites can 
be reconciled. Suppose, for example, we conceive the 
opposition to be sensuality versus spirituality; then by 
virtue of its wealth of spiritual associations, the media- 
tory content born from the unconscious offers a welcome 
expression to the spiritual thesis, and by virtue of its 
plastic sensuousness it embraces the sensual antithesis. 
But the ego rent between thesis and antithesis finds in the 
uniting middle territory its counterpart, its reconciling 
and unique expression, and eagerly seizes upon it, in order 
to be delivered from its division. Hence, the energy 
created by the tension of the opposite flows into the media- 
tory expression, protecting it against the conflict of the 
opposites which forthwith begin both about it and within, 
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since both are striving to resolve the new expression in 
their own specific sense. Spirituality tries to make 
something spiritual out of the unconscious expression, 
while sensuality aims at something sensual; the one wish- 
ing to create science and art from the new expression, the 
other sensual experience. The resolution of the uncon- 
scious product into either is successful only when the in- 
completely divided ego clings rather to one side than the 
other-." 
in conclusion, a word or two must be said about the 
value of the psycho- analytic contribution to the elucida- 
tion of the problem of the psychological nature of art. 
it cannot be gainsaid, as Dalias maintained, that "It is in 
the hidden sphere of thought, even more than in the open, 
that we live and move and have our being;" that there is 
within us a "felt existence" transcending consciousness, 
"instincts of our lower nature, intuitions of the higher, 
dreams and suggestions," that there is in all art a "laten- 
cy of meaning beyond the simple statement of facts." But, 
in emphasising one aspect of human personality to a point 
of distortion, which makes man's whole life fundamentally 
gross and bestial, psycho- analysis goes far beyond the 
range and relevance of available scientific evidence. 
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The vice of the psycho- analytic view of art, as Lord Listo- 
wel points out,(1) "is precisely the same as that of the 
entire Freudian psychology, the exaggeration of a true 
principle to a degree that verges on absolute erotomania, 
its shining merit a humble but scientific contribution to 
our understanding of art forms and the delight they afford." 
The mere 'imaginative' gratification of unconscious desire 
is not art; art demands a formal organisation and quality - 
la ligne de l'artiste - which psycho -analysis is entirely 
unable to account for or to value. Freud recognises this 
difficulty, but it does not deter him from illustrating 
his wish -fulfilment theory by reproducing an artistically 
worthless picture of a prisoner dreaming that an elf is . 
sawing away his prison bars.(2) Pfister likewise repro- 
duces three pictures, all of which are from the artistic 
standpoint quite puerile, though obviously well suited to 
the purposes of his exegesis.(3) (Plates III,A,P and C). 
Compared with a work of art like Cosimo Tura's St. Gerome 
(Plate I), they obviously belong to a different technical 
genus, and a different spiritual world. Whereas in the 




() The Psycho -Analytic Method. 
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Op. cit., p.164. 
a moving principle in every inch of line, there is in the 
three pictures of Pfister's patient nothing but commonplace 
shapes and nerveless, turbid masses. The choice of such 
illustrative material does not win confidence; it points 
either to the psycho -analysts' lack of sensibility or to 
their preoccupation with problems which have little rele- 
vance to the phenomena which they purport to be elucidating. 
Their accounts of what is supposed to go on in the 
artist's mind are also very wide of the mark. "iúothing," 
declares hoger ,ry,(1) commenting on Jung's chapter on the 
artist - "Nothing that he says corresponds to any kind of 
experience which I or, I suspect, any of the artists I have 
ever known have ever had." In their preoccupation with 
fundamental impulses they have sought to account for the 
origin of art in the dynamic functions of the organism, 
"but it must be borne in mind that the discovery of the 
origin is not an explanation of the phenomenon... The 
alimentary cana]Jand the brain both have their origin in the 
epithelial tissue, but one would give an enquirer a strange 
idea of the functional importance of the brain in the econo- 
my of the body if one only stated that it was originally 
part of the skin." Thus, if it be argued with the psycho- 
analysts that art originated in the sexual cravings of 
(l) 
The Artist and Psycho- analysis, Hogarth Essays, p.13. 
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primitive man and that all art to -day emanates from the 
same primitive impulses in modern man, not a glimmer of 
light is thrown upon the problem of the nature of art here 
and now. As the late Dr. Henry J. Yatt pointed out,(1) 
"the study of mind from the biological side has in the 
primates had to recognise beyond hunger, love and play a 
delight in mere sensuous or intellectual effects, as when 
a monkey plucks at a vibrating pin or a child beats a drum 
indefinitely, so the science of art must rise above the bio- 
logical cant that was natural in a recent generation and 
restore even to popular favour the idea that art is one of 
the three supreme ends of the spirit... After all biology 
now claims loudly that an organ is first formed and then, 
may be, finds a use... Well, then, art and knowledge and 
morality have first been formed and have been put out on 
loan. No amount of ... mere 'need' would ever have brought 
them into being. And so no matter out of what actions or 
organs they arise and no matter how they are used, they are 
values essentially independent of these attachments." By 
perversely distorting the ontogenetic perspective, and 
bringing into the foreground of attention. elements which 
properly belong to the remote distance, the psycho -analytic 
writers have obscured their own vision by viewing art from 
(1) "Mind and = 4iedium in Art," (III), British Journal of 
Psychology, Vol. XI, p.24. 
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the wrong end. That a vast amount of art may have origin- 
ated in the "faint, far cries" of the soul need not be dis- 
puted, but in the process of expression the fundamental 
primitive factors come into contact with other needs and 
powers of lat er development, whose ends they are made to 
serve. If what is to be expressed is a pathological sex- 
ual craving and nothing more, a few symbolic or representa- 
tional scribbles may be adequate; but if the thing to be 
expressed is a vast and momentous intuition, it will demand 
a formal arrangement of an order, which only the true 
artist is capable of constructing to the point of perfec- 
tion, and only the man of high sensibility is capable of 
appreciating. So that art, far from being merely a means 
of gratifying libidinous wishes, becomes the highest means 
of expressing the whole personality. 
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CIÍPTER VIII. 
Return to Expressionism. 
Plate IV. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
"ks in a dream everything is uncertain, meaningless 
and contradictory except the feeling that directs the dream, 
so in this communion of ideas, apart from every law of rea- 
son, what is clear and consecutive is not what is said, but 
the feeling that prompts the words." 
Tolstoi, War and Peace. 
The best -known aesthetic theories, Professor Valentine 
has pointed out,(1) err in that they mostly take one aspect 
of aesthetic experience, or one or more characteristics of 
certain selected beautiful objects, give quite convincing 
illustrations, and then generalise as to beauty or aesthetic 
experience as a whole. Thus art and beauty have been vari- 
ously defined as "imitation," or as "the characteristic use 
of tools and materials," or as "feeling become plastic," or 
as "pleasure regarded as a quality of a thing," or as "sig- 
nificant form," or as the "expression" of feeling, emotion, 
the ideal and so forth. In the long run probably all 
theories have some fundamental truth in them; the difficul- 
ty is to find a point of orientation from which the 
(1) 
"M.ind and Medium in krt," V., British Journal of Psy- 
chology, Vol XI, p.47. 
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essential truth of each may be viewed and given its 
proper setting and due formulation. 
Of all theories perhaps the most persistent and most 
widely held is the expressionist theory. E. F. Carritt 
is convinced that when Plato said that music and shapeli- 
ness 'imitated' states of mind he was simply at a loss for 
a word;(1) and he makes out quite a good case for regarding 
the expressionist view as the golden thread of aesthetic 
theory, the via regia to the secret of Parnassus. Its 
modern formulations, however, have suffered from the inevit- 
able defects of extreme subjectivism and the obscurities of 
psychological mysticism in which it has become involved and 
from which, despite the dialectical skill of its protagon- 
ists, it has been impossible to extricate it. 
It is not the object of this chapter to enlarge upon 
the criticism of Croce's theory as the formulation par ex- 
cellence of the expressionist doctrine, but to examine more 
closely certain obscure points, mostly psychological and 
not necessarily peculiar to Croce's exposition, and, if 
possible, to make some suggestions whereby the more obvious 
flaws of its current formulations may be amended and made 
to conform with psychological fact and common experience. 
Beauty is the expression of feeling: this, in simple 
(1) 
Nhat is Beauty? pp.108 -110. Cf. Theory of Beauty, 
pp.284 -2$7. 
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terms, is the core of the expressionist theory. ,sir. Carr - 
itt, for instance, a staunch advocate as well as a careful 
critic of Croce, is convinced that the 'expression' of anL 
feeling is beautiful.(l) This is at once an extension as 
well as a refinement of the doctrine of the Estetica. 
Signor Giovanni Gentile, on the other hand, affirms that 
beauty is the feeling which accompanies every mental act, 
"not the expression or intuition of feeling but feeling 
itself.''(2) Either to agree or disagree with these state- 
mente is obviously impossible, until the meaning and psycho- 
logical significance of the term 'feeling' is defined and 
analysed. For Croce feeling is that part of experience 
which is capable of lyrical representation, it is simply a 
state of the soul;(3) for Gentile it is something ultimate 
and indefinable, a J e ne sais quoi , (4) yet identifiable in 
the pleasure, "the feeling which is the essence of art. "(5) 
/2.t other times and places, however, apparently when these 
(1) 
Theory of Beauty, p.287 (footnote). 
(2) :2hilosoph- of1.rt, p.20l. Cf. Abercrombie, Lascelles, 
Toward a Theory o Art, pp.33-34, also p.26. 
(3) Saggi Filosofici, Vol.I, pp.22-23. (Vide supra p.161). 
(4) 
Op. cit., p.179. 
(5) Op. cit., pp.294-295. 
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writers are off their guard, they speak of emotion as being 
the thing Ghat is expressed, as though emotion and feeling 
were identical modes of experience. Thus L r. Carritt 
states that "all beauty is the expression of what may be 
generally called emotion, and that all such expression is 
beautiful. "(l) If words are to be strictly construed, 
then this statement can hardly be said to be consistent 
with the one quoted above from the same source. 
how it may be suggested that it is of little use at- 
tempting to define beauty or art in terms of feelings ex- 
pressed until the significance of the term 'feeling' is 
cleared up and demarcated from its psychological sister 
'ernotion.'(2} As such a task has already been attempted 
by professor ,dcDougall (among others) it will be worth while 
to note his pronouncements and conclusions.(`) 
Orientating from the position that the primary forms 
of animal striving were food- seeking and aversion from the 
noxious, he propounds the view that all modes of experience 
called feeling and emotion are incidental to thestriving 
activities, the conations of the organism, and that feelings 
and emotions may be distinguished by their functional 
(1) Op. cit., p.296. 
( 2 ) Cf. Claparèd.e , Ed . , Wittenberg Symposium, p.124. 
( 3 
) ,dleDougall , W., Wittenberg Symposium, pp . 200-205 . 
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relations to the conative activities which they accompany 
and qualify. There are two primary modes of feeling, 
pleasure and pain. These colour and qualify all strivings. 
Pleasure is the consequence of success; pain the conse- 
quence of failure. With the growth of the cognitive powers, 
whereby diverse aspects of objects and situations are sim- 
ultaneously apprehendabie, there develop corresponding com- 
plications in the modes of feeling, blends and fusions of 
pleasure and pain, such as hope, anxiety, despair, regret 
and sorrow. Hence with the mature mental structure of 
adulthood come those pleasures struck from pain which 
Dalias recognised as somehow fundamental to all art experi- 
ence; desires become complex and long range, and the simple 
alternation between pleasure and pain gives place to a per- 
petual ranging through the scale of complex feelings which, 
in common speech, are known as emotions. Such. "derived 
emotions" must be differentiated from emotions proper, 
which have their origin in specialised bodily strivings 
and corresponding bodily adjustments of varying degrees of 
complexity. Each system of bodily adjustments is reflected 
in the experience of the striving organism, giving to each 
specialised mode of striving a peculiar and distinctive 
quality. hs mental development progresses two or more of 
the specialised impulses may come into play simultaneously, 
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conflicting or coöperating, the primary characters of which 
are experienced in the complex blendings and qualities, 
such as embarrassment, shame, awe, reverence, reproach. 
Comparing the complex feelings, which arise from the 
degree of success and failure of the striving organism, 
with emotions proper, :icüougall points out that whereas the 
former modify the further working of the generating impul- 
ses, strengthening and sustaining or checking and diverting 
them according as the balance of feeling -tone is on the 
positive or negative side, the qualities of tue latter are 
prior to and independent of success or failure, springing 
to life with the evocation of the corresponding impulses 
and continuing to colour the experience of striving each 
with its distinctive tone. The true emotional qualities 
have no direct influence upon the course of striving. The 
complex feelings, then, are dependent upon and secondary to 
the development of the cognitive functions, and probably 
peculiar to man. The true emotions, on the other hand, 
may be supposed to have appeared very much earlier in the 
evolutionary scale, and then as mere by- products of the 
impulsive strivings of animals. in man alone they become 
an important source of self -knowledge and self- direction. 
Setting aside for the moment the aesthetic question 
involved, it will be instructive to contrast McDougall's 
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point of view with that of the philosophical aesthetician, 
Ir. W. T. Stace.(1) The aesthetic experience, Mr. Stace 
believes, is correctly described as a feeling, not an emo- 
tion. It is not a judgment of the intellect, but an immed- 
iate awareness. A feeling, however, is not an emotion; 
it is a cognitive act. when a person states that he feels 
that a ghost is in the room, or that a man is to be trusted 
or distrusted, he is performing a cognitive act. "instead 
of inferring, from observations or principles, the truth of 
the .judgment that h is not to be trusted, we think that we 
feel it as an immediate conviction. But what we feel con- 
vinced of is none the less the truth of a judgment and the 
feeling is therefore cognitive. This is quite different 
from a pure emotion, such as fear or anger, which, in so 
far as it is pure, contains no implicit judgment or cognitive 
element of any kind." In other words, an emotion as such 
is not a state of awareness, whereas the feeling that a 
ghost is in the room, or that k is hostile, are states of 
awareness of these facts. And it is in this sense that 
beauty is described as a feeling. Emotions possess no cog- 
nitive nor intellectual element. They are possessed by 
animals as well as by men, and to confuse feelings such as 
those just mentioned is an unpardonable error. 
(1) 
The Meaning of Beauty, pp.20 -21; 168 -169. 
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Between these two views there are many points of con- 
gruity which need not be discussed here. From the limited 
point of view- of the present topic all that need be noted is 
that both are agreed. on the importance of drawing a clear 
line of demarcation between feeling and emotion and that 
both recognise the cognitive character of feeling and its 
essential relation to cognitive functions. But when the 
theory of art as the expression of feeling is construed in 
the light of what they each enunciate, the conclusions they 
point to are very different. 
In Professor :.cDougall' s opinion (and here he may claim 
the support of the majority of psychologists) all modes of 
experience called feeling and emotion. are incidental to the 
striving activities of the organism, evoked either by im- 
pressions from the environment or by metabolic processes 
taking place within it; they are, that is to say, necessari- 
ly and intimately connected with the degrees of success and 
failure attending the functionings of fundamental appetites 
and aversions. As mental structure develops, however, ex- 
perience on the feeling side is no longer limited to simple 
pleasure and simple pain, but embraces complex blendings of 
pleasure and pain, the offspring of long -range "prospective 
and retrospective" desires. This, apparently, is as far 
as Professor McDougall would go in suggesting the relation 
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of feeling to the purely cognitive functions of the organism. 
The "expression of feeling" would thus involve nothing 
higher in the scale of cultural values than those complex 
blendings of pleasure and pain arising from long -range 
desires, which psychologists and others call hopes, anxiet- 
ies, regrets, sorrows, joys, surprises.(1) Stace, on 
the other hand, maintains that feelings are in essence 
cognitive and intellectual. "bye speak," he says," of our 
feeling that a thing is evil, that disaster is coming... 
So, too, in religious music we feel the divine presence, or 
in lyrical poetry we feel the gaiety, sadness, or melancholy 
of the poet's mood. In the drama or the novel we feel 
rather than think, the artist's attitude to life. Such 
feelings are ... conceptual cognitions. We do not think 
them as concepts just because we are not in the presence of 
science but of art." Feelings, then, are in essence cog- 
nitive and intellectual.(2) His view of the nature of 
feeling thus admits of a much wider range of spiritual 
(1) 
Cf. Croce, saggi Filosofici p.19; Iroblemi p.23;    
Logica, p.154; Pratica, p.187. 
(2) 
Op. Cit., p.169. In vír. Stace's view concepts may be 
either free or submerged. "A free concept is one which we 
think about abstractly, as a concept, as when we speak gener- 
ally of unity, or civilisation, or whiteness, without re- 
ferring to any particular object which is one, or civilised, 
or white. This thinking of free concepts is the peculiar 
function of the abstract intellect. But concepts, as well 
as being free, may also be unrealised and submerged in 
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(intellectual, psychological) material than may be expressed 
by art: indeed, it would include almost everything that 
Croce and his adherents would specifically exclude. In art 
(according to Mr. Stace) man fashions an external medium 
with the definite aim of making it express his intellectual- 
ity; indeed, what is known as the content of art may be so 
rich as to embody in its different forms practically the 
whole of human culture.(1) And the greater the wealth and 
profundity of the intellectual content the greater will be 
the value of the aesthetic experience. For the intellect- 
ual content consists in the total intellectual reaction of 
the artist upon the world as exhibited in the work of art. 
The artist possesses his own peculiar attitude to the world, 
to life, to things, to people. Ian's view of the world 
may be summed up in a very general and approximate way by 
such words as pessimistic, optimistic, hedonistic, resigned, 
gay, sullen, cynical, joyful, tolerant and so forth.(2) But 
perception. yihen I see an object and recognise it as a man, 
1 must, in this act of recognition, make use of the general 
concept or class -idea of man. For without the concept of 
the class I could not recognise the object as a member of the 
class. And this is true even of the perception of animals. 
But in the act of perception, the concept, though implicit 
and present, is not held free before the mind as an abstrac- 
tion. It has not yet been abstracted or separated from the 
matrix in which it is fused." pp.22 -23. 
(1) Op. cit., pp.134 -136. 
(2) Ibid. pp.163-164. 
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at bottom any man's attitude is the product of his intellect; 
it is founded upon concepts, composed of concepts. 
Now these views have been cited not in order to com- 
pare or to discuss their merits, either from the point of 
view of psychology or aesthetic theory, but to show, by 
taking representative views of feeling and emotion, the 
difficulties and ambiguities involved in the theory of art 
couched in terms of expressed feelings. The term is as 
yet much too vague and altogether too convenient and sus- 
ceptible of dialectical manipulation to be of any service 
in scientific discourse.(l) 
So much for the 'feeling' ingredient of the expression- 
ist formula. There is the other much discussed 'expression' 
part. It will be recalled that, for Croce, beauty (and 
art) is simply expression, the expression of an intuition. 
And, since no intuition can take place apart from expression, 
it is of no matter whether it be said that art is intuition 
or that art is expression. Intuiting is the giving form to 
the mere raw material of consciousness - sensation, which 
(1) The most fundamental problem - that of the relation of 
sensation to feeling - cannot, of course, be discussed here. 
It is worth noting, however, that Croce's view of sensation 
is not supported by contemporary psychology. Apart from 
factors of motive or valuation nothing can exist in con- 
sciousness or experience that is recognisable. Vide Harts- 
horne, C., The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, 
p.108 et seq. 
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is outside the knowing spirit and formless. To intuite is 
to express, to have an image, an individual image of a feel- 
ing. This image, of course, is not an image in the ordin- 
ary sense of the word, which is based on external perception, 
but the precise inward expression of a state óf the soul. 
And it is this inward expression, this giving form to raw 
material of consciousness, that is art, beauty. Beauty is 
an experience of the spirit, it is art, it is intuition, it 
is form all at once. For .1r. Carritt, on the other hand, 
expression is the embodiment of feelings in sensible form.(1) 
What is beautiful, however, is not the sensible form but the 
contemplation of it, "without practical interest, without 
scientific abstraction, and without existential judgment, 
as the pure expression of emotion. "(2) But Carritt is 
not quite clear as to what really constitutes expression: 
"We may read the poem or watch the dawn coldly; and in that 
indeed 
case, like other symbols, they may,,remind us of certain 
feelings, ... but they do not actually embody them. This 
is the reason why it is not the written or spoken poem ... 
which must strictly be called beautiful, but only a particul- 
ar way in which at any given moment any individual expresses 
himself in them. "(3) As to the 'particular way' 




Ibid. p.298. (Present author's italics.) 
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Ir. Carritt gives no clue. 
Thus in the hands of those distinguished philosophers 
the doctrine' of aesthetic expressionism becomes a texture of 
tautologies, a sonorous philosophic rejection of the world 
of plain fact and everyday experience in favour of a bodi- 
less world of empty abstractions. 
But must the expressionist theory of art be abandoned 
because of the failure of its advocates to say precisely 
what art does express and how? Surely not. For, despite 
the manifold obscurities and defects of its present and past 
formulations, no other theory appears to be better consti- 
tuted to explain the phenomena of art and artistic experience. 
Already throughout the preceding discussion various hints 
may have revealed a leaning towards this conclusion. knd 
in Chapters V, VI and VII reasons were set forth which indi- 
cated the lines along which the weaknesses of current formu- 
lations might be rectified. An attempt will now be made to 
state these a little more concisely. 
The reasons which led to the rejection of the Crocean 
view of expression were (1) that his definition of ex- 
pression is both arbitrary and empty. It is arbitrary in 
that it limits the term without sound reason to aesthetic 
expression, "spiritual aesthetic synthesis;" it is empty 
in that he fails to establish and define the nature of this 
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synthesis, Croce being content with a "judicious interchange" 
of strict synonyms;(1) (2) it ignores the fundamental im- 
portance of material to all art: expression is the giving 
form to sensation - the raw material of consciousness - but 
the nature of this form is unknown and unrecognisable, the 
only examples being the expressions themselves; (3) Croce's 
hypothesis of a raw material of consciousness (sensation) is 
also unknown and unrecognisable; it is philosophically and 
psychologically meaningless - in other words, the material 
or spiritual substance which must be formed (intuited) and 
expressed cannot be shown to exist. 
Towards the end of Chapter V the view was advanced that 
expression cannot take place except in terms of a physical 
medium (the actor cannot act unless he employs his body as 
his medium of expression; the artist cannot function unless 
he manipulates a physical medium and creates something out- 
side of himself); that the artist's reactions to his medium 
are an essential ingredient of his creative mood; that phys- 
ical expression is the only means whereby the artist can 
(1) "The keystone of Croce's method consists in a skilful 
application of the Law of Identity combined with a partial 
denial of the Law of Contradiction. Thus when Intuition 
is identified with Expression it may be asserted that all 
intuitions are expressed without any further necessity of 
proof. Then if Intuition -expression be identified with 
Art, it follows that all intuitions are works of art." 
Ogden, Richards and Wood, The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.43. 
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discover what he wants to express; and the conclusion was 
reached that if expression means the outward embodiment of 
inward states and events (and it was argued that this was 
the truest meaning of the term), then it is possible - con - 
trary to Croce's view - to differentiate between expressions 
which are 'naturalistic' and expressions which are artistic, 
by showing that in the former the medium is ignored and that 
in the latter the medium, because of its inherent qualities 
and the expressing agent's (i.e. the artist's) cognitive and 
affective relations and reactions to it, becomes a crucial 
factor in determining the manner and the final form of the 
expression. In Chapters VI and VII, where it was found 
necessary to go into the question of technique in art and 
its relation to the purely psychic process and vice versa, 
this conclusion, it may be claimed, was substantially 
supported. To round off these studies two questions must 
be asked: first, if the expressions called art are determin- 
ed in part by the artist's cognitive relations and affective 
reactions to his medium, what constitutes the other parts ?; 
and second, what does art express? - for it was found on 
examination that the formulation of the expressionist theory 
as the expression of feeling (Croce and Carritt) was both 
ambiguous and inadequate, according as the term 'feeling' 
was interpreted in the light of one or other of representative 
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current theories. These questions, it need hardly be 
stated, raise the most vital issues with which the psycho- 
logist of art must be expected to deal. It cannot, there- 
fore, be hoped to offer anything more than tentative answers. 
To some extent the ground on which the answer to the 
first of these questions will be founded was prepared in 
Chapter I, where some suggestions were made as to the nature 
of the artist's sensibility to form. For in the long run 
what distinguishes the true work of art from other fórms of 
plastic expression is the quality of line and formal struc- 
ture it exhibits. This quality, however, does not reside 
in the mere line and structure as such, but in their power 
of evoking strong affective reactions both in the artist 
and in the spectator. It must, therefore, be ultimately 
traced to the artist's total state of mind (and body, since 
so much of man's conative activity is bound up with somatic 
processes) throughout the period during which creation is 
proceeding. The line and structure are precisely ex- 
pressive of the phases of affective experience through which 
the artist passes as he works, and unless his hand and 
vision are completely responsive to every minute change and 
tremor taking place within him and outside him on the canvas, 
he will never be satisfied with1jis work. Herein lies the 
secret of his formal -sensibility, his acute responsiveness 
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to those manifold subtleties of line and rhythm, which a 
truly vital work of art possesses. Herein, too, lies the 
secret of that peculiar all- pervading quality of liveliness 
and organic coherence that may be found in every inch of 
canvas of a masterpiece. The same spirit of nervousness 
is manifest in the smallest leaf or twig in a painting by 
Botticelli as there is in the tenderest fold of his diaphan- 
ous drapery. Whence the miracle of this oneness in life 
and expressiveness if not in his exquisite sensibility? 
Whence that elegant flow of abundant and resistant energy 
of a Picasso or a Matisse drawing? 
In his most excellent book of critical and speculative 
essays(1) the late Roger Fry has a great deal to say which 
is much to the point in this discussion. Fry is dealing 
with modern drawings; and it is in drawing that the opera- 
tion of sensibility is best demonstrated - though, to be 
sure, it is not generally in drawing that its grandest revel- 
ations are manifest. In dealing with what he calls the 
"unconscious mechanism" of execution he points out how prac- 
tice makes for perfection. "But there is another method 
by which the artist may withdraw his consciousness from his 
gesture sufficiently to allow of his line being rhythmical. 




so concentrated upon the interpretation of a contour as to 
be unconscious of what goes on between his hand and the 
paper. The ideal of such a situation is that he should 
actually never look at the paper. This, of course, is a 
counsel of perfection, since, under such circumstances, 
although the hand is likely to express the rhythm admirably 
it will fail to do so with correct proportions. Neverthe- 
less, some artists do make admirable notations in this way. 
Or, if the vision be one aroused in the 'inner eye' by the 
artist's imagination, he may draw with his eyes shut. Here, 
again, the rhythmic c, uality is likely to be excellent, but 
the proportions are almost sure to go astray. "(1) The im- 
portant point in this quotation is, of course, the fact that 
the hand is completely responsive to the mind's activity 
though the visual mechanism is shut off. The sensibility 
is at work through the exquisite mechanism of the hand alone. 
It may then be that sensibility is ultimately a matter of 
cerebro- neural structure, something operating at what Köhler 
would call the psycho -physiological level.(2) .hut until 
both psychology and physiology have progressed far beyond 
their present limits it would be dangerous to propose any 
more specific explanation. 
(1)Ibid. p.202. (Present author's italics.) 
(2) Cf. Langfeld, H. S., "Conflict and Adjustment in Art," 
Problems of Personality, p.379. 
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But compare, for example, the line of Rubens' drawing 
with a careful tracing of it (Plate V) and the miraculous 
power of the productive sensibility will be seen most re- 
markably. Notice the nervous, reticent vitality - the ex- 
pressiveness of the original compared with the flaccidity 
of the tracing and its complete lack of life and distinction. 
Roger-.Fry tells(1) how an indignant spectator at the Post - 
Impressionist exhibition was moved to send to the papers 
his own version of a Matisse drawing. "The result was, to 
any sensitive eye, as far removed from Matisse as it was 
from Ingres!" 
Sensibility, of course, will be influenced to a greater 
or lesser extent by the artist's chosen medium of express- 
ion - a point upon which some emphasis was laid in another 
connection in an earlier chapter. All the drawings of 
Eric Gill, for instance, are clearly influenced by the art- 
ist's feeling for stone. The paintings of Signorelli have 
a sculpturesque quality which derived from that master's 
study of the antique. On the other hand, the drawings of 
the sculptor Maillol (who was a painter oefore becoming a 
sculptor) have none of that too positive assertion of the 
tactile as opposed to the visual aspects of form that 






usually marks a sculptor's drawings.(1) rerhaps this 
factor lies near the psychological root of 'Wölfflin's styl- 
istic dualism - "das Lineare and das lilalerische" modes of 
vision. This is a suggestion, however, which cannot be 
followed up here. 
The artist's sensibility to form and medium, it may be 
concluded, is the primary condition of his achievement. 
Without this gift of sensibility he would never become an 
artist, never attain that "inward peace," which is the in- 
effable reward of adequate expression. (P1ate1V.) 
The question, What does art express? is the most diffi- 
cult, because the most comprehensive and far -reaching ques- 
tion which the psychologist must face; for not only does it 
raise crucial psychological issues for the very discussion 
of which psychologists have as yet not even prepared a proper 
setting, but it involves more or less directly almost every 
department of the science of man. In fine, it raises the 
whole problem of the psychology of the personality, a branch 
of psychology which even to -day has barely won due recog- 
nition as being entitled to isolation for special department- 
al treatment and study. Any answer to the question as to 
what art expresses can, therefore, be put only in the very 
vaguest of terms. 
(1) Ibid. p.209. 
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No more suitable point of orientation could be found 
than the following: remarks from the pen of a famous critic, 
ihr. R. H. Wilenski.(1) "At the present time there is a 
wide - spread notion than an artist when he paints a picture 
or carves a statue etc. is not a man but only part of a man - 
a group of art -producing elements. It is assumed that, in 
the process of his work, he can somehow or other get wholly 
or partly outside himself; that he can shed for the purpose 
a part of the complexity which he is; that he can go away 
for a week -end, as it were, from himself and leave behind 
him the whole of himself except one set of organs - the or- 
gans used in the art -producing activity. i nd there is 
evidence that many artists in recent times have entertained 
this singular notion. 
"But reflection, I submit, will make it manifest that 
no man can perform this feat. A man can take off his 
clothes and take out his false teeth before he goes to bed 
because they are not and never have been really part of him; 
but he cannot take off his stomach and take out his memories 
and range them on the dressing -table to prevent them disturb- 
ing his night's rest. A man's stomach and all his memories 
are with him all night whether he choose to admit it or not; 
both are also with him when he starts a game of poker or 
(1) 
The Study of Art, pp.19 -20. 
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when he goes off to Brighton to play golf or to his studio 
to paint a picture; and both remain with him all through 
the game or the painting. Every artist like every other 
man is a changing complexity at every moment of his life. 
But at any given moment he is a complete indivisible whole." 
This view is in complete accord with the modern conception 
of mind as an organically integrated functioning unit, and 
with certain notions prevalent in contemporary art criticism 
which imply that art is the expression of the artist's 
personality. 
Now although the word 'personality' is tossed about 
in most reckless fashion by all and sundry, it does stand, 
albeit in a vague way, for the idea of a whole individual, 
a complex of traits, dispositions, memories and mental capa- 
cities. Such a 'whole' is obviously what Mr. 'Jilenski had 
in mind when he wrote the words which have just been quoted. 
The term, however, is far too hospitable and elastic to be 
of very much service in a field of discourse where exactness 
and consistency are above all things necessary. Neverthe- 
less, it appears to be the most suitable, because the most 
suggestive, of the many terms in current use, which are in- 
tended to denote the unique totality implied in the idea of 
man as a living and acting organism. It does stand for 
those essential 'personal' aspects of an individual, which 
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mark him off from his fellows, making him what he is in their 
eyes, the living embodiment of a set of ideals and values.(1) 
Disembarrassed of the ambiguous accretions which have be- 
come attached to it in current usage, it might be made to 
perform useful work in the service of a science which is 
much in need of a precise terminology of its own - the sci- 
ence of art. 3ut the difficulty is to know where to begin. 
The concept 'personality' is so inextricably bound up with 
other comprehensive concepts such as 'character' and 'temp- 
erament,' with which it is frequently identified, that any 
attempt to clear the ground must involve far more than a 
survey of present opinion and achievement; it means going 
back to fundamentals. Such a task is far beyond the scope 
of this study, and may be left to those who are competent to 
deal with it in future research. For the present it will 
be worth while to refer to a recent essay(2) by Mr. Herbert 
Read, in which he has attempted to "introduce a few defini- 
tions" into the study of what he calls "the creative 
(1) 
"In what a man sees value, especially in what he sees 
the highest value of his life, that value, in fact, which 
makes life important to him, that is what we must know if 
we are to be capable of understanding his personality." 
Stern, E., "New Ways of Investigating the Problem of Person- 
ality," Psyche, Vol.IIl, p.364. 
(2) Form in Modern Poetry. 
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functions of the personality." 
Mr. Read's purpose is to show that artistic form de- 
pends upon the artist's personality. There is in every 
individual "a coherent organisation of mental processes" 
called the ego, he states, (quoting from Freud's The Ego 
and the Id); "and this may serve as the preliminary defini- 
tion of 'personality' of which I am in search. "(1) This 
ego, he goes on to point out, is identical with the flow of 
conscious thoughts, impressions received and sensations 
experienced, and from it proceed the repressions "by means 
of which an attempt is made to cut off certain trends in 
the mind not merely from consciousness, but also from their 
other forms of manifestation and activity." The conduct 
ui -ine ego tnroughout life is essentially passive - the 
individual is 'lived,' as it were, by unknown and uncontroll- 
able forces - the reserve of instincts and passions which 
are normally repressed and beyond the complete control of 
the conscious reason. This reserve, the impersonal aspect 
of the 'Ego' Freud calls the 'Id.' Personality Ir. Read 
associates with the ego. Character, which is so often 
identified with personality, he regards as "a disposition 
in the individual due to the repression of certain impulses 




the result of certain fixities or negations imposed on the 
flow of consciousness." In ordinary usage it implies a 
man moulded to a pattern, firm, consistent, dependable. 
Quoting from Dr. Roback (Problems of personality), he de- 
fines character as "an enduring psycho -physical disposition 
to inhibit instinctive impulses in accordance with a regu- 
lative principle" - the will to hold in check, which implies 
an element of self -determination. "Character, in short, 
is an impersonal ideal which the individual selects and to 
which he sacrifices all other claims, especially those of 
the sentiments and emotions. It follows that character 
must be placed in opposition to personality, which is the 
general- common- denominator of our sentiments and emotions." 
In the mood of creative activity the artist stands 
face to face with his personality. "He stands fully con- 
scious of the wavering confines of his conscious mind, an 
expanding and contracting, a fluctuating horizon where the 
light of awareness meets the darkness of oblivion; and in 
keeping aware of that area of light and at the same time 
watching the horizon for a suggestion of more light, the 
poet induces that new light into his consciousness; as 
when, at twilight, no stars are visible to a casual glance, 
but shine out in answer to a concentrated stare. Such 
lights come, of course,' from the latent memory of verbal 
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images in what Freud calls the preconscious state of the 
mind; or from the still obscurer state of the unconscious, 
in which are hidden, not only the neural traces of repressed 
sensations, but also those inherited patterns which deter- 
mine our instincts. But it is not inspiration alone - not 
the sudden ingress of light - which makes the poet; that 
is only the intermission which, if isolated, leads to an 
easy despair. The essential faculty is an awareness of 
one's own personality, and the capacity to cultivate its 
inherent activities 'without division or inner revolt...' "(1) 
The scientific value of such an analysis depends, of 
course, upon the value of the psycho- analytic theory upon 
which it is founded; but, viewed in the light of itead's 
illuminating illustrations, it is both suggestive and plaus- 
ible. There is no gainsaying the fact that in his so- called 
inspired moments the artist achieves contact with a self 
that is normally hidden, and that this self is closely con- 
nected with the deeper levels of his psyche. But whether 
it is scientifically possible to identify the personality 
with the ego is a question which present -day psychology is 
unable to answer. The nature and function of the so- called 
"unconscious" is still in dispute, and until psycho -analysts 




far brought forth, little progress is likely to be made. 
"The term 'unconscious'," states Dr. Goddard,(1) "may have 
justification if it can be used in the right way. It may 
also be useful to designate that part of the so- called un- 
conscious which is more easily recalled as the fore -con- 
scious or co- conscious. When the psycho- analysts will ... 
translate their explanations into neural terms, or terms 
consistent with the known facts of brain physiology, much 
of the objection to it and many of the difficulties now en- 
countered will disappear, and we will be on the road to a 
true science of psycho- analysis and the unconscious." But 
taking Ir. head's suggestion for what it is worth, there 
can be little quarrel with the assumption that the secrets 
of personality are not to be found in any theory which dis- 
regards the existence of the hidden self and its essential 
function in the inspiration of the artist. Art, then, may 
be defined as the expression of personality in terms of a 
chosen medium controlled and directed by sensibility. 
"Our little life is rounded with sleep; our conscious 
existence is a spot of light, rounded or begirt with a haze 
(1) Goddard, H. H., "The Unconscious in Psycho- Analysis," 
Problems of Personality, p.329. 
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of slumber - not a dead but a living slumber, dimly - 
lighted and like a visible darkness, but full of dreams 
and irrepressible activity, an unknown and indefinable, 




PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
AESTHETIC APPRECIATION. 
(From the Scottish Educational Journal, Volume XVIII, 
Nos. 51 and 52, 1935.) 
I. Preliminary. 
Art education is a two -fold process: on the one hand, 
the cultivation of the child's productive creative ability; 
on the other, the development of his capacity for passive 
or receptive artistic experience. This view is expressed 
in the Handbook of Suggestions for Teachers (Board of Edu- 
cation, 1927) and reiterated in the Report of the Consulta- 
tive Committee on the Primary School (1931), where the aim 
of Art education is defined as follows: "To cultivate in 
the children sufficient skill to enable them to express 
their own ideas in some form of art, and also to stimulate 
the growth of such sympathy and sensitiveness as may lead 
to aesthetic appreciation." 
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II. Mainly Historical. 
1. The increasing amount of time and attention 
accorded to the appreciation lesson during the past few 
years is a reliable indication of the importance now 
attached to it in pedagogic practice. Indeed the percep- 
tual illiteracy of the general public has occupied the minds 
of educationists for a considerable time, and in most pro- 
gressive schools serious efforts have been made to devise 
ways and means of dealing with the problem. To -day its 
solution is probably the most significant issue before 
those charged with the preservation and development of our 
artistic culture. administrative bodies are voting consid- 
erable money for the provision of necessary facili- 
ties and equipment and for the improvement of class -room 
amenity. Responsible officials seize every opportunity to 
urge the necessity for sustained effort and experiment. 
Educational journals regularly devote space and attention 
to the subject; and outside this limited field of publicity, 
in the Press and Wireless Broadcasting, unmistakeable signs 
point to a growing public consciousness of the need for 
guidance and instruction in the exercise of the aesthetic 
faculties. On all hands there is evidence that the devebp- 
ment of the powers of appreciation and discrimination is no 
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longer merely an aspiration of the educational idealist 
but a practical exigency of the highest importance to the 
economic and material well -being of the nation. 
2. The appointment of the Council for Art and Industry 
was the first serious step towards the study of public 
taste and appreciation from the national or economic point 
of view, and, although the first Reports have called forth 
a measure of criticism in some quarters, it cannot be gain- 
said that the Council deserves the support and approbation 
of every responsible educationist. It would be well to 
keep in mind, however, that the outlook of a Council 
sponsored by the Board of Trade must be material rather 
than academic and that the scope of its deliberations is 
necessarily circumscribed by the nature of its mandate. 
Fundamental questions underlying the theory of art educa- 
tion, although extremely pertinent to the topic of public 
taste, cannot therefore be regarded as coming within the 
Council's province of investigation and research. 
3. The primary purpose of this essay is to examine 
the wider question from the educational point of view, in 
order, if possible, to discover whether current practice is 
based on sound assumptions. There is reason to suspect 
that it is not. For, if the larger public was really 
sensitive to the finer qualities of design and construction, 
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it would refrain from -purchasing goods of inferior artistic 
merit and workmanship. Manufacturers would thereby be 
forced to maintain a minimum standard of design in the 
articles offered for sale: in short, the nature of the 
demand would determine the nature of the supply. 
4. This line of argument, however, has frequently been 
attacked on the ground that it is based on a naive econom- 
ics. Many people maintain that the standard of design of 
manufactured wares is not a simple question of demand and 
supply, that the manufacturer merely supplies what he knows 
from experience the public wants, and that his experience 
shows that good designs are all too frequently commercial 
failures: which is an oblique way of asserting that it is 
not the manufacturer who is responsible for the low standard 
of design of manufactured articles, but the debased state 
of public taste. The discriminating public - and it must 
be admitted that this is a comparatively small part of the 
public at large - maintains, in its turn, that, willing as 
it is to pay a slightly higher price for better designed 
products, these are not procurable in the ordinary markets 
patronised by the middle classes. It claims that the 
manufacturer sets his standard by the success or failure 
in the larger market which caters for the less discriminatin 
buyers. The public is blamed in the one instance and the 
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manufacturer in the other. But from whatever angle the 
problem is examined, the general standard of public taste 
appears the main factor to be considered.(1) 
5. There seems to be general agreement that the aver- 
age standard of public taste and aesthetic discrimination 
is unnecessarily low. Attempts have been made to account 
for this by asserting that good taste is a special endow- 
ment accorded to the few. This argument, however, is no 
longer tenable. It is completely refuted by the existence 
of a very high level of taste among extant primitive people 
and among young children whose vision and sensibility have 
not been warped by 'education.' The capacity for artistic 
experience and discrimination is, without doubt, the 
possession of every normal individual. And that capacity 
is capable of being developed by the right kind of environ- 
ment and right teaching and stunted by the wrong kind of 
environment and wrong, teaching. Industrialism, it is 
true, must bear a large share of responsibility for the 
devitalised and debased sensibility of the man- in -the- 
street. But it would be as unjust to charge industrialism 
with all the blame as to foist entire responsibility upon 
the daily press for the indifferent literary taste of the 
(l) 
A point of view quickly realised by the Council for 
Jrt and Industry. 
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greengrocer. The fault, I submit, lies mainly - I shall 
not say exclusively - with the educational system, which 
until now has failed to achieve its Ultimate aim, namely, 
the development in every child of a discriminating sense 
of artistic values. 
6. A detailed examination of the causes of this 
failure would involve an unwarrantable excursion into the 
history of social life and culture in this country during 
the past two centuries. Here it will be sufficient to 
attribute the failure in part to the fact that in the earli- 
er systems of art education the distinction between the 
active and the passive aspects of artistic experience was 
not recognised, and in part to the inherent defects of the 
systems as then practised. These defects have, to a large 
extent, been remedied, but, as the general public standard 
of artistic taste and sensibility remains unsatisfactory, 
it will be worth while to scrutinise current practice in so 
far as it aims specifically at developing art appreciation. 
This scrutiny, I suggest, will reveal two things: first, 
that the diversity of opinion professed and of methods 
practised by art teachers is considerable; and second, 
that behind this admittedly important branch of pedagogic 
practice there exists a confusion that is astonishing in 
the face of the glib utterances of educationists. 
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III. The Development of Art Appreciation: Current Practice. 
1. Broadly speaking, there are two points of view, 
two schools of thought. One school believes that the best 
way to learn to appreciate art is to learn something about 
its production by actual creative experiment. It main- 
tains that the highest form of appreciation is the apprecia- 
tion achieved by the artist himself and that any improve- 
ment in creative ability must produce an improvement in 
appreciative capacity. There is; therefore, no need for 
a separate course in appreciation, since all children re- 
ceive at least eight years' art instruction, irrespective 
of their creative endowments. Allied with this school are 
those who, while believing in the primary importance of 
practice, y -et would combine practice with some form of 
theoretical instruction or passive contact with art. This 
school may conveniently be called the Practical School. 
2. The other or Theoretical School of thought main- 
tains that appreciation does not necessarily involve prac- 
tical creative experience and knowledge, that it is possible 
fully to appreciate a work of art without being able to 
produce one. It believes in giving appreciation an indep- 
endent status and attempts to develop it by one or all of 
four principal methods:- 
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(a) The Historical Method. By teaching the history 
of art, thereby giving the children an introduction to 
its historical evolution. 
(b) The Analytical- Historical .:,Lethod. By teaching 
the history of art and analysing important exa.iiples with a 
view tó emphasising their structural and thematic components, 
thereby (it is claimed) providing the basis of theoretical 
knowledge essential to the highest appreciation. 
(c) The Analytic Method. By analysing selected 
works of art from the standpoint of the so- called rules of 
composition (rhythm, balance, harmony, proportion, unity, 
etc.) and the elementary principles of aesthetics. 
(d) The Comparative Method. By comparing items of 
differing artistic merit, thereby (it is claimed) providing 
the training in discrimination necessary for the attain- 
ment of a sound personal scale of values. 
A fifth, but rather vague practice consists in dis- 
cussing works of art in the light of historical and bio- 
graphical facts which relate to their production and 
creators. 
3. Prima facie it appears quite reasonable to assume 
that creative ability must be highly correlated with 
appreciative capacity, that the artist's appreciation must 
be fuller and richer than the layman's. The assumption 
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rests upon a very doubtful hypothesis. For no evidence 
has ever been produced to prove that the artist's apprecia- 
tion is one whit better than that of the cultured and 
sensitive layman. Indeed, it would not be difficult to 
establish a strong case in support of the contrary argu- 
ment. It mae, be true, however, that some experience of 
producing art is accompanied by a fuller appreciation(l) of 
art in general, but the fact remains that there are thous- 
ands of people with little or no productive artistic 
capacity who yet possess a discriminating sensibility of a 
very high order and are capable of genuine enthusiasm in 
the presence of meritorious work. If the needs of these 
people are neglected, then art education is not fulfilling 
its proper function. The case for the teacher who main- 
tains that practical instruction is the only real training 
in appreciation falls to the ground when he has to deal 
with the pupil whose endowment does not include productive 
creative ability in the plastic arts. 
4. The validity of the hypothesis upon which the 
Theoretical school proceeds is beyond dispute, and for 
this reason it occupies by far the stronger position. 
But when they advance beyond their primary postulate that 
(1) I use the word here in its strictly etymological sense - 
to estimate, judge, appraise. Vide Section IV. 
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practice in artistic production is not essential to 
complete artistic appreciation, its adherents show little 
or no unanimity either of precept or of practice. Each 
teacher makes his own theoretical assumptions and follows 
his own pedagogic method; there is no comon understanding 
or agreement about fundamentals, no body of accepted prin- 
ciples. In actual practice, however, the aualytico- 
historical method - the teaching of the history of art 
coupled with the analysis of selected works in order to 
display their historical setting and to bring to light the 
main elements of their structure and content - appears to 
be the most favoured one. It appeals to prevailing 
opinion on theoretical grounds and accords with the long- 
established practice of historical and technical analysis 
adopted in teaching the appreciation of literature. Next 
should be mentioned the teaching of art history alone, 
which by many teachers is believed to be an adequate and 
satisfactory method of dealing with the problem. whether 
this is so or not depends, of course, upon the view taken 
of the meaning and scope of art history. In its most 
thorough -going form the analytical method is practised 
mainly in America, where it has attracted favour, both in 
the art curricula of high schools and in the courses of the 
university art departments. The method of comparison is 
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one of the newer approaches which has many advantages, 
since it appeals directly to the artistic sensibility 
through first -hand visual experience. The biographical 
approach is not generally recognised as adequate in itself; 
it is used oftenest in association with the other methods, 
as providing a desirable supplement to analytical and 
historical study. 
IV. Theoretical Considerations. 
1. The analytico-historical method, it may now be 
noted, is adopted on the theoretical assumption that "art 
appreciation" is essentially a rational process which in- 
volves historical and technical knowledge, or is founded, 
at least, on rational processes of mind such as those which 
precede the judgments of Kunstforscher, connoisseurs and 
historians. Which brings me to the central points of my 
argument: That (i) the experience commonly known as "art 
appreciation" is a relatively superficial experience of 
the real import of meritorious art, and (ii) that there is 
a more fundamental and potentially richer mode of artistic 
experience which is independent of historical and technical 
knowledge, being founded on the capacity for immediate 
apprehension of universal art value. But, as I desire 
to proceed cautiously, I shall turn aside for a moment to 
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examine briefly the history and meaning of the term 
"ap_reciation." And, since I make no claims to philologic- 
al expertise, I shall have recourse to the authority of the 
Oxford English Dictionary. (1) 
2. Unfortunately, no mention is made of the specific- 
ally aesthetic connotation of the term. "appreciate," 
meaning etymologically "to form an estimate of worth, 
quality or amount" appears first to have been introduced 
into the language about the year 1769. In 1798 it took 
on the connotation "to estimate aright" and in 1820 the 
further connotation "to perceive, to be sensitive to;" 
not until 1833 did it acquire the meaning "to be sensitive 
to, or sensible of, any delicate impression or distinction" 
- which probably suggested its relevance to aesthetic ex- 
perience, philosophy and discourse. Its specifically 
aesthetic connotation is, therefore, a comparatively modern 
linguistic phenomenon, not unconnected, as I hope to show, 
with the history of modern(2) aesthetic philosophy and the 
history of the philosophy of European education. 
The gradual expansion of the meaning and connotation 
attaching to the term, it will have been observed, is 
(1) Shorter Edition, 1933. 
(2) As distinct from contemporary aesthetic philosophy. 
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centrifugal in nature; it spreads outwards, as it were, 
from an unambiguous centre to a vague and diffused peri- 
phery, but it has never lost its literal and etymological 
significance, namely, "to form an estimate of worth, quality 
or amount." Consequently, the term "appreciation" in one 
of its principal applications is normally held to imply 
a weighing -up process, a judgmental act of a rational kind: 
in other words, a species of logical judgment. For in- 
stance: "I appreciate your argument;" "I appreciate your 
desire to go abroad;" "I appreciate the difficulty of 
your situation;" "this poet is not easy to appreciate." 
3. The term "art appreciation" carries with it the 
same connotation; the concepts worth, quality, value are 
essential constituents of its linguistic history. To 
appreciate a work of art is to know its merits and demerits, 
to appraise them, and in the process of knowledge and 
appraising, to enjoy. Hence "art appreciation" is regarded 
as a special and somewhat exalted form of pleasure, depend- 
ing upon a peculiar amalgam of a priori and empirical 
knowledge and sustained by a more or less effortless act 
of will. That is to say, in the act of appreciating a 
work of art, the agent, aided by his knowledge, intelligence 
and reason and supported by his past experience, uplifts 
himself (or rather finds himself uplifted) for a time from 
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the unblessed valley of the prosaic world into a higher 
world of rare experience and intense awareness. An exam- 
ination of everyday- language, however, shows that three 
different, but not very clearly defined, senses of the 
term "art appreciation" are current: - 
(a) Expert Appreciation. It is used (as above) with 
reference to the capacity to judge and enjoy the work of 
art in the light of experience and specialised knowledge 
of art in general. 
(b) Naive Appreciation. It is used (to a very 
limited extent) with reference to the capacity to derive 
artistic satisfaction and enjoyment from art independently 
of specialised knowledge. 
(c) Learned Appreciation. It is used. to denote a 
composite kind of "artistic" experience resulting from . 
the influence of learning upon direct experience, superior 
importance being attached to the intellectual ingredient. 
Any general analysis, however, is almost bound to 
prove inadequate, since the term "art appreciation" may 
mean anything in the form of art experience, from the 
a priori judgment of the expert to the naive enthusiasm 
of the peasant. But in most usages (except b) the primary 
importance of knowledge (as distinct from direct intuitive 
experience) appears to be firmly established. And this 
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is just as might have been expected, considering the 
literal and etymological history of the term and the cir- 
cumstances in which it was absorbed into the vocabulary of 
aesthetic philosophy and discourse - a point of view I 
wish now briefly to consider. 
4. Prior to the emergence of the contemporary (psy- 
chological) standpoint, the history of European Aesthetics 
is :Mainly the history of philosophic inquiry into the 
nature of beauty as the essential criterion and quality 
of Art - Art itself being regarded as a species of know- 
ledge capable of rationalistic explanation and abstract 
intellectual analysis. Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff, it 
will be recalled, had all recognised an "obscure" kind of 
Knowledge associated with the passions and sense perceptions 
and available to mind through feeling. This type of 
knowledge was in direct contrast to the science and method 
of Logic, which aimed at clear knowledge. Baumgarten, 
wishing to complete the Leibnizian theory, therefore, in- 
troduced the prior science of sensible or "obscure" know- 
ledge which he called Aesthetic - the philosophic theory 
of perceptual knowledge which Kant developed into a logic 
of aesthetic judgment. The term "aesthetic," however, 
quickly lost its original narrow connotation - to perceive 
by a sense, and especially an external sense - Kant being 
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the last to use it as its originator had intended. Its 
current use, though firmly established, is neither etymol- 
ogically accurate nor historically justified. Properly 
regarded, Aesthetics is the science of sense perception - 
"the science of perceptual knowledge," as Banmgarten defined 
it. It excludes from its purview the rational, the con- 
ceptual, and all mediate awareness and experience. Philo- 
sophical aesthetics, however, has tended to uphold the 
concept in relation to artistic experience and, because 
pedagogy has looked more to philosophy than to psychology 
for its theoretical sanctions, the term "art appreciation" 
has taken on a predominantly intellectual colouring. 
V. Pedagogical and Psychological Considerations. 
1. The conception of art as painted or sculptured 
philosophy, however, only partly accounts for the intellect- 
ualistic connotation attaching to the term "art apprecia- 
tion;" there is the prior influence of philosophy itself. 
European philosophy has consistently exalted intellect and 
reason above feeling and intuition, and since the doctrines 
and institutions of educational practice have always been 
dependent on current philosophies, the "educated" view of 
art and art appreciation is rationalistic, intellectual. 
To admit that the source of art might be found in the more 
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"obscure" functions of mind would be, according to tradi- 
tional standards of culture, a degradation of it and a 
gratuitous insult to world- recognised genius. The great 
philosophic systems, wherein the conception of life under- 
lying the prevailing culture is clearly reflected, for the 
most part see in some form of logic the deepest and finally 
directive discipline. "The conception," declares Jaensch,l` 
"appears in two substantially different forms. In the one, 
the thought process as conceived by the science of logic 
is regarded as giving to our whole method of acquiring 
knowledge, and, therefore, to our whole specifically human 
conception of the world, its deepest basis and final justi- 
fication. A.t the same time it lays down the forms that 
reality has to assume in order to become an object for 
knowledge (logic as a system of "innate ideas" or "rational 
truths" or even as "transcendental logic. ") sat the ra- 
tionalistic hypothesis also appears in a second and more 
far -reaching form. Thought as conceived by the science 
of logic is not only regarded as laying down the forms and 
foundations for our methods of acquiring knowledge, and 
therefore for our conception of the world: Being and the 
world are themselves regarded' as the products of thought 
( "metaphysical logic" and "logical Idealism. ") The systems 
(1) Jaensch, E. R., Eidetic Imagery, pp.43 -45. 
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of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and the Neo- 
Kantians conform to one or other of these types, or both." 
:educational practice has thus modelled itself upon the 
science of logic. Subjects are taught logically; "they 
appear as a framework of logic filled in with facts. 
Inner participation is not directed to the subject but to 
the form of thought (formula, rule) which it expresses." 
Throughout every department of education the logician's 
ideal predominates; intellect - "the faculty of knowing 
and reasoning" as opposed to the faculty of imagining or 
intuiting - is the final criterion of "education." Train- 
ing in art appreciation has therefore come to mean only one 
thing: training in estimating, appraising and judging art. 
2. Now, it may be agreed, having regard both to the 
evidence of etymology and the sanction of common usage, 
that the term "art appreciation" is peculiarly appropriate 
to at least one aspect of the experience or process it is 
intended to denote - weighing -up, estimating, judging. 
But in all genuine art experience there is a satisfaction 
gained that is independent of any intellectual judgmental 
act and more than a mere response to the sensuous phenomena 
of art. For the sensuous phenomena hold a vision of life 
that demands an extension of the normal range of human 
perception for its apprehension. Common usage, however, 
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appears to imply some sort of satisfaction of this kind, 
but the emphasis upon the judgmental act is so strong that 
it is generally assumed that without it appreciation in 
any real sense cannot be said to take place. In other 
words, the work of art cannot be "appreciated" unless it 
is appraised - which is assuredly not the case, since 
nothing could be more immediate and instantaneous than 
the satisfaction appropriate to artistic experience. 
Common usage of the term appears, then, to confuse or re- 
gard as one, two separate processes and two independent 
experiences: on the one hand, the intellectual (judgmental) 
process and the resultant satisfaction (the judgment); on 
the other the artistic apprehensive process and the satis- 
faction which accompanies it. This distinction, I submit, 
is fundamental to the whole problem underlying the psycho- 
logy and pedagogy of art appreciation and until it is es- 
tablished in the minds of those responsible for the educa- 
tion of public taste little real progress is likely to 
accrue. The term "art appreciation" means nothing more 
than Clive Bell's "enthusiastic analysis, "(1) a conversation 
between a work of art and an aesthete about the work of art 
and the aesthete. Prior to this, however, there is the 
experience of "aesthetic ecstasy," the first brilliant 
(1) Enjoying Pictures, p.21. 
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shock of artistic awareness. 
b. Responsible exponents of the theory of art are for 
the most part in agreement as to the directness, the im- 
mediacy of the art experience and its independence of the 
rational intellect. This view is not the result of the 
recent philosophic trend towards the exploitation of the 
alogical, but to a deeper understanding of the nature of 
art itself. Contemporary theory looks not to philosophy 
for its cue, but to psychology, ethnology, anthropology 
and kindred sciences. Recent researches into the origin 
and significance of primitive and savage art have thrown 
a flood of light upon their fundamental nature and upon 
the path which future investigators must follow. The 
philosophic approach, though pursued with earnestness and 
hope, has led to an arid and melancholy wilderness swept 
by every wind of the spirit. 11.ttention is now directed to 
origins, to the psychology of the artist himself, whether 
he be a Polynesian potter, a child in the kindergarten or 
a member of the Royal Academy. The question of ultimate 
values alone is left to philosophy. 
From the contemporary psychological standpoint art 
experience has nothing to do with knowledge or the rational 
intellect or academic culture; it begins with a stirring of 
the senses, an acute responsiveness to subtle qualitative 
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differences of line, of form, colour, texture, rhythm, 
pattern. At a' higher stage it means an enrichment of life 
through intuitive apprehensions of meaning and value, a 
quickening of the pulse, a stretching of the mind beyond 
the normal range of experience. This, I submit, is the 
type of art experience which should be placed, not, indeed, 
in opposition to the appreciative experience just discussed, 
but prior to it or above it; and its development should. be 
the central aim of every scheme of art instruction. In 
the course of its history, art has assumed appearances 
that are not of its essential nature. The traditional 
worship of the rational intellect has forced it into 
moulds that have warped and deformed its features. h 
return to the original paths of primitive perception must, 
therefore, precede any serious effort to understand art 
and explain its nature; and an exhaustive psychological 
study of the modes of perception must be the first step 
towards the formulation of those pedagogic principles 
without which no system of art education is either secure 
or satisfactory. 
4. Sensibility is the foundation of artistic experi- 
ence whether that experience be productive or receptive. 
The term is admittedly a vague one, capable of diverse 
interpretations, but its significance from the standpoint 
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of the theory of art lies precisely in the stress it lays 
upon the feelings and senses. In artistic discourse it 
denotes acute responsiveness to the formal elements of art 
and to the state or states of mind, of which the formal 
elements are the objective equivalents. It implies a psy- 
cho- physical organism susceptible, in more or less degree, 
to acute stimulation by the pattern and rhythm of form, and 
through and beyond that to the fundamental universal moods 
and emotions that supply driving force to life, making it 
not an isolated and individual phenomenon but an expanding 
continuum of experience. The rational intellect provides a 
mode of experience apart: it is interpretative, explanatory, 
systematic, scientific. Its function is to order our con- 
cepts, to systematise our knowledge. The function of the 
artistic sensibility, on the other hand, is to order our 
visual percepts and systematise our feelings. Knowledge of 
the rational kind is, therefore, irrelevant to artistic ex- 
perience as such; it is always knowledge about not knowledge 
of which is the primary condition of living art value. 
To round off this topic I should like.to quote two 
passages which seemed to me to be peculiarly relevant to 
the foregoing argument. The first is from Sir William 
Mitchell's Structure and Growth of the vïind: "Absorption 
in an object consists in attending to it, and so thinking 
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it fully, from interest in the object itself. The last 
words distinguish the experience from others where we are 
absorbed, but not absorbed in the object... In absorption 
in or with (an object), in all great attention, we prevent 
our thoughts from wandering: we hold the object before us 
with or without effort, and with less effort the more we 
are absorbed. pie may do it in order to understand the 
object better, or in order to act in view of it. Our 
interest is then cognitive, however fascinating the problem, 
or practical, however exciting the occasion. But when we 
attend to the object for nothing but the interest in itself, 
then the more it interests, fascinates, possesses, carries 
us away - the words are worth observing - the more we are 
absorbed in it. We may at the same time have a purpose to 
understand it, and a practical purpose with it, but so far 
we deal differently with the object in attending to it. 
For then we are absorbed not in the object, but in our pur- 
pose with it; we take a critical attitude towards the ob- 
ject, or we make it merely a means; its value, the satis- 
faction we find in it, is not on its own account; we are 
not absorbed in it, but only absorbed or occupied with it. 
It is when we have no ulterior consideration or purpose that 
we can freely indulge in experience of it... 
"When absorbed we are said to lose ourselves, meaning 
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that we lose thought of ourselves. 'There is no more 
mystery in this than in our ignoring the things about us 
of which we usually take thought on slight occasions. But 
confusion is certain, if the self as subject is not distin- 
guished from the self as object of experience. It is not 
always subject, but it is only an object when we set it 
before us. When we are speaking of self- forgetting or 
losing ourselves in thought, we simply mean that the dis- 
tinction between ourself and other objects is not before us.. 
The self -forgetting is usually greater when our absorption 
is in the object than when it is in a purpose to understand 
it, or to act regarding it. For the sense of something to 
achieve, the criticising, the choosing, indeed the mere 
looking forward, all tend to drive us from indulgence to 
take thought of our going. But to be absorbed in an object 
is all indulgence; and, when the object is experienced as 
individual, we live it. "(l) 
Out of its proper context the passage-loses much of 
its richness, but, alike in the profundity of its thought 
and the precision of its statement, these words give added 
significance and meaning to a distinction, the full implica- 
tion of which it is impossible to follow up. 
(1) pp. 104-192. 
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The second passage is from Henri _Bergson's Laughter.(1) 
"From time to time, in a fit of absent -mindedness,. nature 
raises up souls that are more detached from life. Not 
with that intentional, logical, systematical detachment - 
the result of reflection and philosophy, but rather with a 
natural detachment, one innate in the structure of sense or 
consciousness, which at once reveals itself by a virginal 
manner, so to speak, of seeing, hearing, or thinking... 
"One man applies himself to colours and forms, and 
since he loves colour for colour and form for form, since 
he perceives them for their sake and not for his own, it 
is the inner life of things that he sees appearing through 
their form and colours. Little by little he insinuates it 
into our own perception, baffled though we may be at the 
outset. For a few moments at least, he diverts us from 
the prejudices' of form and colour that come between our- 
selves and reality. And thus he realises the loftiest 
ambition of art, which here consists in revealing to us 
nature. Others, again, retire within themselves. 13eneath 
the thousand rudimentary actions which are the outward and 
visible signs of an emotion, behind the commonplace, conven- 
tional expression that both reveals and conceals an individ- 
ual mental state, it is the emotion, the original mood, to 
(1) Quoted by IIerbert Read, Art Now, pp. 54-56. 
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which they attain in its undefiled essence. And then, to 
induce us to make the same effort ourselves, they contrive 
to make us see something of what they have seen: by rhythm- 
ical arrangement of words, which thus become organised and 
animated with a life of their own, they tell us - or rather 
suggest - things that speech was not calculated to express. 
Others delve deeper still. Beneath these joys and sorrows 
which can, at a pinch, be translated into language, they 
grasp something that has nothing in common with language, 
certain rhythms of life and breath that are closer to man 
than his inmost feelings, being the living law - varying 
with each individual - of his enthusiasm and despair, his 
hopes and regrets. By setting free and emphasising this 
music, they force it upon our attention; they compel us, 
willy- nilly, to fall in with it, like passers -by who join 
in a dance. And thus they impel us to set in motion, in 
the depths of our being, some secret chord which was only 
waiting to thrill..." 
5. Before concluding I should like to mention one 
further influence which has contributed towards the estab- 
lishment of the intellectualistic interpretation of art 
appreciation. I refer to the preeminence of the classical 
tradition in the system of European art values. Greek art 
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is an intellectual art, in that it was concerned with the 
plastic representation of philosophic ideals, but it is 
great not because it is intellectual, but because it is the 
apotheosis of one great world style. Too much earnest 
scholarship has been directed by classical enthusiasts 
towards the interpretation of Greek art, and too little by 
critics of sensibility. Its defects and limitations have 
scarcely been noticed; it has been worshipped as the type 
of all art, the zenith of artistic achievement. In the 
hands of a critic like parch Phillipps, Greek art is set in 
a new perspective. writing(1) of the transition from the 
immobility of Egyptian and Assyrian art to the animated art 
of Greece, he pictures the figures of men struggling into 
reality and life as the new intellectual faculty is brought 
into action. This, however, remarks only half the interest 
derivable from the study of Greek sculpture, for, if it 
reveals the dawn of intellect, it reveals also the nature, 
proportions and limitations of intellect. Greek sculpture 
is a definition and therefore a criticism of intellectualism; 
in defining what it is it indicates what it is not. In 
spite of its sculptured clearness Greek thought has proved 
inadequate to human needs. Its very perfection is its 
greatest defect. Pure form denotes exact definition, and 
( 1) The dorks of laan, pp. 94-96. 
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exact definition involves limitation. The consciousness 
of limitation in Greek literature and art is, perhaps, pro- 
duced by the inherent tendency of the Greek mind to rely 
solely on the rational and intellectual faculties, and to 
ignore as much as possible the spiritual aspects of exper- 
ience, whose mode of procedure is pure receptivity and 
contemplation. The exquisite lucidity of Greek thought 
and the purity of form of Greek sculpture are due to the 
exclusion of those vague and indefinite ideas characteristic 
of inward vision and enlightenment. This "spiritual 
prompting" cannot be permanently ignored, because it con- 
stitutes that "something" beyond intellectualism which we 
demand and which the ancients "can never give." 
Narrow 
The heart that loves. The brain that 
Contemplates... 
One object, and one form. 
VI. Conclusion. 
If the foregoing thesis is sound, two conclusions are 
possible: First, that the preëminence accorded to the 
rational intellect in the concept of "art appreciation" 
has tended to obscure the primary importance of artistic 
sensibility in artistic experience, and that certain preval- 
ent methods of teaching designed to develop the love of art 
are founded upon false hypotheses as to the fundamental 
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nature of art experience and are calculated to hinder its 
proper development by creating a wrong orientation. The 
kind of knowledge imparted by current courses in art appre- 
ciation is for the most part knowledge about art; it is 
as irrelevant, as Ducasse(1) points out, to artistic experi- 
ence as knowledge about wines is to the enjoyment of fine 
wine. For the enjoyment of fine wine all that is necessary 
is the capacity to taste. But if we desire to enjoy the 
fineness as well as the taste of the wine we require know- 
ledge, since the pleasure we seek is not merely sensuous 
but also intellectual. To the connoisseur the knowledge 
that the wine he tastes is old and rare and famous is a 
source of keen pleasure. That pleasure, however, is quite 
distinct from the taste of the wine, which any man, untutored 
in the history and the lore of wines, may enjoy quite as 
keenly as the connoisseur, if he but have a tongue sensitive 
to the subtle qualities of blend and flavour:(2) his pleas- 
ure may, indeed, be keener than that of the connoisseur, 
since his attention to the sense of taste is not distracted 
by any irrelevant factors. But this analogy, for a very 
obvious reason, must not be pressed too far; mind and 
í1i Ducasse, C. J., The Philosophy of Art, p.227. 
(2) 
This, it may be at once conceded, involves training; but 
it is not a training of the mind, but of the tongue or 
sense of taste. 
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matter are categories of opposite philosophies; yet it 
expresses in a somewhat crude form an important psychologic- 
al truth, which has been too easily obscured. Knowledge 
about art is essential to the expert, the historian, the 
critic - all men of science; but "The fact that someone 
makes confident judgments concerning the aesthetic worth 
of various works of art, and supports his judgment by im- 
pressively technical reasons, is ... no more a proof that 
he possesses any capacity for aesthetic feeling or aesthet- 
ic pleasure than is Helen Keller's ability to say when she 
is among trees a proof that she possesses the capacity to 
see them. ílí 
The second conclusion is that the time is ripe for a 
thorough examination of the whole field of aesthetics, 
with a view to re- orientating the pedagogic theory of art 
and the consideration of the problem of how best to develop 
artistic sensibility. That this is an immense problem 
need hardly be stated, but if once it were isolated and 
studied the desired methods would no doubt be forthcoming. 
At present the only hope, so far as the school is concerned, 
lies in the provision of a proper environment, the intelli- 
gent exploitation of the Method of Comparison and the incul- 
cation of a proper attitude. From the pedagogical point 
(1) Ducasse, C. J., The Philosophy of Art, p.228. 
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of view appreciation should be regarded solely as a branch 
of theoretical study, embracing the framework of art his- 
tory, the outlines of the theory of art, and the elementary 
principles of aesthetics. 
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THE CRITERION OF ACCURACY IN REPRESENTATIONAL ART. 
(From the British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol.III 
Part II, June, 1933.) 
I. Introductory. 
The opinion which this paper will express, and 
attempt to substantiate, is that the criterion of accuracy 
employed as a means of estimating drawing ability and accep- 
ted as an aim in the teaching of representational drawing 
is psychologically unsound and detrimental to the develop- 
ment of true artistic ability. It will be concerned to 
show that the aesthetic and educational theory underlying 
the teaching of representational drawing is not only at 
variance with the historical development of world art, but 
is out of touch with modern tendencies in art and with the 
findings of modern psychology. 
H. Definitions. 
At the outset it will be advisable to define several 
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terms which will appear frequently throughout the paper. 
A clear understanding of these terms will materially aid 
in following the argument. 
(1) Drawing. The term "drawing" will be employed to 
connote (a) the act of reproducing upon paper or canvas in 
an artistic manner, the appearance of an object or objects 
as observed from a particular point of view, by means of 
lines, colours, tones and masses; and (b) the product of 
such an act. 
(2) Representational Drawings. This term will be em- 
ployed to connote (a) the act of reproducing as accurately 
as possible, upon paper or canvas, the supposed appearance 
of an object or group of objects as observed from a partic- 
ular point of view; and (b) the product of such an act. 
(3) Art. This term will be employed to connote (a) 
a fundamental activity of man exercised for its own sake, 
issuing in the creation of sensuous objects, each of which 
expresses or embodies in its wholeness the psycho -physical 
state of its creator and yields him an immediate and unique 
satisfaction; and (b) the products of such an activity, 
generally called "works of art." 
III. Historical Résumé. 
(a) It has long been recognised that the aim of art 
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teaching is twofold:(1) "to cultivate in the children 
sufficient skill to enable them to express their own ideas 
in some form of art, and also to stimulate the growth of 
such sympathy and sensitiveness as may lead eventually to 
aesthetic appreciation." In the past, the executive, as 
distinct from the receptive, aspect of the artistic activity 
has been given undue preëminence in the course of instruc- 
tion. This may be attributed partly to the original 
utilitarian purpose of 'art' education, as prescribed by 
the Department of Science and Art, and partly to the failure 
of educationists to observe the distinction between the 
productive and the receptive aspects of the artistic activ- 
ity to which I have just referred. 
(b) A long period'of experimentation followed the 
introduction of 'art' instruction into the school curricul- 
um. At first the course was very limited and, strictly 
speaking, could not be described as art instruction at all. 
(1)Report of the Consultative Committee on the Primary 
School. Board of Education. (H.M. Stationery Office,) 
p.189. Vide also Curriculum for Pupils of Twelve to Fif- 
teen Years (Advanced Division), Scottish Council for Re- 
search in Education, University of London Press, 1931, 
Section VII, Art and Craftmanship, p.184. Aim, "To develop 
in the pupil a consciousness of beauty, the habit of acquir- 
ing and expressing knowledge in form and colour, and the 
practice of critical judgment in aesthetic products; to 
stimulate the creative impulse to Art, and improve construc- 
tion by inculcating the idea that beauty and fitness for 
purpose are inseparable." 
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The syllabus "took no note of the natural instincts and 
interests of children - being based upon that used for the 
training of adults engaged in industrial occupations. "(1) 
Gradually, as educationists began to recognise the true 
nature of art and its significance in life and education, 
the aims of instruction were modified'and extended. In 
the absence, however, of a sound theory of art education, 
and in deference to a stubborn conservatism, the old methods 
were continued, with various modifications, to meet the wider 
ideals. The main purpose of the course was to enable the 
pupil to represent with reasonable accuracy anything he saw. 
Despite the advancement of a more enlightened view of the 
artistic activity, representational drawing "at present occu- 
pies the first place in most schools for older scholars. "(2) 
IV. Assumptions underlying Present Theory and Practice. 
Three main assumptions underlie present theory and 
practice in art education: (a) That all children are 
educable as graphic executants, and that this is desirable; 
(1) Handbook of Suggestions for Teachers, Board of Education, 
p.270. 
(2) Ibid. p.272 (ii.) Vide also (a) Circular 30 (1932), 
Scottish Educational Department, p.18, Section VII, Art. 
"Each coarse should be well balanced and should be based on 
a foundation of sound representational work;" and (b) Curri- 
culum for Pupils of Twelve to Fifteen Years (Advanced 
Division), University of London Press, pp.189 -190. 
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(b) that representational drawing supplies the disciplinary 
training in technical skill necessary for complete artistic 
expression;(1) (c) that technical knowledge and practical 
experience are necessary for complete appreciation of art.2) 
(a) Regarding the first of these assumptions, it will 
generally be agreed that all children (excepting physical 
and mental defectives) are educable in a practical, artistic 
sense within certain limits, but as these limits depend 
upon the original endowment of the pupil, it is very doubt- 
ful whether continuous executive training, as presently 
understood, is desirable in all cases. it may be noted, 
first, that only a small proportion of pupils attending 
school will ever be called upon to create (graphically), 
and that only those specially endowed will create out of 
spontaneous impulse. In the second place, the present 
system of executive training, being based upon skill rather 
than art, does not, I submit, lead to the development of 
true ability in graphic art. And, in the third place, by 
giving precedence to these aspects of the productive artistic 
activity which are concerned with graphic processes, the 
(1) 
Handbook of suggestions for Teachers, p.272 (ii). 
Representational drawing "supplies the technical skill which 
forms the practical basis of art." 
(2) Ibid. p.273. "Persons who have some degree of practical 
skill in any of the arts appreciate that art more fully 
than those who have none." 
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present practice tends to overlook the true artistic and 
educational significance of craftmanship. These objections 
point to a new conception of art education, which will pro- 
vide greater facilities for the development of its receptive 
aspect, and for the inclusion of a greater amount of craft 
and handwork than present practice allows. 
(b) With regard to the second assumption, that repres- 
entational drawing supplies the disciplinary training in 
technical skill necessary for complete artistic expression, 
it cannot be admitted that this is a valid base upon which 
to found a theory of art education. The assumption is 
open to three main objections. First, that the type of 
technical skill developed by representational drawing is 
altogether different from that required in art. Technical 
skill involves (i) the manipulation of a medium and (ii) a 
motive or purpose. When the former is adequate to the 
demands of the latter, technical skill is functioning at 
its highest level of efficiency. In this sense it would 
be right to describe as a good technician a juggler whose 
manipulation of his material was adequate to his motive; 
but it would be wrong to describe him as a good artist. 
This is not to assert that the juggler may not be an artist, 
but his claim to this designation can only be upheld if his 
motive is to express an artistic purpose, and not to juggle, 
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and only in so far as he successfully achieves that purpose. 
Similarly, a painter who manipulates his medium in order 
accurately to represent the visible appearance of an object- 
ive fact may be described as a good technician, if his mani- 
pulation of his medium is adequate to his representational 
purpose, but he can claim to be an artist only by abandoning 
his representational purpose and manipulating his medium in 
a manner which adequately expresses an artistic one. Thus 
the process of manipulating a medium towards the end of 
representation cannot be regarded as an exercise of the art- 
istic activity, but a mere exercise of technical skill; and 
from the point of view of art education the exercise of the 
artistic mental power is fundamental. In the second place, 
representational technical skill can only secure literal 
transcription of what is supposed to be the visible appear- 
ance of objects; which is, properly regarded, not an artis- 
tic, but a scientific achievement. I have italicised the 
word "supposed" because it has been experimentally demon - 
strated(1) that there is considerable divergence between 
what the eye actually sees and the shapes and sizes in plane 
projection which are determined by the laws of perspective. 
There is, therefore, no objective criterion of visible 
(l) 
I1houless, R. H., "Phenomenal Regression to the Real Ob- 
ject," British Journal of Psychology, Vols. XXI, XXII. 
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appearance. Representational drawing must accordingly be 
judged by mathematical standards (the spatial properties of 
the plane projection); and this, from the point of view of 
art education, is absurd. And, in the third place, the 
assumption is at variance with the evidence of history; in 
point of fact, it is refuted alike by Classic, Oriental, 
Gothic and cdod.ern art. To indulge in a detailed argument 
here in support of this contention is unnecessary; the 
statement is justified by established historical fact. It 
is sufficient to point out that the history of Classic art 
shows that when representation became an end in itself, as 
in the Hellenistic period, the quality of art deteriorated. 
Oriental art has never embraced representationalism; and 
the finest manifestations of Gothic art are as far removed 
from representation as day is from night. Modern art like- 
wise refutes the assumption. The naïve art of Le Douanier 
Rousseau,(1) who began serious painting late in life without 
any technical knowledge, in particular may be cited in 
justification of my contention that modern art refutes the 
(1) Le Douanier Rousseau (1844 -1910) was at one time an ex- 
cise officer. In his spare time he played the violin and 
painted pictures. When over forty years of age he gave up 
his post to devote the rest of his life to art. He "knew 
nothing of drawing as it was taught in the art schools, and 
nothing of impressionism," but "his hand did exactly what 
his mind, his spirit and his imagination willed." (íd lenski 
R. H., French Painting, Medici Society, pp.327 -329). 
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aesthetic and educational theory underlying the teaching 
of representational drawing. 
(c) The validity of the third assumption depends upon 
the meaning attached to the term "appreciation." in aes- 
thetics this term is used in two not very clearly defined 
senses: first, with reference to the capacity to estimate 
or judge the work of art in the light of previous knowledge 
and experience; second, with reference to the capacity to 
derive aesthetic satisfaction and enjoyment from art, in- 
dependently of previous knowledge and experience. The term 
is employed in a third sense, which partakes of both mean- 
ings, but this usage is so vague and unscientific as to 
render its discussion here impossible. In its essence, art 
appreciation is, as McDougall asserts,(1) "an attitude in 
which we are content to contemplate without belief or doubt; 
we accept and enjoy the appearance without enquiring into 
the reality of that which appears, just because the appear- 
ance yields an immediate satisfaction." Such an attitude 
is, I submit, psychologically incompatible with the intell- 
ectual process of estimating, judging, and criticising 
implied in the first and third of these usages. If this 
view be accepted, then the validity of the third assumption 
underlying the present theory and practice of art education 
(1) McDougall, V., An Outline of Psychology, p.376. 
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cannot be admitted. 
V. 'Drawing' and 'Art.' 
From the standpoint of art education, the distinction 
between 'drawing' and 'art' is of fundamental importance. 
As a consequence of the teaching practice of the past, the 
term 'drawing' has acquired a meaning in everyday language 
which limits its application to representational drawing, 
as defined in Section II of this paper. In recent years, 
however, as a result of a change in fundamental ideas con- 
cerning the artistic activity, the course of instruction in 
art has manifestly altered. The introduction of imaginative 
drawing, design and craftwork has been'an important forward 
step in the history of art education. But current practice, 
with its insistence upon representational drawing, suggests 
that educationists have not yet fully realised the true 
significance of the change in terminology now generally 
employed in educational discourse.(1) Contrary to current 
(1) Witness (a) the fact that "drawing" is the official 
designation applied to the subject by the Board of Education 
(Handbook of Suggestions for Teachers); and (b) that "draw- 
ing and elementary art" is used in the Report of the Consult- 
ative Committee on the Primary School (1931), as if to draw 
a distinction between these two activities. While admitting 
the relevance of technical studies to art training, the 
committee is careful to issue a warning against possible 
dangers: "By training mere technical skill it is possible 
to foster the desire to draw, but it is essential that the 
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opinion, representational drawing is, I submit, neither a 
desirable nor an essential discipline for the attainment of 
artistic expression. Technical skill in art is not a 
matter of routine learning, but a personal quest and dis- 
covery of the means necessary for the expression of artistic 
feeling; and this can be developed only by the constant 
exercise of the artistic mental power. If my thesis is 
right, then what passes as art education at present is not 
true art education at all, but mainly (though not wholly), 
training in scientific technical skill. 
VI. Ability in Representational Drawing. 
(a) Broadly speaking, there may be distinguished three 
main classes of executants, graded according to their rep- 
resentational drawing ability. In estimating this ability 
art should remain within the child's natural understanding 
and ability, and should not assume an artificial and sophis- 
ticated quality because undue emphasis is laid on technique.' 
(p.190). Again, in the publication Curriculum for Pupils 
of Twelve to Fifteen Years (Advanced Division), issued by 
the Scottish Council for Research in Education (1931), the 
distinction between 'drawing' and ,'art' is noted (p.189), 
but the need for realistic representation is admitted, be- 
cause it leads to the acquisition of "technical skill in 
various media and the development of appreciation" (p.183; 
the italics are mine), and because "representational draw- 
ing is undoubtedly suited for school work, in that it is 
less affected by interruption... and further, it lends 
itself admirably to the compiling of full and orderly port- 
folios for presentation." (p.189; italics mine). 
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the criterion will be that of accuracy in representation, 
based on perception of the following characteristics: - 
(1) Perception of the particular object or objects 
as distinguished from other similar objects. 
(2) perception of the position of the object in rela- 
tion to the observer and to other objects coming 
within the particular field of observation. 
(3) Perception of the precise character of the object 
or objects in respect of all these qualities 
(colour, texture, etc.) which distinguish it (or 
them) from other similar objects. 
First, the lowest grade: those whose representations 
are so inferior as to render (1) and (2) impossible or ex- 
tremely doubtful, and (3) definitely impossible. Second, 
the middle grade: those whose representations are suffici- 
ently accurate as to render (1) quite certain, but (2) and 
(3) doubtful. This will be the largest group. Third, 
the highest grade: those whose representations are more 
or less accurate in respect of all three characteristics. 
As a certain amount of overlap is inevitable, these groups 
will not, in practice, be clearly defined; but for present 
purposes the three groups may be taken as corresponding to 
the more general classification of poor drawers, average 
drawers, and superior drawers. 
(b) It is self- evident that of the total number of 
pupils receiving training in representational drawing the 
ability of those in the lowest grade will not improve to any 
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considerable extent by continued instruction and practice, 
and that their drawings will have no practical value as 
representations of physical facts. With regard to the 
second grade, this group will be educable only up to the 
standard attained by the "average pupil," whose drawings 
are neither accurate enough to be of any practical value 
as representations, nor poor enough to be wholly devoid of 
representational value. But if, as I have submitted, re- 
presentational drawing is fundamentally a scientific activ- 
ity, it is obvious that there is not justification for the 
teaching of representational drawing to pupils whose pro- 
ductions fail to satisfy the practical test of scientific 
accuracy. .1..nd with regard to the third grade, the superior 
drawers, it may be pointed out that the only result to be 
gained by continued training in representational drawing 
will be more accurate representations. 
(c) In his presidential address at the Conference of 
Educational kssociations, Sir William Rothenstein said that 
"we are all equipped by nature to go as far as possible in 
(1) This is not to deny that some improvement in technical 
skill may be produced by special training designed to 
remedy specific partial disabilities (for instance, dis- 
abilities affecting the motor -graphic or optical- perceptual 
processes,) which may interfere with drawing ability; but, 
as the application of therapeutic methods lies outside the 
orbit of ordinary school work, the statement (and the one 
which follows it) may stand unchallenged. 
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some practical direction," and that he was doubtful "of the 
value of making all children draw or learn music. "(1) hs 
Sir William is a teacher of long and wide experience, his 
statement cannot be brushed lightly aside. For clearly a 
scheme of education which ignores the existence of a rela- 
tively uneducable class of executants, by insisting on 
making its members try to do something which, in virtue of 
the limitations of their natural endowment, they are un- 
fitted, is wasteful and badly- founded. Indiscriminate 
insistence on executive work of a representational kind 
instils in many pupils a prejudice against art, which only 
a particularly happy set of circumstances can eradicate. 
VII. The Psychology of the Drawing het: ryerTs analysis. 
dyer has pointed out") that "the complete act of 
drawing is composed of two major processes which are quite 
distinct. It consists of an optical -perceptual process 
and a motor- graphic part, each of which is composed of sub- 
ordinate partial processes. In the optical- perceptual 
process the eye receives the sensory stimuli from the object 
in view, and the mind assimilates the perceived impression 
on the basis of previously acquired experience with sensory 
(1) 
Times Educational Supplement, January 9th, 1932. 
(2) ayer, The Psychology of Drawing, p.87. 
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material. In the motor -graphic process the hand is set 
in motion to reproduce the perceived and more or less 
worked -over image of the original object.'" Analysing the 
optical- perceptual part of the drawing activity, Ayer dis- 
tinguishes the following characteristics: (1) The purely 
optical process; (2) the sensational process; (3) the 
awakening of percepts which tend to be present and apper- 
ception; (4) assimilation; (5) secondary reproduction of 
earlier associations; and (6) preconceived observation. 
Three main characteristics are recognised in the motor - 
graphic part: (1) Drawing by optical image; (2) kinaesthet- 
ic control; (3) control by watching results. Ayer bases 
his observations on the experiments of Albein,(1) who em- 
phasises the fact "that the preceding optical -perceptual 
process of drawing varies individually in its composition, 
its components and the significance for the whole process "(2) 
- a fact which explains in part individual variations in 
drawing ability. Accuracy in executive ability, therefore, 
may depend upon very varied factors. A child, for instance, 
whose optical -perceptual processes are highly developed 
(1)Albein, Behalten und Wiedergabe einfacher Formen, 1907. 
(2)Ayer, The Psychology of Drawing, p.90. 
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might be a bad executant as a result of defects in his 
motor -graphic processes, and vice- versa.(1) 
VIII. Recent Experimental Research. 
(a) Recent experimental research into the psychology 
of perception by Dr. Thouless,' of Glasgow University, brings 
new evidence bearing on this point, which is of the very 
utmost significance. Dr. Thouless states: "If a subject 
is shown an inclined circle and is asked to select from a 
number of figures the one which represents the shape seen 
by him, he chooses without hesitation an ellipse. This 
ellipse, however, is widely different from the one which 
represents the shape of the inclined circle indicated by 
the laws of perspective, being much nearer the circular 
form. The subject sees an inclined figure neither in its 
'real' shape nor in the shape which is its perspective pro- 
jection, but a compromise between these. "(2j Clearly to 
understand his experiments, it will be necessary to define 
Thouless's terms. By "real" shape he means "true physical 
shape;" "perspective shape" means the shape of the object 
(1) Meumann (Experimentelle Pädagogik) draws attention to 
the interesting fact that he found subjects possessed of 
excellent visual acuity and manual dexterity who could not 
draw. 
(2) Thouless, R. H., "Phenomenal Regression to the Real 
Object," British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXI, p.339. 
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in accordance with the laws of perspective; and "phenomenal 
shape" means the actually seen shape of the object. Thou- 
less has been able to show by experiment that phenomenal 
regression applies to the perception of shape, parallel 
line, brightness, hue and size. "Under ordinary conditions 
of binocular vision, the actually experienced character of 
the object (or the 'phenomenal character') is a compromise 
between the 'real' character of the object and the character 
given by peripheral stimulation, whether this character is 
shape, relative size or relative brightness. In all these 
cases the phenomenal character shows a tendency away from 
the stimulus character towards the 'real' character of the 
object. As a general name for this tendency, in whatever 
Kind of perceptual character it is found, we may use the 
term phenomenal regression to the 'real' object, or, more 
shortly, phenomenal regression." 
Now, as the degree of phenomenal regression varies 
from one individual to another, it is obvious that a drawing 
which appears correct to one person may appear quite wrong 
to another. A pupil with a high index of phenomenal re- 
gression will draw a foreshortened circle (for example, a 
plate) much nearer the circular form than a pupil whose 
index is lower; and, it is important to notice, both indices 
may differ from that of the teacher. 
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(b) The laws of perspective, it may be noted, are not 
laws of the ways we 'see.' Clearly, then, the usual de- 
vices adopted in teaching children to draw foreshortened 
figures not only do not teach them to draw what they see, 
but actually teach them to draw what, in all probability, 
they do not see. By employing such methods the child's 
drawing is "reconditioned to the stimulus object (perspect- 
ive shape)(1) instead of the phenomenal object," which is 
the object he actually sees. From the point of view of 
art education the significance of the discovery of phenom- 
enal regression cannot be over -estimated. Dr. Thouless 
himself appears to take an altogether too moderate view of 
the importance of his researches for art teaching.(Z) "On 
the whole," he states, there is probably sufficient ground 
for justifying the teaching of strict laws of perspective 
to those learning to draw. A simple set of rules is better 
than a complicated one. Moreover, the uncorrected tendency 
is to draw the phenomenal figure which is at the opposite 
extreme of error (if the object is realistic representation), 
,, and the combined effect of the uncorrected tendency and the 
learning of strict perspective rules may well result in a 
(1) The brackets are mine. 
(2) T'houless, R. H., "Phenomenal Regression to the Real 
Object, II," British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXII, p.28. 
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practically satisfactory compromise. "(l) nut, in point of 
fact, the teaching of perspective rules, at all events to 
school children, is probably not undertaken even by the 
most ardent advocates of representational drawing. The 
commonest method adopted is that of teaching the children 
to make measurements by holding the pencil or ruler out at 
arm's length and other similar devices, but the pupils are 
exhorted to draw what they see.(2) áctually, however, the 
method is only of very limited practical value, because 
precise measurements are difficult to make by these means 
(the younger the child the greater the difficulty), with the 
result that in the long run the child trusts to his percep- 
tions. Moreover, if we assume that the child does make 
accurate measurements and applies them to his drawing, the 
result may not look right to him, and if his index of pheno- 
menal regression is very high, it will look all wrong. 
The psychological importance of this cannot be over- emphas- 
ised, because the first thing the teacher must do is to lead 
the child to have confidence in himself and to believe in 
the rightness of his own efforts. Confusion will baffle 
him and engender diffidence and probably lead to strained 
(1) 
Ibid., p.29. 
(2) Handbook of Suggestions for Teachers, pp.298 -300. 
Sections 35 and 36. 
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relations with the misunderstanding teacher. 
IX. Summary and Conclusion. 
(1) The aim of art education is twofold: to develop 
the means of expression by executive training and to stimu- 
late the growth of such sympathy and sensitiveness as may 
lead to the appreciation of art. 
(2) In the past the executive, as distinct from the 
receptive aspect of art education, has predominated. This 
may be attributed partly to the original utilitarian purpose 
of 'art' education and partly to the failure of education- 
ists to observe the distinction between the productive and 
the receptive aspects of the artistic activity. 
(3) Despite the growth of knowledge concerning the 
nature of the art activity, representational drawing (the 
act of reproducing as accurately as possible on paper or 
canvas the supposed appearance of things as observed from 
a particular point of view) occupies the principal place 
in the present practice of art education. 
(4) Three main assumptions underlie present practice: 
(a) That all children are educable as graphic executants, 
and that this is desirable; (b) that representational 
drawing supplies the technical skill necessary for complete 
artistic expression; (c) that technical knowledge and 
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practical experience are necessary for complete apprecia- 
tion of art. 
(5) These assumptions do not appear to be justified. 
The principal objections are: first, with regard to (a), 
only a comparatively small number of pupils attain the 
standard of accuracy aimed at, and few are by natural en- 
dowment equipped with special graphic ability; second, with 
regard to (b), representational drawing develops a type of 
skill that is altogether different from that required in 
art; and third, with regard to (c), apart from the ambi- 
guity of the term appreciation, there is no evidence to 
support the assumption. 
(6) From the point of view of art education there 
appears to be no justification for the teaching of repres- 
entational drawing. Based upon skill of hand and scientif- 
ic observation, it is fundamentally not an artistic but a 
scientific activity. Literal accuracy can only be secured 
by scientifically analysing the visible appearance of things. 
As such a process is incompatible with artistic expression, 
representational drawing cannot be regarded as an exercise 
of the artistic mental power. The exercise of this power 
is considered fundamental to art education. 
(7) The present insistence upon graphic execution tends 
to obscure the true aesthetic and educational significance 
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of craftwork and the importance and value of promoting the 
development of appreciation by means other than practical 
training. 
(8) These considerations point to the need for a new 
theory of art education and a new orientation of teaching 
method, that will pay'greater regard to (a) the artistic 
and educational values of craftwork, and (b) the purely 
appreciative aspect of the artistic mental power. 
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